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Abstract
We investigate the effectiveness of strategic alternatives that are designed to dampen the
cyclicality manifest in the commercial aviation (CA)-related industries. In this research we
introduce the conceptual framework of Enterprise of Enterprises (EoE) as an extension and
special case of a System of Systems, to facilitate the design of strategic alternatives in an
enterprise ecosystem characterized by loosely coupled enterprises. The constituent enterprises in
an EoE exhibit managerial and operational independence and have diverse value functions that
are often viewed by the enterprises as zero-sum games.
We argue that this may not always be the case; for example, in the CA EoE both airline and
airframe manufacturers constituents would benefit from a steadier influx of aircraft that counters
the current situation that is characterized by relatively stable demand growth rate for air travel
while airline profitability and aircraft ordering fluctuate intensely. A strategic alternative geared
towards this EoE-wide desired state is "symbiotic".
In order to identify such strategies, we use the EoE framework to analyze the CA-related
industries and to specify their local value functions and the salient interfaces among them based
on an extensive review of the literature on commercial aviation. We develop working hypotheses
about the driving mechanisms of the cycle in the CA EoE informed by the literature on economy-
wide and supply chain cyclicality. To test these hypotheses, we extend a system dynamics model
of commercial aviation.
After testing several individual strategic alternatives, we find that capacity management is key to
cycle moderation. We then compare two diverse, non-collusive ways for capacity management:
faster aircraft deliveries and semi-fixed production schedules generated by long-term forecasts.
While both are promising, only the latter alternative is shown to be Pareto optimal. We also
examine the potential synergistic effects from combining more than one strategic alternatives for
which we also discuss implementation implications.
The EoE framework and some of our findings can be applicable and generalizable to other
industries facing intense cyclical behavior.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Enterprises do not operate in a vacuum. The actions of enterprises impact the industries
they are in and the industries related to their value chain. This interdependence is not
confined to pricing but extends to longer term strategic decisions. In some cases
information about the competitor actions is only inferred and far from perfect, but even in
cases where available information is adequate the decisions made do not necessarily align
with a rational expectations framework as they are influenced by intuition, strategic
gaming, and human psychology. In other words, all the central assumptions of the perfect
market theory are challenged in varying degrees for large enterprise systems.
The airline industry and the air transportation value chain is no exception. The
interdependence and strategic interactions between the enterprises active in this system
combined with delays of varying length between an action and its consequences create a
volatile environment which is characterized by cyclicality' evident in profitability,
employment, capacity growth rates, order rates, utilization and other enterprise metrics
across the echelons of the value chain.
When an entire industry or the economy as a whole enters a protracted recession period
with operating losses, this is an indicator of economic inefficiencies and societal
problems. Economic inefficiencies stem from misallocation of capital and overinvestment
while societal problems arise from painful employment adjustments that range from
income cutbacks to job losses and overall insecurity. These non-seasonal oscillations are
not confined to air transportation but they have been identified in diverse industries and
the economy as a whole and they are generally referred to as business cycles.
Not all industries exhibit cycles of the same intensity. Some manage to dampen the cycle
and stabilize while for others there is a persistent low intensity cycle. Unlike them, the
industries connected to air transportation have exhibited intensifying cycles of increasing
amplitude and severity. This dissertation aims to (i) examine and understand the driving
mechanisms of the business cycles in commercial aviation (CA), (ii) demonstrate that
these cycles are costly, and (iii) identify the driving mechanisms for their generation and
ways - strategic alternatives - to dampen these cycles.
In this introductory chapter we discuss our motivation for undertaking this study. Next
we define testable hypotheses that direct our effort and discuss the methodological
approach that we followed. Finally, we trace the structure of the dissertation summarizing
the key points of each chapter.
These non-seasonal oscillations do not exhibit a precise period and therefore the term cycle is not applied
precisely when used to describe them. Nevertheless the term business cycle has prevailed in common
usage.
1.1 Background and Motivation
A report commissioned by the Air Transport Association estimated that commercial
aviation generated almost 6% of the US gross economic output including direct, indirect,
and induced economic activity and employed about 8.8% of the total U.S. active
workforce. Figure 1-1 provides a more detailed snapshot of the scale of operations for
commercial aviation. Not only is its size substantial, but also the rate of its growth has
been outpacing average economic growth rate significantly.
Engine manufacturers, 1" tier
sub-system contractors: -20
Airframe manufacturers: 2+
Major Airlines: -500
Direct O-D Markets: -40.000
Figure 1-1 Relative Economic Output and Employment for the U.S. and Global Commercial Aviation(Data Sources: (CAMPBELL 2006) and author calculations)
Air transportation relies on the existence of large-scale infrastructure (e.g. airports,
airport access connectors, air traffic control system) and the manufacturing and operation
of large numbers of complex technical artifacts (the modem commercial jetliners). In
order for this level of technical complexity to be gainfully and safely constructed,
manufactured, deployed, and operated, large-scale organizational capabilities are
required.
From a high level view, commercial aviation can be considered as a value chain that
involves operation of aircraft, ownership and maintenance of aircraft, and aircraft
production. While each of these activities can be broken down into a large number of
smaller value-adding activities, this view serves for delineating the boundaries of the
enterprises involved as shown in Figure 1-2.
*~~...~~
~s
SPassengers: ~0.8 Billion
U.S. Data (Source: Campbell) Global Data (extrapolation)
Direct Employees ('000) Direct Employees ('000)
Output in $B Output in $B
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CommercialC 75 241 
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-640Aircraft manufacturing
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Figure 1-2 High level view of the commercial aviation value chain and the enterprise types involved
As mentioned previously, the commercial aviation enterprise has exhibited a tendency to
oscillate. While the demand growth rate has been tracking and reacting to the global
economic conditions (tight correlation with global gross domestic product (GDP) as
shown in Fig. 1-3a), the net profitability of the global airline industry has been oscillating
with increasing amplitude both in real and nominal terms (Fig. 1-3b). These oscillations
in profitability of airlines are transmitted upstream in the value chain as the orders
placed for new aircraft are highly correlated to profitability fluctuations (Fig. 1-3c).
Conventional wisdom attributes the cyclical behavior to factors as external to the
commercial aviation enterprise. In reality, as we discuss in Chapters 6-8 and 10, the
industry structure is a strong factor that endogenously can create and amplify cycles by
the collective reactions of the individual enterprises. Given the different types of
stakeholders involved and their numbers collective action to mitigate the cycles would
pose significant coordination problems that have proven seemingly insurmountable for
the past three decades.
Cyclical behavior in the airline industry has been identified by Jiang and Hansman (2004)
and Weil (1996) among others. Similar instabilities of varying degree have been observed
in shipping Dikos (2004), telecommunications, oil refineries (Weil and Stoughton 1998),
and other industrial markets.
In a manifestation of the 'bullwhip effect' observed in supply chains, the cyclical
instability faced by airlines increases the severity of variation in the demand that is faced
by the airframe manufacturers. While the cycle can be observed ipso facto, attempts to
predict it are faced with significant uncertainty and high stakes since erroneous forecasts
may result at the very least in loss of ground to competitors. Given the unpredictability
and high stakes, cyclical instabilities are associated with concomitant costs.
Figure 1-3 Evidence of cyclicality in demand growth rates (a), net real and nominal profitability (b),
and aircraft order rates (c) (for sources and additional discussion see Ch. 3)
For the private sector, highly cyclical profitability has implications that range from
liquidity constraints to vulnerabilities to bankruptcy, hostile take-over, or market-share
loss. Attempts to adjust by following the cycle involve capacity adjustments through
employee hire/fire cycles which in turn can result in loss of tacit knowledge
('institutional forgetting') and management-labor tensions. On the positive extreme of the
cycle, implications include unsustainable growth, upward creeping unit costs,
overestimation of future capacity requirements, and spurring a wave of new entrants. The
society at large is also affected due to labor distress, tax payer assumption of defaults,
and a general sub-optimal use of resources.
1.2 Thesis Objective and Research Questions
The contemporary commercial aviation industry seems bound to the 'paradox' described
summarily above: it is comprised of a set of industries with a relatively small number of
constituent enterprises that individually have the ability to make carefully scrutinized
strategic decisions and yet they collectively create an unstable oscillatory environment.
Given the perceived negative implications of these cycles for commercial aviation, this
work was designed to investigate the existence, severity, and root causal mechanisms of
the cycles that seem to dominate the commercial aviation enterprise and identify
strategies - we call these "bundles of strategic alternatives" - that could lead,
cooperatively if need be, to a more stable and profitable business environment for the
enterprises involved and ideally a better quality of service for the end consumer.
The above objectives can be articulated in the form of the following research questions:
Q1. How is cyclicality manifested in commercial aviation? What are the impacts from
cyclicalify in commercial aviation?
Q2.What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the cyclical behavior in
commercial aviation?
Q3.What are implementable strategic alternatives for dampening that cyclicality and
what are their benefits?
If stated in the form of hypotheses they could be phrased as following:
H1. Cyclicality characterizes the Commercial Aviation EoE.
H2. Cyclicality is costly to the industries involved and society at large.
H3. There are identifiable and feasible strategies that can dampen the cycles in a
long-term Pareto-efficient manner.
As part of H3, we examine a hypothesis proposed by Womack and Jones (Womack and
Jones 1996). They anticipate dampening of the business cycle in a given industry by
widespread adoption of a management practice known as lean production. Focusing on
just-in-time (JIT) satisfaction of demand across all echelons of a supply chain they
suggest would be a sufficient dampener and no additional coordinated action of the
stakeholders should be needed.
1.3 Methodological approach
The methodology that we followed to investigate our hypotheses centered on three
iterative and interdependent approaches:
1. Qualitative understanding
2. Framework-based analysis
3. Quantitative modeling and experimental testing
Qualitative understanding was pursued by study of the available literature. We focused
on the commercial aviation enterprise looking especially into the interfaces between the
echelons of the CA value chain. In addition to this we reviewed the literature related to
business cycles in this and other industries and their supply chain counterpart (the
'bullwhip effect').
Framework-based Analysis
In order to better structure and use the knowledge gained from reviewing the literature
and also to define the type of systems problem that we are addressing, we developed the
concept of 'Enterprise of Enterprises' (EoE). The implication is that the amalgamation
of enterprises comprising commercial aviation can be described as an enterprise but one
with loosely coupled constituents that are enterprises in and of themselves. EoE extends
the system-of-systems (SoS) concept and modifies the architecting heuristics developed
for SoS to be applicable in the EoE context.
Defining our system at hand using the EoE concept helps in structuring the available
information on commercial aviation and in distilling the interactions that appear to be the
most promising candidate mechanisms for dampening the CA EoE cyclicality. Thus we
identify the leverage points available for a possible re-architecture and the stakeholders
that have both the interest and the capacity to pursue such change.
Quantitative Analysis
Direct experimentation on the CA EoE is, of course, not a feasible proposition and no
known 'natural' experiments were extensive enough as to provide solid confirmation of
the causal mechanisms of the cycles identified using the analysis above. As a result, in
order to verify the effectiveness of strategic alternatives that aim to change the identified
leverage points and quantify their actual impact in such a way as to make comparisons
between alternatives possible, a quantitative model was necessary.
Business cycles have been studied primarily on an economy-wide level and more
narrowly under the guise of the 'bullwhip effect' on a supply chain basis. The tools
developed for the high level analysis include econometric regression analysis for testing
hypotheses against data time series and theoretical general equilibrium macroeconomic
models. These instruments were too broad for dynamically testing strategic alternatives
followed by only a subset of the stakeholders in a system that changes dynamically. In
the 'bullwhip effect' literature the system dynamics (SD) methodology had been applied
to model cyclical behavior in a supply chain system. Furthermore, the CA EoE itself had
been modeled on different levels of analysis using SD as well. In addition to these
favorable points, SD is a flexible modeling tool and has the ability to model individual
agent-behavior which was a desirable characteristic for our multi-stakeholder system.
Given the advantages outlined above, we developed a system dynamics model of the CA
EoE that expanded on a previously published system dynamics model by Weil (1996).
After extensive calibration and validation testing using historical data, we conducted a
number of experiments using the SD model to test the modeled behavior of the CA EoE
under different strategic alternatives and across a set of three future scenarios. This effort
allowed us to rank the causal mechanisms of cyclicality in the CA EoE based on their
relative impact by testing the related strategic alternatives. The ability to implement the
most promising strategic alternatives was discussed using the EoE framework.
1.4 Dissertation structure overview
The sequence in the methodological approach as outlined above is reflected in the
structure of the dissertation. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 we present the key characteristics of
the echelons of the commercial aviation value chain starting from demand generation
from passengers and freight shippers and moving progressively upstream to airlines and
aircraft manufacturers. The way that cyclicality is manifested and how it affects each
echelon is discussed in parallel. Chapter 5 introduces the concept of Enterprises of
Enterprises and applies it to commercial aviation (CA EoE). Chapter 6 reviews the
literature on business cycles in economy-wide and supply chain-specific settings. Chapter
7 applies the themes and mechanisms of cycles, as identified in Chapter 6, to the CA EoE
and proposes stakeholder-specific sets of strategic alternatives for dampening the CA
EoE cyclicality. Moving towards experimental testing of these alternatives, Chapter 8
reviews the methodologies that have been used for enterprise modeling and may be
applicable for our purposes, discusses their comparative advantages and disadvantages,
and identifies the reasons that qualify system dynamics as more appropriate. Chapter 9
describes the SD model of the CA EoE in detail and presents the verification and
validation process that we followed. In Chapter 10, we execute experimental comparisons
using the SD model to identify the salient mechanisms of cyclicality in the CA EoE and
test the effectiveness of relevant strategic alternatives (as outlined in Chapter 7). The
implementability of these alternatives is also discussed and recommendations are made
based on our findings. Finally, Chapter 11 summarizes the findings and conclusions and
indicates directions for further research to supplement our findings.
Chapters 2-4 are intended to have a dual role in the dissertation: on one hand they
introduce the basics and the nuances of the key commercial aviation stakeholders and
what cyclicality means to them, and on the other hand these chapters form the
knowledge-base on which the CA EoE representation and the SD model rest.
With this in mind, in Chapter 2 we introduce how demand for air transportation is
formed, how is it measured, the different types of consumers (passengers and shippers),
how they can be represented with different elasticities of demand, and what are the key
attributes that make air transportation appealing to consumers (passengers and shippers)
compared to competing modes. We look at how demand for air transportation evolved
over time, globally and in different regional markets. Finally, we note that given the
nature of travel (i.e. meeting the need to transfer from a given origin to a given
destination or O-D pair) competition in transportation always boils down to the ability to
service this O-D market and therefore (as we discuss further in Ch. 3 on contestability)
measures of nation-wide industry concentration are less accurate predictors of
competition that in non-transport industries.
Along the same lines, Chapter 3 focuses on airlines; their fundamental operations,
performance metrics, cost and revenue structures. The important for airline competition
concept of yield management is introduced along with the strategic choices airlines face
in network planning and fleet composition. The different types of airlines are introduced
with attention paid to the relative differences in the business models between incumbent
legacy carriers (including new full-service carriers) and the low-cost carriers (LCCs) that
in deregulated markets increasingly gain market share. Alliances, legacy carrier
restructuring, and the realities of network economies that precludes dominance of the
point-to-point network structure (favored by LCCs) indicate that in the near future, airline
business structure would not be dominated by LCCs. They should be expected to gain in
market share but the dominant force would likely be consolidated alliances. In discussing
the impact of cyclicality we conclude that if pure economic measures are used, airlines
would not have added value to their investors (practically zero real return) which is an
absurd state. Airlines did add enormous value to the global economy but have not been
rewarded for that contribution due to the cyclical characteristic of their industry. We also
note the observation by Jiang and Hansman (2004) that the oscillations in that cycle have
been amplifying after deregulation.
Chapter 4 is the final chapter in the industry background sequence. It reviews how the
modem duopoly market for large commercial aircraft (LCA) dominated entirely by
Boeing, a U.S. based manufacturer with a history going back to the beginning of air
transportation, and Airbus, a European consortium with an unlikely collaborative
structure. We discuss Airbus's ascent and how it managed to overcome advantages held
by the dominant manufacturer. Advantages that are particularly strong in aircraft
manufacturing include economies of scale and scope, steep learning curves, and vendor
lock-in effects. Because of these, airframe manufacturers have an incentive to inflate their
order book and thus gain an edge over the competitor even if that means that they are
accepting increasing shares of the aircraft ownership risks.
Strong collaboration in the extended enterprise, including suppliers, labor, government,
and capital markets provides an advantage in increasing and retaining market share in this
competitive, duopolistic market. As the aircraft performance envelope is pushed the
financing requirements and risk involved in launching a new product line increase,
making the aforementioned collaboration all the more critical. Airframe manufacturers
are particularly affected by cyclicality in the airline industry as they receive orders with
an amplified variation and correlated to airline profitability, in a phenomenon that
approximates closely the bullwhip effect discussed in Ch. 6. They react by changing their
production rates with corresponding impacts on their employees and their position on the
learning curve.
Having presented the characteristics of the commercial aviation-related industries in
some detail, in Chapter 5 we aim to integrate and organize this information into a
coherent framework. Since the base component at this level of analysis is the enterprise,
one section of Chapter 5 reviews the literature on the phenomenology of the enterprise as
a complex system; i.e. ways to represent and interpret the actions and observed behavior
of enterprises. Another section of Ch. 5 explores the concept of loosely-coupled system-
of-systems (SoS) and the parallels with the system at hand. This leads to the introduction
of the Enterprise of Enterprises (EoE) concept as a specific case of SoS. Commercial
aviation is presented as an Enterprise of Enterprises (CA EoE) by identifying the local
value functions of the constituents, the global value function of the EoE, and the major
interfaces among the constituents. Based on the understanding of the value functions and
potential influence over the system by the different constituents, we conclude that
airframe manufacturers given the consolidation of their industry and direct influence over
capacity are the prime candidates to affect system-wide change. Airline alliances, capital
markets in the form of "universal owners" and labor unions in both industries have the
incentive but less of a potential to stabilize the CA EoE. We note the similarity of the CA
EoE short-term equilibria with the "prisoner's dilemma" game in which a collaborative
outcome is more efficient but the incentive structure is lacking to promote it.
Chapter 6 looks closely into the business cycle literature in order to find the dominant
explanations for such behavior in other industries. Not unexpectedly, the field proved to
be rich with references dating back to the beginning of free markets. Industrial cycles in
the economic literature have been identified in several industries with maritime shipping
being a prominent one. While the period of these cycles could be longer than five years,
the supply chain-specific literature noted early on that a very similar phenomenon can be
found on the micro level in supply chains with periods that can be as short as weeks. The
causal mechanisms and defining characteristic of industries that are prone to the cycle are
summarized below2:
Triggers.
* Macroeconomic cycle.
* Final demand and Input variability.
Psychological Factors.
* Bounded rationality.
* Supply chain discounting. Underweighting of existing backlog.
* Investment exuberance and strategic optimism.
Industry Structure. These are endogenous characteristics of the supply chain that
promote cyclicality or bullwhip volatility.
* Imperfect financing and capital market volatility.
* Investment irreversibility and intertemporal substitution.
* Underutilized capacity and labor 'hoarding'.
* Inventories.
* Technological change.
* Low barriers to entry, high barriers to exit.
Supply chain characteristics. Imprecise forecasting and planning due to
* lack of transparency of downstream demand
* Order batching
* Order gaming due to constrained supply
* Price fluctuations (promotions, bulk discounts)
* Strong seasonality or network effects
* Multiple supply chain echelons
Interestingly, empirical evidence suggests that even in the absence of most of the
procyclical factors, 'bullwhip' behaviors can still be observed Croson, Donohue et al.
(2004).
2 Detailed explanations for these are given in Section 6-4.
Using this list of potential causes of the business cycle, in the first part of Chapter 7 we
piece together a narrative description of the different mechanisms with which the CA
EoE can generate and amplify cyclical behavior. The transition from a regulated to a
deregulated environment is shown to be important but not necessary in producing cyclical
behavior. This narrative is then codified into specific stakeholder actions as cycle-
inducing mechanisms. Based on these observations, strategic alternatives that target these
behaviors are generated in the last part of Chapter 7. The intent of investigating these
strategies is to promote "symbiosis." We define symbiotic strategy as an action taken by
one or more EoE constituents that improves aggregate EoE system performance over a
long-term horizon. Ideally, this action is Pareto efficient and not detrimental to the short-
term interests of the actor(s) but not necessarily so.
A sample of such strategies identified for the CA EoE is given below3 :
* Supply chain visibility
* Information sharing
* Uncertainty management
* Lead time reductions
* Output stabilization
* Capacity constraining
* Price stabilization (demand management)
* Technical/operational product improvements
* Extensive use of leasing (for capacity flexibility)
* Off-cyclical behavior (buy low, sell high)
* Capacity constraining
* Less aggressive revenue management
* Mergers
* Subsidies / long-term financing
* Total subsidy withdrawal
* Re-regulation (price or market capping)
Having analyzed CA EoE in qualitative perspectives, we need to test our hypothesis with
regard to the effectiveness of these strategic alternatives. As direct experimentation is
prohibitive and our mental models could not fully anticipate the impacts of the strategies
on the various stakeholders and their corresponding reactions, quantitative modeling was
deemed necessary. In Chapter 8 we review the different methods available for modeling
enterprise systems and their strengths and weaknesses. Extensive mention is given to
previous efforts to model the parts or the whole of the CA EoE. After examination of
modeling methods, we note that qualitative analysis that makes use of mental models is a
necessary step in the application of quantitative methods. We conclude that the desired
model for our purposes is to create a system dynamics model that allows for agent
differentiation and is supported, where necessary, by application of econometrics and
game theory.
3 The constituent enterprises that can upon these strategies and more details about them are given in
Chapter 7.
In Chapter 9 we present the basic structure of the system dynamics CA EoE model that
we built to perform quantitative experimentation. The calibration, verification, and
validation techniques that were employed to ensure that the model is a useful simulation
of reality for our purposes are also described.
Finally, in Chapter 10 the SD model of the CA EoE is used to test the different proposed
causal mechanisms of the cycles and their corresponding strategic alternatives. The
model simulated a period of 40 years, starting in 1984 and extending 17 years into the
future. In order to take different possible futures into account, three scenarios were used
that were developed based on plausible alternate hypotheses that echoed similar exercises
found in the literature. Based on these experiments we confirm our hypothesis that
exogenous factors contribute only to a limited degree in the generation and propagation
of cycles in the CA EoE and that endogenous mechanisms are critical. We find that
among the endogenous mechanisms, correcting for the apparent collective disregard by
airlines of the industry-wide aircraft backlog when ordering has the greatest impact on
reducing the cycles. The other mechanism that has similar impact requires the reversal of
the effects of deregulation in the competitive environment. Given that the latter option is
unpalatable because it would relieve any competitive pressures on operating costs and is
also politically infeasible, we focus our attention on the former and develop a composite
strategy that would not require collusive behavior between manufacturers but would
require a paradigm shifting move of one manufacturer to becoming an on-demand aircraft
service provider thus optimizing over the aircraft's operational lifecycle. Such a change is
neither easy nor intuitive and how it may be played out is extensively discussed.
Chapter 11 is the concluding chapter where we summarize our key findings and discuss
how future research can build off from this work.
We now begin our journey with Chapter 2 where we discuss the primary reason for the
existence of the CA EoE: the generation and characteristics of demand for air
transportation.
Chapter 2 Demand for Air Travel: Drivers of Growth
In order to satisfy our objective as stated in Chapter 1, that is to specify the causes and
propose strategies that could dampen the boom-bust cycle in the commercial aviation
industries, it is necessary to acquire a solid understanding of the details in the industries
involved. We start the journey of understanding commercial aviation starting with their
raison d'dtre: satisfying the demand for air travel. Commercial aviation exists first and
foremost to provide reliable, safe, and affordable travel and shipping options to
passengers and shippers. Could the volatility in airline profitability as shown in Figure
1-1 have its root cause in volatile demand?
Airlines and airframe manufacturers interact in balancing the demand for air
transportation services with the availability of supply and the effects of macroeconomic
factors. While this is a basic economic function, the markets involved are usually far
from perfect.
In this chapter we review what drives the global demand for air travel and how passenger
and freight preferences influence the strategies of the providers (Airlines in Chapter 3 and
aircraft manufacturers in Chapter 4) and vice versa. We examine the needs that air
transportation satisfies in Section 2.1. These needs are diverse and so is the expected
utility from air transportation exhibited by different customer segments. We break down
the different types of customers that use air travel and the resulting markets in Section
2.2. Finally, in Section 2.3 we discuss modal competition, review the historic growth
trends of air travel, and generate some plausible scenarios of its future potential.
2.1 Valuing Air Transportation.
2.1.1 Human Needs and Air Transportation as a Derived Demand
Maslow (1954) categorized human needs into a hierarchy of four fundamental sets:
1. Safety, security, and sustenance. ("These are the needs we have for food on
our tables, a roof over our heads, and clothing to protect us from weather
- the essentials of life."
2. Competence, efficacy, and self-esteem: To satisfy these needs we must "be
capable of doing what we set out to do and of obtaining the things we
value."
3. Connectedness: Humans have a strong desire to be intimate and close to
others. "We need to feel that we belong and are connected with others'
lives, be it as parents, friends, neighbors, or coworkers."
4. Autonomy and authenticity: It is human nature to "constantly strive for
increased freedom and more opportunities to experience life in a self-
directed manner."
Hall and Sussman (2004) argued that consumption of goods and by implication freight
transportation is primarily driven by the first two sets of needs while the desire for
personal travel is driven by the two latter sets. With some exceptions (Mokhtarian and
Salomon 2001) that apply to general aviation but not as much to commercial aviation, the
demand for transport is a "derived demand" that is, it is generated as a direct or
indirect consequence of another economic activity. Furthermore, the demand for air
transport can be induced, which means that the existence of air connection between an
origin and a destination, creates additional demand than the demand measured before the
connection was established just because of the perceived qualities of air travel (e.g. ease,
speed, novelty, etc).
From the perspective of the needs hierarchy, passenger travel is a higher level need and
therefore it is expected to exhibit a higher degree of elasticity when lower level needs are
harder to meet. In other words, during economic slowdowns or recessions demand for air
travel is expected to be lower. Anecdotal evidence to this is given by Masashi Izumi, VP
at All Nippon Airways in 2003 who notes that "[e]specially during the [...] long
recession, [...] consumers have become very sensitive to price and now look for value in
purchasing their [...] services."4 Business travelers who are traditionally considered as
less price sensitive are not immune to this phenomenon; Taneja (2003) notes that "airline
passenger traffic, particularly the part relating to business, has become overly sensitive
to corporate profits."5
Similarly freight transportation by air, which as we discuss in Chapter 3 contributes
significantly in the revenues of civil aviation, should be also affected by macroeconomic
changes both because of a reduction in the demand for the high value, low volume (and
usually but not necessarily low weight) goods that are usually transported by air and of a
shift to cheaper albeit slower modes of transport.
It is implicit in the discussion above that the customers (passengers and shippers) value
certain aspects of air transportation differently. In the next section we explore the
distinguishing characteristics of air transportation products that will allow us to construct
the first link in the value delivery chain, as presented in Figure 1-2, and give us insights
on how to measure it.
2.1.2 Attributes of Value for the Air Transportation Product
Evaluations of transportation needs started with urban transportation; Zahavi (1981)
postulated that travelers make their decisions on their Travel Time Budget (TTB) and
Travel Money Budget (TMB). The first has been shown to be practically constant across
societies and the second is shown to be constant as a percentage of expenditure income
(Schafer and Victor 2000)(see pg. 175, Fig. 1 and pg. 177 Fig 3). This attribute of
constancy across societies provides a strong support that Zahavi's postulates are a valid
way for establishing the utility of a transport mode.
Building on this observation, the air transportation product is fundamentally simple: it
provides to consumers the ability to reach a desired destination from a given origin at a
4 Taneja 2003. pg. xvi.
5 Taneja 2003. pg. 12.
competitive combination of schedule, travel time, price, and comfort6. This view suggests
that there is a vector of four fundamental attributes that define value for air transport:
* Network coverage,
* Speed (total trip time), frequency, and reliability (including door-to-door access
and egress) as part of TTB,
* Fare (or tariff) as part of TMB, and
* Amenities and comfort (including connecting vs. direct flight)
Each consumer makes their choice on whether to travel or not and which mode to take
based on their available information on the alternatives and their relative balance placed
on the attributes of the offered products. The consumers' decision process can be graphed
onto a decision tree as shown in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1 A passenger choice decision-tree
6 In the text we refer to both passenger and freight transport. In some cases it is easier to refer to attributes
of the dominant passenger traffic that have their equivalent to air travel. In this case, for example, comfort
for a shipment would be on-line tracking or desired temperature and vibration environment. Similarly when
referred to fares the implied terminology for shipments is tariff
There are several approaches or theories of choice for understanding and predicting
consumer choices as summarized by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) 7. Each theory
requires the definition of (i) a decision maker, (ii) alternatives, (iii) their attributes, and
(iv) decision rules. The fundamental assumption is that consumers make an informed
choice based on the available alternative products for their desired purpose by comparing
their relative perceived value.
One way of deciding between the alternative choices is dominance: the alternative that is
perceived as equal or better for each identified attribute is the one chosen. While this is
straightforward and not controversial, in reality few are the cases where an alternative is
clearly dominant. To address this problem in a quantitative function the concept of scalar
utility was first introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953); that is the
assumption that the vector of attributes for any given alternative can be represented as a
scalar which can then be used to compare among alternatives. According to this view, the
maximization of the utility function is therefore the objective of rational consumers.
This allows the description of the utility function equation with variables that represent
the attributes of the decision maker and of each alternative. Some attributes for air travel
products were given in the opening paragraph of this section. The attributes of the
decision maker / passenger or shipper can include socio-economic factors like income
level, education, residency, age etc.
By estimating the parameters of a hypothesized regression equation based on an observed
dataset the researcher can then calculate the probability of a given alternative to be
chosen by a given individual and thus estimate the coefficients of the utility function
equation. While this approach is conveniently quantitative it can soon run into difficulties
in reconciling the differences across consumer preferences. Some studies for example
may indicate that consumers value the time spent for a commute positively which runs
counter to our rational expectations. In such cases the "errors" may be attributed to
unobserved attributes of the alternative, unobserved variations in the tastes and other
characteristics of the decision maker, imperfect information, or the use of inaccurate
proxy (instrumental) variables in place of the non-observable real attributes.
Another challenge to the validity of utility theory application was given by Simon (1982)
who cautioned that perfect rationality is not observed in practice given the limited
capacity of decision makers to retain and compare information even if complete
information was available, which of course is not the case in most real-world problems.
This obstacle was overcome by normative decision theory by assuming "consistent and
transitive preferences"8 for decision makers. That is by treating the decision maker as a
black box and thus avoiding dealing with the information processing part of choice
alltogether. For the scope of our research this assumption is acceptable when it comes to
7 Chapter 3, pg. 31-58.
8 Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1987), pg. 38. Consistent: under the same conditions, the choice of a decision
maker would not change. Transitivity: if choice A is preferable to B, and choice B preferable to C, then A
is preferable to C.
individual consumer choices but it will be challenged in Chapters 2 and 3 when the
discussion turns to the choices made by enterprises.
There are numerous studies that use utility theory to estimate consumer valuation of
certain attributes of air travel (for a recent example see Parker and Walker (2006)). Yet
given the scope of this dissertation, this level of analysis contains a large number of
details that are region or study specific. In order to describe and model the effect of
airline competition, or lack thereof, on aggregate demand for a number of markets we
need to focus on the distinguishing fundamental characteristics of a product that is
nearing commoditization (Weil 1996). This means that most categories of air travel
passengers are not interested on the aircraft brand or type as long as the industry standard
levels of safety and comfort are met, or as stated in an airline industry 'motto' "a seat is a
seat is a seat."
To capture this aggregate choice behavior, summing the probability of choices for a given
set of alternatives and estimated utility functions of all customers in a market should
provide the total demand. In a formula form if we define demand for services from a
provider i with competitors k in a given origin destination (O-D) market as a function of:
* customer attributes (C),
* demographic attributes of the region (D),
* product attributes (P), and
* time (t).
we should be able to establish an equation of total demand for air travel9.
Eq. 2-1 RPKi = f ( C, D, Pi, Pk, t)
Following traditional industrial economic analysis, airlines can affect the share of
demand, or market share, that they command for a given demand curve and their
profitability by adjusting the attributes of their products in view of the competitive
environment. The effects of similar scale adjustments can be captured by using empirical
demand curves.
The price quantity demand curve from classical economics is well known but similarly
constructed curves with service attributes like frequency or comfort can be used. In the
generic demand curve diagram shown in Figure 2-2, the curve can portray changes in
consumer behavior due to changes the price of a product (moving along the curve) or due
to changes in the attributes of the consumer (moving to a different curve). For air travel
shifts in the demand curve can occur due to macroeconomic effects (e.g. recessions) or
due to external shocks (e.g. pandemics).
The tangential line on any point of the demand curve provides a measure of the price
elasticity of the consumers at that point; if a percent change in price induces a greater
percent change in demand then demand is considered elastic.
9 Revenue Passenger Kilometers is a convenient measure of actualized demand for passenger air travel
demand. The equivalent metric for freight demand is Revenue Ton Kilometers (RTK). They are explained
further and presented in context in Chapter 3.
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Figure 2-2 Generic Demand Curve
Shifts in demand curves imply that the consumers with different sets of characteristics
behave differently with respect to the change in the price of the good. These changes,
though, can also occur with stable pricing precipitated by changing income levels or new
substitutes. To account for these effects empirical studies aim to define the "own-price"
elasticities of goods instead. Own price elasticity is estimated after controlling for all
other variables causing a shift in the demand function besides price.
The next section, explores the air transportation markets from the demand perspective on
different scales. The empirical findings on air travel elasticities are discussed in Section
2.2.5.
2.2 Market Level Perspectives in Air-transportation.
On a fundamental level all business functions exist because of their ability to efficiently
satisfy certain needs for their customers (individuals, other businesses, or departments
within the same organization). Even in monopolistic situations, a form of a market exists
that can be characterized as "a social arrangement that allows buyers and sellers to
discover information and carry out a voluntary exchange of goods or services." (Pindyck
and Rubinfeld 2000).
The air-transportation markets can be analyzed from multiple perspectives:
geographically, based on population characteristics, institutionally or based on the types
of services offered. The firms that provide these services use the characteristics of
consumers across the different market segments to differentiate their products or to set
pricing strategies. We will discuss the institutional and service aspects of markets in
Chapter 3 where the airline perspective is provided. In this section we review the
geographic and target population characteristics of markets for air travel.
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Geographically, we distinguish three levels of view:
* macro level: aggregate global demand,
* meso-level: aggregate regional demand in routes that share common institutional
and regulatory environments, and
* micro level: Origin-Destination (O-D) pair.
The scope of our study, understanding the cyclicality in the global civil aviation,
indicates that we consider mainly the market on the macro-level; the market for large
commercial aircraft (LCA), after all is a global market. Yet, the extent of differences on
the meso-level and the airline competitive game that is essentially framed primarily on
the micro-level compel us to analyze them individually.
2.2.1 Global Demand: the Macro-level
At the macro-level, the trends for passenger and cargo demand have been consistently
rising over the history of aviation as the global RPK figures, as shown in Figure 2-3.
While the rate of growth in RPK since the beginning of the century has slowed down it
still shows a respectable 6% growth per year on average over the past thirty years and has
been negative only two years (1991 and 2001) in the 75-year span of available historical
data. The growth in cargo transport (RTK) has been high with an average growth rate of
7% per year over the past 30 years.
This trend seemingly contradicts the assertion made in Section 2.11 of a causal
relationship between the growth in aggregate demand for passenger and cargo and the
growth of the economy as a whole. What is missing in this picture is the supply side: the
effort of air transport providers to meet the needs of their customers at lower real fares
and more importantly the ability to clear the market of a perishable product (the
scheduled seat) by using yield management (a set of complex pricing techniques briefly
reviewed in Section 3.2.2). Even after these counter-cyclical corrective actions there is
still a strong correlation between the growth rate of demand and the GDP rate as
discussed further in Chapter 3.
In any case, because transportation facilitates the satisfaction of fundamental needs, the
demand for it is unlikely to die out as long as no efficient alternative can be used. This is
especially true for air transportation as long as it still provides the fastest way for crossing
medium to very long distances over both land and sea.
Global Demand for Cargo Air Transprt (RTK)
ual Change Rate of Gobal Demand for Cargo Air Transport
Annual Change Fate of (lobel Demand for Cargo Air Transport
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
-0.10
Figure 2-3 Global Air-travel demand trends (Data source: ATA (2006))
2.2.2 Regional Variations: the Meso-level view
The aggregate graphs in Fig. 2-3 paint a positive picture despite the reductions in the
growth rates but they do not tell the whole story. Different regions show different
potential in growth and, even in high-growth regions, most airlines face significant
volatility in the demand for their services. In order to later transition to the causes of
cyclicality in the industry it is useful to review how this volatility is expressed on the
meso- and micro- levels of the market.
Demographic characteristics of regional markets
The "derived" property of demand for air transportation suggests that it is strongly
dependent on the economic activity levels present in the origin and destination of trips as
well as the condition of the entire regional economy. This correlation of air transportation
demand has been observed repeatedly, and on a global scale is shown in Figure 2-4. The
scatter plot on the bottom left of the figure shows that there is indeed a positive
correlation between the real (inflation adjusted) GDP growth rate and air travel demand
growth rate (correlation = 0.74) while this is not true for the airline profitability and GDP
(bottom right diagram and a correlation value = 0.10).
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Figure 2-4 Relationship between global GDP rate in real $, air travel demand rate, and airline
operating profit. (Data sources: Shane (2006), ATA (2006))
In addition to varying rates because of changing economic conditions in one region,
regions with different economic conditions exhibit different dynamics in generating
demand for air travel. Economic activity is not distributed evenly across the world with
some regions lagging and others accelerating at different times in recent history.
Therefore, the regional demand for air travel is expected to diverge based on
demographic characteristics like:
* population size,
* per capita income,
* income inequality, and
* special characteristics of the region:
o tourist attractions,
o industrial and trade centers,
o political outlook,
o regional conflicts etc.
This correlation is demonstrated in Figure 2-5 where it is shown that the relatively small
increases in wealth in emerging economies can generate substantial increases in travel
demand (the circled region) while in mature economies that trend is marginal as other
variables like the availability of discretionary time and desire to travel provide trade-offs.
Most forecasters agree that, barring other problems, increasing urbanization and
standards of living in the developing world will keep similar rates of increase in the
demand for air travel (Taneja 2002). Reflecting these differences in expectations, the
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projections for future demand of new aircraft are usually divided into regions and inter-
regional travel expectations.
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Figure 2-5 Demand for travel (trips per capita) relationship to per capita income (source: Taneja
(2002))
Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 demonstrate the differences in regional demand growth rates in
two different time periods. Table 2-1 shows the very strong growth rates that prevailed in
the second half of the 1980s both intra-regionally (diagonal) and inter-regionally (off-
diagonal), with the areas showing higher growth rates were Asia and Europe. Similarly,
Table 2-2 shows very strong declines in between 2002 and 2003 that hurt particularly
Asia and its connections to Europe and North America, reflecting the drop in demand due
to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic.
Table 2-1 Average regional growth rates (1985-1990) for passenger demand
(2005))
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Table 2-3 and Table 2-4, taking the view of the distribution of demand (as opposed to
growth rates), show a much steadier picture between 1990 and 2003. The global
distribution of demand is actually relatively stable with North America and Europe being
the largest generators of demand for air travel, with a combined contribution of more than
50% of global demand with Europe slightly increasing and North America decrease in its
share. The only significant difference between the two tables is the stagnation in the
demand experienced by the states of the former Soviet Union that went from 10% of
global demand in 1990 to less than 2% in 200310. The distribution and magnitude of the
busiest 150 world airports as marked on the world map shows that North America,
Europe, and to a lesser extent, East Asia, dominate with only a few contenders in the rest
of the globe.
Table 2-3 Regional Demand as a Percent of Global Demand for Passenger Travel 1990 (Data source:
Boeing (2005))
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to The trend is definitely reversing since the CIS posted high growth rates (>10%) even in a very weak year
like 2003.
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Table 2-4 Regional Demand as a Percent of Global Demand for Passenger Travel 2003 (Data source:
Boeine (2005))
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2.2.3 Market as O-D pair: the micro-level view
For the level of analysis that we are interested in, industry-wide and macro, it is tempting
(and easier) to stay focused on the aggregate market level (macro and meso). This
approach though would attribute a homogeneity level to the industry that is unrealistic
and hide some important attributes of the industry. Several researchers (Holloway 1997)
state as a principle of the industry, that each O-D pair is a market in and of itself. The
implications of this maxim affect how the competitive status of the industry is viewed
and generates additional characteristics that airlines have to consider when making fleet
decisions.
Business and leisure
Maybe the most important micro-level characteristic of demand is the different utility
functions that characterize customers in different segments of the market. The
differentiation between business and leisure travelers is especially important since it
defines the characteristics of the product service and how it competes with the other
market offerings.
As a general description, business travelers value high frequency services and the ability
to change itineraries and dates easily as the reasons for their business trips change while
their flexibility in travel dates is also limited. Given the number of hours they spend
traveling, they want amenities and the ability to rest or work accordingly. Finally, they
are less sensitive to price.
The leisure travelers on the other hand are more flexible in the dates they choose, more
sensitive to the ticket price, and they value in-travel comfort less than business travelers.
In more technical economics terminology, consumer groups exhibit substantially
different elasticities of demand and more generally different aggregate utility functions.
Market segmentation and other airline business models that have evolved allow airlines
to exploit, with varying effectiveness, these basic differences among their customers.
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Similarly, cargo types differ in terms of the utility preferences of the shippers but less
radically than the utility functions characterizing passenger markets. Cargo servicing is
done either by dedicated carries that focus on different market segments (e.g. FedEx,
UPS and DHL, focus on parcel deliveries while others like Cargolux and cargo
subsidiaries of legacy carriers focus on consolidated cargo). Freight forwarders and postal
services also use the cargo bay of airliners for their shipments and this revenue stream
may provide a substantial part of an airline's revenues and thus influence its decision on
the type of aircraft it may operate.
Substitutes and complements
For both classes of passengers as well as for cargo, demand for the airline product
depends not only on the attributes of the product itself but also on the availability and
relative attractiveness of substitute products.
For business travelers substitute products may range from IT solutions like
teleconferencing to business jet time ownership. To cater to this market niche, several
business models have emerged in recent years like fractional ownership, time-share, and
lease by the-hour for business jets. In short-haul distances, high-speed rail or car can also
be attractive options.
For the leisure traveler, the number of options is greater and usually they include the
complement products (e.g. hotels and vacation spots). If air ticket or hotel prices are
unattractive then a change of destination to a more affordable overall option is usually an
easy trade-off.
Distances and availability of other modes also play a role and it should be expected that
passengers on short-haul flights would evidence a higher price-elasticity as other means
of transportation (e.g. train, bus, or driving) may be available as seen in Figure 2-6.
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Figure 2-6 Curve of rail/air modal split for distances between 300 and 600km (Source: (WBCSD
2001) (pg. 5-13))
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Empirical Verification
These theoretical expectations have been verified repeatedly by empirical observations.
The meta-studies by Gillen et al. (2004) and Brons et al. (2002) provide a good overview
of the different demand curves for different categories of passengers. Gillen et al.
aggregated the empirical observations of 21 econometric studies of air travel demand and
showed that there is a consistently difference estimation of elasticities across market
segments as shown in Figure 2-7.
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Figure 2-7 Estimated Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel (Source: Gillen et al. (2004))
As anticipated, business travelers exhibit more inelastic demand behavior than leisure
passengers. Similarly, short-haul passengers exhibit more elastic demand than travelers
on long haul trips. Based on their findings, Gilen et al. caution against using a single
point estimate of price elasticity averaged across market segments - a recommendation
that is important for the calibration of our modeling in Chapter 9.
Seasonality and travel reciprocity
Seasonality is another characteristic of the air transportation industry that emerges at the
micro level view; it is expected that in most O-D pairs there are peaks in demand for
several reasons ranging from vacation destinations to large business conferences.
Holloway (1997)(p. 70) reports that the average high-to-low ratio of demand is 1.7 for
European airlines but reaches 2.4 for the highly seasonal demand faced by Olympic
Airways in the leisure travel segment. Airlines try to plan their fleets around and ideally
to use the idle capacity on one route to supplement the peaking demand in another (e.g.
planes used in trans-Atlantic routes over the summer can be used for Caribbean
destination over the winter). Seasonality, as a type of cyclicality, has a well defined
period and can be forecasted with relative accuracy, unlike the aperiodic business cycles
discussed in Chapter 5.
In spite of the demand peculiarities mentioned above, one characteristic, at least for
passenger traffic, is that it is fairly well equalized over O-D pairs - that is the majority of
trips are two way. This is not generally the case for cargo traffic though, since the time-
sensitive, high value products that make use of the service tend to follow one way routes
from production to consumption.
2.3 Chapter 2 Summary
Chapter 2 has explored the customer/used dimension of air transportation. This represents
the fundamental starting point where airlines (Chapter 3) and aircraft manufacturers
(Chapter 4) base their forecasts on and consequently their decisions. We showed that
demand for air travel, as it satisfies a basic human need for mobility, will most likely
continue to grow. The growth in demand is dependent upon both the characteristics of the
customer and the attributes of the product. For passengers, their characteristic time and
monetary budgets constrain their decisions and determines their demand elasticity curve.
As emerging economies mature their populations are expected to increase their relative
proportion of air travel demand faster as compared to the more mature economies.
In the next chapter we proceed one level upstream in the commercial aviation value chain
to present the fundamental aspects of aircraft operators and owners.
Chapter 3 Aircraft Ownership and Operation: Airline
Organizations and Infrastructure
As shown in Chapter 2, demand for air travel has been growing with a year to year
growth rate of about 5% for the last two decades. This continuous growth is made
possible through the efforts of airlines that manage to steadily decrease the real (adjusted
for inflation) fares despite continuous increases in equipment ownership costs and
volatile fuel prices. In response to these challenges, airlines create a difficult competitive
environment faced with trade-offs on the passenger utility arena. For example, in the US
domestic market, the trend for using smaller aircraft (average seats per flight dropped
from 154 in 2000 to 137 in 2007) offers the advantages of flexibility and frequency but at
the expense of taxing the airport and air traffic control system resources. These combined
with efficiency initiatives that reduce the number of stand-by crews and aircraft make a
system prone to cascading failures and consequent deterioration of the on-time
performance thus impacting the utility of their customers.
More importantly for airlines, their profitability is highly cyclical compromising their
operations by restricting their access to financial resources during troughs and hampering
their ability to adhere to their long-term planning. These have negative repercussions for
their labor relations that more often than not are adversarial.
As airlines are such a critical link to the commercial aviation system, this chapter reviews
the basics on their operation and their interactions as a competitive market as well as their
interface with customers and suppliers. This review provides us with a critical
understanding for developing modeling and strategic alternative implementation
solutions.
In Section 3.1 we review the basic quantitative parameters that are use to describe aircraft
ownership and operation cost and revenue streams. In Section 3.2 we discuss the
operating consideration of airlines and in Section 3.3 present the different business
models and types of enterprises that are active in the airline industry. In Section 3.4, the
relationship between airlines and other stakeholders in commercial aviation
(governments, airframe manufacturers, leasing firms, and labor unions) is examined.
Finally Section 3.5X examines the evidence on cyclical behavior for airlines.
3.1 Fundamental Airline Economics
Like all markets, the air transportation market consists of buyers (potential passengers
and cargo operators) which we explored in the previous chapter, a product (air
transportation for goods and people), and sellers (airlines). While passengers are
accustomed to dealing with firms generically known as airlines, aircraft ownership and
air transportation service provision is in reality organized around a diverse ecology of
enterprises. In this chapter we present the fundamentals of this ecology by reviewing the
taxonomy, structure, and interrelationship of the enterprises and the markets that they
operate in.
(Belobaba 2006) distinguishes the enterprises involved in the provision of air
transportation services by their function into:
* Carriers
* Aircraft operators
* Aircraft owners
Carriers are the end suppliers of transportation services to the consumers. A carrier
defines the prices, schedules, marketing and service type. An operator is responsible for
supplying the carrier with aircraft operations at specified schedules and prices. Finally,
owners make capital investments in aircraft, airport gates, etc and lease (and/or sell) them
to operators.
Most airlines perform all three functions to some degree and the extents in which they
vary signify different business models. There are passenger carriers, passenger-centric
carriers with a freight component, and dedicated freight carriers. These can additionally
be characterized as low-cost, no-frill, low-fare, legacy, differentiated, full-service, parcel
etc. In the next section we define the common characteristics, differences and
comparative advantages of the prevailing business models.
In traditional economics, the theory of the firm suggests that firms operate as rational
long-term profit maximizers. While this statement is subject to qualifiers, defining the
sources of revenue and costs for airline operations and the relevant performance metrics
is useful for comparative analysis for airline firms and their strategies.
3.1.1 Basic Airline Performance Metrics
In order to compare the performance of airlines, their costs and their revenue potential, on
a common basis the academic and business literature has converged towards metrics that
identify units of analysis, e.g. revenue per passenger per mile flown, rather than absolute
size, e.g. total revenues, total passengers boarded etc. In this section we review those
basic performance metrics and how they can be derived by aggregate measures as these
metrics form the foundation for most of the quantitative cross-company comparisons for
the rest of the dissertation.
For any operation the basic equation of operating performance can be written as:
1 Operating performance = demand , unit revenue - supply * unit cost
The most widely used aggregate metric for supply, or output, for airline production is
Available Seat Kilometers"1 (ASK). This is the total number of seat-kilometers offered
by an airline during a period of operation. Similarly for cargo traffic, the metric used is
" Available Seat Miles (ASM) is more commonly used in the U.S. aviation press but for this dissertation
we will consistently use the International System units.
Available Ton Kilometers (ATK) which can alternatively by used for all traffic (Clark
2001).12
There are two equivalent ways to calculate airline supply:
2 Supply = P* C*D -F * T, or
3 Supply = P C S U T
Where
P: Number of airplanes
C: Average capacity of airplanes in number of seats
D: Average stage length (distance flown per flight)
F: Number of flights per unit of time (frequency)
T: Time period of interest
S: Average aircraft block speed (note that this speed is not equivalent to cruise speed since it
includes take-off and landing procedures. As a result, short stage lengths have lower stage speeds
compared to longer stage lengths for the same type of aircraft.)
U: Aircraft utilization in block hours per day. (Block hours are defined as the time in which the
aircraft is in use, i.e. from the time the doors close -- after boarding -- at the gate to the time they
open again for disembarkation.)
The latter method is generally easier to obtain data for.
Once aircraft go into service, available capacity can be moderated in response to a
reduction in demand by:
* Retiring older aircraft,
* Temporarily withdrawing from active service older or new aircraft by parking
(mothballing), and
* Reducing the utilization of active aircraft.
The two last bullets imply that it is critical to distinguish between operated capacity
(which is usually measured by the ASK metric) and active capacity which is the offered
capacity at the maximum possible utilization of the equipment. In other words, airlines
may choose to fly an airplane four routes a day based on demand (operated capacity) but
they may be able to use the plane in six routes (active capacity). While airlines may draw
down their operated capacity their pricing and costs still depend on their active capacity
as the aircraft becomes an expensive underutilized asset.
Following logically from the ASK definition, unit costs are the monetized resources
(operating expenses 13) expended to provide one ASK under the given capabilities of the
airline. In a similar fashion, actualized demand for airline travel is measured in Revenue
Passenger Kilometers (RPK) and Revenue Ton Kilometers (RTK).
Unit costs are usually measured in currency / seat-kilometer.
4 Unit cost = Operating Expenses /ASK
12 Clark (2001, pg. 49) suggests the conversion of ASK to ATK by assuming an average weight for
passengers and their luggage. We will not follow this method since it obscures the actual separation
between the productivity of the two market segments.
13 As we discuss in the next subsection, ownership and system/administrative costs are included in the
calculation of operating expenses. They do not include finance charges (interest) though.
An important utilization metric that combines output and demand is the load factor
(LF)1 4 .
5 LF = RPK/ASK
The last component of Equation 1, unit revenue, is usually referred to as yield in the
airline/aviation literature. Yield is equal to the total operating revenue of a given airline
divided by the total demand.
6 Yield = Operating revenue /RPK
A measure more consistent with unit costs, is unit revenue, and is the revenue generated
by paying customers divided by the total ASK provided (RASK).
7 Unit revenue = Operating revenue /ASK
If the sole source of airline revenues were the paying passengers, then yield would
represent the average fare per RPK. As we shall see in the business model section 3.3.5.1,
airlines anticipate revenues from ancillary sources so this is not strictly true but it is
representative in most of the cases.
By definition, RPK is always less than or equal to ASK (LF < 1). But as we shall explore
later in this section, the demand for air travel is highly seasonal and, as a result, there are
cases where demand exceeds supply. In those instances excess demand is called spill.
While spill is a "necessary evil" excessive spill signals poor management and invites
competition in non-monopolistic environments. (Clark 2001) (pg 65) discusses the
concept of spill and gives an extensive presentation on how it can be represented using
statistical analysis.
Based on the terms introduced above, we can rewrite the fundamental Equation 1 as:
8 Operating performance = RPK yield - ASK * unit cost
Identifying the winning balance between the revenue and cost side is key for airline
managers. To do so, one needs to understand what drives the costs and the revenues or, in
other words, the break-down of the cost and revenue components. We will review these
using sample time series from aggregate databases.
3.1.2 Airline Cost Components
Starting from the cost components, there is not complete consensus on the categories best
describing the cost breakdown. Different data aggregators tend to favor slightly different
14 Service quality can be compromised as load factors increase; this is not only a matter of comfort in the
air but also it is a result of the increased probability of delays due to the entire aircraft/airport system being
close to capacity.
categories as they balance the reluctance of airlines to divulge data that may provide
sensitive information to their competitors. 15
A cost categorization introduced by (Belobaba and Simpson 2006) consistent with the
Form 41 data and other studies of operating costs is summarized in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 Categorization of Airline Operating Costs and average values for U.S. Airlines Domestic
Operations (source: Belobaba and Simpson 2006)
Annual
Percentage*
Cost Category Description 1980 1990 2003
Flight Operating Costs 55.6 44.9 44.5
Direct Flying Operations 40.9 31.4 31.3
Includes direct wages, benefits, pensions, training etc. Larger
Flight Crew (Pilots) aircraft have higher crew costs in the same airline as senior
pilots are flying them. 11.1 6.3 7.8
Fuel Variable. Depending on aircraft fuel bum and cost of fuel. 29.8 17.1 13.2
Flight Maintenance 8.7 10.0 9.5
Direct Airframe and Engine Variable. Labor and parts for scheduled and unscheduledinspection and repair. 4.8 6.4 5.9
Indirect (burden) Supervision, inventory carrying costs. 3.9 3.6 3.7
Flight Equipment Ownership Depreciation, leasing costs, insurance but not interest. 5.1 3.5 3.7
Depreciation 4.0 2.6 3.7
Ground Operating Costs 25.1 33.2 25.4
Traffic Servicing Loading and unloading aircraft. Check-in, ticket collection,boarding. Gate leasing. 8.0 10.0 11.2
Aircraft Servicing Landing fees, ramp and flight dispatch activities. 5.9 6.1 6.4
Landing Fees Variable. 1.5 1.8 2.1
Reservations and Sales 10.3 17.2 7.7
Commissions 4.8 10.4 1.8
System Operating Costs 19.3 21.9 30.2
Passenger Service (In-Flight) 9.6 10.2 10.0
Cabin Crew 5.0 5.4 6.4
Meals 4.4 3.6 2.2
Advertising 1.8 2.1 1.0
General and Administrative 3.2 4.7 6.2
Ground Equipment Ownership and maintenance of facilities and equipment. 3.5 2.4 2.1
Other Includes interest payments for equipment. 1.2 2.5 10.9
Total Operating Costs 100 100 100
Source : Belobaba and Simpson (with changes)
* Percentage of total operating costs for major U.S. airlines.
'
5 As a first approach we utilize the breakdown introduced by BTS in Form-41. Form-41 has been a
primary source of real airline data. It is collected by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) under the
auspices of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Major U.S. airlines were obligated to report the
requested data on their operations as means for monitoring competitive behavior and the effectiveness of
the airline deregulation act in 1978.
While the table has average values, it is interesting to notice some trends like the
significant decline of the costs of reservations and sales and of commissions specifically
with the advent of electronic ticketing and the almost commensurate increase in the
percentage of system operating costs.
Figure 3-1 provides a graphical representation of the average cost allocation of U.S
airlines using data from the Air Transport Association. While the allocation percentages
are slightly different from the previous table the three cost types that stand out are labor
costs, fuel costs, ownership costs, and other which includes interest payments for
equipment and payments to subsidiaries or third parties for the provision of feeder
services. While landing fees and leasing of gate slots are a small percentage of total
operating costs, increasing congestion at key airport hubs is likely to raise those costs.
UNIT COST BY CATEGORY
Cents per Available Seat Mile
3.50 1
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
.~ j t tjlj1 -- 11 A
Cormunication
1.5%
Landing Fees
1.7%
Professional
Services
4. 5%1/
Communication
Landing Fees 1.0%
1.9%
Professional
Services6.9% -
bor
8%
S& Pronotion
2.4%
enance
erials
rage_ Other I 2.1%8.9%1
SOw nershp
8./9%
Uls & Office
-Suppes
1.4%
. 1 _ _ =_ ___ 1 (•
Cost Allocation 19•4 Cost Allocation 2004
Figure 3-1 Airline cost allocation per seat mile and as a percentage of total operating costs (Source:
(ATA 2006))
Passe
Conmis
7.7,
Fuel
23.49A
Ins
I
Pas
corn
Food & Beve
3.2%/
Insur0
0.8
Food & Bev
Ad & Promotion
0.9%
Maintenance
- Materials
1.3%
nership
Z9%
bice
s
Other
22.2%/6 0.6%
A I k §11 0
ii H I s -1 , I df9j
I I
1. 5%
While the view of aggregate industry costs is informative, different airlines exhibit
drastic differences in the level and allocation of those costs which depend on their
business models.
3.1.3 Airline Revenue Streams
Traditionally airlines have relied on revenues from their passenger and cargo operations.
There were instances where revenues from freight operations were used to cross-
subsidize passenger operations (early mail carriers or flights to Hawaii from continental
U.S.) and other cases where the reverse can be true (commuter flights with high load
factors and the majority of luggage as carry-on have an underutilized cargo hold that can
be sold for additional revenue for cargo).
Airline operators can also get revenues from ancillary sources which can include
advertising, special in-flight services and sales, partnerships with other service providers
like telephone and internet providers in flight or at the gates, rental car agencies, and
hotels, car parking revenues etc. While the low-cost charter operators, as we discuss in
the next section, were traditionally relying on similar types of revenue given their tight
vertical integration, scheduled airlines are catching-up with Ryan Air being the poster
child of first-mover towards such 'unconventional' revenue streams to the point where
they equal or exceed the ticket revenue.
If ticket prices and seat availability are fixed (as is usually the case in price regulated or
monopolistic markets) then there is a direct relationship between load factors, revenues
and profitability. This relationship though breaks down when yield management systems
were put into place in response to competitive pressures as we will discuss in the
following section.
So for an airline, the ability to be profitable depends on how effectively it can balance the
two components of Equation 8, i.e. the number of tickets it can sell vs. the costs it incurs
to provide these services. In the sections that follow we explore the operational, tactical,
and strategic actions taken by airlines in their pursuit of profitable operations, what
impedes them in achieving this goal, and how they act on and react to changes in their
markets. In the next section, we describe the functions that are more or less common
across all airlines and in the section after how they differ based on their strategies and
enterprise structure.
3.2 Fundamental Airline Operations
Airlines, in order to provide their services competitively and efficiently, have to plan and
take action on aspects of the business that are shared across the diverse set of airline
business models. These 'primary' airline operations span different timescales. They can
be short-term when adaptive changes and decisions need to be made every few hours or
days, medium term for plans that change on monthly or quarterly basis and long-term
when they involve planning from a year to over ten years. These functions include:
* Crew scheduling (short-, mid- term). The daily allocation of crews over the
network satisfying union and regulatory occupational requirements (e.g. working
hours, home base overnight stays, matching crew rating and aircraft assignment).
* Fleet Scheduling (mid-term). Assigning aircraft type and size based on the route
requirements and aircraft availability.
* Fleet maintenance (short-, mid- term). Planned and unscheduled maintenance
require aircraft to be taken off duty for certain periods. Deciding on whether to
maintain aircraft in-house and in which location such facilities should be
established can impact operations significantly.
* Yield management (short-, mid- term). The continuous adjustment of the
capacity allotted for a given fare type based on observed demand.
* Distribution and marketing (mid-term). The channels offered to consumers for
finding about airline services and purchasing and receiving their tickets.
Companies can balance the use of solely direct channels (company web sites) that
offer the advantage of significantly reducing overhead and third-party
commissions with the visibility and access offered by large scale hub websites
and travel agencies.
* Network planning (mid- term). Deciding on the routes and schedules offered by
the airline.
* Fleet acquisition and management (long-term). Choosing the capacity, type,
and other relevant aircraft attributes that fit best with the airlines' growth strategy.
* Strategy planning. Integrating the above functions and making corporate level
decisions so that the objectives of the company are achieved.
Short- and mid- term operations can be formidably complex and may require elaborate
optimization algorithms. There is a rich operations research literature focusing on optimal
crew planning, yield management, and fleet scheduling which, accompanied by
specialized software packages that run the optimization algorithms, facilitates decision-
making on that level. For example, Hane, Barnhart et al. (1995) use integer programming
to assign aircraft and Vance, Barnhart et al. (1997) to solve crew scheduling problems.
The planning continuum
Our work is focused on long-term effects but in reality it is hard to isolate those from the
performance in the medium and short term. In fact there is a continuum of choice
problems that should ideally be solved holistically and iteratively. Taneja (1982) (pg. 21-
25) is advocating a similar holistic view from the strategy perspective as shown in Figure
3-2 which illustrates the connections among network planning, fleet planning, and short-
term crew and fleet scheduling.
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Figure 3-2 The Airline Planning Continuum
The type of network (hub-spoke vs. point-to-point and stage lengths) affects the possible
utilization and the preferred type of aircraft. The types of aircraft have to be matched to
the crew certification and their capacities to the forecasted demand for the given market.
The higher level planning activities have to balance between designing for robustness and
optimizing for cost-efficiency. Spare capacity or flexibility can be added in the system to
provide resiliency against unanticipated disruptions. As competition and poor operating
performance drove many carriers towards increasing efficiency, the networked nature of
airlines became more apparent and ripple effects from a storm that disrupted operations
in one airport spreads through the system and, in extreme cases, it may take days until
normal schedules resume .
Fundamentally, the planning continuum means that for true system optimization, the
ideal planning process or algorithm should address all levels either simultaneously or
sequentially and iteratively. The simultaneous solving is computationally unattainable
with today's machines and the iterative planning approach is deficient given the
organizational barriers between the different airline departments.
The widespread availability of scheduling optimization algorithms means that their
application has become the industry standard and does not constitute a competitive
advantage anymore but rather a necessity. Therefore we will focus instead on the other
short term operations and how they fit into strategy planning. We will start by examining
yield management continue on to network planning present other strategies for growth
and leave fleet management and maintenance issues to be discussed in Section 3.4.9, as a
critical link to the airframe manufacturing industry.
16 These type of cascading failures were traditionally buffered by the ability of airlines to reshuffle aircraft
overnight and start the next day with a clean slate but in recent years as the availability of stand-by aircraft
and crews is small and the booking is so high, reshuffling looses its effectiveness as the passenger stranded
at an airport will not fit in next day's normal operations.
3.2.2 Yield Management and Pricing Strategies for Airlines
Yield (or revenue) management by airlines was precipitated by market liberalization and
the consequent increased competition among airlines. It is a fundamental tool in the
competition between airlines on the same route but it can be used in unchallenged routes
equally well as it relies on demand signals. Yield management systems are a
sophisticated tool to address the age-old capitalist problem of clearing the market of a
perishable good at maximum profit. The perishable good in this case is a seat on a
flight which has zero value after the airplane departs. Yield management systems use
forecasting based on historical data to estimate demand for a given flight. Based on the
forecasts, they allocate the airplane capacity to be sold at different prices as defined by
fare types. These forecasts are updated on real-time as travelers are booking tickets for
that flight and so they can detect non-seasonal variations like the additional demand
created by a large conference or the lost demand due to bad weather at a tourist
destination. Yield management systems are therefore the engines behind the drastic
changes in ticket price that most airplane travelers have experienced while searching for
booking their flights.
Yield management relies on a combination of third-degree price discrimination and
peak-load pricing. Economists like (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2000) (pg. 376) define third-
degree price discrimination 17 as "[the] practice of dividing consumers into two or more
groups with separate demand curves and charging different prices to each group"
Market segmentation depends on successfully discriminating between the different types
of travelers (primarily business and leisure). This is made possible by offering different
fare types that range from first class to regular economy to discount fares and are tied to
certain restrictions like weekend stayover, advance purchasing, non-refundability, non-
upgradeability, or high fees for cancellations and rebooking. These restrictions are
thought to effectively differentiate between passengers with different demand curves
(e.g., business and leisure travelers). While this has been proven correct and led to as
many as 32 fare types and a commensurately wide gap between ticket prices by some
airlines, the success of low-cost carriers that offer a substantially simpler fare type
selection with smaller gaps forced a simplification of fares on the legacy carriers as well.
Peak-load pricing is also used but with a twist: by reducing the number of seats offered at
discounted fares thus effectively increasing the average ticket price but without explicitly
doing so as the fare type pricing remains as announced. Belobaba (1987) offers a review
of yield management practices while Belobaba and Farkas (1999) discuss its effect on
spill. As an extension of these, Subramanian, Stidham et al. (1999) develop algorithms to
optimize yield that include no-shows and cancellations see.
Table 3-2, using historical data, illustrates the seemingly erratic behavior of airline prices
based on economy type tickets and their response to new entrant competitors.
17 First degree of price discrimination is charging customers their reservation price, and second degree is
offering quantity discounts. These types of price discrimination are utilized more in the aircraft market
rather than the air travel market as we see in Chapter 4.
Table 3-2 Comparative Historical Prices for the Boston San Francisco Market from Jan 05 to Jan 07(Source: (FareCompare 2006))
1. BOS-SAN
JetBlue (B6)
Minimum Fare
2. BOS-SAN
JetBlue (B6)
Delta
Delta matched and then
undercut JetBlue's price.
3. BOS-SAN
JetBlue (B6)
Delta
United
United followed Delta with
brief drops in price until just
before JetBlue's entrance
where its pricing was erratic.
4. BOS-SAN
Similar behavior for U.S
Airways and American
Airlines.
Table 3-2: Continued
5. PVD-SAN
Providence has overlapping
catchment area with BOS and
is served by Southwest.
United and Delta exhibit
- stabler pricing.
The reduction in ticket prices (and consequently yield) showed in Table 3-3 when legacy
airlines are faced by competition by a low cost-carrier has been informally termed the
"Southwest effect." Its existence is supported by Table 3-2 where the entrance of JetBlue
in the Boston San Francisco market similarly forced the prices lower. Windle and
Dresner (1999) concurred with a set of previous studies (see pg. 61of cit) and
demonstrated this effect empirically. They also showed that legacy airlines do not resort
to price increases to other routes when they lower their prices in response to low-cost
entry.
Table 3-3 Revenue yields of other airlines (OA) and Southwest (SW) (Source Gillen et al. 2004)
Yields
(cents per passenger mile)
Market type 500 Miles 1000 Miles
OA-no SW presence 51 26
OA-SW connecting competition 31 20
OA- SW direct competition 26 19
SW-connect 21 14
SW-non-stop 18 12
Due to elasticity in demand, a reduction in price should be expected to increase leisure
travel yet. Whether to what extent this is real total growth or simply substitution from
airports in the same catchment area is not clearly established yet.
Tactical, Strategic, and Predatory Pricing
While the O-D market is the primary competitive ground for airlines (see Section 2.2.5)
airlines operate networks which they strive to expand either through organic growth, via
acquisitions, or with alliances. The primary rationale behind expansion for airlines is that
growth signals two outcomes: (i) increased appeal to passengers due to network effects
and (ii) in the case of organic growth, a means to control unit costs by utilizing scale
economies (distributing administrative costs) and more importantly (yet probably not
sustainable in the long term) by keeping average fleet age and average personnel
seniority low.
Therefore it is not surprising to see the competitive strategies extend on that level.
Fournier and Zuehlke (2004) note the antitrust case brought by the U.S. DOJ against the
Airline Tariff Publishing Company (1994) where carriers were accused of colluding to
"trade fare changes in certain markets in exchange for fare changes in other markets."
They find small but persistent indications that this practice continues.' 8
Using Table 3-2 for illustrative purposes, we can see that from January '05 to October
'05, Delta, U.S. Airways, United and American maintained what can be called a tacitly
collusive equilibrium. In that period U.S. Airways and United occasionally cut prices
leading to brief "price wars" (defined in game theoretic terms as a period of non-
cooperative equilibrium). The entrance of JetBlue changed the competitive environment
as prevailing prices stabilized to a lower level in what could be called a predatory pricing
move; i.e. an effort by incumbents to undercut a new entrant in hopes of making entrance
costly. The erratic price behavior prior entrance could be conceived as a preemptive
signal of predatory pricing.
Busse (2002) reviews several models of price wars.
(i) Low demand price wars (cyclical pricing): firms with high fixed costs or
underutilization of capacity have an incentive to undercut prices in period of
low demand.
(ii) False signal price wars: a firm misinterprets a drop in their demand as (secret)
pricing change from their competitors thus undercutting their prices.
(iii) High demand price wars (countercyclical pricing): in anticipation of a high
demand period firms may cut their prices with the expectation of gaining
greater market share.
(iv) Ticket Fire sales: Financially weakened firms may strive to raise "badly
needed cash" in the short term by reducing their prices.
She finds that firms with financial trouble are more likely to start a price war (model IV)
and in contrast to previous studies she does not find a significant effect of demand.
While the above discussion focused on pricing strategies among network carriers, the
effect of low-cost carriers can in fact be stabilizing once they have an established
presence in a market.
3.2.3 Network Planning: Competitive Behaviors and the Balancing of Hubs
and Points-to-Point
As we saw previously, airlines carve market niches and defend against entrants through
pricing19. A more implicit form of signaling than price is commitment in terms of aircraft
18 Fournier and Zhuelke (2004) used by "reciprocal pairs" of routes to test their hypothesis that airlines with
multi-market contact may balance market shares with their competitors in a tacit form of collusion.
Stylized, this form of collusion it works by airline A not pursuing a strong presence in a lucrative market
and its competitor B does not compete strongly in another market which is lucrative for A.
19 Contestability theory, which we discuss in Section 3.4.1, postulates that airlines do not use predatory
pricing but instead hold consistently low prices if they want to discourage competition. Empirical evidence
does not support this hypothesis.
capacity and network planning. Legacy airlines moved from point-to-point type of
networks before deregulation to hub-and-spoke networks post-deregulation in pursuit of
efficiency. This move also gave them significant and often close to monopolistic market
power at their hub airports. Their strong presence created a shortage of available gate
slots in the increasingly more congested airports thus providing an effective means of
warding off competitors. Gate shortage at major airports constitutes a market failure and
as such, several regulatory attempts have been tried with some success. Low-cost airlines
when trying to enter these markets could wait either for a serendipitous free-up of gates
(e.g., JetBlue at Newark) or, more commonly, utilize satellite airports20 reasonably close
to large metropolitan areas. Thus these airlines revert to a point-to-point scheme.
The characterization of an airline as point-to-point or hub-and-spoke is not absolute and
simply characterizes the dominant type in what is essentially a mix.
In summary, the hub-and-spoke model by consolidating demand in a few hubs offered
two advantages:
* Operationally, it offered efficiency gains. Aircraft can be larger and still fly with
high load factors, thus creating economies of scale. Service to small regional
markets is made possible by using feeder lines to the hubs. The frequency even
for small O-D markets is high.
* Strategically, it allowed for a regionalization of the markets and effective
protection against entrants due to the market power of the airline developing the
hub. This effect was facilitated by mergers.
When over-used, though, the hub-and-spoke system can backfire. First, it creates
additional inconveniences for the travelers, which value direct flights more. Second, it
creates an operating environment prone to cascading delays. The reason for this is that
hub airports see their traffic coming in waves with the outgoing traffic scheduled to
depart after the wave of the incoming flights has arrived. Thus delays incurred by the
incoming flights propagate to the flights waiting to depart. Thirdly, that arrangement
underutilizes the airport capacity which is designed to handle the peak loads.
Balancing between a point-to-point network structure and hub-and-spoke is not trivial as
it impacts the business model, market share and the operating costs of an airline. While it
is true that LCCs have been successful by following a point-to-point-dominated structure,
the reality for the traveling public is that this structure is only feasible for relatively dense
routes and even then, the frequencies offered rarely rival those of a hub-and-spoke
network.
In practice all airlines operate some kind of hub network even if only for reasons of
aircraft maintenance and crew housing. Furthermore, just the logistics of connecting a
number of airports make the hub-spoke model practically indispensable if service to
lower demand areas is to be maintained. 21 Without at least regional hubs, barring a
20 For example, the Boston metropolitan area is served by the Logan International, Manchester NH, and
Providence RI airports.
21 For example, if an airline should cover one airport in all 48 continental States, then in a pure hub-spoke
network this would require a minimum of 2*(48-1) = 94 flights whereas a pure point-to-point one would
disruptive innovation on mass air travel, the population of smaller urban areas would be
left without affordable air travel. On the international travel front, alliances and code
sharing allowed the extension of networks with little direct cost to the airline but at the
expense of decision independence.
3.2.4 Additional Strategic Planning Considerations
The airline product is the provision of a connecting service between an origin and a
destination. In a regulated environment, airlines were only able to differentiate their
products by the services offered in-flight in an attempt to capture market loyalty. Post-
deregulation the driving force has been cost-cutting as evidenced by the success of no-
frills LCCs that is the commoditization (Weil 1996) of the airline product become
apparent. (a seat-kilometer offered between points A and B by one airline is
indistinguishable from the passenger's perspective from a seat-kilometer on the same
route by a different airline) and the effect of passenger loyalty diminished.
Differentiating characteristics of the airline product can include the following:
1. Fare.
2. Network extent.
3. Frequency.
4. Safety record.
5. Reliability and on time performance.
6. Load factors. As a metric of service, at very high load factors the aircraft feels
cramped.
7. Amenities
i. Airport lobbies.
ii. Security screening.
iii. In flight amenities
a. Ambiance
b. Entertainment
c. Personnel
d. Food/drinks
8. Frequent Flyer program.
We discussed fare setting and network planning and how they can impact frequency.
Safety is subject to stringent regulations so for our purposes it can be considered as equal
across airlines although there are documented instances showing that cash-strapped
airlines, especially in countries with reduced oversight, try to postpone maintenance
sometimes with dire results. Reliability and on-time performance depend on the airline
network type (point-to-point flights have generally better on-time performance) but also
on the airport congestion and the state of the air-traffic control system (ATC).
require a minimum of 48*(48-1) = 2,256! In reality, the number of primary U.S. airports is -550 which
would require 301.950 flights to be operated in a pure point-to-point network for one connecting flight/day.
In 2005, the total number of flights performed daily by all airlines (including charter and international) in
2005 totaled 20,000 (BTS data).
Despite the commoditization trend, airlines still try to present a differentiated face with
occasional success. JetBlue's leather seats and personal screens, offered to all passengers,
are a case in point for an LCC. Besides luxury and entertainment, comfort as evidenced
by seat pitch and width is also a common theme of airline advertising. Many airlines also
provide special services targeting the lucrative business/first class travelers in hopes of
building loyalty. This kind of in-flight differentiation reflects on aircraft orders making
aircraft more customized and thus less easily interchangeable across companies.22
Perhaps the most successful effort for differentiation has been the frequent flyer programs
introduced by American Airlines in 1981 and adopted since by most airlines worldwide.
The expansion of the frequent flyer programs to include other companies as partners,
from rental car agencies and hotels to retailers and credit cards, has contributed to the
ancillary revenues generated by airlines (Grant 2005) (pg 34).
Other Strategic Planning Considerations
In decisions on pricing and network strategies, airlines ideally pursue their overarching
corporate strategy. Decisions on employee relations, the availability and extend of
unionization, market entrance, alliance participation, fare setting, organic growth vs.
growth via mergers and acquisitions are shaped by the company culture (also referred to
as DNA). We will explore this aspects and especially how it differs between airlines in
Section 3.3 where we transition from the generic industry-wide perspective to discuss
specific types of airline business models.
3.3 Airlines as Enterprises: Predominant Business Models
Airlines, like any business, can be managed well or mismanaged. Even so, airlines have
been notorious for the ease with which they become unprofitable. Warren Buffet, investor
extraordinaire and founder of Berkshire Hathaway, remarked during an interview:
"[] the airline business has been extraordinary. It has eaten up capital over the
past century like almost no other business because people seem to keep coming
back to it and putting fresh money in.
You've got huge fixed costs, you've got strong labour unions and you've got
commodity pricing. That is not a great recipe for success.
I have an 800 number now that I call ifI get the urge to buy an airline stock. I call
at two in the morning and I say: "My name is Warren and I'm an aeroholic. " And
then they talk me down. " (Lawson and Ringshaw 2002)
While many airlines have indeed been troubled by bankruptcies, liquidations, or heavy
subsidization there are several others that have been successfully profitable over long
stretches and some even with the perceived handicap of unionization. In this section we
try to identify their critical differences as manifest by their business models.
On the airline operator side, we can distinguish between:
22 To give a recent example, the Airbus A380 delivery delays can be partly traced back to wiring
complexity resulting from the non-standard requirements for in-flight entertainment systems.
* charter-only and scheduled airlines,
* low-cost and full-service legacy scheduled airlines,
* parcel and cargo freight carriers
although none of these distinctions are mutually exclusive, as within the same corporate
entity, a mix of the above types can be present.
3.3.1 Scheduled Operators
3.3.1.1 Low-cost carriers (LCCs)
According to (Taneja 2004) (pg. 2) the low-cost airline business model was pioneered by
Pacific Southwest Airlines in 1949 in the Californian markets. Southwest, which began
operations in the early 1970s just before the airline deregulation in the U.S, has been the
showcase example for the LCC business model. By choosing a sustainable growth rate of
about 5% a year and focusing on niche underserved market, Southwest kept a low profile
and avoided the mistake of direct confrontation with entrenched incumbent airlines at its
formative years, a behavior which has exterminated other start-up airlines before and
since. This was far from being the only distinguishing characteristic of Southwest and its
low-cost brethren.
LCCs, as their name implies, are characterized by their ability to maintain a substantial
cost advantage over the legacy operators. Yet, this is not what differentiates their
business model; it is rather their perception of markets. LCCs view the market for air
travel as commoditized and do not drastically differentiate between business travelers. In
other words, they break the the 80/20 rule by not anticipating 80% of their revenue to
come from 20% of the market (i.e. business and first class travelers).
Their ability to practice this stems from a large number of operational and organizational
strategies. The synergistic properties of the strategies and their sometimes implicit non-
transferable qualities make the replication of the successful model harder.
While some of the approaches differ, for example with regard to labor unionization some
others are quite common. The distinguishing operating approaches of LCCs include:
* single aircraft type fleets,
* short to medium haul stages,
* point-to-point dominated networks,
* secondary airports,
* simple fare structure,
* little if any differentiation between seats,
* internal distribution networks (for ticketing),
* limited alliance membership
The comparative success of the LCC model drew the attention of the legacy carriers in
the form of 'when you cannot beat it, adopt.' And, at least in the U.S. domestic market,
they did en masse but with limited success. Continental launched Continental Lite in
1994, United "Shuttle by United" in 1995 and Ted in 2004, Delta launched Song in 2003,
while American chose to outsource some of their feeder or competitive flights to smaller
airlines (Grant 2005). None of the imitation LCCs survived long enough to be considered
successful for reasons that may range from not adopting critical aspects of the LCC
model, to weighing the newly formed subsidiary with the existing burdens of the parent
airline (e.g labor agreements, network extent etc), to cross-subsidizing the parent
company with resources needed for expansion of the subsidiary. The lack of success in
imitating the 'Southwest model' can partly be attributed to the multiple and in several
cases tacit facets of the business strategy followed by Herb Kelleher (Southwest's
founder) like employee empowerment, creating a 'fun' workplace environment,
cultivation of team spirit towards common goals, and several others as described by
Gittell (2003).
Characteristic LCCs are Southwest and JetBlue in the US and RyanAir and EasyJet in
Europe. LCCs are by no means indomitable and can succumb to competition and
mismanagement as the PeopleExpress rapid expansion and breakdown shows (described
vividly by Petzinger (1995) ).
3.3.1.2 Legacy or Network or Full-service Carriers
The carriers that evolved during under a more regulated regime period in their home
countries developed on a different business model than the more recent low cost carriers
as they were in most cases protected from competition by government-sanctioned semi-
monopolies that could be entry controlled and/or price controlled. The government-
supported approach made sense for a fledgling industry23 with significant potential for
helping economic development by offering much needed integration of national and
international destinations and with great accident risks if left unregulated.
Airlines' 'cushioned' existence continued, partly due to institutional inertia, even when
the airline business was well established. The controlled competitive pressures in turn led
to powerful companies like TWA and Pan Am but also to an insidious bloating of costs
that could be passed on to consumers without much effort. In parallel, employee
compensation and benefits, like pension plans which were critical for the post-
deregulation developments, were mounting. With the advent of deregulation (see Section
3.4.8.1), these protections largely disappeared leaving the legacy airlines to adapt or
perish although some subsidies do persist for flag carriers or disguised as emergency
support. The way that legacy carriers changed to adapt and like the low-cost carriers, they
come in many different flavors with varying levels of success.
There are legacy airlines that have completed successful transformations like Continental
and United in the US or Air France, British Airways and Lufthansa in Europe and others
that have tottered and survived with government support (e.g. Alitalia and Olympic
Airways) and other that stumbled (like Swiss Air). There are also newer carriers which
like Singapore Airlines and, more recently, Emirates that can be called full-service rather
than legacy airlines as their primary field of competition is international travel between
connecting hubs and their status as flag carriers for their home countries (and the
presumably favorable regulatory environment that this entails) is of little relevance in
their success.
23 Railways, telegraph and highways were infrastructure projects that received similar support worldwide.
3.3.2 Charter Operators
While scheduled airlines may also offer charter services directly or through a subsidiary,
charter operators operate only on a fixed scheduled basis and their services bound the
high and low yield end of the passenger markets.
The primary advantage of charter services on the low yield market is that it can cater
specifically to seasonal demand without an obligation to maintain year-round service.
Their services are usually inclusive packages with bundled services like hotel stays,
meals, transportation to and from the airport, sightseeing at destination etc. It was
estimated that in 2000 about 80% of the charter seats were sold as inclusive packages and
the rest to independent passengers (Williams 2002) (pg. 87). Passengers are not offered
flexibility over the duration of their stay or the ability to reschedule their departures.
In Europe, where charter operators provide about 30% of the passenger traffic24, 50% of
the charter operators (60% by capacity) are vertically integrated enterprises with the
travel agencies owning the airline and possibly other parts of the bundled services like
hotels and restaurants at the destinations.
On the high yield end, charter operators, like fractional jet ownership 25 , caters to the
business traveler segment that is looking for flexibility and less boarding hassle than
scheduled airlines.
From the industry perspective, high yield air charters have the potential to pose a
significant revenue threat for scheduled carriers in the highly coveted business market but
the aircraft that are operated in this market are mostly if not entirely less than 100 seats.
On the low yield side, charter operators are still threatening scheduled carriers on their
revenue side because of their low cost operation but they are also active in the new and
secondary markets for mid to short range LCA26 at very high density seating
arrangements.
3.3.3 Freight Carriers
An important source of capacity for the freight airline industry comes from the belly
capacity of scheduled passenger aircraft with up to 35% of scheduled revenue-ton-
kilometers coming from passenger aircraft (US 1998 data as calculated by Gaier (1998)).
The majority of dedicated freighters are also ex-passenger aircraft that are converted to
freighters as they age and therefore are outlets of the second-hand market. Only a small
minority of new aircraft are bought as freighters. Given this origin of capacity, it is not
unexpected that passenger airlines have large freight subsidiaries usually contracting with
a freight consolidator agency or third party logistics firms (3-PL) for renting their
24 Williams 2002 pg. 87.25 Since 1998 and as of 2007, Berkshire Hathaway has the controlling interest of NetJets, a successful
fractional jet company seemingly contradicting the quote in the opening paragraph of this section.
26 Williams 2002 pg. 115 notes that British charter companies use A321 (220 seats) and B757 (235 seats)
aircraft for medium haul and B767-300 (326 seats) and A330-200 (360 seats) for longer haul.
scheduled capacity. Seven of the ten largest air freight operators in revenue ton
kilometers (RTK) are network carriers 27
Demand for freight services has been fairly consistently in the past two decades and, in
fact, grew faster than passenger demand which is an indicator of a less saturated market.
Moreover, the growth rate volatility tracks economic activity in a very similar fashion to
demand for passenger services that we discussed in Ch. 2 which is also shown in Fig. 3-3.
Figure 3-3 Correlation of Global Economic Activity and Demand for Air Freight (Source: Boeing
2006))
The similarities do not stop there as the competitive and commoditization dynamics that
are encountered in the passenger side of the business are similarly strong if not stronger
as indicated by the drop in real yields showed in Fig. 3-4.
Figure 3-4 Comparison of real yield trends for passenger and freight carriers (Source: Boeing 2006) )
27 Korean Air, Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific China Airlines, Air France, Japan Airlines
with Federal Express, United Parcel Services, and Eva Airways (a subsidiary of sea shipping firm) being
the non-passenger ones in 2004.
Given the similarities in competitive behavior, growth rates, ownership, and capacity that
were discussed above, it can be deduced that the market structure in the two segment is
very similar. As a result, for the purposes of modeling the industry it is fairly safe to
combine the two for an aggregate perspective as we practice in modeling the industry(see Chapters 9 and 10).
3.3.4 Comparisons Among Operators
While there is a great deal of diversity across airlines, in order to be able to model the
industry successfully in its current and future states it is important to understand what the
real differences between operators are and how they may evolve. In other words, is it
reasonable to expect that the structure of the airline industry as a whole will change
radically and what impacts would that have for its future performance?
The most apparent effect of airlines competition is the reduction of real yields even in the
face of increasing fuel costs. This happens as airlines manage their costs better and
rationalize their operations. Charter airlines, with aircraft that have the maximum number
of seat configurations that operate only based on demand and on certain routes have by
far the least unit costs in the industry as shown in Fig. 3-5.
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Figure 3-5 Operating costs comparison of LCCs and charter operators (Source: (Button, Haynes et
al. 2002))
The same differences can be found between LCCs and legacy carriers as shown in Figure
3-6. LCCs until 2003 managed to retain a significant advantage in unit costs and
equipment utilization which in turn translated in better profitability. In later years the cost
advantage gap is closing after restructuring and rationalization of services by several
legacy carriers while the service levels provided by the two are also equalizing.
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Figure 3-7 Comparisons of Market Share in Emplanements and available seats (source: (Bhadra and
Texter 2004))
While the boundaries between the operations of LCCs and network carriers are blurring,
the ability of the entire industry to mimic the LCC model entirely is impeded by the
difficulty to dispense with the hub-and-spoke network system. Although rationalizing the
system through depeaking (or peak-smoothing) is seen as viable total point-to-point
network is impractical and inefficient. The network distribution does change (as seen in
Figure 3-7) but the trend is slowing and it is likely that it will reach an equilibrium
distribution between the types of carriers.
3.4 Airlines and Other Stakeholders
Airlines do not operate in a vacuum. They face competition from other modes, they buy
equipment and services from suppliers (airframe and engine manufacturers, airports, air
traffic control system), they are regulated by governments in the ways that they can
operate and compete, they are financed using capital markets and also make extensive use
of financing instruments to help with the acquisition of the increasingly expensive
equipment. In this section we will review these connections.
3.4.1 Governments
Taneja (1982) (pg. 112) notes that governments have been wavering in their industrial
policies of promotion of a strong air-transport industry. The first types of protections to
go were access to markets and government-set fares on the national level, described in
Section 3.4.8.1 known as deregulation and later on an international level (see Section
3.4.8.2). Subsidies and state support sometimes persist even in a deregulated environment
(Section 3.4.8.3) increasing the barriers to exit which in turn can fuel the industry cycle
discussed in detail in Section 3.5, as we discuss in Chapter 6. Governments also provide
for infrastructure and they regulate emissions (noise, pollutants, and, recently, greenhouse
gases). Other areas of direct government involvement include taxation levels and safety
standards but these are not discussed here as they apply universally (independent of the
type of carrier) and, at least theoretically, they should not create any kind of competitive
advantage between airlines although it is known that increased competitive pressures
have an effect on regulatory compliance that needs to be considered (see Perrow (1984)).
3.4.1.1 O-D market as a competitive environment: Contestability theory and
deregulation
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) exerted regulatory control over the US airline
industry from 1938 to 1978 (Viscusi et al. 2005). The CAB controlled:
* Firm entry rates by controlling airline certification28,
* Airline O-D market competition by allocating routes, and
* Fares by using a cost plus model and assuming a 55% load factor levels.
A controversial mixture of ideological conviction, political convenience, and a genuine
technocratic belief that market forces should be allowed to operate freely to the benefit of
the consumer led to the first deregulation of a transportation industry in the US (Kahn
(1988), Dempsey and Goetz (1992)). The results were dramatic and included substantial
operating cost reductions and faster increase in total demand but also increased profit
cyclicality (see Section 3.5), labor frictions and a spurred a deterioration of service
quality that accompanied the lowering of the fares. Baltagi et al. (1995) estimated that
deregulation precipitated cost reductions from 9 to 20%. In the following we discuss how
the level of competition can in fact still be limited despite deregulation and examine the
barriers to entry and exit present in the airline industry.
Probably the most interesting dynamic that emerges at the micro-level view is the
dynamics of O-D competition in a regional market. If the regional market is "regulated"
then the markets are not competitive and no additional dynamics emerge: each airline is
servicing its assigned routes and without direct competition can charge monopolistic
rents as fare-capping permits. This approach was favored not only for the industry to be
established but also to prevent 'destructive competition.' (Button 2002)(pg.2)
Theoretically, in "deregulated" markets, the barriers to entry are low enough that
interested parties, either existing airlines or investors interested in creating one, can enter
and exit any given O-D market without difficulty. Such a behavior would lead to
competitive pricing close to marginal cost.
While the first deregulation in the U.S. and all subsequent market liberalization exercises
in markets across the world 29 did in fact lead to greater competition and a proliferation of
business models most deregulated markets are still oligopolistic. A perfectly competitive
market implies that airlines are price takers and so their decisions on capacity or pricing
do not affect the market. As we have seen though, market competition does not reside on
the global or regional level but on the local level (O-D market).
Ideally, a deregulated industry would ensure low barriers to entry. Examining one by one
the relevant barriers to entry, we mark the factors with (+) if they lower the barriers, (-) if
they impede entry, and (=) if the effect is unclear.
* Entry capital costs: The necessary capital intensive infrastructure (airports and air
traffic control system) is already in place and funded mostly by government
28 Interestingly, an entry to a served market was allowed only if it could be proven by the entrant that the
incumbent's position would not be harmed (Good et al. (1993)).29 It is estimated that 50% of the world's O-D markets operate in a deregulated setting.
sources (+). The acquisition of aircraft is capital intensive (-) but the recent
availability of leasing contracts attenuates that effect (+).
* Government policies: given a deregulated state, they should not be an issue (+).
Safety and security requirements are not impediments to free entry as long as
ownership and cabotage30 requirements (-) are met. For large markets like the
U.S. or E.U. this is unlikely to be a reason for dearth of entrants although it still
exerts capital stifling effect. Holloway (1997) contends that government subsidies
through state aid or state owned airlines can prevent entrants by retaining an
inefficient airline and hence potential oversupply in the market (-). On the other
hand, the government's interest of accessibility to non-competitive, remote and
underpopulated markets, may justify this in terms of social policy.
* Economies of scale: Air transportation has economies of scale with larger aircraft
up to the point where load factors cannot keep pace (+). For the same size of
airplanes the marginal cost of adding an extra seat should be the same
independent of whether a firm owns 2 airplanes or 200 airplanes. There are four
caveats in this assertion: the availability (and cost) of landing slots at airports, the
network effects, the utility advantages from higher frequencies in short haul
markets, and the smaller capital costs for large orders (or leasing contracts) of
aircraft (-).
* Economies of scope and Network Effects: Hub-and-spoke networks, code-sharing
and alliances are the primary way for airlines to increase their coverage and hence
the utility to potential customers. To the extent that new entrants are precluded
from these arrangements, they can offer less value to the potential customers than
the competition (-). This is the reason why successful low-cost carriers focus their
entry on specific, usually under-utilized routes
* Distributor agreements: Travel agents were responsible for the bulk of ticket
reservations by passengers until the wide-spread use of online reservation
systems. But both reservation systems present similar barriers to entry that include
commissions charged, system ownership by incumbent airline competitors, and
volume agreements (-).
* Advertising and Customer Loyalty: In a safety conscious industry incumbents
with a good and sustained safety record have a natural advantage that helps brand
recognition. To counter that, new entrants need to invest in advertising
substantially to enhance their image; a cost that is irreversible if the market is
exited (-). Customer loyalty, especially as enhanced by frequent flyer programs,
is hard to badge (-). New entrants in a market try to attract customer base through
product differentiation. While air travel has only limited potential for
differentiation, some new entrants with high initial market capitalization did
include it successfully in their overall strategy by offering higher service quality
than competing products (see Virgin and JetBlue) (+).
* Predatory pricing: Incumbent airlines have the market power and financial clout
to out-price new entrants by cross-subsidizing their products. If their behavior is
uncontestable in courts (predatory pricing cases are notoriously hard to judge ex-
30 Restricting ownership for transportation operators within a country's borders to citizens.
post) and the financial means of the new entrant are limited then usually the
outcome favors the incumbent with the competitor withdrawing (-).
* Infrastructural constraints: Incumbent airlines have long leases on airport gates
and grandfathered schedule slots. This is a critical advantage for busy airports and
it is a de-facto exclusion of entrants for the most lucrative markets (-). The
emergence and utilization of satellite airports in major urban centers circumvents
this problems but does not solve it (+).
* Market size: Finally, the size of the O-D market can be an entry deterrent in itself;
if the potential size of the market is so small that it cannot justify more than a few
flights a day, then a monopoly situation is usually the natural outcome. There
simply is not enough revenue to justify a second or third entrant even with the
incumbent's rent gains (-). There is a counter effect to this named "Southwest
effect" that derived from the observation that significantly lower fares offered by
Southwest (and later JetBlue) seemed to increased the overall market. In reality
the potential for this effect is limited and it is likely attributed to the attraction of
market share from flights that share the same catchment areas (i.e. the increase in
flights from A to B come from a similar reduction in flights from Al to B 1 that
share the catchment areas of A and B) (see Table 3-2 for an illustration).
From the above overview, the picture that emerges is that regional market deregulation
does not guarantee a competitive market on an O-D pair basis. In contrast to this
observation, Baumol (1982) argued that the market for air travel between two cities is a
"perfectly contestable market" based on the assumption that it allows "frictionless
reversible entry and equal access to technology"; that is airlines have comparable aircraft
and operating processes and can enter and exit the market without incurring substantial
sunk costs. An O-D pair, as a contestable market "may support only one airline, but the
active airline must price at cost to prevent a price-cutting rival airline from flying in and
skimming off customers" as Brock (1983) puts it. That is the threat of competition alone
is enough to force competitive behavior even in natural monopoly situations, i.e. low
density routes.
While Baumol cites the empirical study of Bailey and Panzar on city pair airline markets,
further studies suggest that the applicability of contestability theory on air markets is at
best contestable and that "imperfect contestability" is more aptly describing empirical
findings (Hurdle, Johnson et al. 1989) and confirmed by the persisting barriers to entry as
described by (GAO 1996).
Even if markets are not perfectly contestable and barriers to entry and exit are not low
enough to signal a perfectly competitive market and oligopolistic pricing can persist, it is
undeniable that market liberalization did change drastically the competitive environment
and forced the industry towards commoditization and drastic reduction of their unit costs.
On the international front, market liberalization is slower and its effects are probably less
dramatic as we discuss in the next section.
3.4.1.2 Market Access Regulations: Freedoms of the Air
Air transportation is a regulated activity because of safety requirements but also because
access to a country's airspace and the mobility and accessibility options offered to its
citizens (and military) are considered matters of national sovereignty. As a result,
establishing national airlines and securing access rights to the national and international
markets were subject to international negotiations. Immediately after the end of WWII,
the international treaty that established what came to be known as "freedoms of the air"
was the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) that was
ratified into effect in 1947.
There are nine freedoms of the air that progressively allow for increasing liberalization of
air transport. The first five freedoms are multilateral, that is they can be ratified by all
signatories to the Chicago Convention but the rest are not yet formally recognized in
international treaties (referred to as "so-called" by ICAO). The sixth freedom is
derivative of the third and fourth and its prohibition cannot really be enforced and
therefore is practiced without restrictions. For the rest, bilateral agreements, like the Open
Skies agreements promoted by the U.S., may allow them. All nine freedoms are briefly
presented in Box 3-1.
As can be inferred by the dearth of examples where the eighth and ninth freedoms are
implemented, states still view air transportation as an industry to be protected for the
national interest. For this reason, airline ownership is restricted in varying degrees to
citizens of the country.31
The implication of the regulatory environment discussed is that regional markets can be
closed to competition for companies that cannot comply with the ownership and cabotage
requirements. For geographically small countries this used to mean that the whole market
would be served by a monopolistic airline owned and controlled by the state, which
was usually regulated by fare-setting caps. On the other hand, the U.S., which also
happened to encompass the largest domestic market, pioneered the liberalization
approach that through deregulation lifted some of the domestic market restrictions (fare-
setting and route assignment) and allowed for a more competitive environment.
A more important aspect in the difficulty of liberalizing international markets and
allowing access to local market for international airlines is that it would do little to
change the current cost structure of the long-range flight. The relative unit costs of long-
range travel are already quite low. Reducing them further by faster aircraft turn-around,
which was a primary tool in the toolkit of LCCs, will not have any significant effect as it
is small compared to total travel time. It is more probable that it may effect local markets
if the Eight freedom goes into play. This is probably the greatest impact to be expected
3~ The ongoing struggle (as of October 2006) of the Virgin brand to enter the U.S. market with Virgin
America Inc. serves as a case in point. While, as required by U.S. law, 75% of the proposed airline is
owned by U.S.-based interests and both CEO and president are American citizens, there was strong
opposition raised by incumbent U.S. airlines. If the venture proceeds, it will be the highest capitalization
airline start-up in history with $177M of launch capital.
from the Open Skies agreement between the US and the EU that has been recently
ratified.
Box 3-1 Freedoms of the air
First: Right to overfly a country's territory. Necessary for practicable aviation, it is wallowed almost globally
as long as it is requested in advance.
Second: Right to stop-over in a country's airport without embarking or disembarking customers and cargo.
The reason for it could be scheduled or unscheduled refueling and maintenance requirements. When
airliners' range was not adequate, Shannon airport in Ireland and Anchorage airport in Alaska were prime
examples of such usage for trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific flights, respectively. While for passenger traffic
this freedom is not used anymore, cargo flights do make use of it.
Third: Right to land and deliver traffic to a country that originated from the home country.
Fourth: Right to receive traffic that originates from one country to be transferred to the home country of the
airline.
Fifth: Right to carry traffic from the home country to second country and from there to a third country.
Sixth: Right to transfer traffic, via the home country, from one country to another. Since its prohibition is not
enforceable because it derives from the third and fourth freedoms, it is de facto exercised.
Seventh: Right to connect traffic between two countries without continuing to the home country. Exercising
of this freedom is rare.
Eighth: Right to transport traffic that originates between two points in the same country in a flight that
originates or terminates in the home country. Also known as "consecutive cabotage", this is also a rarely
exercised freedom. It has been extended to carriers for all European Union member countries showing the
need for having very tight interactions between the countries for this freedom to be ratified.
Ninth: Right to transport traffic between points in the same country without needing to connect to the home
country. This is known as "stand-alone cabotage."
3.4.1.3 Bankruptcy Protections and Subsidies
One aspect of government intervention with potential significance for the cyclical
behavior of the industry is the area of subsidies. In a deregulated market subsidies
support can take the form of:
* Distress funding (see the US government response to 9/11 in Figure 3-8)
* Bankruptcy protections
* Pension scheme relief
* National defense funds
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Figure 3-8 Allocation of $2.3B of Post-9/11 Direct Assistance to US Airlines (Source: (GAO 2004))
All of the above means of support are, at least in principle, geared towards social as
opposed to pure market goals but as such they can also be prone to misuse and create
dysfunctional markets (government failure). Pure free market advocates would argue that
any type of intervention is detrimental. From the business cycle literature (see Ch. 6), it is
known that forced retention of capacity for any reason (in this case it takes the form of
higher barriers to exit) increases the chances for price wars and the consequent
profitability cycle (see Section 3.5). In the case of the airline industry the effect is not as
strong because capacity in the form of aircraft would be largely maintained as it can be
sold in second hand markets rather than being taken off-market entirely.
3.4.1.4 Mergers, Code-sharing Alliances and Anti-trust Immunity
Another form of government intervention is anti-monopoly regulations that are intended
to prevent collusion between companies in any industry. These regulations are intended
to provide the benefit to the consumer of the lowest prices and highest levels of service
that competitive markets are supposed to offer. As we saw previously, most airline O-D
markets are only imperfectly contestable and in many cases there may not be a market
core, i.e. the market could not be competitive and efficient as the entry of more than one
competitors would create losses for both (Button 2002).
Partially recognizing this, government policies have relaxed anti-monopoly regulation
(the Sherman Act in the US) to allow international airline alliances in which airlines that
do not compete directly in their markets are allowed (offered anti-trust immunity) to
code-share (i.e. sell a flight that is operated by an alliance partner and thus extend their
network coverage without extending their capacity) and share price information with
their partners. Brueckner (2003) in an empirical study found that the existence of
alliances in international airline markets reduces the fare by 8-17% thus supporting the
concept of empty-core airline markets.
Consistent with Brueckner, Bilotkach (2005) investigated the effect that anti-trust
immunity (sharing price information) can have on alliances and found that immunity is
expected to produce benefits for interline passengers and not granting it can discourage
consolidation. Porter (1990) considered alliances as "transitional devices" characteristic
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of industries under transformation into a more competitive, perhaps commoditized,
setting because of management mistrust in their ability to cope with the change. This
characterization may not be justifiable for airline alliances as they seem to be well
established and may usher an era of mega-carriers.
3.4.1.5 Environmental and Capacity Regulations
The fourth relevant area of government involvement with airlines is the impact of
regulations on capacity. Emission and noise control regulations in the form of standards
are technology forcing and therefore reduce the risk of innovation required to meet them
(Ashford, Ayers et al. 1985). Their existence allowed airlines to plan and conduct their
fleet management so as to meet these regulations and in some cases retire the older
aircraft prematurely although retrofitting and conversion to freighters maintained some of
that fleet in use.
More recently, the concern over the effects of global warming inducing greenhouse gases
has instituted regulations in Europe that will start charging some of that externality cost
in the form of carbon tax to polluting aircraft. Unlike automobiles or electricity
generation, there is no known carbon-free propulsion technology for aircraft and only
increased efficiency in engine technology and operations along with no use can curb
carbon emissions. The expansion of carbon charges beyond Europe is plausible and in
this case, the increases cost of fares could substantially curb future demand.
3.4.2 Capacity Management: Aircraft Manufacturers and Leasing Firms
As shown in Equations 2 and 3 in Section 3-1, the capacity offered by a given carrier in
their market is a product of the number of aircraft in active duty, the number of seats per
aircraft, the frequency with which the fly, their utilization per day, and the distances that
they bridge. As a result the decisions that influence that capacity have both short term and
long term horizons. The short term decisions, with a horizon of about a year, include
scheduling, routing, aircraft parking, aircraft wet leasing and maintenance planning. The
longer term decisions, with a horizon of at least three years32, include aircraft acquisition
and long-term leasing, aircraft retirement, long-term route planning, airport slot and
infrastructure planning, crew training and hiring.
Aircraft capacity management is therefore not only critical in terms of capacity (and by
implication yield based on the supply demand equilibration) it is also responsible for a
large fraction of the operating cost since different aircraft allow for different operating
cost structures. In this section we discuss the critical attributes of aircraft from the airline
operator perspective and the separation of aircraft ownership and operation with the
relatively recent growth of aircraft leasing.
32 Anecdotal information from discussions with Boeing officials suggest that airlines do not usually plan for
further than 5 years.
3.4.2.1 Commercial Jet Aircraft Attributes Relevant to Airline Business Considerations
Modern aircraft are very complex products that utilize cutting-edge technologies in their
design, materials, and systems. The dominant tube and wing basic design has been
refined over several decades in the early period of aviation and remained pretty constant
since the 1940s. This is not to say that innovation did not take place, but it was
incremental rather than radical innovation. The capabilities and prices of aircraft have
evolved accordingly.
From the airline perspective, there are different categories of properties that are relevant
when an order for aircraft is made: mission-critical performance characteristics, non-
mission critical technical and operational characteristics, financial and contractual
obligations.
The detailed technical characteristics of even a simple single engine airplane may fill
hundreds of pages. This kind of detail refers to aerodynamic and flight characteristics that
any certified airplane must have and therefore it is of little value for our purposes. In this
description we collect and focus on the characteristics that drastically differentiate
aircraft offers and influence buying decisions as described by Downen (2005), Clark
(2001), and Holloway (1997).
Mission-critical performance characteristics:
Performance characteristics define the ability of an aircraft to perform a given mission:
i.e. the payload it can carry, the range it can reach and the time it needs to complete the
trip.
Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW): The limit of total weight that an aircraft is
certified to take-off. When an aircraft type is new, it is common practice to rate the
aircraft's structural ability conservatively. Later versions of the plane after it has been
shown that there are no unexpected problems are certified higher. This may make the
early-launch aircraft of a type somewhat less valuable over time.
Operating Empty Weight (OEW): The weight of the aircraft ready to fly without
payload and fuel.
Range: Range cannot be described by a single number. It is limited by fuel tank capacity
and is dependent on payload and MTOW. For each aircraft type there are payload-range
diagrams like the one shown in Figure 3-9. Some aircraft types allow for extra fuel tank
capacity usually at the expense of cargo bay volume. In this work, we tried to be
consistent and use maximum range with full payload at cruise speed when available in
our sources.
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Figure 3-9 A typical Payload-Range diagram
A regulatory and not technical barrier to range consisted of clearances for two engine
aircraft to fly over areas without available suitable airports for emergency landings. As jet
engines proved their reliability, these requirement were relaxed with the introduction of
Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS)33 regulations in the 80s. ETOPS progressively
allowed twin engine aircraft to fly further in airport constrained areas as long as
maintenance and safety record requirements were met.
Seating capacity: While the true maximum capacity for a given range can be found by
subtracting OEW and the fuel needed for the mission from MTOW, in most cases of
passenger LCA the seating arrangement (volumetric payload) is the limiting factor as
dictated by service level requirements. As a comparative metric we use the same typical
class arrangement.
Speed: A measure for aircraft speed is cruise speed at altitude. For commercial jets, it is
usually measured in Mach number but since this metric is dependent on altitude and is
not directly related to distance we use km/h as an equivalent proxy. While speed really
differentiated jet commercial aircraft from propeller driven ones, it is less of a factor now
with most offerings reaching similar cruise speeds. The possible introduction of more
fuel efficient propfan planes that cruise at lower speeds may introduce more variability.
Block speed (as defined in Section 3.1, the average speed between door close at origin to
door open at destination, also known as chock to chock) also vary operationally, and is
higher with longer stage lengths as take-off and landing procedures are time consuming.
Additional performance characteristics:
For fleet planning, other considerations include take-off distance requirements, climbing
performance, and runway loading but for the majority of airports and airlines we consider
3 3 Before ETOPS, two engine airplanes were not allowed to fly further than one hour from an airfield at
their single-engine speed. The ETOPS acronym came to be jokingly known also as standing for "Engines
Turn or Passengers Swim."
them as equivalent across airframe manufacturers and therefore not critical in carrier
choice.
Non-mission critical technical characteristics:
For aircraft that meet mission-critical performance characteristics other technical
characteristics that may offer cost or operating advantages can become the tipping factor
for the choice among them. These technical differences can characterize different
generations of aircraft or be dependent on the existing fleet of the operator.
Crew requirements: As shown in Section 3.1.2, flight and cabin crew compensation is
usually the greatest relative expense in the carriers' budget. While, the number of pilots
required is mandated for redundancy reasons and the number of cabin crew for safety
reasons, technical advancements did manage to relax these requirements. As we discuss
in the aircraft competition vignettes in Section 4.2.2, the Airbus A300 appeal was
enhanced by sporting the first two-man cockpit in a widebody aircraft. Yet, these
differences are rare.
Fuel Burn: Fuel burn expresses the mass of fuel used for the specific aircraft to fly for
one hour at cruise speed and altitude. Unlike Specific Fuel Consumption34 which is
dependent only on engine performance, fuel burn accounts for weight and aerodynamic
differences 35. The fluctuations of fuel prices make this parameter of varying importance
to airlines3 6 .
Noise and emissions: Regulatory requirements mandate performance thresholds for these
characteristics. As noise requirements were introduced in the North American and
European markets, several older models were either retired, sold in other markets, or
retrofitted with noise reduction equipment (hash-kitting) based on the availability of new
aircraft. New aircraft that anticipate or exceed future requirements presumably are more
competitive.
Maintenance requirements: Maintenance is an important cost for airlines. Direct
maintenance costs (DMC) are generally lower for newer airplanes and tend to increase
over time. Clark (2001) divides maintenance into line (simple tasks performed with the
aircraft in duty), airframe maintenance and engine maintenance. Maintenance work is
scheduled in advance and due to safety considerations is intended to be preventive.
Airframe maintenance is divided into A, C and D checks which are scheduled for every
-400 hours, -15 months, and -5 years correspondingly and are of increasing detail.
These checks are done with the aircraft taken off line and therefore incur an additional
cost in lost productivity. Engine maintenance is scheduled similarly into overhauls based
34 The amount of fuel consumed to generate one pound of thrust for one hour.
35 Well designed winglets can lower consumption by about 3 to 5%. Retrofitting older jets is an available
option as well.
36 But the importance of fuel consumption is expected to solidify in the fleet planning decision makers
given (a) the specter of regulating C02 emissions due to their impact on global climate, and (b) the
increasing cost of oil as global capacity is pressed by demand.
on number of take-off cycles and total operating hours. Because of their scheduling,
maintenance costs are not spread evenly over time as shown in Figure 3-10. A recent
trend is the provision of "flight-by-the-hour" agreements by manufacturers of aircraft and
engines that allow for an even spread of maintenance costs and reductions in overhead
from the required personnel.
•9
U
co
0 5 10 15 Years
Figure 3-10 Cost structuring for maintenance costs (concept source Clark 2001)
Fleet commonality: Legacy airlines bought and retained large fleets with diverse types
of aircraft. The fleet diversity would be exacerbated because of mergers when the aircraft
of the two airlines were joined in a single fleet or with impulse buying. With their
reduced emphasis on cost-control, the management failed to recognize that such diversity
entailed significant costs in maintenance, parts inventory carrying, larger than optimal
number of pilots, crews, and mechanics that have appropriate ratings for the different
types of aircraft etc. The success of LCCs showed clearly that keeping a single aircraft
fleet had benefits in all the above cost areas and legacy carriers were forced by
competitive pressures to "rationalize" their fleets.
Of course there is a limit to the types of networks that can be covered with single type
fleet as aircraft were optimized for combinations of distance, range and capacity. In that
respect commonality by single-sourcing (using one supplier) can have an impact as long
as parts are interchangeable. Airbus offered an innovation in that respect by extending
commonality to whole aircraft subsystems and allowing for pilot cross-certification thus
significantly increasing the advantage of single-sourcing (Sttissel 2003). Bador (2007)
discusses limits in the benefits of commonality especially in the area of cockpit
arrangements.
Strategies of aircraft purchasing/leasing/selling
Based on the above discussion, the decision to purchase an aircraft should involve long-
term planning that balances of performance, maintainability, purchase and resale value.
New aircraft have long delivery lead-times as they are complex engineering artifacts that
are built on demand. These delivery lead-times make market forecasting necessary for
airlines but are also providing an incentive to airlines to place phantom orders (orders that
they are unsure if they needs) just to be in the queue. Airframe manufacturers, in their
intent to gain market share (see Ch. 4), are not pricing the option for aircraft at its market
value. In addition they offer several selling incentives: heavy discounts from list price,
financing schemes, performance guarantees, and buy-back agreements. These incentives
add to the pressure of airlines fleet planning teams to make a bargain contract.
Very large airlines may follow a dual-sourcing strategy just to ensure that both of the two
manufacturing competitors can make credible bids for their orders. Large airlines are also
regularly consulted by the manufacturers as to the desired performance of aircraft under
development. In earlier years, dominant airlines like Pan Am, were the driving forces
behind innovative aircraft (like the development of the Boeing 747 see Section 4.2.2).
This is no longer usual although some promising leadership has been shown by Easy Jet
(Harrison 2007). Despite the necessity of long-term planning by airlines, anecdotal
evidence indicate that their true planning horizon is relatively short even when making
these decisions of longer term impact.
Airlines that are in difficult economic position have also been found to be more likely to
sell their used aircraft and at lower prices during market downturns (Pulvino 1998).
3.4.2.2 Leasing Companies: Owners vs. Operators
The dichotomy between owners and operators of aircraft is fairly recent as shown in
Figure 3-11. Leasing firms buy new aircraft and lease them out using different types of
leases37 . They regularly sell used aircraft from their fleet and may also manage fleets for
airlines that are carriers only. The aircraft leasing industry is quite concentrated with
three companies sharing most of the market but several other smaller ones: International
Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC) owned by insurance firm AIG, GECAS which is a
business unit of GE - which also happens to be a large aircraft engine manufacturer, and
AWAS owned by the investment bank Morgan Stanley.3 8
Morrell (2002) identifies four types of leases:
* Finance leases. These are non-cancellable with periods of 10-12 years covering
the entire period of the asset's economic life. They are full pay-out leases, in that
the lessees usually own the aircraft at the end of the lease. Leveraged leases are a
37 Wet leases are short term offering fully manned aircraft and maintenance in which the lessee has to pay
for the fuel and the lease. Dry leasing offers the aircraft only and is usually made for longer periods.
Finally, capital leasing is a sort of financing provision in which the airline intends to retain the aircraft for
periods longer than five years and generally intends to take ownership of the aircraft.
In 2000, GECAS and ILFC owned a little less than 50% of the leased aircraft by value (based on Morell
2002, Table 8-3).
form of finance lease with the difference that they are financed using 60 to 80%
debt finance and provided tax advantages to the lessors.
* Operating leases. These are more flexible, shorter term leases with duration from
one to seven years and average contracts being five years.
* Wet leases. Very short period leases for which the lessor provides complete
maintenance and cockpit and cabin crew (although the latter is not prerequisite).
* Sale and leaseback. This type of lease involves the sale of an aircraft by the
airline that owns it and which continues to operate it under lease. They can be
used as cash infusion mechanisms for airlines by realizing the aircraft value.
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Figure 3-11 Percentage of New Orders by Lessors and coefficient of variation of fleet size (source:
(Gavazza 2005))
Leasing, in theory, facilitates a more efficient allocation of capital resources by
eliminating (or at least reducing) the friction in decision-making encountered by owners
of the resource which is due to the transaction costs involved in trading in secondary
markets or the value loss of idling. Gavazza (2005) found empirical evidence in the
airline industry that support these expectations. He found that leased aircraft are held
40% on average less than owned aircraft and, more importantly, have 8% higher output
than owned aircraft as they are held by airlines that can utilize them better. It should be
noted though that lease contracts do not offer full flexibility; many of them are long-term
and are not open to renegotiation or opting out. 39
Figure 3-11 shows two interesting aspects of leasing firms behavior. First there is high
correlation between the increase in the variation of fleet size which implies that the
emergence (and demise) of large number of small new entrant carriers was correlated and
probably facilitated by the existence of leasing firms. The second aspect is shown more
clearly if the fraction of aircraft orders by leasing firms is superimposed on the total
39 Udvar-Hazy founder and CEO of the leasing firm ILFC recently remarked: "Big U.S. carriers, since the
dawn of the jet age, act almost like superior beings," after half his US customers asked for lease
renegotiation post 9/11. "They want all the benefits when times are good, but if they are bad, they want you
to sacrifice." He continues: "Our company is stronger than any major U.S. carrier. The day will come when
they need I.L.F.C." (Wayne 2007)
orders as shown in Figure 3-12. There it is shown that although overall the orders of
leasing firms follow the market trend they act as a dampening mechanism as they order
much more comparatively to other players during order downturns (perhaps partly helped
by the strong financial positions of their parent firms) and much less during upturns.
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Figure 3-12 The dampening effect of leasing: Comparison of Total Orders to Leasing Orders (data
sources: Boeing and Airbus orderbooks and (Gavazza 2005))
3.4.3 Employees and Labor Unions
The airline relationship with their employees has been notorious. As previously
mentioned, employees enjoyed protected, well-paying jobs with substantial benefit
packages before deregulation. Post-deregulation they were the first to face the brunt of
cost-cutting measures to meet the competitive pressures and in some instances agreed to
negotiated payment and benefit cuts while in others they engaged in severe strikes. In
many cases, the powerful airline unions (pilots, attendants and machinists) did not act
concertedly but rather tried to undercut each other generating animosity and partially
succumbing to management manipulation to that effect. The tumultuous times peaked in
mid-1980s and since then most airlines faced less protracted strikes. Attempts of
employee ownership and management have generally been thwarted and were not
successful the one time that was actually tried (Petzinger 1995)
At this stage, unionization is not an indicative factor of the management-employee
relationship levels. Southwest has the highest level of unionization in the industry but is
also know for extremely high levels of employee satisfaction and these are a key part of
their business strategy (Gittell 2003). JetBlue, another carrier with high levels of
employee satisfaction and stated goal to achieve them, is entirely non-unionized.
3.5 Cycles in the Airline Industry
In the previous sections we alluded to the cyclical behavior of the airline industry but we
did not address it directly. In this section we will review the aspects of the industry that
are cyclical directly.
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Demand itself does fluctuate tracking the GDP (see Fig. 3-13 and Ch. 2) but these
fluctuations are relatively benign as shown in Figure 3-14 and if anything they tend to
dampen post-deregulation.
Figure 3-13 Demand change rate compared to GDP
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Figure 3-14 Global Airline Demand, Trend (left side), and Detrended Normalized Demand (right
side) (data source: (ATA 2006))
This dampening of demand fluctuations is indicative of the increased competition
between airlines and the success of yield management systems and price discrimination
that tailors fare prices to maximize load factors.
As shown, in Figure 3-15, load factors do indeed increase consistently in the post-
deregulation period while the real yield (which is equivalent to average fare price is
consistently decreasing).
Figure 3-15 Normalized real yield and average load factors
Given this consistent increases in load factors and demand even in the face of changes in
economic activity we expect that airlines would alter their fares to achieve this and thus
impact their profitability as the airline cost structure is relatively fixed in the short term.
This indeed is the case as shown in Figure 3-16. Jiang and Hansman (2004) modeled this
profitability cycle with a seemingly increasing amplitude as a second order undampened
oscillatory system with a period of approximately 11 years as shown in Figure 3-17.
Figure 3-16 Airline net profitability in Real and Nominal $
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This quite cyclical profitability is
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regions as shown in Figure 3-18.
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Figure 3-18 Comparison of European, US, and Global airline performance (source: (Button, Haynes
et al. 2002) )
The effect of cyclical profits in a sector that uses durable goods is expected to propagate
up the supply chain amplifying in variance in a phenomenon known as the 'bullwhip
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effect' (see Ch. 6 for further discussion). This is indeed the case in the order relationship
between airline and airframe manufacturers as shown in Figure 3-19. Where the total
orders placed with manufacturers in seats have a phase shift from the profit cycle of the
airlines by about a year in the peaks and two years or more in the recessions.
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Figure 3-19 Airline profitability and order placements comparison
The mechanisms that feed the strong cyclicality in the airline industry as shown by the
indicators in this section will be discussed extensively in Chapter 7.
3.6 Chapter 3 Summary
In this chapter we explored some defining characteristics of the airline industry. We
defined the basic metrics used to measure output and performance in the industry. We
discussed its cost structure and how different business models and deregulation spurred
competition and even price wars in the industry. Even with deregulation though, the
setting of fares can be less than competitive for uncontested routes or routes that would
not support more than one carrier profitably.
Besides the government-airline connection, we saw the factors that airlines consider
when making aircraft purchase decision and how the rise of leasing firms has impacted
the industry: (i) leasing allows (relatively) increased flexibility in capacity ownership, (ii)
leasing also reduces the barriers to entry for new carriers that do not have to carry the full
risk of aircraft ownership, and (iii) while not reacting as fast as airlines in ordering
aircraft as conditions change (dampening effect) it provides an additional echelon of
decision making that may allow for some duplication of ordering.
Finally, we illustrated the aspects of the industry that are cyclical and aspects that are not.
In the next chapter we will present in more detail the immediate upstream suppliers for
airlines - aircraft manufacturers. How the manufacturers' competitive environment reacts
to the cyclicality in the airline industry and to what extent it reinforces it will be analyzed
further in the remainder of this dissertation.
Chapter 4 Airframe Manufacturing: Industrial Evolution
Airframe manufacturers are the next step up after airlines in the value chain of air travel.
Traditionally, they design, manufacture, and support the aircraft equipment used for
providing air transport services. In this chapter we review the strategic alternatives they
face in the context of their industry and its relations to their suppliers, buyers,
shareholders and governments. For exploring the dynamics of the industry we use the
evolution of aircraft as a base for narrating the technological and organizational changes
in the industry.
Airframe manufacturers have to decide on whether to build a new aircraft, what
specifications to equip it with, and at what price to sell it. Although, aircraft prices have
been steadily increasing in line with the increase of aircraft complexity and performance,
the manufacturers have competed aggressively to gain or retain market share. This
competition reflects on the substantial discounts offered to launch buyers, volume buyers,
and most interested parties that try to pit the airframe manufacturers against their
competitors.
The reasons behind such aggressive marketing behavior are summarized in the list below:
* Economies of scale: As aircraft production requires significant upfront
development costs, the average aircraft production costs are reduced substantially
as development costs are allocated over more aircraft produced.40
* Learning curves: Given the complexity and the number of each production run,
it does not come as a surprise that aircraft manufacturing is adhering to strong
learning curves. In fact, the aircraft industry has been the focus of case studies on
the effect of learning effects since the 1930s ((Wright 1936), (Alchian 1950),
(Argote and Epple 1990), (Benkard 2000))
* Vendor lock-in 41 : The larger the number of aircraft of a given production line
that are in use reduces the operating cost of that aircraft type for the airlines. This
is due to the relative greater abundance of spare parts, mechanics, and airports
that accept that type. This effect is even more pronounced internally for a given
airline where commonality in parts and training can allow savings in part
inventories, crew training, and higher interoperability. While the lock-in effects
have not been studied rigorously for aircraft, there are anecdotal indications for
them 42 . (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995) identified three types of lock-in: (i) first
degree where there is cost changing but it the choice was efficient because of full
40 While this is true for most heavy manufacturing products, LCA are in a category of their own as they run
in production lines that range from 200 to 3000. They are produced in higher numbers than large ships
which are largely custom-built yet they are not mass produced like automobiles.
41 While the definition of network effects is usually given as value increasing more than proportionally due
to the addition of users, it can be used for aircraft in the inverse: value decreases more than proportionally
with the addition of aircraft types.
42 A GE executive stated that they are in the "razor business" to justify selling aeroengines below cost and
aiming to recover their expenses and profit by revenues from the after-sale support and parts sales (the
blade aspect of the business).
knowledge; (ii) second degree where the outcome appear inefficient a posteriori
due to limitations on knowledge; and (iii) third degree inefficient but remediable
outcomes. They note that owners (in our case aircraft manufacturers) can take
advantage of lock-in externalities by offering incentives to early adopters.
Lifecycle revenues. Aircraft maintenance during its lifecycle provides sustainable
revenue for the manufacturer as a sort of annuity. While such revenues have been
instrumental in the marketing of jet engines with revenues that could exceed 90%
of the engine price tag over its lifecycle, they are less important for airframes.
The above characteristics offer a potentially long-term and reinforcing advantage to the
manufacturer that can gain an edge in the market share on specific families and across the
product line.
The nature of the competition and the limited production runs for aircraft, forced industry
consolidation to the current point of a competitive duopoly. While in the near term future,
no potential entrant to the large commercial aircraft (LCA) market is perceived as viable,
manufacturers of smaller aircraft like regional jets and turboprops, governments of large
developing world economies, key suppliers of aircraft parts or any combination of the
above may eventually provide a credible counteroffer or even introduce a disruptive
technology that would render the LCA obsolete.
The sensitivity of the airframe manufacturing industry in issues of national defense and
its use of cutting edge technologies with great potential for spillover in other economic
sectors, made aircraft manufacturing an attractive sector for government involvement and
support. This involvement, direct and indirect, has lead to ongoing legal disputes brought
to international adjudication with regard to subsidies provided to Boeing and Airbus by
their respective governments. Even more than airlines, aircraft manufacturers are flag
carriers of national pride. As no single national market is sufficient, aircraft
manufacturing becomes a leading industrial exporter of high value assets. As such, it can
mitigate trade imbalances with third countries. All these characteristics combined, make
the industry a prime target for industrial policy and government manipulation which
some times is brought to the extreme where head of states act practically as sales
representatives for the manufacturer of their country.
It is critical to understand the characteristics summarized above in order to understand
and meaningfully model the interactions of the airframe industry with the airline industry
and the other constituents of the Commercial Aviation Enterprise of Enterprises. In
Section 4.1 of this chapter we will review the current state of aircraft manufacturers. We
discuss the considerations taken in aircraft development and how these affected
competition in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the manufacturing requirements for a
complex aircraft and how competitive pressures shape pricing. Finally, Section 4.4
reviews the effects that the cyclical behavior of the airline industry imposes on the
manufacturing industry.
4.1 Large Commercial Aircraft: Industrial Evolution
Limited markets and the size of capital investments needed to compete for the
increasingly complex task of producing LCA led to the consolidation of the industry
down to a duopoly. Boeing (after its merger with McDonnell Douglas) and Airbus, a
combination of a number of European aerospace firms, are the two remaining players as
LCA suppliers.43 The aircraft supply chain is completed by four engine manufacturers44,
a large number of part suppliers and raw material providers. Some key raw materials for
aircraft manufacturing like titanium and certain types of composites are production-
constrained and therefore access to supply can be critical for aircraft production.
Piepenbrock (2005) used Boeing and Airbus as prototypical examples of his "red vs.
blue" enterprise categorization.
"Red" or integral companies exhibit a tendency to grow organically in slow but intently
sustainable fashion. They form strong relationships with the stakeholders of their
extended enterprise that include governments, suppliers, financiers, and suppliers. As
these companies emerge during the mature phase of a technology, their product
innovation focuses on providing end user value at low cost but usually at the expense of
cutting edge innovation or performance.
"Blue" or modular companies on the other hand tend to be more insular from the
stakeholders of their extended enterprise. As they have a comparatively longer history of
engineering excellence, they are usually driven by technical innovation and in some cases
sacrifice operating efficiency or manufacturability for technical performance.
The red/blue division integrates several models of enterprise evolution from (Utterback
1994) technological maturation to the stakeholder vs. shareholder model of the
corporation as reviewed by (Donaldson and Preston 1995). 45
No company is purely blue or red based on the above description but their shade of
purple may be skewed towards one or the other color. In the following sections, we will
identify the overarching characteristics of aircraft manufacturing as an enterprise and
where the two primary competitors (Boeing and Airbus) differ starting with an overview
of their organizational history.
4.1.1 Early History of US Aircraft Manufacturing: Boeing Commercial Aircraft
Origins
Boeing started its career in the second half of 1920's by selling training aircraft to the
U.S. Navy. Boeing founded Boeing Air Transport (BAT) an airline operator for
43 Regional jets have capacities of up to 120 seats that are on the low end of LCA. This market is also
duopolistic with Bombardier and Embraer being the two primary manufacturers. This is a more contestable
market with ventures from China and Russia intent on entering it.
44 GE and Pratt Whitney on the US side. Rolls Royce and Snecma (part of the SAFRAN group) on the
European side. Many engines are actually developed in collaboration between two (or more) of the
manufacturers to pool the costs and risks of such development.
45 See extended discussion in Chapter 5.
passenger flights (1927) and at the same time it engaged into a contract with the U.S.
Postal Service to transport mail between Chicago and San Francisco. The U.S.
government was involved in the nascent industry through its defense arm by ordering
combat planes and with the passage of the Air Commerce Act which established federal
regulation over commercial air services and federal funding for establishing the beacon
network necessary to guide those flights.
As a builder of planes, Boeing was one among dozens small aircraft companies
competing for a relatively small and unpredictable market. Boeing managed to
distinguish itself through conglomeration: in 1928, during a booming stock market
period, Boeing Airplane and Transport Company absorbed Boeing Airplane Company,
BAT, engine maker Pratt & Whitney, a propeller manufacturer and smaller regional
airlines becoming "the largest aerospace conglomerate in the world" (Lynn 1997). This
conglomerate, known as United, was the essence of vertical integration, controlling
almost all aspects of the aerospace business. By 1931 United Airlines had a fleet of 120
planes that flew 32.000 miles a day.
A continuing expansionist drive for market domination fueled the conglomerate. At work
was a positive feedback loop shown diagrammatically in Fig. 1: United created demand
for aircraft and the manufacturing profits are used for designing bigger and better planes
that would in turn attract more passengers generating more profit for both divisions.
Safety
Passenger
Better / bigger demand
airplanes Cost/seat/.
+ United Airlines
Revenues
Better airplanes higher demand
R & D for Bigger, Demand for
Faster, Further airplanes
Airplane Manufacturing +
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Figure 4-1 A virtuous cycle of demand in a vertically integrated business (Boeing's business strategy
in the 1920's)
Boeing's airplane design in fact followed those demand trends: the four-seater mail
planes were replaced in 1928 with Model 80, a 12-seater known as the "Pullman of the
air." Boeing 247, the "first modern passenger airliner" in 1933 created new standards of
comfort and speed with an all-metal construction, 200mph top speed and a cruising
altitude of 11,500 feet but still carrying only 10 passengers. At this time Boeing had
managed to capture almost fifty percent of a fragmented market.
Ironically, this high point for Boeing, achieved through vertical integration of production,
distribution, and retail, created fertile ground for the anti-trust watchdogs to take action.
Congressional committees investigated into the award of airmail contracts without
bidding and although Boeing's defense indicated that this was done because no
competitor bid for them, they lost the case. The legislation enacted prohibited companies
with a connection to airframe manufacturers to bid for contracts and this for United
meant that its flights could not be sustained since passenger revenue alone was not nearly
enough for profitability. Inevitably, the conglomerate broke up to its original constituents
and Boeing shrunk back to being a "financially weak airframe manufacturer." (Lynn
1997). In the meantime competition was catching up; Douglas built, at TWA's prompting
who wanted a supplier outside the United conglomerate, an all aluminum DC-2 and
Lockheed introduced Electra, a 10-seater all-metal plane sporting a series of
innovations 46
Despite all this, in the mid 1930's Boeing started to gain momentum with the B-17 Flying
Fortress project which was ordered experimentally by the Army. Although, this project
did not expand until WWII, it gave Boeing the experience needed to introduce large
civilian aircraft. In 1936, PanAm ordered a fleet of Model 314 Clippers (4 engine flying
boat seating comfortably 74 passengers) but the flying boat was soon deemed to slow and
inefficient by comparison to the next generation of designs. Model 307 Stratoliners (33
pax capacity) were introduced in 1941 with a significant innovation: pressurized cabins
that make them capable of flying at 20.000ft thus providing comfort and speed by
avoiding bad weather conditions. Douglas responded by developing the DC-4 (42 pax
capacity) which was both faster and roomier and allowed it to capture market share over
the 307. This left Boeing just before WWII at the number two position (45 planes flying
in the US) significantly lagging behind Douglas (183 planes) and closely followed by
Lockheed (42 planes) (Lynn 1997).
WWII changed the landscape radically creating a windfall of revenues from the huge
ramp-up of military aircraft production. During the war more than 300.000 planes were
built. Boeing's facilities for the production of 307 and 314 were converted for producing
B-17s at a rate of over 200 / month at peak period. The improved bomber design, B-29
Superfortress, went into production in 1944.
Expectedly, such levels of production could not be sustained after the end of the war. At
this point, the new president of Boeing, Bill Allen, boldly decided to produce 50
Stratocruisers (Model 377 was a modified B-29 design with an ability to carry up to 100
pax) hoping to attract buyers by taking advantage of scale economies. The strategy
proved successful gaining orders from Pan Am, Northwest and other large carriers of the
day but even so the program was only marginally profitable after ten years of sales and
this margin was achieved primarily due to sales of spare parts (Lynn 1997).
As it happens, for the 1950's Boeing continued to be supported primarily through
military contracts due to the Cold war-induced need for long-range strategic bombers.
46 Electra featured retractable landing gear, trailing edge flaps and variable-pitch propellers.
Boeing's first jet was B-47 followed by the well known and still in use B-52. Despite this
experience, Boeing and the two other major American LCA manufacturers were reluctant
to proceed in creating a jet airliner believing that the operational costs would offset the
advantages of higher speed, comfort and safety. The fact that De Havilland's Comet was
under development loomed as a significant threat though (see Section 4.2.2) that
mobilized the US Congress into action to pass a bill for the development of a civil jet.
The bill ended up being scrapped partly because the manufacturers would not agree on
the allocation of the subsidies.
While the U.S. airframe manufacturing industry never reconsolidated with airlines, it did
see a strong wave of consolidation as the industry matured in both the commercial and
the defense side of the business as shown in Figure 4-2 in accordance with the S-curve
industry and technology development framework proposed by Christensen (1997).
Figure 4-2 Consolidation in the U.S LCA and Defense Aerospace Industry (Source: Ferreri (2003) )
The early years of aircraft manufacturing history demonstrate some themes that are
consistent over time: diversification and synergistic development primarily with defense
contracts, government support, close collaboration with airlines, and exploitation of
economies of scale were instrumental in establishing LCA manufacturers.
These themes are repeated with variations:
* the spillover between military transports and LCAs may have changed direction
from the civil to the defense side (the development of the A400M military
transport by Airbus or the air refueling tankers KC-135 relied more on civilian-
developed technologies and using the economies of scale provided by civil
aircraft production)
* airlines were more fragmented and have not instigated the development of a new
aircraft type since the time of PanAm. Exceptions to this have only recently
appeared.
4.1.2 Airbus Industrie
In the face of the Concorde financial failure (apparent after the 1973 oil crisis) the
European industry players were reluctant to commit to another common undertaking. The
politics behind it made the birth pains of Airbus quite significant, the British and the
French partners were unable to agree on either the size of the proposed aircraft or the
amount of financing provided by each partner and more importantly, partner commitment
was lukewarm, to say the least. So when in 1970, Roger Beteille as chief executive and
Henry Ziegler as chairman of the just formed Airbus Industrie (referred as Airbus) started
work for the first A300 to be produced it was the unlikely brew of German assertiveness
and an American idea that made it possible (Lynn 1997).
The extensive existing fleet that Airbus needed to compete against was substantial and
almost complete as shown in Figure 4-3. Airbus found the niche to enter the market by
following the suggestion of Frank Kolk, the technical director of American Airlines, who
had tried to lobby the U.S. manufacturers during the mid-1960s to consider a twin-engine
wide-body jet that could fly 1500 miles. They all refused to do so for good reasons;
Boeing was committed in the development of the 747, and Douglas and Lockheed had 3-
engine planes in the making. Furthermore, the FAA "60-minute rule"47 was still in effect
for twin-engine airplanes and that would render the airplane less useful for certain routes.
Yet, the idea of such an airplane had appeal for the airlines since it could significantly
reduce their operational costs per available seat-mile. As we discuss in Section 4.2.2, the
resulting A300 became a relative success after intense marketing and lobbying efforts
that allowed for generous terms of development and initial production financing
supported by the European government of the consortium.
The initial Franco-British consortium was stabilized by the German involvement at its
most vulnerable moment, when the British government decided to withdraw their
support. The issue was not only financial but a technical one since no one else in the
nascent consortium had readily available the expertise to build wing-structures of such
scale (Lynn 1997).
47 This rule prohibited flight of twin-engine aircraft for more than 60 minutes over water or from the closest
airport. The reliability and thrust of turbofan engines allowed for a relaxation of the rule for tri-engine
airplanes like the 727, Lockheed L-1011, and Douglas DC-10. The equivalent International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) regulations are known as ETOPS (that stands for Extended-range Twin-engine
Operation Performance Standards or as it is jokingly referred to Engines Turn or Passengers Swim). With
the advent of A300 and the proven safety record of high by-pass turbofan engines the ETOPS regulations
were extended to 180 minutes to allow for trans-pacific flights of twin-engine airplanes like the Boeing 777
given the operation of emergency runways in the Aleutian Islands.
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Figure 4-3 Pre-Airbus Jet Aircraft in Production (Source: (Stiissel 2003) ).
Airbus was created as a special corporate partnership known as Groupement d'Interet
Economique (GIE) under French law. At that stage, the partners were responsible against
third party obligations and not Airbus which had no capital of its own. The stabilized
participation of the partners was France's Aerospatiale S.A. (37.9 percent ownership),
Germany's Daimler-Benz Aerospace (37.9 percent), British Aerospace PLC (20 percent)
rejoined in 197948, and Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. of Spain (4.2 percent) (Stiissel
2003).
While this structure arguably provided unintended advantages to Airbus by forcing a just-
in-time (JIT) production pattern and a less aggressive growth strategy based on consensus
decision-making, it seemed that it would not be able to sustain the growth of the
consortium indefinitely. That became apparent after the merger of Boeing and MDD in
1997 which was the year that negotiations started for forming an integrated European
aerospace entity. After complex negotiations detailed extensively by (Schmitt 2000), the
European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) was formed with activities in
helicopters, space launch, missiles, military aircraft, avionics in addition to LCA
manufacturing. Compromises were made to allow public shareholders against the wishes
of the German partners (Schmitt 2000) (pg. 44).
4.2 Aircraft Design: Performance and Decision-making
Commercial aircraft have shown tremendous gains in performance which have been
accompanied by increases in the cost of their design and manufacturing. The aircraft of
today are highly complicated systems that have in excess of 100.000 primary parts. Their
design requires the coordination of engineers across several disciplines and presents a
formidable systems integration problem. Even a successful aircraft design is produced in
very low quantities (break-even point is usually around 600 aircraft) compared to other
manufactured products like cars or microchips. The low number runs coupled with the
high complexity of the design make aircraft manufacturing subject to strong learning
48 BAe sold their EADS 20% share in 2006 after a strategic decision to focus entirely on defense.
curve effects ((Wright 1936), (Alchian 1950), (Argote and Epple 1990), (Benkard
2000)).49
As we saw in the beginning of this chapter, the learning curve coupled with very high
initial R&D costs make aircraft particularly prone to economies of scale as the average
cost per aircraft is significantly reduced by each additional aircraft produced. Adding to
the economies of scale of production, are vendor lock-in effects that are exhibited after
the aircraft are deployed: the higher the number of aircraft of a given family deployed (or
if there is sufficient commonality across product families of the entire fleet) then the costs
of maintenance and inventory parts are reduced.
The increasing cost of complexity in the design is reflected in the price paid by the
airlines, which has been steadily increasing as shown in Figures 4-4. The capital
ownership costs for airlines follow the same trends as shown in Figure 4-5. Since these
do not include interest expenses (they do include leasing expenses), the true ownership
costs are higher than indicated in the chart. While this price increases could be attributed
to market power of the manufacturers, they are more correlated to an increase in
complexity and the related development costs as we discuss in the next section.
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Figure 4-4 Aircraft Price Trends (Source:(NRC 1992))
Even the pressure of the discounts did not hinder the steady climb of ownership costs as
declared by US airlines.
Impact of aircraft capital costs on airlines
These costs allocated over a large number of aircraft and over the aircraft's usually long
life cycle (-25 years) may seem to lose their importance for the airlines. As we saw in
Chapter 3, the aircraft ownership costs as a percentage of total airline costs can range
from 5% to 13% (10% to 25% of direct operating costs) depending on the estimation.
These calculations are fleet wide and specifically do not take interest into account while
they depend on depreciation method. That range can be as high as an average of 50% of
49 Studies calculated this effect to a 20% reduction of manufacturing costs for every doubling of
production.
direct operating cost when interest is included for specific aircraft rather than fleet wide
(see Table 4-1).
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Figure 4-5 Inflation Adjusted Normalized ownership costs for US Airlines (Data source: (ATA 2006))
Table 4-1 Airline Direct Operating Cost (Source: (NRC 1992) pg. 45)
$0.63 Fuel (1990 Level) $1.20 Fuel
DOC IMPACT ON DOC OF DOC IMPACT ON DOC OF
BREAKDOWN 25% CHANGE (%) BREAKDOWN 25% CHANGE (%)(%) (%)
rew 13.3 3.3 11.4 2.9
Maintenance 14.4 3.6 12.3 3.1
nsurance 1.5 0.4 1.3 0.3
Fuel 18.6 4.7 30.3 7.6
wnership 52.2 13.1 44.7 11.2
(Average for B737-400, B757-500, B747-400 for ranges 500, 1000, 2000 nautical miles respectively).
So for airlines the decision to buy the right aircraft at the right time can be critical for
survival as their actual costs are dependent heavily on the type. Two among the many
anecdotal examples that show how critical this decision can be are (i) Pan Am and its
strong push to acquire B747s that were delivered on the height of recession in 1971 and
were flying at a loss with less than 60% load factors weakening the company (Petzinger
1995) and (ii) the decision by Eastern airlines to order new and fuel efficient B757s
during the second oil crises in 1978 only to find that when delivered in the early 1980s oil
prices were back to pre-crises levels, the aircraft were larger than needed for the markets
they were serving that meant less frequency. This fleet choice created a strong
vulnerability that People Express and New York Air exploited by deploying cheap, small,
old technology, gas-guzzling planes and offering the right frequency at the right price
(Petzinger 1995).
Aircraft performance improvement
Decreasing operating expenses and increased performance is the necessary quid pro quo
for making new aircraft appealing to airlines. The evolution of aircraft has seen a
consistent decrease in the operating costs involved as exhibited dramatically in Figure
4-6. The only exception to the rule was the introduction of the jet engine which, being a
disruptive innovation, was not refined to the point of piston engines. While the initial jet
engines offered dramatic improvements in speed it took a few years until their fuel
efficiency and maintenance costs matched the older technology. The advance in the
relative operating cost per seat mile spanning the total life of the industry can be seen in
Fig. 4-6.
Anecdotal narratives of the state of aircraft pre 1960 give an even better sense of the
disparity between feasible and ideal aircraft designs (Gann 1961).50
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Figure 4-6 A maturing industry: Advances of the technical frontier illustrated by relative operating
cost per seat mile (Source: (Stiissel 2003) )
These improvements were made possible by a combination of advances in technology
and of consultation and push-back from the customers. Any successful aircraft design
when it enters the market is the product of extensive consultations with the dominant
buyers and users (Stiissel 2003) (pg. 6). Being able to achieve the right balance of
performance, size and economics to fill the different market segments as those have
formed and perhaps create new niches is not trivial.
The irreversible sunk costs involved make aircraft development a risky proposition and as
airlines can be critically threatened by erroneous aircraft acquisition, so do aircraft
manufacturers if they develop an aircraft that is not right for the market even if
technically excellent. Commensurately, if the aircraft designed has technical issues that
compromise safety or performance then the costs to the manufacturers can extend far
beyond the specific aircraft and tarnish the image of both the user and the producer.
50 For a vivid illustration of the handicaps faced by pilots that had to tame, live (and not infrequently) die
with such "beast[s] of an aircraft" in the dawn of the commercial airline aviation industry see the book
"Fate is the hunter" by Ernest Gann. The legendary DC-2s, DC-3s, and DC-4s play protagonistic roles with
their quirks and abilities as they fly their unpressurized cabins across mountain passes, through blizzards
and over oceans. Stories of icing on the wings' leading edges, of backfiring engines and auxiliary rubber
fuel tanks fitted in the cabin to increase range are spread throughout the book. For a story that combines the
urge to improve performance with technical miscalculations and a closely avoided disaster, see the chapter
"A certain embarrassment" pg. 337.
To exhibit the effects of aircraft decisions on the manufacturers we use the 'vignettes'
that follow. Each vignette compares key commercial aircraft and discusses the decisions
that led to them and how they affected the current competitive status.
4.2.2 VI: The Early Jet Years
For our first juxtaposition we choose the aircrafts that introduced the world to the jet-age
and a piston-engined competitor. We summarize their characteristics and relative market
success in Table 4-2. The first commercial jet airliner was the Comet produced by the
British firm DeHavilland and introduced into service in 195251. The British used their
expertise on jet engines to bridge the gap in altitude and therefore speed 52 that piston-
engine powered aircraft could not reach.
The Comet presented a technological leap that could have been a disruptive innovation:
the new technology was incorporated by a company that was not dominant in the existing
market for piston-engined LCAs. A disruptive innovation would be expected to give the
first mover an advantage, and this appeared to be the case in the years immediately after
the introduction of the Comet.
Designing the Comet was a challenge with the low thrust the available jet engines53 could
produce. This had three design ramifications: (i) create a small plane (36 seats) intended
for the high-end market, (ii) use a thinner sheet of metal for the fuselage skin in order to
reduce weight, and (iii) position the engines inside the base of the wing to reduce drag
rather than in pods as would be the prevalent design in most LCAs to come. As a way to
improve customer satisfaction, the Comet also sported wide rectangular windows that
would offer views comparable to those of the competition.
From the three compromises described above, the second proved fateful; after multiple
compression decompression cycles in the plane's normal life, metal fatigue concentrated
around the comers of the rectangular windows caused skin failure and as a result
explosive decompression that led to consecutive accidents and the grounding of the
Comet fleet. Investigations eventually pinpointed the cause of the failures and all
subsequent Comet models resolved the problem of metal fatigue by strengthening the
skin, incorporating the then available more powerful engines, and re-adopting round
windows. Yet, the reputation of the Comet was tarnished and was never able to regain
market share.
Given the high stakes in the industry, it appears that the choice to proceed with
innovation is risky. Certification and testing becomes more expensive and if a problem is
discovered after causing accidents, demand will vanish favoring the competition.
51 Maiden flight in 1949. Testing and certification for commercial use took three years.52 Turbulence and
53 The Comet was initially fitted with the DH Ghost engines, and later with Rolls Royce Avon and Spey
engines.
Table 4-2 Early Jets Technical and Market Comparison
L
Year/Sales
,,(Tirst
delivery)
Mfg.
Designation
Lockheed
L-1049
Constellation
DeHavilland
Comet 2
Boeing
707
DC-10
Source credits; Wikioedla. Janes. Boelna
1950
1952
Sales:
112
1958
Civil Sales:
1010
Mil. Sales:
820
1959
Sales:
556
Pax.
Typical
config.
95
36
110
124
That was the case with the Boeing 707. Despite being second, its entry timing allowed for
incorporating the lessons from the Comet failure and also take advantage of the rapid
technological advancement of jet engines.
The established technology was represented by three aircraft: the Locheed Constellation,
the Boeing Stratocruiser, and the Douglas DC-6. DeHavilland was selling as many
Comets as it could produce until the accidents but after that their first mover advantage
proved elusive in the introduction of a disruptive technology. Boeing with the 707 design
captured the technology at a slightly more mature stage and avoiding the pitfalls of their
European competitor.
Range
Typical
in km
8700
2400
6820
7410
Source cedits: HM& Jane, Boein
Speed
Cruise
in
Km/h
530
725
884
946
MTOW
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The competition between Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC-8 was not played on the
technological level though. There are rather two other dominant aspects in the relative
failure of the Douglas aircraft: complacency and government.
Douglas behaved in the textbook way that Christensen (1997) describes. As most
successful firms producing a mature technology, Douglas was expecting a slow transition
to jets and did not want to cannibalize their current and profitable product line. It took the
pressure of customers (in this case Juan Trippe of Pan Am) who wanted an alternative to
the Boeing design (Lawrence and Thornton 2005) (pg. 34). Even with Trippe's urge,
Douglas would not have proceeded if not for competing for the parallel market generated
by U.S. Air Force's expressed desire to acquire a large fleet of military tankers. With the
Air Force's decision to purchase solely from Boeing KC-135s which were modified
B707s. In that Boeing capitalized both on their long held relationship with the U.S Air
Force but also on their demonstrated experience in building jet bombers like the B-47
Stratojet and the B-52 Stratofortress.
Perhaps, this early handicap was the first blow that shape the fate of Douglas aircraft
which although it had to offer a better54 product it did not have the economies of scale,
learning and risk reduction provided to Boeing by their defense contract.
4.2.3 V2: The Wide-body Contenders
After the success of the 707 and 727, Boeing had a substantial cash reserve (Lawrence
and Thornton 2005) (pg. 51). With the support and urging of Pan Am, Boeing went ahead
to create one of the most successful aircraft in history while betting the company's
survival at the same time. The characteristics of the resulting Boeing 747 and the aircraft
that followed its wide-body design but never became direct competitors are summarized
in Table 4-3.
The potential for a military contract of a heavy transport eased initial research and
development costs but far from enough. Cost overruns and the huge infrastructure costs
involved in building the factory floor space drained Boeing finances while revenue influx
from the rest of the product line was substantially reduced due to the recession. Critics
were expecting the supersonic transport to change yet again the face of the industry and
make the Boeing leviathan obsolete in a few years.
The combination of a recession and a major aircraft development undertaking lead
Boeing to the first of its great cost-cutting layoffs moving from 100000 employees in
Seattle plants in 1968 to 37000 in 1971 (Newhouse 1982) (pg. 169).
54 DC-8s being designed later were given a larger fuselage and more powerful engines that allowed it to
travel transatlantic and transcontinental non-stop. (Lawrence and Thornton 2003, pg 35). Incidentally the
first airliner to exceed the speed of sound was a DC-8 in a shallow dive.
Table 4-3 Competing Wide-Body LCA
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The competitive situation worsened by the effort of the two other major aircraft
manufacturer in the U.S. to stay in the game by developing their own version of a
widebody jet: DC-10 by Douglas and L-1011 by Lockheed. Their products used a slightly
smaller tri-jet design and also targeted the medium-long range markets. Both aircraft
proved technologically superb (despite DC-10s teething problems) and airlines had use
for an aircraft of this type for markets that were thinner than a 747 would support. But
two aircraft in the same league divided the already small market in a way that made
neither project viable.
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Mfg.
Designation
Boeing
747
Douglas
DC-10
Lockheed
L-1010
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Airbus
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Pax.
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290
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Lockheed's effort especially showed how the lack of a supporting product family would
make a single aircraft (even a good one) an economic failure by never making a profit
(Benkard 2004).
Airbus on the other hand, with its debut aircraft managed to capture the niche for a large
aircraft on short-medium range routes which American airline executives desired (Lynn
1997). Having two engines and being cheaper A300 fit the profile of an economic
alternative to the tri-jets from which it captured the European and slowly the North
American market. In the widebody market, two big bets paid off in some ways largely
due to luck.
4.2.4 V3: Competition and Incremental Innovation: The 1980s Generation
Despite, the slow success of the its first offering, Airbus would not have been established
without providing a complete product range starting from the A320 workhorse on the low
end, to the A330/A340 in the mini-jumbo area and most recently the A380 superjumbo.
Similarly to how Boeing established itself in the jet age over Douglas, Airbus fought with
Boeing when the latter commanded the largest market share and a successful and
complete product line.
Airbus's second aircraft, the A320 was introduced in order to capture the need of airlines
to replace their first generation narrow body jets (DC-9s, 727, 737) (Clark 1997(pg. 7).
Airbus went for a incremental improvements to a proven design. It offered a wider and
therefore more comfortable fuselage. More importantly it provided fly-by-wire as
opposed to the hydro-mechanical systems in use, saving space, weight and allowing for
easy crew cross-training across the product line (Stiissel 2003).
Boeing, after a harrowing decade that allowed the development of a series of successful
aircraft became reluctant to continue investing in innovative products. Their next
aircrafts, the 757 narrow body and 767 wide body twin engine jets that were partially
competing with the A300 family did not continue the innovation legacy of their
predecessors. The 757 was a narrow body aircraft using the same diameter fuselage as the
737 and did not follow the increased width provided by the A320. More importantly,
unlike A320, neither of the two aircraft used fly-by-wire technology which was already
developed for Boeing's military aircraft citing pilot concerns as the primary reason -- a
system which Airbus had to develop from scratch. On the same vein, the 767 was
designed with a narrower fuselage than the A300 and was therefore unable to
accommodate 2-4-2 seating arrangements or the LD3 type containers used by the 747
thus being at a disadvantage compared to the Airbus offerings.
Interestingly, the development of the 757 in its current configuration could have been
precipitated by Boeing's strategic objectives. British Aerospace (BAe), a key partner in
Airbus formative years, left the coalition in 1977 (Lynn 1997) and Boeing could ensure a
weakened Airbus if BAe stayed out. To do so, Lawerence and Thornton (2003) (pg 79)
allege, Boeing offered to BAe the design and construction of 757 wing and the engines to
Rolls-Royce. It also designed the aircraft to specifications aligned with the needs of
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British Airways. This offer was enticing for BAe and it was quite significant at the time
as the outsourcing of key parts of a new aircraft was far from commonplace. Still it was
not a partnership of equals and BAe opted for returning to the Airbus fold.
Boeing's conservatism in the design field, "flight from innovation" Lawerence and
Thornton (2003) (pg. 87) characterize it, was also observed when the 777 development.
Initial designs that were shown to airlines were based on a redesigned 767 leaving
potential customers dissatisfied - in a very similar fashion to the recent A350 saga
discussed in the next vignette. Boeing was content in developing derivatives of their
existing product line if by making marginal improvements of their product line they
could match the competition at less than half the cost of developing a new aircraft.
Arguably this policy delivered value to the shareholders as it allowed relatively high
profit margins, strong learning curve effects over long product life times and continuous
revenue from maintenance and training requirements that can be more than 10% of the
aircraft value over its lifecycle. These cash flows accumulated cash reserves that could be
used to create the next breakthrough aircraft were used instead for stock buybacks ($8 B
in 1999 to 2001). The disadvantage lay with the fact that Airbus had slightly better
products to offer as a whole at slightly better prices given the, also, newer manufacturing
processes.
Overall, Airbus with its more modem and innovative A320 was capturing significant
market share in the low end of the market. Their product line, augmented by the medium-
long range A330/340 family started filling every niche that Boeing had besides the
jumbo. More than that, Airbus strengthened the commonality value proposition by
providing greater number of interchangeable parts across the product line and, equally
significant, the ability to interchange crews across the product line with minimal training
requirements as the cockpits and aircraft flight characteristics were designed to be very
similar. In the case of incremental innovation, the first mover seemed to gain an
advantage in this case.
4.2.5 V4: Next Generation Widebodies
Airbus offered the A330/340 family as a replacement for the aging medium-long range
DC-10s and L-1011. They designed their long-range A340 with four engines to comply
with ETOPS55 for intercontinental flights. They also used a common wing platform for
aircraft with two and four engines (Stussel 2003) - a first that saved upfront R&D costs
but penalized slightly the performance of the two aircraft as a compromise rather than
optimization of the characteristics of each.
With Boeing's 767X plans being rejected by the airlines, an entirely new aircraft was
finally designed. The Boeing 777 utilized the two engine configuration with its
advantages in maintenance and fuel efficiency and the relaxation of ETOPS regulation
for a highly successful aircraft. Airline consultation for the desired aircraft characteristics
was extensive. The new aircraft was successful and started outselling the cheaper Airbus
55 Extended-range Twin-engine Operations. See Section 3.4.2 for details.
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offerings primarily due to its fuel efficiency with a world stage of highly volatile oil
prices.
The quest for efficiency and range led the development of the next generation of aircraft.
The Airbus A380, the largest passenger airliner with 555 passengers in a 3-class
configuration, after 30+ years provides a direct competitor to the Boeing 747. The 747 by
being virtually unchallenged offered a monopoly niche to Boeing and the opportunity to
charge a premium in its price. Thus the 747 with the development costs long amortized
was justifiably characterized as Boeing's "cash cow." (Esty and Ghemawat 2002)
characterize Boeing's efforts to thwart the A3XX project as a "case of failed
preemption." Boeing attempted to win time by first collaborating with Airbus on a super
jumbo feasibility study. When it became apparent that the Boeing side was stalling for
time Airbus announced their A3XX project. To this Boeing countered a different design
as an alternative. This vaporware product was enough to delay decisions by airlines to
order the Airbus aircraft. While Esty and Ghemawat argued that Boeing's efforts lacked
credibility, it is arguable that the time delays they gained meant additional sales for their
747 and could be considered far from failed.
While Airbus promoted the A380 as a fuel efficient aircraft that would allow the
infrastructure congestion at key hub airports to be alleviated, Boeing went on to design
and produce the 7E7, later designated 787. Because of the extensive use of composite
materials56 in both the wing and the fuselage, the 787 is expected to offer a more
comfortable flying experience through higher cabin pressurization, 20% higher fuel
efficiency than competing aircraft with 15% attributed to the new engine design and 5%
to the reduced weight, and less maintenance requirements. This proposition has been very
well accepted by the airlines who have ordered 500 787s as of this writing (April 2007).
The success of the 787 design was underscored by Airbus's inertia to offer a credible
alternative. Overextended by the enormous task of designing and building the A380 and
plagued by budget overruns due to production glitches, Airbus's strategy was to offer a
redesigned A330, designated A350, that would require about half the development cost of
an entirely new aircraft (approximately US $6B) while not sacrificing much in terms of
performance. The airline customers seemed to disagree with that assessment as they
made clear through order cancellations that they prefer an offering that would compete on
an equal footing with the 787. This pressure forced Airbus to announce the A350XWB,
for extra wide body. The A350XWB ups the ante of fuselage width compared to the 787
while it would be utilizing full composite technology. The downside of course is that the
planned first delivery was pushed back to 2013 and the development costs raised to US
$13B.
4.2.6 V5: 3 rd Gen Narrobody and the (near) future of LCA manufacturing
The question of whether the first or second mover in the 787 A350 rivalry will be the
winner depends on many unknowns and will not be clear until well into the next decade.
Boeing's moves managed to halt Airbus market share intrusion. The next strategic moves
56 The first LCA to sport composite wings and fuselage with total participation of composites reaching 50%
vs. 11% for the Boeing 777 (Pritchard MacPherson 2004, pg. 65)
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between the two companies could be critical as they involve the replacements for the very
popular 737NG and A320 narrow body planes. As neither company has provided a
design and is not scheduled to do so for the next few years, a slight door of opportunity is
opened because of this uncertainty.
We have seen that in the past there were several instances where the established
manufacturers missed the opportunity to gain an advantage in a promising niche. Airbus
gained its foothold by exploiting the short-medium range widebody niche. Bombardier
and later Embraer exploited the need for small regional jets of 50-100 seats - a market
that no large jet manufacture considered possible. Similarly at this stage, there are several
aspiring players that could potentially threaten the domination of Boeing and Airbus in
the large commercial aircraft market with a product targeting the narrowboy 100-200 seat
aircraft. The possible challengers include Bombardier and Embraer, who already offer
aircraft in the 100 seat range, along with companies from Russia, China, and Japan. All
of these stakeholders have some experience with building and integrating large systems.
The Japanese heavies are already invested in their partnership with Boeing. Chinese are
still nascent in the large aircraft industry and expect to gain expertise from the A320 final
assembly line recently established in China by Airbus. The Russian aircraft
manufacturing industry has been set back during the country's recession and has not yet
recovered. The trend of outsourcing and offset agreements is enabling the knowledge and
manufacturing base of these potential competitors. (MacPherson and Pritchard 2003) (pg
230) and (Newhouse 2007) have pointed to the same effect. Given the complexity of the
technologies required, none of the above stakeholders have either the resources or the
expertise to provide a credible new generation LCA. A clever strategic partnership
between them is a possibility but political issues and the strategic moves taken
preemptively by Boeing and Airbus make the initiation of such a venture unlikely but still
not impossible.
Besides who will build the first 3rd generation narrow-body aircraft, its dominant
characteristics are also unknown. With a drive towards more fuel efficient, lighter
aircraft, the options open up to more radical airframe and engine designs. Designs that
have lower cruise speeds and utilize a turbofan engines may be preferred especially for
short range trips in which the economics of lower speeds will outweigh the loss in
productivity due to the lower speed. Another potential design that involves the use of
reduced drag flying wing fuselage known as a Blended-Wing Body (BWB) has the fuel
conservation potential in larger configurations.
While the airlines may be conservative about the desired design, technology forcing by
regulation may be a strong driver of change especially as the C02 reduction measures to
counter global warming come into effect for aviation. Even if that is not the case and
airlines succeed in deferring this burden, the erratic cost of fuel itself may be a sufficient
incentive to look into more radical designs.
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Decision-making influences: A Summary
From the overview of LCA product lines above, we can draw some generalized
conclusions of the type of influences that play a role in the decision to launch a new
aircraft family.
* Performance characteristics: in the developing years of aviation these were
technology-driven. Many new aircraft types were built more because the
technology for pushing the envelope was available and less because of market
considerations. This trend has been inverted in recent years, when the technology
has matured. Innovation is market-driven and results from close consultation with
the clients.
* Airline involvement: While in the early years customer airlines were big enough
as to dictate and support certain designs, their market power of single airlines has
waned. Many airlines are consulted now and the commitment of solvent launch
customers is still crucial for the success of a new design. In the current state,
airlines vote with their orders as their primary means of exerting influence over a
design. Since their orders depend on overall financial expectations than absolute
performance, the market-driven design emerges. On that realm, the market power
of leasing firms has been continuously increasing in recent years but their
influence is still limited to their primary lessors' recommendations. Yet, as resale
value and reusability become of greater importance, the ease of reconfigurability
(flexibility) and the expected resale value will start driving most of the
manufacturing.
* Government involvement: The influence of governments will be discussed in
greater detail but it is certainly significant primarily in the economic support
realm (risk-free launch loans) and technology. Launching a new aircraft product
line as Boeing did in the 1950s and as Airbus did in the 1970s against established
manufacturers would have been all but impossible without some sort of state
guarantees.
* Derivation vs. launching: Using an aircraft design as a product family platform
by stretching (or less commonly shortening) the fuselage, providing more
powerful engines, adding range through extra tanks has been a common and
successful practice. Airframe manufacturers in the absence of competition, and
sometimes in the face of it, prefer to defer the large costs associated with
launching a new aircraft. Boeing pulled this off successfully with the 747-400
which has been left unchanged for 20 years (from 1985 to 2005) and responded
with the upgraded 747-8 only when the A380 came to the market.
* Disruptive vs. incremental innovation: The introduction of jet engines, which
can be considered a radical innovation, became a success by the second mover
(Boeing). Incremental change rather benefited the first mover although the record
is not clear. In some cases the second mover can benchmark against and exceed a
clearly set goal and then the outcome depends on whether the economies of scale
and the network effects enjoyed by the first mover are sufficient to let them retain
the market share. Recently, both airlines and airframe manufacturers have been
averse to radical designs as innovation efforts have been focused solely on
providing marginally better operating economies to the user. Regulatory
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compliance is another form of innovation pressure as the effects of ETOPS, or
noise and emission regulations have shown.
Product development and commonality: Boeing imbued by its strong
engineering culture reengineered each aircraft family they produced optimizing
primarily on performance. Airbus, faced with the challenge of developing a fleet
portfolio in a much shorter timeframe, focused on engineering re-use and part
commonality to provide aircraft that are usually cheaper to design, manufacture,
and operate even if not highly optimized in their performance characteristics (see
Bador (2007) and McConnell (2007) ).
4.3 Aircraft Manufacturing: Production and Sales (the Business
Case)
4.3.1 Revenue Structure
As a business, commercial aircraft manufacturing relies on revenues from aircraft
deliveries, interest from financing (for the leasing/financing arm of the enterprise57), sales
of used aircraft from lease and buyback agreements, and aircraft services and
modifications. Although the exact figures are proprietary, the strong correlation between
aircraft deliveries and revenues shown in Figure 4-7 for Boeing, indicates that direct
aircraft sales currently dominate as source of revenue.
Figure 4-7 Correlation of Seats Delivered and Revenues (Data source: Boeing Annual Reports)
Price Setting
Revenues are a function of price and volume. Aircraft list prices are more or less linearly
correlated with capacity as shown in Figure 4-8 and appreciate at varying rates based on
inflation and demand but with an average of around 4% (based on (Greenslet 2003) ).
57 According to the 2006 Boeing Annual Report, Boeing had US$1,025M revenues with an operating
margin of 28% not including depreciation or interest.
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Figure 4-8 Correlation of Price and Capacity for LCA (2004 Data Source: Boeing and Airbus
websites)
While the list prices are pretty straight forward, the actual prices at which aircraft are sold
are not publicized and all available data are estimates. Manufacturers offer significant
discounts over list prices to launch customers or bulk orders in hopes of harnessing the
economies of scale in manufacturing discussed in the next section. The negotiations
between the airlines and the manufacturers are usually multi-round, as airlines evaluate
the aircraft characteristics versus the contract characteristics (Newhouse 1982).
Benkard (2004) and Irwin and Pavcnik (2001) have attempted to model the mark-ups set
by airframe manufacturers in their competitive behavior. Benkard (pg. 588) leaned
towards quantity setting for describing the dynamics of the industry; i.e. in short term
pricing decisions, airframe manufacturers are constrained by their production rate. This is
assuming that their decision is depending on backlog size which may not necessarily be
the case. Irwin and Pavnick (pg. 13) concur that price competition is paramount and,
citing (Tyson 1992), that for most of the industry's history production capacity was not
constraining.
Beside the tag price, aircraft ownership has lifecycle costs and risks. Manufacturers offer
reductions in these costs as a marketing device in their intensifying competitive situation
to make their products more attractive to buyers. As a result, they providing in addition to
discounts, easier financing terms, performance and delivery guarantees, and buyback
agreements. Offering these additional terms makes manufacturers increasingly risk-
sharing partners in the businesses of their airline clients.
Just on the discount levels, the average percentage off list prices is currently reaching up
to 40% as shown in the 2006 estimates of Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4 Discount Estimates for 2006 Deliveries (Source: Gates (2007) )
I I I I V.. I U. I C- QU.0/0 I
737 302 19.74 12.55 36.4%
767 12 1.68 0.98 41.7%
777 65 15.09 9 40.4%
747 14 3.27 1.97 39.8%
Total 398 39.97 24.62 38.4%
Airbus
A320 339 22.49 13.82 38.6%
A300 71 11.77 6.67 43.3%
A340 24 5.34 2.96 44.6%
Total 434 39.6 23.45 40.8%
According to Greenslet (2003), as yields decrease, airlines pressure all the stakeholders
that contribute to their factors of production. Their employees have been a prime target,
as we saw in Chapter 3, but their capital costs are another one as evidenced by the
continual increase in the discounts off list prices negotiated by airlines. That price
pressure is of course facilitated by the level of competitive behavior in the duopoly
situation which can spiral towards the Bertrand equilibrium 58. Figure 4-9 shows the
discounts increasing. Unsurprisingly the traditionally unchallenged 747 saw its margins
erode as discounts shot from 5% in 1990 to 35% in 2003 to close to 40% in 2006.
It is not clear what part of the steep discount can be attributed to competition and what
part to the pressure by airlines. The two airframe manufacturers though appear to offer
very comparable discounts. As the negotiation with airlines focuses on selling aircraft
characteristics for a given price, it is interesting to see whether aircraft that provide
operating advantage can command a premium and what the market share spread can be.
For this reason we focus our comparison to the competition between the A320 and the
737 family (-300 and -700NG). As shown in Figure 4-10, the A320 advantages discussed
in the previous section, allowed it to command 25% of the market in 1990 at a premium
of 25%. As the A320 was established into a reliable and cost-effective aircraft and before
the next generation 737 became available, at the same premium it commanded 50% of
the market. With the advent of the 737 next generation that premium was gradually
reduced to 13% although market share reached above 55%.
58 A Bertrand equilibrium implies that firms in a duopoly compete to charge prices equal to that of a
perfectly competitive market. In applying it to the aircraft manufacturing competition, the ability to
differentiate products and the fact that competition is a multi-stage game make Bertrand equilibrium
outcomes less likely. The alternative Cournot equilibrium creates an outcome that resembles tacit collusion
in a two firm game where capacity is more restricted than a fully competitive market but not at monopoly
levels. Both competitive games are theoretical constructs with fairly restrictive assumptions that are not
directly applicable to real world situations.
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Figure 4-9 Estimated discount evolution (Data source: Greenslet 2003)
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Figure 4-10 A320 Family market share and corresponding estimated premium in percentage as
compared to the 737 family (Data source: Greenslet 2003)
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At the extreme, this type of massive discounts led airlines to buying aircraft as a means
for "receiv[ing] the huge checks reflecting the discounts on offer" according to
Newhouse (2007) (pg 113) to be used as collateral forfurther loans to cover operating
expenses.
4.3.2 Cost Structure
In order to understand the effect of revenue fluctuations for the airframe manufacturers,
we need to understand their cost structure.
The primary costs of aircraft production can be broken down into:
* Research and Development (R&D)
* Manufacturing facilities and tooling
* Employees (shop-floor and supervisors)
4.3.2.1 Research and Development
Table 4-5 shows the increasing real costs of R&D that are caused by the increasing
complexity of airframes and engines as they struggle for stretching the performance
goals.
The aggregated R&D costs for Boeing commercial are shown in Figure 4-11. Based on
this figure, it can be seen that in recent years when Boeing is developing a new aircraft its
R&D expenditures come close to 10% of its revenues(1995 was the end of the
development of the 777 and 2006 has been critical in the development of the 787). When
derivatives and exploratory research is taking place then the R&D costs can be as low as
2% of revenues.
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Figure 4-11 Boeing Commercial R&D Spending (Data source: Boeing Annual Reports)
There is anecdotal evidence that suggests deeply rooted differences in the engineering
mentality of Boeing and Airbus which is reflected in the characteristics of their product
lines. While Boeing is enthralled with engineering optimization of each individual
aircraft or product family (Piepenbrock 2005), Airbus' attitude was focused towards
optimizing across the product lines with emphasis on re-use and commonality for parts
that reduces the costs of aircraft design but also its manufacturing and operating costs
(Bador 2007).
Whether Airbus management came to this approach deliberately or if they made a virtue
out of necessity is unclear. By the economics of the industry their hand was forced to
design and build a complete product line to could compete offering by offering to
Boeing's product line in as little time as possible.
4.3.2.2 Manufacturing: Learning Curve Effect
Aircraft production by itself has long been used as a case study of the effect of learning
curves. Wright (1936) was the first to document the effects of the learning curve in
aircraft production. Archial (1950) developed models to predict the man-hours necessary
for completion of different types of airframes based on the number of aircraft produced
and type of airframe. He points that no evidence of cessation of the decline in man-hour
per airframe needed was observed based on his data (pg. 6). A typical learning curve in
aircraft production is shown in Figure 4-12.
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Figure 4-12 Assembly hours per aircraft vs. cumulative output with omitted scale. (Source: (Argote
and Epple 1990))
Argotte and Epple (1990) pointed that there is in fact a level of organizational forgetting
as evidenced in the data released on Lockheed's Tristar program. In other words, the
improvements due to learning curves depreciate and as a result, recent production rates
are more indicative of the actual learning curve effect rather than cumulative output in the
face of production disruptions. Figures 4-13 and 4-14, based on the Lockheed Tristar
data, show that indeed average costs rose significantly even as cumulative production
was increasing. When cumulative production reaches 138 there is a slow down in
production rates which immediately reflects on the average costs. The trend is not
reversed until the production rates resume at the 176 point. Besides knowledge, capital
costs that include the manufacturing facilities and dedicated tooling is also part of the
large upfront investment for starting a new product family. For the same reasons,
ramping up production rates or closing down facilities also imposes significant sunk
costs.
Cabral and Riordan (1994) review the strategic implications of such strong learning curve
effects. They developed a model to indicate the "increasing dominance (ID)" offered to
first movers and the "increasing increasing dominance (IID)" of their advantage aided by
the positive reinforcing feedback that it offer to them. Competitors in this situation have
an incentive to engage in seemingly predatory pricing using their expectations of going
down the learning curves as production ramps up which can be thought of as a subsidy
from the future. In one of their conclusions, they propose that the seemingly predatory
pricing that ensues due to the learning curve future expectations of reduced productions
costs which then incentivizes two competitors to undercut each other creates potentially
socially beneficial outcomes.
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Figure 4-13 Cost vs. price for the Lockheed L1011 Tristar (Source: Benkard 2004) and Production
Rates (Source: Argotte and Epple 1980)
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Figure 4-14 Lockheed L1011 Tristar comparison of estimated average costs (AVC) and production
rates / production rate changes (right scale)
Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 372 as quoted by Cabral and Riordan) suggest that firms that
are close to the bottom of their learning curve would have less of an incentive to price
aggressively and would prefer instead to increase their profits. Cabral and Riordan
counter that this would not be the case if aggressive pricing would inhibit competitors
from reaching the same point.
4.3.2.3 Manufacturing: Production and Supply Chain
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2.1, the different outlook of product vs. product line
optimization affects not only the development budgets but the manufacturing of the
aircraft as well.
MacPherson and Pritchard (2003) point that Airbus, by virtue of being a latecomer, used
state-of-the-art manufacturing processes for its plants that reduce overall production
costs. They give as an example the older riveting tools used for the 737 and 767 fuselages
compared to laser welding and greater use of composites in the Airbus products. Boeing
with the 777 and 787 production line has bridged that gap. (see Table 4-6)
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Table 4-6 Boeing Machinery Capital Stock by Period of Installation. Source: (Pritchard 2002) (p56)
Boeing Aircraft Model 737 747 757 767 777
Wing Assembly Riveters 1960s 1960s 1970s 1970s 1990s
Wing Spar Assembly Tool 1990s N/A N/A 1980's 1990s
Fuselage Assembly Riveters 1990s 1960s 1970s 1970s 1990s
Body Assembly Tool 1990s N/A N/A N/A N/A
Lean Manufacturing
Murman et al. (2002) point to a potentially greater significance cost reduction measure
for aircraft manufacturing: lean. Inspired by applications in the automotive industry as
pioneered by Toyota and popularized by Womack, Jones et al. (1991), lean production
systems have been successfully implemented in a variety of industries. Figure 4-15 shows
the potential effect of lean practices in manufacturing and design can result in major
savings. Cook and Graser (2001) provide a detailed review of how lean manufacturing
was implemented in the defense side of aerospace.
Figure 4-15 Estimated Cost savings by implementing lean practices in manufacturing (left) and
design (right) of aircraft (Source: Murman et. al. (2001))
Boeing moved from lean manufacturing to the "Lean Global Enterprise" strategy in an
effort to align its suppliers and address the issues that were revealed in the 1997 crisis
(see Box 4-2). Alderman (2002) reports that for the B737 line, "Boeing has achieved 44%
reduction in flow time, 64% reduction in inventory, and 44% reduction in work in
process" and in parallel reduced its supplier base from more than 3,500 to about 1,500.
This effort, Alderman claims, led to an increase in Boeing's operating margin from 3.6%
in 1998 to 8.4% in 2001. Airbus has not yet implemented lean manufacturing explicitly
but its newer facilities and cross-border corporate structure that forced it to move towards
a version of lean with just-in-time deliveries of aircraft sections allowed Airbus to have
an employee to aircraft ratio of 143 compared to Boeing's 220 in 1999 (Olienyk and
Carbaugh 1999).
& 4
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From the above, it can be deduced that the supplier strategy is critical. MacPherson and
Pritchard (2003) point to the importance of offset agreements with strategically
significant country partners in securing market share. Offset manufacturing agreements
stipulate the outsourcing of certain parts of an aircraft to another country in return for
higher orders of that aircraft type from the domestic carriers. Enforcement can be either
direct (state-controlled airlines) or indirect (subsidies of the price for the aircraft).
Participating countries benefit by establishing their manufacturing base in a high
technology sector with potential spill over to other sectors while the manufacturer gains
from the security in future orders and potentially from lower manufacturing costs due to
differential wages or hosting government subsidies.
Douglas exercised this advantage by outsourcing to Canada and Italy in the 1960s
(MacPherson and Pritchard 2003) and later China (Newhouse 2007). Boeing followed
this trend by outsourcing to Japan in the 1970s reluctantly, being unwilling to lose core
competencies. This shift accelerated as can be seen in the Table 4-7, where the 30% of
critical parts for the 777 were foreign sourced.
This accelerating trend was subsequently enforced by the need to distribute the risk of
upfront investment to partners less jittery than the capital markets. Foreign governments
could fill that gap as shown by the external subsidies received for the development of the
787 aircraft by its risk-sharing partners, especially Japanese and Italian companies.
(Newhouse 2007).
The make-buy decision is a critical one for any enterprise (Fine and Whitney 1996).
Harrigan (2006) argues that the way Boeing outsources its engineering and
manufacturing retains the firm's core competence proposition which lies in large system
integration. Risk-sharing agreements 59 and R&D support provide needed capital for
product development. Moreover, collaborative supply chain relationships are based on
trust and thrive because of the symbiotic benefit that the partners gain out of them. Their
enforcement is implicit, as a breach of trust could mean the loss of future collaborations.
An additional argument in favor of outsourcing is as a way to transfer the requirement for
a flexible workforce generated by the cyclical orders to the partner/suppliers, assuming
that they would be better equipped to provide it.
In outsourcing Airbus holds development and manufacturing of the latest generation of
aircraft in-house and only offers older generation aircraft for offset production
(MacPherson and Pritchard 2004 referencing (Smith 2001)).
59 Whether the 787 risk-sharing partnership is true risk-sharing is questionable. There appears to be no
additional upside accommodation from the Boeing side in the event of good product performance. Similar
to government loans to Airbus the risk is shared asymmetrically: if things turn badly risk is shared but if not
then benefits do not exceed the contractual obligations.
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Table 4-7 Domestic and Foreign Sourcing for Critical Airframe Parts
(2002))
by Boeing (Source: Pritchards
Launch year: 1.963 1966 1969 1981 1982 1994
Aircraft model 727 737 747 757 767 777
Wings D D D D D D
Inboard flaps D F F F F D
Outboard flaps D F F F F F
Engine nacelles D D D D D D
Nose D D D D D D
Engine strut D D F D D D
Front fuselage D D D F/D F F
Center fiselage D D D F/D F F
Center wing D D F D D F
box
Keelbeam D D D D D F
Aft fuselage D D D D F F
Stabiliser D FD D D F D
Dorsal fin D D D F F F
Vertical fin D FD D D F D
Elevators D F D F F F
Rudder D F D F F F
Passenger doors D D D D F F
Cargo doors D D F F F F
Section 48 D FiD F/D D F F
# of major parts 0 7 6 8 13 12
from foreign
sources
4.3.2.4 Employment
As with the airlines, employee numbers and compensation are also critical parameters in
the cost structure of airframe manufacturers. Given the complexity of the tasks involved,
it is not surprising that the workforce is highly skilled with a little less than 50% of the
employees having at least college education (88,000 out of 198,000 for Boeing - (Boeing
2000)). Engineers, assembly line workers, and floor managers all build tacit knowledge
in their tenure in the company. In the recent past, Boeing commercial responded to crises
by drastically cutting its workforce and then rehiring when manufacturing levels required
it, as shown in Box 4-1.
Arguably, the cost of firing employees is not confined to severance packages, though
they can be substantial. Governments on the local or federal level also face social costs in
the form of unemployment and lack of insurance coverage. For the 2001 layoffs, the
government support that was estimated as needed reached US$3.75B for two years
(Cantwell 2001) but only a fraction of this amount was eventually included in the Air
Transportation Stabilization Act.
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Box 4-1 Boeing Em
ployment Cycles in 
Washington State ( Source: 
Pope and N
yhan (2001) )Boeing Layoff History:
1967-1971: 95,000
1992: 28,000 (20% of workforce, Source Newhouse 2006 pg. 48)
1995: 7,500
1997: 50,000
2001: 35,000
1967: Boeing employment hits a 1960s peak with a companywide total of 148,480, with 100,874 in the
Puget Sound region.
1971: After the cancellation of the supersonic transport and other federal projects, Boeing employment
crashes to a low of 53,300 companywide, 37,200 locally.
1980: After four years of steady job growth, Boeing employment hits a peak of 81,392 locally, 113,972
companywide.
1981: Because of a slowdown in jetliner production Boeing begins three years of employment cuts,
bottoming out in 1983 with 57,823 jobs locally, 88,181 companywide.
1989: Boeing employment reaches a peak at 165,787 companywide, 106,670 statewide, ending a six-year
run of years with employment gains.
1990: January: Boeing announces it will end its seven-year hiring binge and will cut 5,000 production jobs
from its local payroll. Boeing had hired 50,000 workers in the Puget Sound area since 1983. Military budget
cuts are partly cited.
1992: February: Boeing announces a cut of 6,500 jobs from its local payroll, the largest drop in a decade,
citing cutbacks in the B-2 Bomber and reduction of 737 production.
1994: Boeing ends five years of cuts with total employment of 117,331 as a result of four bad years posted
by airlines.
1995: February: Boeing announces deeper cuts, reducing employment rolls by 6,500.
2000: May: Boeing ends two years of job cuts, reducing companywide payroll from 238,400 in February
1998, to 191,500.
2001: March 12: After 85 years in the Seattle area, The Boeing Company announces it is moving its
headquarters to another city, affecting 1,000 headquarters jobs. Boeing announces that it is moving
fuselage work to Kansas.
2001: Sept. 19: Boeing announces layoffs of 20 percent to 30 percent of its commercial airline work force,
by as many as 30,000 employees.
On a systemic level, these employees had developed tacit knowledge of the procedures
for the complex task of aircraft manufacturing. If their expertise is not transferable, and a
part of it is certainly not, then the cost of coming down the learning curve at the next
boom is higher due to organizational forgetting.
While the numbers may not be exact, the history of layoff hiring cycles in the aviation
industry has been pronounced and follows the boom and bust cycle (procyclical). While
the U.S. based manufacturers fit this pattern of following the cycle, their European
competitors managed to cope with a higher employment cost structure and more inelastic
hiring/layoff cycles due to the labor relations regulatory regime. In fact Airbus, despite
' ' I
119
several rough spots in its history was constrained by a combination of regulatory
dynamics and different management practices from mimicking the layoff cycles of its
overseas competitors. It was not until the 2006 A380 production glitches that layoffs on a
large scale have been proposed in the Power 8 restructuring plan (Airbus press release)
that still were targeted towards part-time employees with the full-time ones planned for
reduction through attrition and a freeze in hiring. Even so, this proposal was followed by
strong reactions by both employee unions and local governments.
Box 4-2 Costs of following the cycle: Boeing Production in the 1997 Crisis
Following the success of cost reductions due to lean implementation and advanced design and
manufacturing techniques for the 777 aircraft, Boeing was confident that it could reproduce the savings in
the older product families. This initial success and the strategic desire to not concede market share to
Airbus led Boeing's sales department to aggressively seek orders in the peak of the mid-nineties.
As a result of the ensuing price war with Airbus, discounts that ranged at around 10% were increased to
20% and even 30% in an effort to maintain market share and drain Airbus's orderbook (Newhouse 2007, pg.
125). This effort on regaining market share, essentially selling aircraft at cost, it backfired in two ways: first
revenues were significantly reduced and more importantly precipitated a production crisis in 1997.
Between 1995 and 1997, Boeing adds 38000 employees (about the number that was laid off since 1989)
incurring training costs as well as errors. Trailing back the learning curve while increasing production rates
left both internal and external manufacturing facilities wanting. Delays in the production and delivery of parts
led to production stoppages and errors to expensive overtime that increases labor costs by 30% according
to one account (Harrigan 2006) (pg. 24).
As if these issues were not enough, the Asian currency crisis and the resulting recession in the Asian tiger
economies led to cutbacks in orders from the airline market with the greatest growth rate.
Airbus was better positioned to weather the price war as evidenced by internal Boeing studies that showed
Airbus having a cost advantage of 12-15% in production and tooling (Newhouse, pg. 126). Equally
important, Boeing's skilled workforce was reduced by voluntary retirements and strikes had forced Boeing to
hire new and untrained employees. (Newhouse pg. 127). The steep increases in production rates could not
be matched internally but also externally as the Boeing supply chain was not set to anticipate such
increases eventually leading to a US$2.6B write-off and an overnight drop of share value by 8%.
These problems coincided with the merger with MacDonnell Douglas that led to accusations of stock
manipulation as the problems were not officially disclosed until after the completion of the merger
maintaining an artificially high stock price that facilitated the buyout of MDD. This behavior resulted in
lawsuits by shareholders and a US$92.5M settlement in 2001. (Newhouse pg. 129).
4.3.2.5 Financing: The Subsidy Arguments
The sunk costs required to develop and build commercial aircraft is one reason that make
government involvement, direct or otherwise, practically necessary, as the capital
markets would not accept the level of risks and returns involved. Spencer (1986)
suggested six criteria for targeting prime candidate strategic industries. These were:
i. Entry barriers faced by new entrants.
ii. Significant foreign competition.
iii. High domestic and international industry concentration..
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iv. Factor prices would be inelastic to domestic targeting.
v. Economies of scale and learning in production.
vi. Targeting would minimize technological spillovers to competitors and/or maximize
domestic access to foreign technology.
The fact that airframe manufacturing easily meets all of the criteria partially explains the
interest of governments in supporting this industry. More generally, government
involvement is driven by several objectives spanning a wide range that can be
categorized in the following areas:
* Transportation: ensuring that their citizens can have access to affordable air
transport.
* Market: discouraging monopolistic pricing for commercial aircraft.
* Technology: given the technical complexity of aircraft, the technological
spillovers that occur to other sectors can provide significant positive externalities.
* Economic:
o Employment: aircraft manufacturing as high-skilled employer
o Trade balance: aircraft can be a high value export item that balances trade
deficits with developing countries.
o Prestige: aircraft manufacturing with all its implications provides
credibility and prestige for the host country.
* Defense: as aircraft have military applications, the developing and retention of
skills and technological capacities in the production of civil aircraft provides a
serious strategic advantage to countries that do not have to rely on aircraft
imports.
Given the above potential advantages, governments have the incentive to provide for and
retain commercial aircraft related industries. This occurs in direct or indirect fashion and
has over time evolved in a very contentious dispute between Boeing and Airbus on the
issue of government subsidies.
Government involvement and support for domestic airframe manufacturers can take any
of the following forms:
* Financing guarantees and risk-sharing
* Marketing support through international relations and indirect offsets
* Basic R&D support
* Military/commercial cross-subsidies
o Financial support over the cycle
o Commonality in R&D, parts, tooling,
o Indirect risk reduction by moving down learning curve faster.
Financing support provided to Airbus in its formative years has been the most visible and
contentious subsidy leading from accusations to settlements under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)60 agreement to active cases (as of 2007) with
60 In 1992 the US and EU representatives agreed in a bilateral reduction of government subsidies which
would be limited to 33% of development costs and prohibited production subsidies (Irwin and Pavnick
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World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT successor. Obviously the subject is still
contended with a number of articles and reports supporting one or the other side but
although the level and nature of subsidies may be disputed, it is undisputable that both
industries were recipients of government support and continue to be so. In Box 4-3, we
discuss a few examples of the types government support categorized above.
Box 4-3 Government Involvement in Airframe Manufacturers
Financing
Stussel (2003) clarifies that Airbus received government guarantees for repayable loans. While these loans
could not have been supportable in market terms, Airbus would not have existed if not for this support(Olienyck and Carbaugh 1999). More recently, Boeing, using its partners and state governments has
arguably received similar levels of the same kind of development support that could be a little less than 50%
of the total development costs of the 787 (Pritchard and MacPherson 2004, Table 2 pg. 65).
Marketing
Much of anecdotal evidence exists to support the political influence on national airline decisions. An
illustrative example is chronicled by Lynn (1997) and others and details the pressure exerted by delegations
of the Clinton and Mitterand administrations on Saudi Arabia with regard to the choice of the supplier for a
large aircraft order from Saudia, the flag airline of the country. The order at the time was valued at
US$2Billion and after intense back and forth went finally to Boeing allegedly as a result of the U.S.-led
intervention in Bosnia in support of its Muslim population. Similarly politicized decisions have been reported
for China with orders awarded to European or U.S. manufacturers pending on which party favored Chinese
interests (Lynn 1997).
Basic R&D support
This is a rather straight forward involvement and has primarily involved NASA research and the availability
of its facilities to conduct Boeing sponsored research at below cost rates. The argument involves the timing
of the release of the results which otherwise become publicly available ((Pritchard and MacPherson 2004)).
MilitarylCommercial Cross Subsidies
We described examples of this type of ties in the vignettes on the Boeing 707 and 747 ((Ruttan 2006) Ch. 3
pg. 68). In these cases, some of the initial development costs for the commercial versions of these airliners
differed because of the similarities to the military versions. The productions lines gain experience from the
military versions of similar aircraft like the air refueling tankers KC-135 (modified 707) and the controversial
KC-767 (modified 767 for the US Air Force KC-X program). Similarly, Airbus could benefit from its push to
develop the A-400M military transport aircraft with technologies that may spillover in its next generation
narrow body aircraft.
Lawrence and Thornton (2003) (pg. 40-41) underscore this relationship in the following quotes. One
came from a congressional report of the, now defunct, Office of Technology Assessment:
"The single greatest means by which US government policy has affected the competitiveness of the
commercial aircraft industry is in the procurement of military aircraft and funding of the related R&D. [...] In
some cases whole systems developed for the military have been 'spun off to commercial applications,
reducing development costs and risks to the commercial users."
The other from (Hardy 1982) related to the development of the Boeing 707:
"Without the huge KC-135A programme there would almost certainly have been no Model 707."
2003). The dispute reemerged with the development of the A380 which U.S. officials contended that
violated the agreement. The EU side responded with a counter case with regard to subsidies for the 787.
Both cases are pending at the World Trade Organization.
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Profitability
The revenue and cost structure of the industry in the end defines the profitability and
margins. The published results from Boeing Commercial in Figure 4-16 show generally
positive operating margins that do fluctuate with the cycle but not as strongly as the
equivalent metric for the airlines, at least for the limited span of this time series.
Figure 4-16 Boeing Commercial Operating Earnings and Margins (Data source: Boeing Annual
reports 1997-2006).
Of course operating margins do not equal economic return as they do not account for the
cost of capital.
4.4 Cycles in LCA Manufacturing
In Section 3.5 we showed how small variations in demand are amplified by airlines
orders in very close correlation to airline profitability.
Unsurprisingly, the manufacturers need time to gear up and produce the deluge of orders
they receive after a trough and this results in a dampening of the cycle between orders
and deliveries as shown in Figures 4-17 and 4-18. Although dampened the delivery
divergence from the trend is an order of magnitude greater than the divergence of the
detrended demand (see Fig. 4-21).61
61 The coefficient of variation for the detrended demand is 0.06, while the equivalent value for detrended
orders and deliveries is 0.55 and 0.41 respectively.
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Figure 4-17 Comparison of Aircraft Orders and Deliveries
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Figure 4-18 Detrended aircraft orders and deliveries
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Figure 4-19 Employment by Boeing in Washington State (Source: Pope and Nyhan 2002)
The natural response of the manufacturers to use backlogs as a way to dampen the
oscillation of their production rate is not enough to really stabilize production rates. This
creates the fluctuations in employment discussed in Box 4-1 and also shown in Fig. 4-19
which tracks very closely and with a delay the order variation. As we discussed in
Section 4.3.2.2, production rate variation does not allow for a full exploitation of the
learning curve due to the 'forgetting' effect that can be partially attributed to loss of
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organizational competencies as a side effect of the hire-fire cycle but also to a lack of
coordination with the upstream suppliers. In extreme cases, as empirically demonstrated
in Box 4-2, the effect of a sudden surge in production rates can even lead to costly shut
downs of production lines.
4.4.1 Airframe Manufacturers Response to Cyclicality
From the perspective of the individual manufacturers, their reactions differ somewhat.
While Airbus has been receiving a greater order variation (see Figure 4-20), its delivery
rates are shown to be substantially less varied that Boeing's in Figure 4-21. Table 4-8
makes the comparison using coefficient of variation of the detrended time series (see
Figure 4-22) as a measure for volatility.
Similarly, European labor regulations dictate a less pronounced variation in employment
in Airbus compared to Boeing. This is illustrated by the difficulty that Airbus faces
because of labor union reactions in implementing the planned 10.000 job cuts over five
years under its Power 8 restructuring program compared to triple that number for Boeing
only in the post-9/11 period. This inflexibility, when managed correctly, may be a
blessing in disguise given the discussion above.
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Figure 4-20 Comparative Boeing and Airbus Orders in Total Seats (Data sources: Boeing and Airbus
websites)
All the above indicate that the extended enterprises represented by Boeing and Airbus
deal with the cyclicality in the orders received differently. What the differences in the
backlog years data series in Fig 4-23 make prominent is that Airbus appears less
'coupled' or more insulated from the cycle than the Boeing extended enterprise which
attempts to maintain a lower level of backlog. While the data on volatility in Table 4-8
seem that they contradict this (Airbus volatility seems higher) there are three observations
that mitigate this: (i) the volatility of orders received by Airbus is much greater while the
volatility of deliveries is equal, (ii) the latter equality is deceptive in that it does not
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capture the dampening trend shown in Figure 4-22, and (iii) Airbus has a shorter history
and volatility for a start-up is expectedly higher than for an established firm.
Figure 4-21 Comparative Boeing and Airbus Deliveries in Total Seats (Data sources: Boeing and
Airbus websites)
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Figure 4-22 Comparative Boeing and Airbus Deliveries Detrended (Basis: 100)
These findings are aligned to Piepenbrock's (2005) theory of the enterprise. Airbus seems
more bound by the "integral" architecture of its extended enterprise to respond more
slowly to the demand variation while Boeing appears intent to maintain a responsive
production rate. Boeing's behavior comes at a cost which is intent on reducing by
employing lean manufacturing principles.
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Figure 4-23 Backlog in Years of Production Rate Comparison between Airbus and Boeing (includes
MDC pre-1997 data)
Table 4-8 Comparison of Volatility for Airbus and Boeing (includes MDC data pre-1997)
Coefficient of Variation
Boeing Airbus
Order rates (1974-2004 data) 0.48 0.83
Delivery rates (1974-2004) 0.31 0.31
Backlog in years of production (for 1.00 1.95*
narrow body aircraft 1988-2004)
Backlog in years of production (for 1.94
wide body aircraft 1974-2004)
*Excluding first year of delivery for the A320 which skews the results to a much higher number
4.5 Chapter 4 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed some key aspects of the airframe manufacturing industry: its
history, product characteristics, manufacturing performance and pricing strategies. We
also discussed why these led to a consolidation of the industry into a duopoly in the
current market for large commercial aircraft and why, even under such consolidation, the
manufacturers remain competitive and how they respond to cyclical signals from their
customers (aircraft orders). Cyclical order variation induces significant costs when trying
to respond to them. Empirical evidence, namely the length of historical order backlog,
supported the concept of differences in the institutional architecture of the extended
- Boeing Bacddog in Years Narrow
Years of - Boeing Bacldog in Years Wde
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enterprise between the two competitors. In any case, both manufacturers are closely
related to and supported by the governments of the countries they are located in.
This chapter concludes the overview of the three primary stakeholders in the commercial
air transportation system: the customers (Chapter 2), the airlines and owners of aircraft
(Chapter 3), and the manufacturers of aircraft (Chapter 4). While until now the
connection between them has been implicit, in Chapter 5 we make these connections
explicit by developing them under the Enterprise of Enterprises framework.
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Chapter 5 Commercial Aviation as an Enterprise-of-
Enterprises: An Integrative Framework for Cross-Industry
Analysis
In the previous chapters we discussed several aspects of the commercial aviation value
chain. Chapter 2 investigated how passengers and shippers are served and what they
value in terms of service. Chapter 3 gave an overview of the types and structure of
airlines and how they compete in providing air transportation services; Finally, Chapter 4
reviewed the currently duopolistic LCA manufacturing industry and the technical
characteristics of aircraft that they developed in their effort to gain competitive
advantage. Where applicable, we discussed their relationships and interactions with other
key stakeholders.
A broad view of the stakeholders directly involved in the commercial air transportation
system is shown in Figure 5-1.
CIpitaDiMark
Leasing companie
figure 5-1 Broad View of the Stakeholders in the Commercial Air Transportation System
These stakeholders form the core of an interdependent value chain which, as we saw in
Chapters 3 and 4 and further discuss here, is subject to a severe boom and bust cycle with
all the negative repercussions that this entails. On top of that, the cyclical behavior is an
emergent property of the system of interactions among these stakeholders. Instead of
being solely a result of external shocks, the system dynamics are set up in a way that
induces and amplifies this oscillation. As a result one needs a holistic perspective of how
each component stakeholder contributes to the oscillation and what strategies could be
used to prevent this from happening which is our intention as stated in Chapter 1.
Given the variety in value contribution and value perception across the stakeholders in
that global air transportation system, it was necessary to devise a conceptual framework
that would standardize the interactions and value functions of the diverse stakeholders
and facilitate the modeling and experimentation of such a complex system. In this chapter
we develop the concept of Enterprise of Enterprises as a framework for studying and
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prescribing system-wide policies for systems that require coordination across multiple
industries.
5.1 Enterprises and Systems: the need for an Integrative
Framework for Enterprise of Enterprises
Rouse (2005) defines an enterprise as "a goal-directed organization of resources-
human, information, financial, and physical-and activities, usually of significant
operational scope, complication, risk, and duration."62 Based on this definition he
identifies as potential enterprises corporations, supply chains, markets, governments and
economies. In a footnote he states that supply chains can be considered extended
enterprises and markets as further extensions involving several supply chains. According
to the basic tenets of systems thinking, the design and management of the enterprise
functions independently, fails to account for the strong level of interactions among them
and therefore leads to suboptimal performance which, in turn, leads to the natural
conclusion that the enterprise needs to be viewed holistically.
Enterprise transformation can only be meaningful if pursued on the enterprise level
(Womack and Jones 1996). For the enterprise as a corporation or an extended enterprise
(supply chain) several tools have been developed that address the need of holistic
approach with varying degrees of success. Such methods include: Total Quality
Management (see Powel (1995) ), Six Sigma (see Harry (1998) ), Business Process
Reengineering (see Hammer and Champy (1993) ), and Lean Transformation (see
Womack and Jones (1996) ). Lean has been constantly evolving since its inception from
the Toyota Production System (Liker 2004) and is arguably the most encompassing in its
view of the enterprise of the methods mentioned above.
In each of these methods, their successful implementation relies on the existence of a few
champions of the transformation in the higher level of the company that can push the
change and allow the, also necessary, bottom up initiatives to flourish. In the case of
extended enterprises, the lean transformation occurs through the lead of one company
which is usually the primary integrator and has significant influence over its suppliers.
Toyota's ongoing lean transformation of its supply chain demonstrates the best practice
in that arena. Unlike traditional value chain-inspired strategies in which the dominant
organization in each echelon attempts to maximize the value it can capture (Porter 1985),
Toyota shared the benefits of transformation with its suppliers expecting that the value
generated by the whole chain through this incentivized cooperation to exceed the value
Toyota could extract if it acted with a short-term zero-sum outlook (Liker 2004).
In these examples of transformation, independent of outcome, the identification of a lead
stakeholder with defined objectives played a key role. When one considers the larger
62 Another definition for an enterprise is the following: "An enterprise is a purposeful socio-technical
system organized to create value for its multiple stakeholders by performing its defined core missions,
functions or businesses serving societal ends." (as defined by Kirk Bozdogan in the Lean Aerospace
initiative at MIT)
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scope enterprises identified by Rouse, i.e. markets and economies, then the
methodologies outlined above are not applicable directly as even the identification of a
lead stakeholder or the definition of widely acceptable objectives are not straightforward.
By developing the concept of Enterprise of Enterprises (EoE) we take the first steps
towards bridging the gap of transformation from hierarchical to non-hierarchical
enterprises. The ultimate goal is to create a framework that could allow the "architecting"
and purposeful transformation of such systems.
Hitchins (1994,2005) used a hierarchy of five layers to categorize where systems
engineering can be applied as shown in Table 5-1. These layers form a "nesting" model
in which "many products make a project, many projects make a business, many
businesses make an industry and many industries make a socio-economic system."
of Systems according to Hitchins (1994'~ (2OO)51
io-economic.
Icipal lever of control is regulation.
,stry.
nplete and competitive supply chains.
iness.
Itrolled optimization independent of
Ipetitor/partner performance.
ject.
making of complex artifacts.
duct.
making of tangible artifacts.
While some of the differences may need further clarification as the categories are not
complete, e.g. the socio-economic layer is comprised by more than industries, it is a
useful starting point.
Traditional systems engineering has focused on Layers 1 and 2. Management science has
focused on Layer 3 and political scientists and economists have struggled with Layer 5.
Layer 4, the industry and multi-industry interactions is not virgin territory but the scope
of work on that level has been focused on competitive strategies and strategic dominance
when approached from Layer 3 and from the end customer and individual industry
perspective when approached from Level 5 while the holistic system approach has been
lacking. 63
This lack may be the result of the characteristic lack of centralized control that Layer 4
enterprises exhibit. Ackoff (1971) defined organizations in the systems terminology as "a
63 For the air transportation industry, layer 4 has been looked in business school case studies focused on
airline strategies for expansion or on the competitive behavior of manufacturers but not on how the two
interact. It has also been looked at as a system from a regulatory perspective in which the interests of
certain stakeholders are emphasized e.g. passengers and deregulation or specific airlines and antitrust (see
Viscuzi et al. pg 554).
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purposeful system64 that contains at least two purposeful elements which have a common
purpose; ... its functionally distinct subset can respond to each other's behavior ... and at
least one subset has a system-control function." The Layer 4 systems do not meet the
requirement that at least one purposeful element has a system control function and in that
respect, closely match the characteristics of "loosely-coupled system of systems." In the
next section we introduce the concepts of system of systems (SoS), how loosely-coupled
SoS are defined, and then extend this to define the Enterprise of Enterprises.
5.2 Enterprise Views: From Systems of Systems (SoS) to
Enterprises of Enterprises (EoE)
5.2.1 Enterprises as Systems and their Representation: a Literature Overview
The definitions cited in Section 5.1 do not clarify what forms enterprises can take. The
most common organizational form identified as an enterprise is the incorporated
organization (belongs to Level 3 under Hitchin's categories). Enterprises are fairly
cohesive with identifiable strategies and hierarchical decision-making process at least on
the macro-level. This is the type of organization that the term "enterprise" will refer to
when used without any qualifier.
The term "extended enterprise" is referring to the part of the value chain in which an
enterprise is involved, has interests in, and potential influence over. An extended
enterprise is smaller than an industry as it usually does not include competitors.
The view of enterprises has been evolving and continues to evolve. It moved from a
mechanistic reductionist closed-system view to one where emergent behavior necessitates
a holistic open-system view. Both views are valid in different settings. (Ackoff 1994) (pg.
3) noted that the enterprise was conceptualized progressively as a machine, an organism,
and as a social system. The latter conceptualization, as a social system, enables the
stakeholder view of the firm which we discuss later in this section.
Closed-system view of the Enterprise
Taylorism and the scientific organization of labor has been the most widely known result
of the "organization as machine" worldview. The hierarchical centralized bureaucracy is
necessary for deciding on organizational planning and execution via budgeting and
objectives. The control structure is provided through punishment and reward primarily
via financial incentives. Taylor's scientific approach met with great resistance from the
shop floor workers (Kanigel 2005)(pg. 179-180)65.
64 A Purposeful system according to Ackoff "can produce the same outcome in different ways and ...
different outcomes in the same and different states... [I]t selects ends as well as means and thus display
will."
65 "The greatest obstacle faced by the experimenter was 'the blind [] prejudice on the part of most
machinists to any improvement or change. [The experimenter] upon entering such an undertaking must bid
good-bye to all ideas of personal popularity among his fellow workmen.'"
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Toyota improved on that paradigm by instilling a scientific hypothesis testing via trial
and error culture from management appointed organizational scientists to the workers
themselves as part of a broader company culture by using "Kaizen" events to reveal the
tacit knowledge and creativity of its workforce in a participatory fashion (Liker 2004).
Companies operating in fast clock-speed environments also adapted their approaches
from top-down hierarchy to a matrix structure (functional on one dimension and project-
related on the other) and delegating decision-making (Bums and Stalker ref. by Katz and
Kahn (1978) (pg. 133), Fine (1998)).
Open-system views of the Enterprise
On a larger scale though, the reductionist paradigm starts to break down as Katz and
Kahn (1978) (pg. 30-33) are quick to point out. Organizations observe and adapt to their
environment. Organizations compete for resources and information and they survive if
they adapt successfully. (Dooley 1997) considers them as complex adaptive systems with
potentially chaotic behavior that can move between dynamic states either motivated by
crises or leadership. He classifies organizational change into (i) improving the
performance of current functions (first-order change), (ii) changing functions (second-
order change), and surviving or dying-off (third-order change). When they change they
do so for a reason (teleological view) and the way the change is determined by the
understanding of the existing environment and the ingrained organizational knowledge,
culture, and core principles called DNA by Spear and Bowen (1999).
Zott (2003) considers two primary ways in which enterprise change is achieved: (a)
imitation and (b) experimentation. Competitors can choose to experiment and gain
competitive advantage through their ability to generate and operationalize innovation
while other may imitate and adapt innovation. Of course, more traditional modes of
competition like quantity and price setting exist. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) used an
abstract model of the firm that defined quantity, product innovation and process
innovation as basis to study the complementarity between certain firm functions.
Although the biological metaphor has been used widely to describe enterprises, Katz and
Kahn (1974 pg. 37) caution its use because organizations are social structures, and as
such they do not have a physical "anatomy" once they cease to exist. Another difference
stems from the ability of organizations to grow continuously and at will. This ability
which Katz and Kahn called the "maximization principle" overrides the maintenance
dynamics 66 either as a natural result of proficiency or as means for alleviating internal
and external threats (pg. 97). As they are applied successfully, these impulses become
ingrained in the organizational DNA of a successful growing organization but they may
be ill-serving when the organization and its environment encounter limits to growth
resulting in the overshoot and collapse pattern of boom-bust cycles. This is besides the
inherent problems of growth that Katz and Kahn list (harder integration, loss of core
motivation, communication breakdowns, misalignment of incentives pg. 108).
66 They define maintenance dynamics as the tendency of biological systems to retain the status-quo
(homeostasis).
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Strategic Objectives of the Enterprise: Stakeholder vs. Shareholder View
According to Katz and Kahn, productive or economic enterprises have as primary
motivator the creation of wealth through material extraction, transformation, and service
rendering (pg. 153). The motivator of "creation of wealth" or value is not equated to
economic profit. Economic profit is in fact the value to the owners but there is value
distributed to employees (wages), financiers (interest), government (taxes), society
(consumer surplus, employment), suppliers (their products needed the added value to be
sold) etc. These entities are stakeholders of the enterprise and their interests may or may
not be aligned.
In defining stakeholders more formally, (Freeman 1984) simply classifies any group that
impacts or is affected by an enterprise's performance as a stakeholder. Kochan and
Rubinstein (2000) are more specific and use three criteria to characterize the relative
influence of stakeholder groups:
(1) possession of resources key to the enterprise's success;
(2) level of risk that their assets are exposed in the enterprise;
(3) formal and informal power they wield over the enterprise.
Based on the involvement of stakeholders, two corporate traditions have evolved
successfully each with long history: shareholder capitalism in English speaking countries
and stakeholder capitalism in continental Europe and Asia. In stakeholder capitalism, the
enterprise strives to balance the, often conflicting, interests of all major stakeholders
while in shareholder capitalism the interests of the owners have precedence. (Grant 2005)
(pg. 39) illustrates this difference in legal terms; while in the US, Canada, UK, and
Australia company boards are legally expected to act in the interest of the shareholders,
French boards are mandated to act according to national interests, Dutch boards to
guarantee the continuity of the enterprise, and German boards are required to have
employee representatives in their members. Similarly, the Japanese Keiretsus, horizontal
and vertical families of industrial and financial companies, are strong embodiments of the
stakeholder view of the enterprise and are thus recognized by law.
Piepenbrock (2005) observed that the two models (stakeholder vs. shareholder) also
exhibit their advantages best at different stages of industrial and technologic maturity. By
combining Utterback's (1994) innovation s-curves and the stakeholder model of the
enterprise, he postulated that integral enterprises (managed with a stakeholder view) are
advantaged during the initial phase of a disruptive technology where the need for stable
financing and customer integration is significant. As the disruptive technology leaves its
initial product innovation stage only a few designs have the potential to emerge as
dominant. At this stage, a modular enterprise (shareholder centric with arm's length
relationships with their stakeholders) is better poised to push the technology frontier and
innovate faster than the other 'slower' stakeholder-centric enterprise. Once the dominant
design emerges and product starts being commoditized, the competitive advantage is
provided by process innovation and the ability to reduce marginal production costs hence
prices and improve operational efficiencies. At this stage, the integral firms regain the
advantage as they can better focus their energies to satisfying their customers.
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If the two enterprise views are archetypes of black and white then most real-world
enterprises would be painted in shades of gray; that is the two views have influenced each
other but the two practices are still distinguishable. An illustration of the two contrasting
views is given in Table 5-2. While the input-output model depicts only those stakeholders
with a financial interest in the firm and the relationship is primarily one way, the
stakeholder model is far richer and considers the inputs and benefits expected to them.
Donaldson and Preston (1995) reviewed the arguments for and against the stakeholder
theory. Specifically they tried to verify whether (i) the stakeholder model describes the
reality of the enterprise more accurately, (ii) enterprises that follow the model are
relatively more successful in conventional performance terms, (iii) the interests of all
stakeholders are of intrinsic value, and (iv) the stakeholder model prescribes specific
managerial actions. While they do not find a conclusive proof for the second thesis, they
do find a consensus in that the alternative shareholder theory in its pure form is "morally
untenable" even for its proponents.
Table 5-2 Contrasting models of the enterprise: Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Model (Source:
Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Kochan and Rubinstein (2000), adapted)
Shareholder-centric/modular Stakeholder-centriclintegral
Enterprise Enterprise
T A /i Tt
Goals Maximize shareholder wealth Pursue multiple objectives of parties with different
interests
Principal-Agent Model: Managers are agents of Team production model: Coordination,
Governance stakeholders. Control is the key task. cooperation, & conflict resolution are the key
tasks.
Performance Shareholder value Fair distribution of value
metrics
The strategic objectives of enterprises under the two archetypes would be expected to
diverge along with the incentives provided to the managers. Indeed, as shown under
'goals' in Table 5-2, for a shareholder enterprise the economic return is the primary
metric and the incentive structure for management is similarly aligned. A side-effect of
this structure is that the time horizon of strategic decision also varies between the two
archetypes. For shareholder-centric enterprises, the ratio of institutional stockholders
against high-turnover high-return seeking stockholders may determine the length of
investment horizon (Keynes 1936). When managers are judged by short-term economic
performance then long-term strategic investments expectedly take the back-seat to short-
term profit maximization (Stiglitz 1985) (pg. 146).
(Govenments I Groups
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Capital Markets as Stakeholders
As capital markets become more actively involved in the management of firms due to
their status as shareholders in shaping the management decisions it is useful to briefly
review their structure.
Financial institutions as stakeholders can be broadly categorized into banks, stock-
markets, and private investors (equity). All three of them are substitutes as sources of
financing for enterprises. Stiglitz (1985) summarizes the functions of capital markets as
threefold: (i) allocation of limited capital to competing users, (ii) provision of indicators
to managers and (iii) control of capital.
According to Stiglitz, banks and lenders rather than shareholders provide greater control
of the corporate decision-making as the banks can better control the principal-agent
dynamic to their interests. Stiglitz recommended that institutional reforms where labor
unions, as one of the primary long-term interest stakeholders, should play a more active
role in management decisions.
His analysis did not include the ascend of fiduciary capitalism which saw an increase in
the size of mutual and pension funds and other investor pooling mechanisms that
concentrate the power of the shareholders to the fund managers from 5% in 1945 to more
than 50% of corporate equity in 2000 (Hawley and Williams 2000)(pg 55). Hawley and
Williams identify three waves of corporate control: corporate entrepreneurial
management (owners manage the firms they started, 1890-1920), managerial capitalism
(control goes to professional managers with diffuse shareholders exerting weak influence,
1920-1970), fiduciary capitalism (investor fund managers concentrated the power of
shareholders, 1970-).
According to Hawley and Williams, fiduciary capitalism is characterized by universal
owners (institutional owners with highly diversified portfolios that are usually held for
the long term). Universal owners, with their large portfolio of assets, have the potential
to capture spillover externalities; that is positive effects of actions of one firm that do not
benefit that specific firm but others in the value chain which are included in the broad
portfolio of a fund. The case is similar for negative externalities generated by one firm
but which burden another. While this is in theory possible, in practice the short-term
focus and competition among funds to generate large short-term returns along with the
inability to measure externalities has blurred if not entirely eliminated the long-term
focus and potential.
Simplified assumptions on the representation of strategic objectives
Using short-term profit maximization as the primary metric for managing an enterprise
can have adverse consequences that range from corruption and illegal activities (financial
statement manipulation, market fixing, product adulteration etc. with abundant examples
in each case), to disregard for the adverse externalities generated (e.g. environmental
damage, inequality), to short-sighted decisions that endanger long-term strategy and
competitive advantage. While these are real problems when actively managing an
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enterprise, the metric of economic value added remains valid in judging and comparing
enterprise performance if the factors mentioned above are accounted for.
Grant (2004) (pg. 40-41) argues that for analytical purposes on strategy the use of long-
term profit maximization as performance metric is a valid, albeit simplifying, assumption
for the following reasons:
1. Companies in competitive markets face survival threats due to competition and in
many cases earn returns that do not cover their capital costs - a fundamentally
unsustainable situation.
2. Management control can be wrested over from underperforming companies by
either their shareholders or private investment firms.
3. Sustained long-term profitability is more likely to require a stakeholder-centric
management approach.
4. It allows for a simple metric when comparing systematically and analyzing
between companies.
Given the absence of clear alternative metrics, the above arguments are compelling. In
our analysis, we will use relative economic profit as one metric for identifying successful
strategies without endorsing it as a criterion for short-term management tactics.
Enterprises and Extended Enterprises: symbiosis and competition
The vertical value chain from suppliers, to the enterprise, to the customers has been
considered as an extended enterprise. We already mentioned the efforts by Toyota in
affect lean transformation across their value chain in Section 5.1. Stakeholder-centric
managed companies create an extended enterprise as a competitive advantage. They tend
to have a smaller number of suppliers with which they nurture a trust-based relationship.
Illustrative examples of the risk and rewards of such relationships are given by (Sheffi
2005). Risks may include the vulnerability of a single-sourcing strategy but the
advantages outweigh the costs as a close relationship with a single supplier provides:
shared R&D, ability to co-optimize production and logistics as a system, better
understanding of their cost structure, better integrated products due to shared R&D etc.
The boundaries of the extended enterprise though, understandably, do not extend to
include competitors67 - stakeholders in the overall system but not in the enterprise per se.
These competitors have their own value functions but also share a stake in the
performance of the industry they participate in and are influenced by the results of their
collective decisions.
5.2.2 Systems of Systems
(Maier 1998) defines systems of systems or "collaborative systems" if (i) the component
systems operate with different purposes and (ii) "are managed (at least in part) for their
own purposes." This definition matches the difference between Layer 4 and other layers
in Hitchin's categorization. For Maier, systems of systems are a composite of systems
67 Ackoff (1994) echoed this, by not extending the boundaries of his enterprise view to competitors either.
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that have operational and managerial independence among other distinguishing
properties. Shah (2007, forhcoming) points out that these systems have localized value
functions but are also influenced by a global value function. Maier describes the principal
characteristics that distinguish "true systems-of-systems" from "very large and complex
but monolithic systems" as shown in Box 5-1.
Maier (1998) uses three examples to demonstrate systems of systems and their
characteristic architecture: wide area networks like the Internet, integrated air defense
systems, and Intelligent Transportation Systems. Maier's is focused on how these
systems of systems can be architected and thus he concludes with four heuristics:
1. Stable intermediate forms: The systems of systems are expected to form
dynamically and not centrally directed and as such their design should try to
ensure that they can function in intermediate phases.
2. Policy triage. As the designer does not have "coercive" control, he or she needs
to prioritize the points of leverage.
3. Leverage at the interfaces. "Interfaces are the architecture." The interfaces
between components (e.g. data standards and protocols for networks) are the
critical areas through which the designer can control the system of systems.
4. Ensuring cooperation: The designer should enforce the reasons that the
components choose to collaborate.
Box 5-1 Loosely-coupled System-of-Systems Characteristics (Sources Sage and Cuppan (2001), Maier(1998)_)
Operational Independence of the Elements: If the system-of-systems is disassembled into its component
systems the component systems must be able to usefully operate independently. The system-of-systems is
composed of systems which are independent and useful in their own right.
Managerial Independence of the Elements: The component systems not only can operate independently,
they do operate independently. The component systems are separately acquired and integrated but
maintain a continuing operational existence independent of the system-of- systems.
Evolutionary Development: The system-of-systems does not appear fully formed. Its development and
existence is evolutionary with functions and purposes added, removed, and modified with experience.
Emergent Behavior: The system-of-systems performs functions and carries out purposes that do not reside
in any component system. These behaviors are emergent properties of the entire system-of-systems and
cannot be localized to any component system. The principal purposes of the systems-of-systems are
fulfilled by these behaviors.
Geographic Distribution: The geographic extent of the component systems is large. Large is a nebulous
and relative concept as communication capabilities increase, but at a minimum it means that the
components can readily exchange only information and not substantial quantities of mass or energy.
SOS have emergent properties as the behavior of the SOS cannot be deduced from the
behavior of component systems and because of their interdependency of the components
a "new set of mechanisms must emerge to guarantee the integration." (Correa and
Keating 2003).
SoS Related Methodologies
Having identified what systems have been considered SoS, we will discuss the
methodologies developed to address the challenges they present.
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Jackson and Keys (1984) classified the problems encountered by SoS designers into
mechanical-unitary, systemic-unitary, mechanical-pluralist, and systemic-pluralist (see
Figure 5-2). Following Ackoff's (1971) reference to "machine-age" and "system's age,"
mechanical are systems that are "closed [with] passive parts and [] understood through
reductionism" while systemic are "open, with purposeful parts, [] only partially
observable and [] not understood by reductionism." The second attribute refers to system
control; unitary systems have a single set of decision-makers and conversely pluralist
exhibit multiple sets of decision makers.
Jackson and Keys consider operations research (OR), systems engineering (SE) and
systems analysis (SA) as methodologies developed to address problems that are primarily
systemic-unitary. SoS, on the other hand, based on the prevalent examples used to
demonstrate the concept, would fall under the mechanical-pluralist category in which
while there are multiple stakeholders managing the component systems (pluralist) the
systems themselves have well known engineered responses (mechanical). They argue that
Churchman's (Churchman 1979) methodology of synthesis of decision-makers' positions
towards consensus (later formalized by Mitroff, Emshoff et al. (1979) ) may be well
suited to such systems when addressing the pluralist component. They assert though that
"every formulation of a wicked problem corresponds to a statement of solutions and vice
versa" which seems to underestimate the systemic aspect of their behavior.
Socio-
Technical
*P (systemic)
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Mechanical
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Figure 5-2 Classification of Systems (based on Jackson and Keys (1984))
Jackson and Keys describe the environment prone to systemic-pluralist problems thus:
"organizations are purposeful systems which contain purposeful parts and which are
themselves part of larger purposeful systems. Hence organizations have responsibilities
to their own purposes, to the purposes of their parts, and to the purposes of the larger
systems of which they are part." As a result of these characteristics, they assert that the
task of the manager of such systems is to remove the conflicts among these levels of
purpose.
The methodology that they recommend for such a task derives from Checkland (1981)
and revolves around three principles for the problem solving strategies:
* Participative: participation of all stakeholders in the planning process.
* Continuous: continuous adaptation of the strategies to address the changes of the
evolving system.
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* Holistic: address and consider as many layers of the system as possible
simultaneously.
In keeping with these principles, (Ackoff 1981) proposed a structured planning process
that consists of five iterative steps:
1. Formulating the mess
2. Ends planning
3. Means planning
4. Resource planning, and
5. Implementation and control
Participatory and interactive planning is key for such systems as is the second step of the
planning process - ends planning - which is intended to eliminate petty differences
among the stakeholders by focusing on the desired end state. The approach outlined by
Jackson and Keys is still concentrated on systems that despite having multiple
stakeholders, their purposes can be aligned - i.e. conflicts of interest can be held to a
minimum. Layer 4 systems, or industries, may or may not satisfy that requirement.
Wojcik and Hoffman (2007) point to the need for accounting of interactions between
stakeholders with different objectives when modeling enterprises on the strategic level.
They also note that equilibrium seeking methods rather than optimization are more
appropriate for these systems. Even if the equilibrium is not reachable in practice, it can
act as an "attractor" of enterprise behavior that is sufficient to inform strategic decisions.
They also stress the importance of the human factor and organizational context that
seems to be missing from applications of SoS engineering. In order to address that
shortcoming they suggest that Highly Optimized Tolerances (HOT) could be a
methodology that is applicable at the highest level of the hierarchy of the modeled SoS.
Their approach is demonstrated by a simple model of a system of cost equations that is
solved for game theoretic equilibrium. The HOT approach reliance on analytical systems
of equations may prove to be limiting in accurate representing systemic aspects and as a
result could be more appropriate for mechanical-pluralist SoS but it follows the same
trajectory of thought that we combine in the EoE representation (this chapter) and
modeling (Chapters 9-10).
Kasser (2002) suggests that managing an SoS 68 could become easier if abstracted as an
information management problem and use a methodology similar to those used for
configuration management. He points that the difficulties in managing an SoS stem from
the loose coupling of self-regulated systems and therefore he expects that finding and
adding the organizational elements that would interface between the component systems
as shown in Fig. 5-3 would allow for the better management of the SoS. While his
suggestions make sense for unitary systems they may not be practicable for pluralist
decentralized ones.
68 Kasser uses a slightly different definition of SoS as a set of interdependent systems that evolve at
different rates.
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Figure 5-3 Adding control to self-regulating systems as a way for solving SoS problems (Source:
Kasser 2004)
Transportation Domain Applications
DeLaurentis (2005) presents the U.S national transportation system (NTS) as an example
of SoS. He views the NTS as a mechanical-pluralist system with individual stakeholders
operating parts of the system while connected in a network of interactions on both the
business and the physical levels. His view does not extend to the supply chain issues (i.e.
the cross-industry supply chain connections). Crossley and Mane (2005) develop a more
specific application by using the SoS framework for developing the aircraft choice and
future sizing as a multidisciplinary optimization problem. Rebentisch, Crawley et al.
(2005) also used the SoS framework from a stakeholder value perspective to develop
sustainable space exploration. Based on the integrated system-of-systems approach,
Taylor and deWeck (2007) demonstrated a way for concurrent optimization of he aircraft
design and the network structure that the aircraft will operate in.
5.2.3 Enterprise of Enterprises (EoE)
5.2.3.1 The Characteristics of EoEs: Need and Definitions
The discussion above illustrated that while the SoS framework encompasses systems with
systemic-pluralist problems, the bulk of applications of SoS have been reserved for
mechanical-pluralist problems. Even when systemic-pluralist problems are considered,
for example by Jackson and Keys (1984), consensus and tight-coupling of the
stakeholders is implied. Similarly, Kasser's solution to challenges faced by loosely-
coupled self-regulating SoS is to add a centralized control mechanism. But neither
approach is generally feasible for Level 4 systems. The difficulty to assert centralized
control and the divergence of interests among the constituents are the distinguishing
characteristics of EoEs. Box 5-2 translates the characteristics of loosely coupled SoS
from Box 5-1 to address the characteristics of EoEs.
As a concept, EoE bridges the gap between the between industry and enterprise as it
considers the a set of related industries as a purposeful system with the implicit
assumption that it can be modified towards optimizing its performance across
stakeholders. This is done by using terms, methods and heuristics from literature on
System of Systems, Enterprise Architecture, and management science.
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Box 5-2Characteristics of an Enterprise of Enterprises based on SoS
Operational Independence of the Constituents: If the Enterprise-of-Enterprises is disassembled into its
constituent enterprises, the constituent enterprises are able to usefully operate independently.
Managerial Independence of the Constituents: The constituent enterprises can and do operate
independently. The constituent enterprises are separate and interface through material, financial, or
regulatory exchanges. There are strong conflicts of interests (especially short-term) present in the value
functions of the constituent enterprises that instill a zero-sum game mentality in their behavior.
Evolutionary Development: The enterprise-of-enterprises is not static. Its development and existence is
evolutionary with functions and interactions added, removed, and modified by the volition of the constituent
stakeholders responding to market forces.
Emergent Behavior: The system performs functions and carries out purposes that do not reside in any
component system. These behaviors are emergent properties of the entire enterprise-of-enterprises and
cannot be localized to any component system. The principal purposes of the enterprise-of-enterprises are
fulfilled by these behaviors.
Diversity of Interfaces: The constituent enterprises interface with each other through a variety of ways:
material, financial, and regulatory. Information exchanges still occur but are relegated a supporting rather
than primary role.
Following the classic systems approach for EoEs may not be possible for the following
reasons:
* No obvious architect. The need for systemic change may be recognized by several
stakeholders in the system and yet either because of their relative size or because
of difficulties to see beyond the short-term, the option of rearchitecting the EoE
may not even be considered.
* No obvious points of leverage. Even if there are stakeholders that recognize the
need for change and have the will to do so, there may not be any obvious point of
leverage given the magnitude and complexity of the system. The usual point of
leverage considered is regulatory intervention and hence lobbying towards that
end but the objective is usually still guided by short-term self-interest and is
expected to cause reaction and counter-lobbying efforts by stakeholders that are
adversely impacted. Cooperation may also be considered but it is not an obvious
leverage point due to the competitive nature of the relationships and because of
the legal implications introduced by anti-trust regulations.
* Divergent value functions. The local and the global value functions are usually at
odds with each other especially in the short-term.
* Large system inertia. The nature and magnitude of EoEs make them difficult to
change compared to regular SoS examples. Even when intentional changes occur
their results are rarely immediate and often hidden by the compound effect of
multiple actions.
In response to these differences, we reformulate Maier's four heuristics or architecting
principles to represent the specific characteristics of EoEs:
* Leverage at the interfaces: Interfaces for EoEs can include price signals,
delivery and order rate signals, product characteristics, information etc. Interfaces
are still prime leverage points.
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* Policy triage: Even more than other SoS, standardization will not always be
possible and the leverage points not readily identifiable. Effort will be required on
the part of the architect to find them and decide where to use limited resources to
affect them.
* Stable intermediate forms: Because of their independence, parts of the EoE may
separate from the whole and function entirely independently. This can happen
dynamically and unexpectedly but with all its disadvantages it gives a reassurance
as well: the system is resilient and will continue to operate even if change fails.
* Ensuring collaboration: The value delivered to the component systems needs to
be considered in order to maintain long term participation. The value functions
and culture of the constituent enterprises of the EoE become of equal importance
to the interfaces in affecting change as they are expected to be conflicting more
often than not. While arguably these may be one of the hardest elements of an
enterprise to change, they do evolve over time.
The definitions and heuristics that were presented here in the abstract will be used to
define the air transportation related industries as an Enterprise of Enterprises in the next
section.
5.2.3.2 Building Blocks/Components of an EoE
In order to provide a common terminology for referring to EoEs, we define the common
building blocks of EoEs based on the conceptual abstraction of the EoE concept:
* Consituent enterprises and stakeholders,
* Value functions, and
* Interfaces.
EoEs are comprised of enterprises which we call constituent enterprises. EoEs can also
have non-enterprise stakeholders. In some cases there is an overlap of stakeholders and
enterprises but there can be stakeholder groups that are not tightly organized enough to be
considered an enterprise (for example, passengers are stakeholders in the commercial
aviation EoE as they cannot be considered constituent enterprises).
Enterprises are defined by their value functions and exert control/authority over
components internal to the enterprise in the desire to fulfill their value functions.
Enterprise components can be physical capacities (e.g. capital equipment, contracts,
liquid assets, etc) or functions (e.g. business units, marketing, operations etc.).
Value functions represent the needs, expectations and objectives of constituent
enterprises and stakeholders. They are the fundamental aspects of the enterprise which
are targeted by the driving policies and strategies followed by the enterprise's managers.
They are not always quantifiable and in many cases they may not even be clearly
articulated by managers. For the purpose of this thesis, we follow Grant's simplification
of the strategic objectives of a private enterprise and the stakeholders directly involved
with it (labor, capital markets, owners) which is the maximization of its long-term
economic return (see Grant (2004) and Section 7.3 for further discussion).
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The primary interface within an enterprise is authority that is the strongest level of
coupling is assumed for interfaces within an enterprise. (Authority in our definition
includes the notion of contractual obligations and team inputs and so account for the
objection raised by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that the primary governance of activities
within the firm is not authority).
Interfaces between constituent enterprises of an EoE cannot be authoritative. Enterprises
are coupled with stronger (tight) or weaker ties (loose). In the generic form, EoEs can
have variations of loosely- and tightly- coupled interfaces but not of authority. An
extended enterprise, referred to as an EoE by Nightingale (2004) can be considered as a
tightly coupled EoE according to our definition above.
Figure 5-4 Demonstration of the EoE mechanical analogy view in two different EoEs
Transcribing the notation above into a mechanistic analogy, the EoE could be presented
as shown in Fig. 5-4.
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A note on the Figure 5-4 of the graphical EoE view mechanical analogy:
* Capital first letter and overarching ovals were used to represent enterprises.
* Double lines, one dotted the other continuous, indicate control (authority coupler)
from an enterprise.
* Lower case first letter and small circle denote capacity or function.
* Small oval represents pooled capacity or function.
* Spring indicates interface/coupler, with the wider/bolder lines denoting a tighter
coupling than thinner ones.
5.2.3.3 Architecting Heuristics for the CA EoE and Cyclicality
The distinction between a supply chain and an EoE is that the latter is substantially more
pluralist. The prevailing view of supply chains is based on the ability of one stakeholder
to exert control over the choices and behavior of their upstream and downstream partners.
This implies that the level of managerial independence (and therefore value functions) in
supply chains is less than an EoE, in which each echelon can be populated by competing
enterprises that may or may not be able to control their supply chains as extended
enterprises.
In order to connect though cyclical behavior in an EoE, we will borrow the conceptual
understandings of the cycles in supply chains (and to a lesser extent macroeconomic
theories) which are reviewed and summarized in Ch. 6. In this section we will simply
define strategy heuristics on architecting an EoE to be less prone to cycles based on the
insights from the aforementioned literatures (which we name cyclicality moderation
strategy heuristics CM-SH). We will further discuss and apply these strategy heuristics in
the experimental modeling section in Ch. 10.
CM-SH.l(pooling strategy): Cyclicality in an EoE can be reduced by delegating control
of a function that is internal to a number of enterprises to another enterprise that can
pool that capacity and function and thus reduce overcapacity.
For supply chains, this heuristic is applied for example in supplier-managed inventory.
I.e. the retailer delegates the authority/control over inventory to the supplier who can
control it better across several other retailers.
CM-SH.2 (JIT strategy): Cyclicality in an EoE can be reduced by tighter coupling of one
or more enterprises
For supply chains this is equivalent to just-in-time (JIT) inventory control or a pull supply
chain strategy. Tighter coupling to downstream demand, i.e. as close to immediate as
possible gratification or completion of the downstream orders, reduces the lead times and
the associated forecasting errors, therefore reducing the amplification of order variation
upstream. Womack and Jones suggested the JIT production can eliminate the business
cycles which we introduced as the Womack and Jones hypothesis in Ch. 1.
CM-SH.3. (capacity decoupler strategy): Cyclicality in an EoE can be reduced by
delegating control of a key interface capacity that is common across the EoE.
This is a variation of the CS-SH. 1 but for capacity.
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These heuristics and the relative effectiveness when applied to commercial aviation as an
enterprise of enterprises will be the subject of Section 10.3. In the next section we will
define how commercial aviation can be viewed as an EoE.
5.3 Commercial Aviation as an Enterprise of Enterprises
Having described the need and the theoretical basis for an Enterprise of Enterprises
analysis, in this section we will consolidate the key aspects of the commercial aviation
related industries, as discussed in Chapters 2-4, using the EoE lens. Section 5.3.1
identifies the objectives and the constituents of the CA EoE. Section 5.3.2, summarizes
the costs (and benefits) incurred by the EoE constituents and stakeholders, discusses the
key interrelationships between the constituent enterprises and directs to potential points
of leverage based on these interfaces.
5.3.1 Purposeful Commercial Aviation
Commercial aviation as an EoE is purposeful in the sense of purpose that Keynes (1936)
(pg. 158) called "social purpose. Arguably its primary social purpose is to produce
transportation services for the customer class of stakeholders (primary value) and in the
process provide value to the other classes of stakeholders (incidental value). Going one
level lower, corporations as constituent enterprises are also purposeful in providing their
services and meeting their obligations to their shareholders, employees, and society.
Objective ofAnalysis
As with any type of system representation and analysis, ours is motivated by specific
objectives. Our motivation is to identify ways to mitigate the cyclical behavior of the
related industries.
Constituent Enterprises of the Commercial Aviation EoE
The multitudes of stakeholders shown in Figure 5-1 are interdependent but not all
interactions are direct. Interactions are directed and the constituents can be aggregated
based on their position in the system and their behavior. A schematic is shown in Figure
5-5.
In our analysis, the NTS that DeLaurentis (2005) describes as an SoS is confined by the
triangle of demand (passengers and shippers), service providers (aircraft
owners/operators) and infrastructure (airport and ATC capacity) with the other modes
being implicitly included as moderating demand through competition. The airport and air
traffic control (ATC) systems are considered here only to the extent that they become
constraining factors in the expansion of air travel. Therefore, the commercial aviation
EoE (CA EoE) includes the aspects of the NTS described previously in addition to the
aircraft supply chain (airframe and engine manufacturers and their suppliers), and the
relevant parts of governmental and capital market constituents.
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Figure 5-5 Constituent view of the EoE and their interactions in the Commercial Aviation EoE
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Figure 5-6 Interface and Constituent View of the CA EoE
The representation in Figure 5-5 simplifies the system significantly and it does not
include the potential differences in the constituent enterprises structure and culture (e.g.,
Piepenbrock's stylized "red" vs. "blue" distinction) and the nature of the interactions
between them. In order to accurately portray the type of managerial independence in the
constituents of the EoE the differences of enterprise structure and culture need to be
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considered at least on a broad scale. Furthermore, given the importance of interfaces in
SoS analysis discussed in the previous section, they would need to be represented as well
in any high level view of an EoE. The representation of Figure 5-6 portrays the key
interfaces of the CA EoE.
5.3.2 CA EoE Constituents: Perspectives, Relations, Points of Leverage
Sections 3.5 and 4.4 illustrated the manifestations of cyclicality for airlines and airframe
manufacturers and their suppliers. They showed how the airline profitability cycles
increased their amplitude after the deregulation of the industry and how the cycles in one
echelon of the value chain (airlines) were transmitted upstream to the airframe
manufacturers. Finally we also hinted how the manufacturers dealt differently with their
backlog of orders allowing it to build (in the case of Airbus) or following a much faster
response in the case of Boeing.
Sections 3.5 and 4.4 answered the research question Q1 posed in Section 1.2 i.e. "How is
cyclicality manifested in commercial aviation?" Various aspects that address research
question Q2, i.e. "What are the impacts of cyclicality in commercial aviation?" have been
hinted at previously, namely employment hire/fire cycles and direct and indirect
government-funded subsidization for airlines and manufacturers. In this section we
formulate a concise answer to Q2 for each constituent enterprise or stakeholder group and
discuss their potential leverage over the EoE.
5.3.2.1 Passengers and Shippers
Passengers and shippers are the ultimate "consumers" or final users of the air
transportation service good and therefore the primary beneficiaries and the raison d'tre
of the CA EoE. As the primary beneficiaries of the CA EoE and the base of the value
chain, one could expect that the leverage of passengers and shippers over the system
would be substantial. In reality, these constituents are very diverse and extremely
fragmented. They 'vote with their feet' and will buy a service or not based on the relative
benefits they perceive but their influence stops there. Moreover, excepting severe events,
their behavior is stable and, to a large extent, predictable based on macroeconomic
conditions. The combined effect of decreasing real costs of air transportation and
increasing real per capita income across both developed and developing countries has led
to a steady increase in demand.
Impacts of Cyclicality on Passengers and Shippers
It can be argued that passengers and shippers are potential beneficiaries of the boom-bust
cycle (Gross 2007)(see Ch. 6); as increases in aircraft capacity orders during a boom
further reduce fares during the trough. Therefore they may have neither the incentive nor
the power to affect the system behavior.
This argument assumes that the liberalization of air transportation markets that could
arguably be credited with reductions in fare prices due to higher competition invites more
cyclical market behavior by necessity. In reality though, as shown in Figure 3-15,
149
normalized real fare prices have been downward trending continuously long before
deregulation and the technical changes brought on by deregulation (primarily the hub-
and-spoke network system) were credited for more than 50% of the cost savings
attributed to deregulation in the U.S. market (Baltagi et al. 1995).
More importantly for the final users, cyclicality brings unpredictability in air
transportation fares and levels of service. Overinvestment during the upcycle may indeed
create a capacity glut during the downcycle and bring down prices but it also sets the
stage for a period where when demand recovers there is a lack of capacity at which point
both the fare prices are high but also the levels of service deteriorate; aircraft load factors
are high and delays are more frequent.
5.3.2.2 Capacity providers
Airports and air-traffic control systems were traditionally government owned and
operated as basic infrastructure. Airline deregulation was followed by airport
privatization in the form of public-private partnerships with varying degrees of
government involvement (De Neufville and Odoni 2003)(pg. 107). While the rapid
growth of aviation and the sometimes incommensurate investment in the infrastructure
created bottlenecks, especially in the congested metropolitan airports, these were either
resolved or worked around (e.g. by using airport systems69 to serve a metropolitan area or
introducing new technologies for air traffic management).
Impacts of Cyclicality on Capacity Providers
For airports, the volatility associated with the boom-bust cycles is significant and
increases the risk involved to investments in new facilities and dictates a more flexible
approach to planning and leasing (ibid., pg. 113). While airport authorities usually have
close to monopoly power over their area (local monopoly ibid. pg. 101), they are very
fragmented as stakeholders on a national and, even more so, on a global level.
Moreover, the competition among airports to attract hub traffic is adding to the inherent
volatility that they face (ibid. pg. 125). This influence depends on the relative importance
of hubs in the future.
Given the above, the possibility that either airports or ATCs would act as a constituent
stakeholder with common interests and in a concerted fashion impact the CA EoE cycles
is unlikely. Rather, their impact revolves around the de facto ability of these public-
private partnerships to provide the capacity requested by the airlines while managing
these volatility risks especially if these requirements continue at historic growth rates. If
the volatility associated with the cyclicality of the CA EoE subsides then the effort and
costs associated with managing the infrastructure risks are reduced substantially and as a
consequence these constituents have a strong incentive to facilitate their reduction.
69 Multiple airports that serve the same metropolitan area therefore sharing a large part of their catchment
areas. For example, the Boston MA metro area can be served by the Logan airport, but also by Manchester
NH, and Providence RI primary airports as well as by smaller airports that can be used by regional or
charter carriers and air taxi services (e.g. Hanscom field).
150
5.3.2.3 Airlines
Airlines went through periods of consolidation and fragmentation. On a global scale,
airlines, as a constituent of the CA EoE, are fragmented. One level down, the industry
remains fragmented in most deregulated national markets (including the EU) with
significant competition in most notable routes and very few remaining uncontestable
monopolies. There is a strong trend for consolidation in the passenger market which,
unless stopped by antitrust legislation, can result in a small number of mega-carriers as
the evolution of the existing legacy carriers and a fairly large number of small niche and
regional carriers. The successful low-cost carriers will be among these mega-carriers
even if they do not expand into international long-haul routes.
Airlines are primary agents in introducing cyclical behavior in the CA EoE and also
recipients of a large share of the related costs. Fragmentation, commoditization, and the
economies of scale derived by size have lead to intense and occasionally destructive
competition. While competition fueled demand by lowering the prices and facilitating the
reduction of operating costs by process innovation, it also led to conditions that generate
significant costs for the airline enterprises and the whole value chain.
The primary interfaces that airlines control in relation to other constituents of the CA EoE
are:
* fare prices and capacity (strongly correlated in free markets) with the demand
constituents, and
* order patterns with the airframe manufacturers constituents
As airlines consolidate, the ability to form partnerships with an airframe manufacturer
and stabilize the ordering pattern may be a significant point of leverage for attenuating
the cycles. Other than that possibility, a fragmented and commoditized airline industry
may be incapable of exerting enough control on the CA EoE by itself to do this.
Impact of cyclicality on Airlines
Airline profitability is the archetypical symptom of cyclicality in commercial aviation. In
nominal terms, as seen in Figure 3-16, there were two times in which the nominal losses
of the industry practically wiped all its cumulative profits (this occurred between 1990-
1995 and between 2001-2005). During protracted low profitability periods airlines slow
investments in new capacity to a near halt (transferring the cycle upstream). In addition
they furlough employees or radically reduce their benefits to a point which labor-
management tensions can lead to strikes, loss of confidence, and a demoralized
workforce whose productivity suffers. These pressure conditions may lead to
compromises of safety especially in regions where regulatory oversight is laxer.
5.3.2.4 Airframe manufacturers and Suppliers
We have seen that as the aircraft industry matured the number of competitors was
reduced to a duopoly. This kind of concentration has the potential of exerting significant
control on the industry cycles through the aircraft delivery and aircraft type interfaces. As
economies of scale forced the duopolists into fierce head-on competition, they fueled the
cyclicality of the industry by accepting and even inducing orders larger than prudent on
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an industry-wide level. Additionally, the level of customization of aircraft to meet
customer requirements that made them incompatible without heavy modifications across
fleets reduced the attractiveness of the second market.
Aircraft manufacturers, in their quest for market share, have increasingly and willingly
accepted a greater share of the ownership risk born by airlines (Section 4.3). These risks
compound the risks of development of new, increasingly complex, aircraft and the costs
associated with variability in production rates (Section 4.3). As a result, aircraft
manufactures have both the incentive and the potential leverage to work towards
attenuating the cycle.
Their suppliers are also very fragmented and have far less control over delivery rates than
manufacturers although they share in both the risks and costs associated to volatility
described above. Given these, they are an unlikely constituent for affecting change as
they do not share a direct interface to major dynamics.
Impacts of Cyclicality on Airframe Manufacturers
The primary negative aspect of cyclicality that airframe manufacturers have to contend
with is the cyclical aircraft orders that are highly correlated with the airline industry
profitability as shown in Figure 3-19. This creates three related problems; (i) a
manufacturing slow-down followed by a production ramp-up which, as manufacturing is
labor constrained, leads to a hire/fire cycle with problems similar to those faced by
airlines. In Box 4-2 we showed how an attempt by Boeing to rapidly increase production
in 1997 cost Boeing a $2.6B write-off and an 8% drop in their stock price in a single day;
(ii) the hire/fire cycle reduces the effectiveness of the learning curve and at least in the
Lockheed Tristar case led to increases in per unit production costs reversal (Benkard
2004); (iii) increased risk with regard to the return in the substantial upfront costs in new
aircraft development. In their efforts to command greater market share, manufacturers
may also take underpriced risks in aircraft options and repurchase agreements offered as
incentives to airlines.
5.3.2.5 Leasing Firms
Similarly to airline manufacturers, the leasing companies also have both the incentive and
the consolidated position necessary for becoming change agents. As owners of expensive,
depreciating assets whose value fluctuates dramatically with the industry cycle and on
which operation and efficiency have little if any leverage, leasing firms carry a
substantial share of the industry risk (Section 3.4). As an increasing share of the total
industry orders go through some form of lease, they are in the position of moderating this
ordering pattern. Like the other industries though, leasing firms have to compete in
offering better terms to their clients and surge of entrants in booming periods can
diminish this type of leverage. In addition, their sophistication on the industry needs is
deferred to the clients and a broader view of the system as a whole is usually not pursued.
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5.3.2.6 Capital Markets
As we saw in Section 5.2.1, capital markets as constituents are quite diverse. Large banks
and lenders are relatively consolidated while the stock-markets have been consolidating
their diffuse power. The interests of financial institutions with broad portfolios and long-
term hold strategies would be aligned with the combined improvement of all their
holdings. While in countries with stakeholder capitalism tradition like Europe and Japan,
the ties of financial institutions with the industry are part of the existing model, the full
potential of a portfolio system that actively pursues the synergies generated by it is not
yet realized.
Capital markets in the form of universal owners, in the Hawley and Williams
nomenclature (see Section 5.2.1), have both the incentive and the power to work towards
creating more stable and long-term profitable value chains, and this could apply to the
CA EoE as all the enterprises involved are publicly traded companies. The practical
effect though is currently the opposite. Institutional investor managers are currently
rewarded for generating higher return rates than their competitors in the short-term. The
kind of returns that are achieved in that fashion (usually significantly exceeding market
index rates) are not sustainable and therefore implicitly require the existence of asset
bubbles with their high albeit temporary returns. In the troughs, as long as the
institutional managers do not do worse than their peers, the repercussions for them are
limited (not to mention some positive as downcycle actions, like loan renegotiations or
mergers, can generate additional fee income). Overall, the current structure of
expectations high short-term return provides perverse incentives against long-term
sustainable growth and portfolio-wide synergistic optimization.
Impacts of Cyclicality on Capital Markets
While capital markets are inherently volatile, investors receive significant hits when
airlines default or airline and aircraft manufacturer stock prices plummet as a result of the
cyclicality in their returns. The volatility of economic return of these enterprises pretty
much captures the impact borne by capital markets.
5.3.2.7 Labor
Stiglitz's insight (Stiglitz 1985) that because workers "collectively have the largest
undiversified stake in the [enterprise]," they along with banks have the incentive to
monitor and control enterprise management. Like banks, employees have an interest in
the long-term survival of the enterprise but unlike banks they are not impelled to be as
risk-averse. In order for labor unions to take such a role, the adversarial relationship
between employees and managers would need to be ameliorated and become a mutual
realization that their interaction is not a zero-sum game. The pension funds of said
employees would also be prime candidates in realizing the synergies alluded to in the
capital markets section.
Several enterprises have demonstrated the benefits from active participation of employers
in improving workplace conditions and cutting operating costs using Kaizen events and
other methods. Prominent examples of such integral companies come from the aviation
sector (e.g. Southwest) and manufacturing (e.g. Toyota). In the U.S. airline industry,
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employees have attempted to actively engage in the ownership and management of the
company in the late 80s and early 90s with relatively poor results (e.g. United, see
Petzinger (1995) ). Airbus labor unions have similarly obstructed drastic management
measures and precipitated a leadership change as members of a stakeholder coalition
(recent example... reference). In all cases though, labor unions do not reach out across
the value chain and lack the big picture system view necessary for managing a long term
system change. Their incentives could make them significant members of a coalition that
attempts to bring stability in the boom-bust cycle but they have neither the power, nor the
capacity to bring this change single-handedly.
5.3.2.8 Governments
Governments as constituents of the CA EoE are connected, much like capital markets, to
all other constituents and therefore have great potential leverage over the system.
Furthermore, assuming that stabilizing the boom-bust cycle creates tangible economic
benefits and better meets the intangible needs of their citizens; governments have the
incentive to facilitate long-term stabilization. Governments can exert control indirectly
through regulations and selective subsidies and directly by their control over the
infrastructure. Government action that does not directly target any of the other
constituents could also have significant impact on the CA EoE (e.g. monetary policies to
stabilize macroeconomic cycles and ameliorate recessions or environmental regulations
in the form of carbon caps or taxes).
While theoretically governments have incentives and the power to dampen the cycles,
their policy making process is highly fragmented and disproportionately responsive to
selective interests. On the airline industry side, it could reasonably be argued that it was a
government action in the form of deregulation that destabilized the system and deepened
the troughs of the cycle. As the benefits of deregulation to the consumer are also quite
clear, a reversion to the previously regulated environment is highly unlikely. On the
airframe manufacturing side, the governments involved expectedly support, protect, and
promote their domestic industry champion. There are plenty of anecdotal examples where
international policy and aircraft marketing were tightly coupled (see Box 4-3) as well as
formal support as is the case of the recent WTO case (see Section 4.3.2.5).
Impacts of Cyclicality on Governments
We saw that governments carry a significant proportion of the societal costs of cyclicality
directly. To use a recent example, the post-9/11 layoffs from airlines and aircraft
manufacturers induced federal and state support for retraining and health care coverage
for the 30,000 laid-off employees in addition to the $20B in direct and indirect assistance
U.S. airlines received under the Airline Stabilization Act (GAO 2004). Other types of
support include subsidies for flag carriers, bankruptcy protections and pension relief. This
support when aimed at the enterprises, rather than directly to the furloughed employees,
may perversely exacerbate cyclicality in the long-run as it increases the barriers to exit
and retains capacity in the industry.
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5.3.2.9 Comparative Return on Investment
Another view of the constituents of the CA EoE can be based on their relative margins.
This view is shown in Figure 5-8. Airlines are shown as the most competitive industry
while aircraft manufacturers and leasing firms are shown to have greater margins. This is
simply indicative and does not track long term performance and year to year changes
though.
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Value Functions of the CA EoE
The type and relative importance of value functions of the constituent enterprises in an
EoE can be subjective. In Table 5-3, we present in summary form a choice of value
functions and metrics for the different constituents of the CA EoE. As discussed in
Section 5.2.1, long-term economic value can be a metric of choice for both the
stakeholder and the shareholder view of the firm. In addition to this, we used the stability
of economic value as a way to gauge cyclical behavior and as a tie-breaker in the analysis
between situations that yield approximately the same total returns.
The content and specific formulations of Table 5-3 are controversial as they embody
subjective definitions of value and, more importantly, aggregate the fractious interests
present in most enterprises as we discussed in Section 5.2.1.
5.4 Chapter 5 Summary
From the discussion in this section, it is apparent that none of the CA EoE constituents
have a strong incentive to retain the status quo with the prevailing cyclical behavior with
the potential exception of some capital market stakeholders. On the other hand, there are
few constituents with a full view of the value chain and with power to significantly
influence its behavior. Private sector constituents with power include the two airframe
manufacturers, a duopoly, the similarly concentrated leasing firms, potentially some of
the larger airlines after further consolidation, and universal owners in capital markets that
have a portfolio extending over the entire CA EoE. Governments and labor unions are
also significant constituents as they are necessary but not sufficient in and of themselves
to make practical changes.
While these institutions have the potential power to change system behavior and dampen
the cyclicality, they do need to do so in some collaborative fashion as the individual
incentives within the respective industries and across the value chain are competitively
set and favoring short-term results - a behavior for which the capital market constituents
had a significant part in promoting.
The CA EoE can be simplistically seen as a large scale 'prisoner's dilemma' game, in
which the collaborative outcome provides substantial benefits for all stakeholders but the
incentive structures that are in place reward "defection."
Stiglitz's (1985) observation about the enterprise represents even better the situation
faced by any constituent interesting in changing the CA EoE as it "is not appropriately
modeled as a single-principal/multiple-agent problem, for which the Nash equilibrium is
almost invariably inefficient. [All] participants (or classes of participants) pursuing
[their] own interests, given the set of controls at [their] disposal, results in resource
allocations that are not Pareto efficient. The actions of each group have important
consequences for all other groups []." He goes on to state that as good management is a
public good, in a version of a tragedy of the commons, no small group has the incentive
to devote enough resources to push for the right management especially as it would be
unlikely to capture the positive spillovers from such action.
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In considering the solution he states that the "problem is to design institutional structures
that serve to internalize some of these externalities, that take advantage of those who are
in the best position to obtain information and exercise control [], and that can ameliorate
[1 some of the free-rider problems which are inherent in the maintenance of good
management."
In this chapter we have established a conceptual framework for enterprise ecosystems. In
the next chapter, we will review how enterprises, forming ecosystems like the ones
presented here, can create and amplify cyclical behavior.
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Chapter 6 Manifestations of Cyclicality in Industries and
Supply Chains
"Cycles are not, like tonsils, separable things that might be treated by themselves, but
are, like the beat of the heart, of the essence of the organism that displays them."
J. Schumpeter (1939)
With this chapter we transition from an examination of the CA EoE as a system in
Chapters 2-5 to exploring the specific causes of the cyclical behavior we identified in
such systems.
Cyclical or periodic behavior of natural systems has accompanied mankind since pre-
history. The alternation of day and night, of seasons, of tides, of sowing and harvesting,
and even of life and death are all manifestations of natural cycles. Any break in this
periodicity like an eclipse or a particularly prolonged drought could wreak havoc to the
psychological, social, and economic structures of ancient societies. Social cycles with
longer and uneven periods like the rise and fall of empires and civilizations were also
identified as soon as historical records were introduced. Yet despite the fact that 100%
hindsight was available, foresight was and, unfortunately, remains elusive.
With the development of social sciences and economics and the quantification of
socioeconomic interactions that they introduced, it soon became apparent that several
measures of economic activity also appeared to follow synchronized cycles. While these
cycles involve aggregate economic activity and monetary policy similar patterns were
revealed on smaller scales by the study of supply chains. Evidence of similar industry-
level cyclical behavior in the commercial aviation world is readily available as we
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Like natural cycles, these socioeconomic cycles may have benefits in their ability to force
a Darwinian selection process for enterprises and technologies and also, as suggested by
(Gross 2007), provide ample infrastructure during the boom periods on which innovative
uses of technology can build upon. But they also entail significant economic costs in the
form of production inefficiencies and, more importantly, social costs due to pro-cyclical
labor policies that entail hire/fire cycles with costs for enterprises as they lose both talent
and trust and for the workers themselves that face uncertainty and loss of benefits. These
costs are pronounced in the high amplitude oscillations experienced by most enterprises
involved in the commercial aviation world.
If the intent of organized society is to ameliorate the effect of unpredictable swings on its
more vulnerable members, a similar argument can be made in the context of commercial
aviation world. In order to provide effective policies to mitigate negative impacts an
understanding of the underlying causes of the phenomenon is necessary. This chapter
explores the literature on the business cycle and particularly as it is manifested in specific
industries rather than the macroeconomy. In Chapter 7 we review different hypotheses on
the causes of cyclical behavior as they apply specifically in the CA EoE while Chapter 8
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matches causes and strategies that can potentially counter these effects in the form of
plausible scenarios.
Our stated objective is to understand the costly cyclical behaviors that are observed in the
aviation world and develop strategies to mitigate their effects. Since, similar cyclical
patterns have been observed in many industries and supply chains of capitalist industrial
systems and a thriving research literature exists about them. This chapter reviews the
literature on business cyclicality on the macroeconomic (business cycles) and
microeconomic/supply chain level (bullwhip effect) to introduce the existing theories,
terminology, and tools to understand and interpret business cycles.
The Business of Cycles
There is evidence of cyclicality in capitalist economies since their establishment. The
traditional definition of the business cycle given by (Burns and Mitchell 1946)
characterizes them as: "a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate activity of nations
that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions [,]
recessions, contractions and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next
cycle; this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic..."
While the frequency of extreme cycles and their impact has seemingly been moderated,
regional economies are still prone to them. Although the cycles are not periodic 70 they
seem to involve similar sequences of events and reactions as indicated by the identified
macroeconomic indicators. The economists and practitioners that developed theories on
the business cycle were interested in aggregate economic behaviors but they did
recognize these as results of seemingly rational actions of agents.
Based on this definition, the business cycle is an aggregate phenomenon and as such we,
interested in a specific industry, should only consider it as an exogenous factor. Yet, our
interest is deeper than this because the terms used to describe macroeconomic cycles and
the models developed to dampen them provide insights for more focused applications.
This is especially the case for theories that review the micro foundations of the business
cycle.
Early recognition of greater volatility of inventories, prices of durable goods, and
business profitability predated the conclusions reached by research on the microeconomic
and supply chain side although the specificity of the tools developed by the latter does
not have counterpart in macroeconomic theories of the business cycle. We discuss the
macroeconomic theories on business cycles in Section 6.1 and the supply chain research
on the bullwhip effect in Section 6.2.
70 The use of the term "cycle" is controversial because it implies regularity in the period and intensity of the
fluctuation which is generally not the case as the inability to accurately predict future cycles shows. Despite
this shortcoming, the alternative "economic fluctuations" is not as evoking or recognizable.
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6.1 Macroeconomic Business Cycles
The existence of business cycles is widely acknowledged as an economic phenomenon.
Economic activity in national, regional, and, more recently, global scale is correlated and
tends to synchronize into periods of stronger and weaker growth or contraction. Business
cycles, like waves, can be analyzed into periods of expansion, recession or contraction,
and recovery and they have a peak at the end of the expansion period and a trough at the
end of the recession.
The business cycles had been recognized early on in the history of capitalist economies.
Characteristically, Lord Overtone, a successful English banker, described the phases of a
cycle more graphically, and expressing the personal aspect of cycles, as: "quiescence,
improvement, confidence, prosperity, excitement, overtrading, convulsion, pressure,
stagnation, [I quiescence." He was quoted by Walther Bagehot, chief editor of the
Economist, after a crash in the British economy in 1847 with global repercussions (Tvede
2001) (pp. 50).
Schumpeter (1939) 7 1 categorized business cycles based on their observed period and
named after those who first proposed them into:
* Kitchin inventory cycles - (3-5 years)
* Juglar fixed investment cycles - (7-11 years)
* Kuznets infrastructural investment cycles - (15-25 years)
* Kondratiev waves - (45-60 years)
While there is a vast literature on the business cycles as it relates to monetary policy and
public investments and their effect on business cycles in this review we focused on those
aspects of the cycles that deal with consumption and infrastructure investments and the
theories dealing with them.
6.1.1 Manifestations and Causes of Industrial Business Cycles
"The only cause of depression is prosperity."
Clement Juglar
Keynes: "[] where should a crisis come from?"
Somary72: "From the difference between expectations and reality..."
1927. Quoted by Tvede pg. 108
An early, although quickly discredited, theory of the causes of business cycles had been
proposed by Jevons in the late 19 th century and came to be known as the sunspot theory.
Starting from the assumption that markets systems are inherently stable, Jevons looked
for external shocks that would coincide with the observed cycles and indeed he found
these in the sunspot cycle; as agriculture productivity would vary based on the intensity
71 Three years before introducing the creative destruction concept as a force of capitalism.
72 Felix Somary. Investment banker in Zurich.
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of sunlight this variation would feed and amplify in the economy hence creating the
observed cycles (Tvede 2001), (Morgan 1990). While the actual cycle correlation was
soon found to be incorrect, the idea that external shocks may be the cause of at least some
of the cyclical behavior is still perfectly valid.
Neoclassical "real business cycle theories" suggested that technical (Schumpeterian
creative destruction), societal (political events like wars, revolutions, regime changes),
and natural (epidemics, climate changing supply of labor or raw materials) shocks could
create and propagate cycles by generating external events to which the market economies
responded while remaining in equilibrium. Lucas (1975) proposed that while markets
keep clearing based on rational decisions, imperfect information about the market and
the external shocks lead to forecast errors which cumulatively in the economy create the
accelerator effect, a precursor of the bullwhip effect in the supply chain literature that
we discuss in Section 5.2. These shocks are relevant for aviation, as we shall see in
Chapter 7, given it can be influenced from weather related events and fuel fluctuations in
the short term and from economic and health events in the longer term but other
researchers probed what they considered as endogenous instabilities of markets.
Despite the acknowledged importance of external shocks in precipitating business cycles,
the real business cycle theories failed to account for a number of endogenous economic
mechanisms that had been described as cycle inducing. Tvede (2001) categorizes the
endogenous factors of cyclical movements in capital markets into:
* Positive feedback loops (non-linearity)
* Echoes (Durable goods and reinvestment cycles)
* Cascade reactions (network effects and mass psychology events)
* Lags (Time delays inherent in system performance that are not perceived by
multiple players), and
* Negative Feedback Loops (Disinhibitors).
In the rest of the section we will highlight the theories that present those endogenous
aspects of the business cycles as documented in the literature.
Pigou (1929), cited by Tvede (2001) (pg. 76), like Jevons, noted the importance of
external shocks, but he also assigned importance to the psychological factors that make
errors of optimism and also create subsequent errors of pessimism thus feeding cyclical
behavior. He noted that bankruptcies are not very effective in destroying capital, as the
capital investments simply changes owners73, but instead instill fear for new investments.
Price changes created profits for some and losses for others. As remedies to these effects
he advocated for transparency and dissemination of market information by regulators as
well as stabilization of prices.
73 This is true for assets like ships and aircraft as well as manufacturing plants and land. Arguably, the
reintroduction of the former in the productive economy is faster.
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Delays, the Cobweb Theorem and Commodity Cycles
Aside from psychological factors, the micro foundations of cycles were seeded early with
the concept of imperfect information and its effects on inventory cycles. Reminiscent of
the recent bullwhip supply chain theories, (Metzler 1941) and later (Abramovitz 1950)
stressed the impact of the firms' inability to forecast the cycle in the generation of
procyclical inventory fluctuations.
Metzler's point of inaccurate forecasting makes the assumptions of perfect knowledge in
classical economic models hard to justify. This lack of perfect knowledge has
repercussions in the actions of multiple agents making simultaneous decisions to enter or
exit a market. This phenomenon named cobweb theorem 74 by Kaldor (Ezekiel 1938)
was first identified in commodities markets and therefore was also known as the 'hog-
cycle.' Farmers and commodity manufacturers, the theorem went, could only perceive the
prices in the market but lacking coordination they rushed to the "opportunity"
synchronized. As there was a delay between them starting the effort, e.g. planting crops,
and their selling them, the market ended up flooded and the prices for the previously
scarce commodity dropped precipitously.
Shipping and Durable Goods Cycles
Similar cycles though were also identified in non-commodity products. Tinbergen was
the first to describe the "durable goods" cycle in the shipping industry in 1931.
According to (Tvedt 2003), he attributed the cyclicality in the orders to delayed feedback
between orders and rates. When freight rates increased orders followed, yet as the delay
of construction intervened, freight rates could reach very high levels triggering even more
orders for ships. Expectedly, when the orders materialized they could create a glut and
even a depression in cycles.75
What complicates the behavior of durable goods compared to the commodity cycles is
the need to replace them when they reach their useful life. Most machines produced for
the same purpose and at the same period have approximately the same useful life span;
therefore a spike of orders should be replicated when the machines reach their useful life
in what was named the reinvestment cycle.
Continuing research in the shipping industry, Einarsen (1938) observed the reinvestment
cycle but he also noted that since the useful life of machinery can be extended through
repairs capital replacement should be elastic. This would imply the existence of what he
called the secondary reinvestment cycle. These cycles "owe their existence to the fact that
the replacement of the machinery, which during depression becomes ripe for renewal,
will to a great extent be neglected or postponed. During revival and prosperity, there will
consequently take place a concentration of replacement."
Assuming that manufacturers have adequate capacity to respond and do not smooth their
orders, this mechanism can synchronize the reinvestment cycle and the macroeconomic
74 The name comes from the cobweb-like image if the behavior is mapped on a supply demand graph.
75 Similar type of cycle causality is at work in the aviation industry as well, as we see in Chapter 7.
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cycle and potentially increase the amplification in the industry cycle magnitude due
resonance between the two cycles. In other words, the need to replace and the need
invest in new capacity could synchronize and their effects add.
Einarsen's work was based on the time series of shipbuilding construction from 1883 to
1932 as shown in Figure 6-1. The peaks in the diagram exhibit a period of about 5 years
and in almost every cycle, the replacements in that time series preceded the new
investment orders. This could be an artifact of how Einarsen defined replacements - he
could not look for equivalence between ship types - but is also reasonable as the least
performing ships in the fleet would need to be replaced first by the better performing
ones before newer additions are made.
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Figure 6-1 Shipbuilding for Norwegian Shipowners, 1883 - 1932 in gross tons (Source: Einarsen
1938)
Another set of interesting observations can be made based on the age distribution of ships
when they are sold or replaced as shown in Figure 6-2. There are two fairly clear peaks:
one in 20-year time which coincides with the productivity vs. maintenance and
technological change trade-off point and another at about 10 years for which Einarsen
does not give an explanation. If these were aircraft, the explanation would be the sharp
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increase in maintenance costs due to the requirement for complete overhaul. Assuming
that no such requirement existed for ships at that time, and given that during prosperity
this peak is lost, a plausible hypothesis could be that it reflects the need of ship owners to
unload capacity and the newer ships are the only ones that can be sold reasonably as
demand contracts.
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Figure 6-2 Age Distribution of Ships Sold and Replaced between 1884 and 1932 based on the Cycle
Phase when the Transaction Occurred. (in tons. Source: Einarsen 1938)
Supporting the view that durable good industries are highly cyclical, Petersen and
Strongin (1996) found that durable-goods industries are on average three times more
cyclical compared to non-durable goods industries. They used an empirical study of
disaggregated industry data to answer the question of why some industries are more
cyclical than others. They found that "quasi-fixed" factor inputs, market concentration,
and "labor hoarding" 76 are key determinants of cyclical industry behavior. They also
noted that energy intensity is an indicator of cyclicality when energy costs fluctuate more
than GDP.
Infrastructures, Rational Investment, Stock Market and Mass Psychology
While the reinvestment cycle is a more or less deterministic artifact of the underlying
technology that is used as producing capital, there is another factor of production
76 Petersen and Strongin notes: "f firms retain workers in periods of low demand, their economic incentive
to cut output is lower than for firms or industries that do not hoard labor. Likewise, iffirms are reluctant to
hire new workers in boom periods, their incentive to increase output is also less than for firms that do not
hoard labor. Other things equal, the more labor hoarding an industry engages in, the less cyclical its
fluctuations in output should be." A consequence of that is that their profitability may be sacrificed during
the downturns.
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investment that is used for acquiring the capital assets. The development of stock markets
and public financing made this aspect of the business cycle far less predictable and more
prone to effects of mass psychology.
It is at the intersection of capital markets and industries that the effects of business cycles
are most heavily felt. As shown in Table 6-1, the level of investment as reflected in the
stock prices is quite volatile, procyclical, and a leading indicator of the business cycle. It
has been observed that increased financial liquidity and a capital glut that allows for
speculative investment with higher potential returns but also more exposed to risk may
precede heavy crashes as investors rush to protect their positions. Whether this is a causal
relationship, i.e. if stock market rallies actually precipitate the cycles, is controversial.
What is certain is that it affects the industry's ability to finance infrastructure expansion.
There have been cases where the two were intricately linked as shown in Box 6-1 for
railways in the late 19th century but similar scenarios played later in the aviation sectors
as well.
Box 6-1 Infrastructure the Stock Market: Railways and the crash of 1873 ( Source: Lubben (2004)(pg. 1428) )
While financial fraud, mismanagement, and cartelization were not unusual railroad stock prices were
booming. Fueled by the bullish performance of railway equities, new companies and incumbents raced to
provide railway services. Overcapacity started ensuing in 1868 and onwards as new railway construction
soared.
The inevitable price wars allowed even more traffic demand to use the railroad network though at a loss for
the providers and their balance sheets.
The inevitable crash landing occurred 1873 and the sparking event was the failure of the investment bank
heading up the financing of Northern Pacific Railroad. That precipitated widespread stock market panic and
the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange value (in the accompanying figure the event is shown starting
in August of 1873 and culminating in November 1873 with the railroad index (_SPRAILD) closely followed
by the SP500 (_SPXD)). Eventually, 89 railroads defaulted on their bonds and the effects of that collapse
were still felt a decade after.
As a side note, railroads did recover and continued expanding until the geographical limits for expansion
were reached just before the turn of the century. The cut rate competition that prevailed and continued
mismanagement led to another crash and even greater number of defaults in 1893.
What this anecdotal evidence brings into question is the relationship between the market
valuation of firms (their equity) and their fundamentals (assets). Lucas (1975), as we saw
25 jH
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Figure source: www.globalinfdata.com
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earlier, suggested a model where investors made rational decisions based on expected
returns of a given market and he developed a model of overinvestment based on this
assumption, that is the cycle was actually generated by the traders and the financial
market as opposed to any change in the real production and valuation of the market. This
connection of financial markets and business cycles and more specifically how operating
decisions over output, pricing, inventories, and working capital investment are influenced
by financing decisions is investigated by (Krainer 2003).
Krainer (pg. 6) suggests that "the higher (or lower) the market valuations investors place
in equity shares as a result of a reduction (or increase) in risk aversion, the more (or
less) operating risk managers will accept in the implementation of their operating
strategies." This model explains why, as shown in Table 6-1, stocks are leading
indicators of business cycles: changes of the valuation of equity by investors precipitates
the cycle in the economy. As a simplification, Krainer distinguishes investors into more
risk averse bondholders and less risk-averse stockholders ("buy and hold" investors) but
his model does not consider the more aggressive traders. Krainer favors the sharing of
firm's decision between stockholders (operating) and bondholders (financing).
Bernanke and Getler (1989) formalize the intuitive understanding of the reinforcing
feedback loop that in "good times when profits are high and balance sheets are healthy, it
is easier for firms to obtain [investor] funds. This stimulates investment and propagates
the good times. Conversely, poor financial health in bad times reduces investment and
stimulates the decline in output." (pg. 27). Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide an
additional reinforcing feedback to this cycle by noting that equity holders prefer activities
that raise payoffs in good states even at the expense of lowering payoffs at bad states.
The two models differ in their perspective of what can start the cycle, as Krainer (2003)
(pg. 66) notes, in the Bernacke Gertler model a change in the new worth or value of the
firms is necessary while in Krainer's model a change in investors risk-aversion is
sufficient. More recently, (Jaimovich and Rebelo 2007), going back to Pigou's
psychological factors develop a model that generates cycles without the need of an
external productivity change but just a change in the future expectations of investors that
can be rational optimistic or overconfident. In practice, these models can operate side by
side reinforcing each other's effect.
Along the same lines, (Blanchard, Rhee et al. 1993) discuss the case when there is an
apparent contradiction between the equity market's valuation of an investment and the
expectations of its managers based on their knowledge of 'fundamentals'. In discussing
prior literature he notes that there are two diametrically opposing theoretical
recommendations: ignoring the market (Bosworth 1975), or following the market
(Fischer and Merton 1984). Their empirical analysis indicated that in practice market
valuation did influence operating decisions, given fundamentals, but on a limited basis.
Going from external finance to internal finance, the firm's cheapest access to funds,
Carpenter, Fazzari et al. (1994) found that fluctuations of internal financing due to
changes in profitability are quickly reflected on their inventory holdings that is being
correspondingly depleted. By extrapolation, they argue that for firms where inventory is
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not a primary factor, airlines and airframe manufacturers for our case fit in that category,
the internal financing fluctuations would be expected to be reflected on capital
investment, that would be made more cyclical.
The Random Models
Examining the behavior of prices or other indicators during the business cycle, some
researchers instead of examining causality focused on the statistical properties of the
those indicators. Bachelier first postulated that the observed behavior could be
approximated as a random walk based on a Gaussian distribution (Bachelier, Davis et al.
2006). As Tvedt (2003) observes after affirming the random walk property in freight rates
in the dry bulk shipping markets, the random walk means high prices are not necessarily
followed by lower prices and vice versa. In other words it confirms the traditional market
models in which high prices stimulate demand and low prices increase scrapping.
While mathematically elegant, this model failed to allow for the frequency of extreme
fluctuations that was actually observed. Mandelbrot suggested that different probability
functions with "fatter tails" would be more accurate (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004). He
also noted fractal properties, primarily self-similarity, in the time-series of economic
indicators at different scales. In other words the time series of stock fluctuations within a
day could not be distinguished by the time series of stock fluctuations within a year based
on the properties of their plots.
In the next section we review some of the economic indicators that are more referenced
in the business cycle literature.
6.1.2 Measures and Indicators of the Business Cycle
Business cycles reflect the aggregate state of the economy; therefore the measures used to
define them are also aggregate. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the primary indicator
but personal income, employment, industrial production, and industrial and wholesale-
retail sales are also considered in identifying the U.S. economic cycle according to
National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER, Hall et al. 2003).
For forecasting and modeling purposes, economists categorize the macroeconomic
variables with regard to how synchronized their behavior is with the cycle into:
* Procyclical for variables that have approximately similar phase to that of the
cycle
* Countercyclical for variables that oscillate against the cycle, and
* Acyclical for variables that do not oscillate.
Similarly, they were categorized based on their phase into:
* Leading,
* Coincident, and
* Lagging
Identifying the indicators of business cycle, especially the leading ones, has been the
objective for a number of researchers. While there is consensus on most of the primary
variables, observation of change in one leading indicator does not provide sufficient
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proof that a cycle change is under way. Economists rely on a number of these in order to
forecast or identify recessions ex post facto. A partial list of primary indicators is given in
Table 6-1 which summarizes the findings from several sources that based the direction
and phase of the indicators on historical datasets derived from observations of the U.S.
and European economies.
Table 6-1 Classification of Macroeconomic Variables (Sources: (Roubini 2003), (Forni, Hallin et al.
2001), (Zink 1993), (Ralf 2000))
Industrial production Procyclical Coincident
Corporate profits Procyclical (volatile) Coincident
Orders Procyclical Leading
Mark-ups and prices Countercyclical
Consumption Procyclical
Investment and stocks Procyclical (volatile) Leading*
Capacity utilization Procyclical Leading
Employment Procyclical Coincident, Lagging**
Labor productivity Procyclical Leading
Unemployment rate Countercyclical
Inflation rate Procyclical Lagging
Short-term nominal interest rate Procyclical Lagging
* Stock market performance can provide false signals
77
** Employment found as lagging by Forni et al. (2001)
Forni et al. (2001) make similar observations from EU datasets but, expectedly due to the
more rigid EU labor laws, find that employment is generally a lagging rather than a
coincident indicator.
Figure 6-3 reproduces three of the graphs used by Roubini (industrial production,
corporate profits, and employment) that exhibit the relative sensitivity of the corporate
profitability compared to the other variables. This sensitivity is similar to the one
exhibited in the commercial aviation industry as shown in Ch. 3.
While the indicators can be useful for forecasting the business cycle, their explanatory
power is limited as they can just as well be reactive measures taken by individuals
(investment), firms (orders, employment), and governments (interest rates) to dampen
the effects of the cycle as perceived by each stakeholder.
The macroeconomic cycles aggregate the behavior of individual firms. As we saw,
Metzler and Abramovitz, among others, had identified the importance of inventories for
the higher frequency business cycles.
77 Stock market is considered as reflecting the best knowledge of market conditions and therefore
theoretically investors should be able to anticipate recessions. Yet, as Roubini cautions, "the stock market
has predicted twelve of the last eight recessions"!
168
111 15 1 1 1 155,s1 1 q1 169 1 1 1 6; 1 1 1 ?q 1 175,1 1 1 ,aq II I a I I q  , 1 .
INEW ME MMMMI
72109MMORNW, ;gu -72-,WAWWý,
R,15.151*4ýt 9.45
TMý NO., W.1 V.Vr
A f4 i ANA. 4u.,A14,iS.4.P-1 "ýFel M, H11"WH V'G..A.V.X
rAOM042 42. Pe,:7:Cný- Proý it Ir I, r la,_ _Iltural 1 )141"17.I - :,`
Figure 6-3 Industrial production, corporate profits, and employment indices for the U.S. from 1950
to 1995. (Source: Roubini 2001)
(Note: Up arrow indicates peak and down arrow trough of business cycle)
More recent, business-oriented literature using operations research homed in
independently on what practitioners called the bullwhip effect and developed models to
help managers avoid its repercussions. The bullwhip cycles can have even shorter periods
although the described mechanisms for their occurrence may sound similar to the
inventory, or infrastructure cycles as discussed previously. In fact the bullwhip effect can
just as well be an inventory cycle as industries evolved to produce at faster pace and the
clockspeed of production development shortened. Another point of connection between
the cycles is the potential of the macroeconomic cycles to create the changes in demand
growth rate that can spawn bullwhip effects in multiple industries.
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6.2 Supply Chain specific cycles and the "bullwhip effect"
The stylized narrative of Box 6-2 presents the basic workings of what was named by
industrial logistic experts who first witnessed it "the bullwhip effect." It was later defined
as the amplification of order variation moving upstream in the supply chain. (Forrester
1961) initially pointed to this phenomenon without actually naming it and research has
been actively conducted to analyze, explain, mitigate, or even deny it ever since.
Box 6-2 Stylized Description of a Bullwhip Cycle
An upward trend of the macroeconomic cycle creates a robust demand growth for product X. The retailers of
product X did not anticipate that growth of demand and being in a competitive industry their ability to
manage demand by increasing prices is limited. They are concerned that their competitors will have the
ability to capture the spill over demand and therefore gain a foothold in the opportunities presented by this
market surge.
Their remaining option is for every competitor to increase safety inventories and order rates. Yet the
manufacturers for product X and their suppliers did not anticipate this surge in demand either and their
spare production capacity is not sufficient to cover it. If their monopoly power is also constrained and their
forecasters advise them that the surge will continue apace then their viable option is similar to that of their
downstream counterparts; increase capacity. For them this is a longer term investment, as factories need to
be built and manned and in the meantime orders keep pouring in.
Some of orders are 'phantom' placed in multiples by exasperated retailers vying to see which manufacturer
can clear their backlog first. As all these processes rely on forecasting, overshooting in one or more
echelons is almost a certainty and suddenly supply can exceed demand or the demand for the product
starts trending downward, following the exogenous macroeconomic cycle. Suddenly inventories lose their
value as retailers slash their prices to get rid of them and cancel their orders while the extra capacities built
upstream become redundant and underutilized. That is until the baseline demand growth rate catches up
and supply shortages make the cycle start over.78
Industries where bullwhip effect behavior has been reported are diverse based on the
examples in the literature. Lee, Padmanabhan et al. (1997) based on their work with
Procter & Gamble report it in a three echelon supply chain of baby diapers, which
surprisingly is a product with a stable base demand. In that case it involved retailers, the
manufacturer, and its suppliers as distinct firms. Hammond (1994) describes it in the
pasta industry. Lee, Padmanabhan et al. (1997) also report the bullwhip effect in the
electronics industry for printers. In that case the supply chain was also multi-echelon
(retailers, wholesaler, manufacturer, parts manufacturer) but the bullwhip effect was
existent even at the last two sites that belonged in the same firm. Svensson (2003) reports
that the seeds of the effect can be found even within a single echelon as the levels of
inbound inventories are found to be higher that those outbound inventories within a site.
While the examples cited above are firm specific, the bullwhip effect has been identified
on the industry level as well. (Blanchard 1983) reported higher variance in production
78 The period of the cycle described here can be a few years but the same patterns can apply for shorter
period variations but with different mechanisms dominating as we see later in the section.
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than in sales in the automotive industry. (Anderson, Fine et al. 2000) report evidence
that point to the bullwhip in the machine tool industry and (Terwiesch, Ren et al. 2005)
in the electronics industry (order volatility was found higher for semiconductors than for
personal computers). In fact, on an industry level the bullwhip effect had been observed
and described by classical economists (Tvede 2003) (pg 155) and dubbed the
"acceleration principle" since the beginning of the 20 t century (Clark 1917). They
observed that stabilization of growth in one industry could create a shock in the supplier
industries and (Samuelson 1939) conducted a sensitivity analysis using a simple model
economy to identify the relationship between the parameters that led to four possible
outcomes: stability, dampened cycles, accelerating cycles, and extreme growth.
However, Cachon, Randall et al. (2005) conducted an aggregate industry study and report
that they did not find the bullwhip amplification signature universally on aggregate
industry level production and sales data. They conclude that a majority of industries do
production smooth and therefore the bullwhip effect is not as prevalent as originally
thought. Some drawbacks of their methodology though make their results far from
conclusive (firstly they were able to compare the variance of demand and production on
individual echelons only and as a result the multi echelon view critical for observing the
bullwhip effect is missing and secondly the data aggregate behavior of all firms and of all
products in an industry which by averaging may hide areas where the bullwhip is
occurring). The aircraft manufacturing industry is included in the Transportation
Equipment North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) group which is
found to production smooth79.
6.2.1 Costs of the Bullwhip Effect
"The bullwhip effect has been viewed as one of the forces that paralyze supply chains."
(Lee, Padmanabhan et al. 2004)
The costs of the bullwhip effect stem from the inefficiencies generated by sub-
optimization. In fact, after the system delays and feedbacks run their course, the result
may be actually harmful to the interests of both the acting party and the supply chain as a
whole. One of the most dramatic examples of the effects of the bullwhip effect is the
write-off of $2.1B inventory by Cisco in 2001. Overoptimistic forecasting by Cisco and
shortage gaming by its customers 80 who placed multiple orders conspired to create that
huge almost catastrophic outcome for the company (Lee et al. 2004).
Inventory write-offs are extreme manifestations of the bullwhip effect inefficiencies. Less
visible inefficiencies but in aggregate more costly due to their pervasiveness are
identified by Hugos (2003) (Ch. 4) to exist into the following areas:
* Manufacturing: the manufacturing side copes with the large swings in demand
by maintaining reserve capacity that is underutilized for periods of time
79 The average ratio of variance of production over variance of demand is found to be 0.57 for the years
1993 to 2004. (Cachon et. al. 2005 Table 1).
80 See next section for cause explanations.
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* Inventory: Inventory stocks at all points of the supply chain are kept higher than
optimal as insurance against the variability. In extreme cases write-offs may be
required.
* Transportation: Overcapacity in the transportation side of logistics operations to
cope with the excesses.
* Labor: High demand periods may require expensive overtime while idle time or
even lay-offs may be required during troughs.
* Sales: Sales can be lost at the beginning of the bullwhip cycle.
The actual relative costs of these inefficiencies are hard to quantify even having access to
proprietary company data. Sancar (2003) using modeling, estimated the benefits from
addressing the bullwhip effect inefficiencies caused by seasonality in production and
forecasting error to range between 15 to 30 percent of the supply chain profitability but
did not define the beneficiary.
6.2.2 Identified Causes of the Bullwhip Effect
Having strong empirical evidence on each existence researchers focused on the causes of
the bullwhip effect and ways to mitigate it given the inefficiencies it caused in the
affected supply chains. Initial perceptions of the bullwhip effect attributed its roots to
exogenous shocks but later research strongly suggested that it is an endogenous
phenomenon.
Towill (1996) characterizes the bullwhip effect as highly undesirable and gives as a rule
of thumb an amplification ratio of 2:1 upstream the supply chain and attributes it to
overordering by each echelon of the supply chain as guard against uncertainties in their
market and supply chain (see Fig. 6-4).
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Figure 6-4 The "Forrester Flywheel Effect" (Source: Towill (1996))
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Croson, Donohue et al. (2004) recognize two categories of causes for the bullwhip effect:
operational and behavioral.
On the operational side, Lee et al. (1997) in their seminal paper identified four primary
causes for the bullwhip effect:
1. Demand forecast updating (Demand signal processing)
Supply chain managers base their forecasts on historical patterns of the orders they
received and adjust their upstream orders to maintain adequate safety stock and satisfy
the forecasted demand. The longer the lead times the greater the safety stock and the
variation in the output orders. As this function is repeated in multi-echelon supply chains
the amplification in the variation becomes significant.
2. Order Batching
While retailers receive a constant stream of orders usually with small variability, the cost
of processing orders creates incentives for batching orders over longer periods. Order
batching reduces the visible costs to both parties and allows for more cost-efficient
shipping (truck-load and less-than-truck load rates are significantly different. On the
negative side though, it requires significant inventory accumulation and accentuates the
bullwhip effect since the receiving supplier sees an erratic series of orders that often
coincide with orders from the rest of its customers.
3. Price Variations
Often suppliers may try to promote their products by offering discounts that induce their
customers into forward-buying, i.e. before the demand for the product materializes.
While these types of promotions may help some supply chains by evening out their
seasonal demand or by increasing the penetration of products that rely on network effects,
it may wreak havoc to others when not implemented correctly. Inventories can surge and
the market forecasts can be distorted. If shareholders are not informed properly changes
in the realized versus forecasted sales can also reduce the value of the stock.
4. Rationing and shortage gaming
When supply of a product is constrained compared to demand, manufacturers will ration
their product. A common rationing scheme involves allocating the existing supply
proportionally to the orders, i.e. if supply is only 75 percent then each customer will
receive 75 percent of their placed orders. In such cases, the customers may try to game
the order system by artificially increasing their orders beyond their forecasts. This way,
the manufacturers receive a false signal of demand and when they eventually adjust their
supply to order cancellations pour in.
Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky et al. (2003) (pg. 104) added lead time to the list as for longer
lead times, even a small change in variability of the demand impacts the calculations of
safety stocks and order levels.
The behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect were first investigated experimentally by
Sterman (1989) with the introduction of the beer game. Croson and Donohue (2006)
replicated the beer game experiments but removed all the identified operational causes of
the bullwhip effect except lead time and still found significant amplification of the order
variance for about half the teams that participated in their experiments.
173
Anderson, Fine et al. (2000) proposed that the amplification of cyclical volatility faced by
tool manufacturers can be attributed primarily to the investment accelerator. It should be
noted that in their system dynamics model they excluded the "irrational" supply chain
discounting discussed by Sterman above and also used a single supply chain with no
competitors.81
The bounded rationality of the participants gives them insufficient intuition of the
prevailing feedback loops and time delays of their actions. The, so called, supply line
underweighting (supply chain discounting) effect, i.e. the inclination of decision makers
to place orders based on current inventory and demand without appropriately accounting
for orders in transit, is the more prominently identified behavioral cause. As Croson et al.
(2004) note this choice can be a result of 'rational' behavior in anticipation of non-
optimal behavior from the other participants in the supply chain - what is known as
coordination risk. The latter may also be implicated in the shortage gaming behavior
discussed previously.
6.2.3 Measures of the Bullwhip effect and Recommended Solutions
The bullwhip effect consists of an amplification of the volatility of downstream demand
when it translates to upstream orders. Hence a reduction in volatility is one measure for
identifying a successful implementation of a countercyclical strategy. This is a rather
indirect performance measure as it is not directly related to the performance of the
enterprise. Beamon (1998) in her literature survey summarized the performance measures
used in supply chain analyses in the following:
* Cost minimization,
* Sales maximization,
* Profit maximization
* Inventory investment minimization,
* Return of investment (ROI) maximization
* Product demand variance minimization
* Stockout probability minimization
* System capacity maximization
Having seen the relevant performance measures, we move back to connecting the causes
of the bullwhip effect and corresponding strategies. The discussion in Section 6.2.4
indicates that there is a strong interdependency among the echelons of the supply chain.
As Swaminathan, Smith et al. (1998) recognize, "performance of any entity in a supply
chain depends on the performance of others and their willingness and ability to
coordinate activities within the supply chain." Therefore cooperative solutions dominate
those suggested in the literature.
The solutions proposed by researchers ranged across a wide spectrum and included
among others measures to:
* increase transparency,
81 These assumptions differ substantially from the assumptions we used in the system dynamics model that
we developed for the CA EoE as described in Ch. 9.
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* reduce lead times,
* integrate supply chain echelons,
* refine and automate ordering practices,
* introduce price stability,
* improve forecasting.
Some of those measures were adopted and tested in practice while others that had been in
use by few pioneering firms were widely disseminated.
Central inventory control had been found to be better than site specific inventory control
by (Clark and Scarf 1960). Three practices allowing for differing degrees of integration
flourished in response: distribution of point-of-sale (POS) data across the supply chain,
vendor managed inventory (VMI), and direct-to-consumer marketing (Dell and Apple
are good examples). Strategic partnerships, by increasing the level of trust in the supply
chain, may make the adoption of the measures discussed easier for companies.
Addressing the long lead times and the costs of inventories, just-in-time (JIT)
manufacturing as pioneered by Toyota became an industry norm. This was enabled by
logistics innovations that allowed shipment consolidation and LTL shipping at
reasonable rates.
More importantly, Womack and Jones (1996) (Ch. 3 & 4) emphasize that enterprise
innovations that foster lean production and pull principles in supply chains can be
instrumental in gaining the most out of JIT applications. The difference is between JIT-
supply that simply transfers the need for inventory upstream and JIT-production that
allows for real single batch, on-demand production in an economic fashion. In some
cases, inventories may continue to provide the safety cushion against unexpected supply
chain disruptions Sheffi (2005) without jeopardizing the benefits of JIT.
In dealing with rationing scheming and order gaming the proposed solutions are geared
towards making the retailers to commit to their forecasts by making it harder to cancel
orders or return products. In a competitive environment this may be difficult to
institutionalize if competitors can provide this 'service' and use it as a competitive
advantage to gain market share.
Order batching behaviors can be abated by cheaper LTL services as mentioned above, but
also if the transaction costs of orders can be reduced. Electronic systems for ordering like
business-to-business network solutions enabled by electronic data interchange (EDI)
based standards. Many of these solutions come bundled with automated ordering
systems that further reduce the transaction costs of ordering and alleviate some of the
behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect if properly calibrated with forecasting and
ordering algorithms like those proposed by (Dejonckheere, Disney et al. 2003) and the
forecast control algorithms that (Ingalls, Foote et al. 2005) recommend as a way to
overcome the assertion by Dejonckheere et al. that order-up-to policies will always result
to a bullwhip amplification.
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Stabilizing demand can happen by offering stable pricing on the retail level or what many
retailers call value-pricing or "everyday low prices" that avoids the surges in demand by
offers and promotions.
6.3 Intersecting and Overlapping Cycles
Womack and Jones (1996) (pg. 88) suggest that stabilizing inventories on an individual
firm level with just-in-time production and pull operations can have a "damping effect on
the traditional business cycle." They claim that if inventory buildup can be moderated by
pull production then the optimistic overproduction that fuels the inventory cycle will be
ameliorated. Although they probably refer to the Kitchin cycle they do not discuss what
impact that would have to the longer period cycles.
As we saw, Cachon et al. (2005) showed that the aggregate volatility data do not support
such an assertion and (Zarnowitz 1999) concurs with his observation that : "business
inventory investment in constant dollars was about as volatile and as cyclical in the
1990s as it had been in the past." Womack and Jones (1996) preempt this argument
pointing that the critical mass of businesses that have adopted JIT-production as opposed
to JIT-supply is not there and therefore visible changes on aggregate indicators are not to
be expected.
This means in looking for cyclical behavior in the aviation environment we need to look
both on the aggregate as well as on the individual firm level.
Why some industries are apparently more prone to cycles than others is a worthwhile
question. The railroad industry in the U.S. exhibited the very strong boom-bust cycles
that precipitated a financial market crash as we saw in Box 6-1 but its more recent
behavior is far more benign. The airline industry itself had been less cyclical during the
pre-deregulation period as we saw in Ch. 3. The sea shipping industry has been
consistently cyclical with no signs of easing out since the 19"' century as we saw with
Einarsen's and Timbergen's work.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In scanning the literature on business cycles that covered both economic and supply chain
operations research, we identified a series of factors that were thought to be contributing
to their creation, propagation. Corresponding to the factors there are broad policies that
have been proposed to address them. We summarize and distill them in the list below.
While not all characteristics are necessary and neither is sufficient for a supply chain to
exhibit the strong cyclicality it is a useful reference.
Triggers. These are factors exogenous to the industry or industries considered and they
cannot be directly impacted from within the industry.
* Macroeconomic cycle, the effect of the larger economic cycle spilling over to
specific industries
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* Final demand and Input variability. If the cost and availability of critical inputs to
the industry considered (fuel, raw materials, etc.) is volatile chances are that the
profitability of the industry will be subject to cyclical pressures.
Psychological Factors. Influences caused by the human characteristics of the decision
makers in a supply chain.
* Bounded rationality. The inability of the human brain to meaningfully process all
available information even if complete information was available.
* Supply chain discounting. Human subjects were shown to 'forget' or underweight
the orders that are placed in backlog even in quite simple supply chain settings
(beer game).
* Investment exuberance and strategic optimism. Related to availability of
financing and new entrants. During market upswings, managers and participants
tend to extrapolate positive trends expecting them to last into the future and
discounting previous recession experiences.
Industry Structure. These are endogenous characteristics of the supply chain that
promote cyclicality or bullwhip volatility.
* Imperfect financing and capital market volatility. The ability, or lack thereof, to
obtain financial means for investment is subject to the whims of investors whose
appetites for risk and perceptions of acceptable return change with the markets.
As a result, firms may try to expand more than optimal when funding is available
during an expansion or peak.
* Investment irreversibility and intertemporal substitution. large capital investments
can be deferred into the future (causing reinvestment cycles) and conversely when
they are made they are relatively irreversible and commit the enterprise into using
them.
* Underutilized capacity and labor 'hoarding'. Similar to investment irreversibility,
the difficulty in training new employees (and labor regulations) make existing
capacity inflexible and can force the firms to produce more than optimal.
* Inventories. Existence of inventories in the supply chains is an indicator that
replenishment ordering strategies would more likely than not increase volatility.
* Long lead times. When delivery times are stretched the effects of psychological
factors (discussed above) are pronounced.
* Technological change. It includes the Schumpetarian idea of creative destruction
but can be extended to more benign forms of product improvements. Making the
previous technology obsolete can trigger a wave of demand that will saturate
some time in the future until the next technologic breakthrough appears.
* Low barriers to entry, high barriers to exit. Overly competitive industries
generated by low barriers to entry but higher barriers to exit are expected to have
low profit margins.
Supply chain characteristics. Imprecise forecasting and planning due to
* lack of transparency of downstream demand
* Order batching
* Order gaming due to constrained supply
* Price fluctuations (promotions, bulk discounts)
* Strong seasonality or network effects
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* Multiple supply chain echelons
In Chapter 7, we look at the CA EoE cyclicality more specifically to identify its potential
causes based on the generic causes identified here.
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Chapter 7 Cyclicality: Causes and Cures. Cyclical Scenarios
for Commercial Aviation and Symbiotic strategies
"[A] review of the last twelve [sea shipping] cycles demonstrates that the same
explanations of cyclical peaks and troughs appear again and again. Economic
conditions, the 'business cycle', trade growth and the ordering and scrapping of ships
are the fundamental variables which can be analyzed, modeled, and extrapolated"
(Stopford 1997) (pg. 62)
Chapter 6 scanned the literature on business cycles from an economic and supply chain
perspective. Chapters 3 and 4 (Sections 3.5 and 4.4 respectively) discussed how
cyclicality is manifested in the CA EoE. In this Chapter, we combine the views and
understanding of cyclicality gained from Chapter 6 with the specific characteristics of the
CA EoE to produce plausible narratives that explain the cyclicality in the related
industries and their interaction (Section 7.1) and then distill the industry specific causes
in Section 7.2. Finally, in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 we generate strategies that correspond to
these causes. We will use these strategies to develop and test strategic alternatives via
modeling in Ch. 10.
The multifaceted evidence of cyclical behavior in the commercial aviation EoE, which as
we have shown in Chapter 7 affects the entire value chain and carries significant social
costs, can be caused by an overlapping set of drivers. In order to achieve our goal of
elaborating countercyclical strategies in the CA EoE, we need to answer the following
questions:
a. Is the cycle amplified and delayed as the bullwhip effect would have us expect?
b. Do individual firms fare differently in different parts of the cycle (the
Piepenbrock hypothesis) and can this behavior alter the cycle as whole?
c. What are possible causal relationships that impact how the cycle wave is
transmitted upstream the supply chain and what is their relative impact?
d. What are potential strategies to for dampening that transmission? How can they
be investigated?
The next section describes, in a narrative form, the plausible causal relationships that
trigger cycles in the industry drawing from the narrative representations. Researchers that
focused on modeling the commercial aviation business cycles using system dynamics
appear to also have a consensus on a number of factors that apply to the industry which
we summarize in Chapter 8.
7.1 A Short History of Waves: Pre- and Post- Deregulation
Interactions in the Communercial Aviation
This narrative is based on the U.S. deregulation experience (post-1978) but similar
behaviors to the ones we describe have been prevalent to airline market liberalization in
Europe (mid-1990s) and Asia (ongoing).
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7.1.1 Ripples: Pre-deregulation status-quo
Passenger travel is growing steadily but slowly. No new airlines have commenced long-
range operations for several years due to regulatory barriers and the few newcomers are
limited to regional markets. The incumbent carriers have divided their primary markets
by being assigned to them in consultation with the Civil Aviation Board (CAB) and they
coexist in a relatively stable semi-collusive equilibrium. Given that fare prices are capped
and adjust based on a cost-plus basis, unit costs have been allowed to creep up and the
primary competitive advantage (where there are competing routes) is considered to be
differentiation in service. Employees are given generous benefits especially for their
pension plans. While in the U.S. airlines were privately owned even before deregulation,
in the smaller European and Asian markets, flag-carriers were government-owned but
their ability to pass their costs on to consumers was preserved via the government
sanctioned monopoly.
Along the lines of providing high level of service, point-to-point connections become the
network structure of choice and widebody aircraft are used for most flights longer than
2000 miles. While relatively inefficient, the service levels provided to passengers are
very high as this is the only means of competition available given the caps on fares
Causes of cyclicality under the status-quo
This relatively stable situation has still been subject to smaller cycles caused by:
* changes in demand growth rates,
* increases in operating costs due to fuel surges,
* occasional intensification of the competition among incumbents in their attempt to
grow market share, and
* introduction of disruptive technologies like the jet engine and the resulting
premature fleet retirements and consequent Einarsen reinvestment cycles.
Stakeholder Status
Overall, the system was able to reach equilibrium quickly and the stakeholders (carriers
and airframe manufacturers) would prosper with profit margins comparable to other
industries.
The customers were satisfied with the service and the sense of privilege from flying but
affordability was not part of their expectations and consequently the extent of personal
travel was limited even for the relatively affluent society. The business model of the
dominant airlines revolved around the business and first class travelers and the load
factors were expected to hover around 60% on average. The reliance on travel agents and
the difficulty of monitoring and adjusting prices due to the limitations in technology
made demand management hard.
On the supply side, the relationship with airframe and engine manufacturers is one in
which the big airlines have significant leverage. Their overall healthy balance sheets
allow them in certain instances to support the heavy upfront costs of aircraft development
by early commitments and generous front payments. This is particularly the case for
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ground-breaking aircraft that were made to fit to the dominant airlines' business models
(see aircraft vignettes in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4).
7.1.2 The Deregulation Wave
The period of relative stability described in the previous section reached its closure for
the US market when fuel price surges accompanied by global and regional recession
pushed tickets prices to being even less affordable. At the same time, the liberalization of
traditionally regulated market was gaining traction in theory and practice. In that setting,
constraints on airline launching, market assignment by the CAB, and price capping are
abandoned. While this regulatory change does not immediately raise all significant
barriers to entry, access to infrastructure like airport gates and slots being a prominent
one, it allows for the gradual increase in the intensity of the competition and the reluctant
entrance of nascent airlines that brought diversified business models.
As funding an airline is expensive, new airline entrants are fueled by an increase in
economic output. This has the direct effect of raising the demand for air travel and the
indirect effect of increasing the availability of investment capital and willing investors. In
addition, airline entrants were helped by the emergence of aircraft leasing as a viable way
to obtain and operate new aircraft.
The newcomers
In the view of the potential entrants, their ability to start without the obligations of the
legacy carriers provided an advantage on their unit costs and hence the prices they could
offer but their primary selling point was the difference in business models. In some cases,
the competition was not considered to be other airlines but the automobile (a more
detailed discussion of the low cost carries (LCCs) business model see Section 3.3.1). The
targeted customer base expanded significantly.
The managers and investors of the newcomers and incumbents could have faced a short-
term payoff matrix where their lower unit costs would give them an advantage over the
incumbents in any scenario and therefore the incumbents feeling that they are not
threatened enough they would accommodate the entry. For a visualization using game
theory, we present the above in the short-term payoff matrix in Fig. 7-1 where the
outcome is depicted using token representative payoffs. The first number in each cell is
the expected payoff for the incumbent and the second number the expected payoff of the
new entrant.
Similarly for the expected long-term payoff matrix, the Nash equilibrium is at an area
were both competitors accommodate and a sort of reversion to the pre-deregulation status
ensues which may be sporadically threatened by price wars but quickly reaches
equilibrium. These mental attitudes to the results of entry are shown in the payoff
matrices in Figure 7-1.
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Short-term Payoff Matrix (expected)
Incumbent
Newcomer Compete Accommodate
Enter -1,-2
Refrain 0, 1 0, 3
Long-term Payoff Matrix (expected)
Incumbent
Newcomer Compete Accommodate
Compete -2, -3 1, -2
Accommodate -1, 1
Short-term Payoff Matrix (post entry)
Incumbent
Newcomer Compete Accommodate
Compete -2, 3
Accommodate 2, -2 1,0
Figure 7-1 Anticipated and post-entry payoff-matrices for incumbent and new-entrant airlines
(illustrative payoffs)
What the above analysis does not take into account is the uncoordinated simultaneous
decision making of several investors eyeing the same market in a textbook application of
the cobweb theorem (see Ch. 6). The simultaneous investment, aided by investors ready
to supply the industry with capital, creates very different dynamics with overcapacity
being a distinct consequence. Faced with overcapacity, competition becomes a fight for
survival; LCCs are seen as having potentially weaker resources and the incumbents see
that they will loose if they accommodate as their competitors need to compete for
survival; they need to reach a critical mass of frequency and network to be sustainable.
This is depicted in the third payoff matrix. The result of this fight, as discussed later is
that most LCCs are wiped out by the end of the competition but with significantly
weakened if not broken legacy carriers that cannot reenact the same game for the second
wave of entrant a few years later.
Overcapacity and competitive situation
For the new entrants, a fast growth rate and an expanding market share is considered
necessary to counter the advantage of scale and network economies enjoyed by their
established competitors. Their cumulative projections thus translate in an ordering rate of
aircraft that exceeds, by far, the historic one.
In their eagerness to penetrate new markets and establish market share the primary short-
term objective of the new entrants is to fill their existing capacity by reducing their
prices. The realization that the marginal cost of offering an additional empty seat on a
scheduled flight is considered to be zero generates interest for algorithms that can
automatically calculate the optimal fare under these assumptions and given demand. As a
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result, profit margins are sacrificed in pursue of higher utilization rates and market share
penetration.
A second order effect of the price wars is the strong stimulus that they provide to
demand. Passengers can now travel by air almost as casually as they travel by car. A
warming economy adds to that demand growth and as result the overly optimistic aircraft
order rates on a systemic level become a self-fulfilling prophesy once the objective of
profitability is relegated to the future.
While the incumbent carriers might have initially dismissed one or two new entrants as
niche players and accommodated, their sheer number and aggressive strategies make this
a matter of survival for the incumbents.
The ensuing price wars become more severe and protracted than what the 2-player games
above would have suggested fueled as they are by a slowing economy and the
accumulation of debt create unsustainable conditions for the new entrants. Another
second order effect of the price wars is that in a slowing economy they are fueled by
liquidity constraints as much as by competition; fares sold at giveaway prices become the
last resort before Chapter 11. Nevertheless, this situation along with flawed business
models becomes unsustainable and leads to the bankruptcy or merger of the majority of
the first wave new entrants with the notable exception of Southwest.
The incumbent carriers have several advantages that allow them to sustain the price wars:
accumulated capital, established network of distributors, dominance in their hub
operations, and international routes - a market segment with relatively higher barriers to
entry as it requires bilateral agreements. Since competition now focuses on price, the
pressure to reduce costs leads to a new network structure that becomes dominant. Hub
and spoke operations consolidate demand across several markets and allow for high
frequencies - probably the highest element of service after price for passengers. In
addition, the generous in-flight services that gave flying its glamour are severely cut back
especially for the economy fares. Yield management systems, enabled by technology,
create potentially huge fare disparities for the same seats in the same flight. The
pendulum for demand consolidation and yield management swings somewhat too far for
travelers as the reliability and cost of their travel take on significant variance.
While the incumbents can rely on their extensive international routes for a positive cash
flow, aggressively expanding them to compensate for the deficits on domestic flights
creates competitive tensions there as well. This makes positive flows elusive and far from
being adequate to sustain the incumbent carriers. The incumbents' victory is pyrrhic.
Most of the incumbent airlines are staggering under accumulated debt and their pension
funds are drained as they were used to supply needed cash. An economy slow down on
the domestic front and a war on the international scene reduces demand in both markets.
The increasing pressure to honor the pension responsibilities and the extent of red ink in
the airlines' balance sheets diminishes their access to cash necessary for wages, capital
and interest payments, maintenance, leases etc. creating an additional pressure for
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reducing the prices and gaining that short term increase in market share before their
competitors react.
Under these conditions, the wave of bankruptcies that follows is not surprising. Chapter
11 relatively generous protections help the majority of the weak incumbent airlines
reorganize while a few previous giants are forced to succumb to hostile takeovers and
mergers. In either case, capacity is not correspondingly retracted from the market as the
aircraft continue to operate under a different brand or helped by bankruptcy proceedings.
An expansion of the economy and a decrease in fuel prices allows profitability to return
but also encourages a second wave of new entrants. These new entrants try to reverse the
pendulum of cost and service variance by reintroducing point-to-point networks and
simpler fare structures. They also start using their cheaper one or two aircraft type fleet
for longer domestic and even international trips challenging the conventional wisdom that
passengers will not be comfortable in single aisle aircraft for longer flights.
Stakeholder Status
In these turbulent times, passengers and freight consolidators witnessed ambivalent
effects: overall they benefited from the increased competition and the expansion of
networks but the losses in level of service and reliability were substantial.
The aircraft manufacturing side also saw benefits in that period. Some of the benefits
were partly attributed of stricter noise and emissions regulation that forced a partial
renewal of older fleets. Increases in fuel prices created a similar effect by increasing the
financial strains of airlines that had insufficient leverage in hedged fuel. Newer, more
fuel efficient aircraft presented an advantage and a further incentive for fleet renewal.
The legacy airlines tried to reduce the size of their fleets and following the lead of LCCs
homogenize it with varying success. The dearth of aircraft orders during industry
consolidation generated an additional price war among the aircraft manufacturers. The
ascendancy of a new player (Airbus) was by the necessity of economies of scale forcing
it to reduce prices and try to lure buyers by offering additional operating efficiencies
based on the commonality features of their product architecture.
Lower aircraft prices due to competition and the introduction of an additional stakeholder
in the form of aircraft leasing companies offered greater flexibility for the airlines in the
planning and optimization of their fleet. At the same time, the expanding set of decision
makers created another source of potential overcapacity through overoptimistic forecasts
and the limited liability that airlines faced when ordering planes through a leasing firm.
Causes of cyclicality post-deregulation
In addition to the causes of cyclicality effective in the pre-deregulation period the
following effects created destabilizing forces after deregulation:
* A large number of new entrants with lower operating costs were suddenly allowed
to enter and were free to order far more capacity than the market could absorb.
* The new entrants focus on gaining market share and utilizing their capacity rather
than profitability. This behavior although rational in the short-term for a single
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player, created the illusion that even more capacity is needed as the lowered
prices boosted demand; this was exacerbated by a growing economy.
* Airframe manufacturers and, later, leasing firms were happy to oblige in offering
that capacity as that also helped them reduce their unit costs faster and compete
for market share in a duopolistic market.
* Airframe manufacturers were engulfed in their own price war further inducing
demand and adding another source of overcapacity.
* Airline bailouts, subsidies, mergers, and Chapter 11 protections create barriers to
exit thus retaining a level of overcapacity and allowing for a continuation of the
high unit cost practices by the legacy carriers.
* Airlines have difficulties in adjusting their capacity flexibly as their operations
face significant fixed costs:
o Highly trained employees have to be "hoarded" rather than fired if the
airline can remain competitive at the next market upturn and furloughs
have only limited effectiveness.
o Costs for long-term leases, owned equipment and gate leases are all fixed
in the medium-term.
High fixed costs made the prospect of price wars more palatable to decision-
makers as at least these would ensure a source of badly needed short-term
liquidity even at the expense of profitability and long-term viability.
7.1.3 Post post-deregulation and the Future: Ripples or Tsunami?
The second wave of LCCs along with a set of successful full service carriers that use hub
airports to connect international markets became established. The economic boom of the
90s allowed both the newcomers and the previously ailing legacy airlines to recover and
post strong profits. Utilization rates for both types of carriers were increasing and aircraft
orders pouring in. The ascendant manufacturer (Airbus) aided by a lack of commitment
by MDD, demonstrated in their incomplete product line, became established as the
largest manufacturer after Boeing and in a way precipitates the merger of the two
American manufacturers, Boeing and MDD. Orders to the two remaining manufacturers
are issued with renewed vigor aided by liquidity and smaller debt constraints. This
necessitated increases in manufacturing capacity that end up being costly and poorly
managed for Boeing to the point of halting production and reorganizing its operations
right after the merger with MDD.
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 that exposed the accumulation of capacity in that
region was a prelude for the more far reaching crisis in 2000/2001. The latter mini-
recession created a sharp drop in demand for air travel with obvious repercussions in the
airline industry. Compounded by the tragic terrorist attacks of 9/11, consequent active
wars, and a potential pandemic (SARS) deepened the predicament of the airlines even
further by further reducing the actual demand for air travel in the more lucrative
international routes. Furthermore, as the world oil production capacity reached closer to
the inevitable peak and spare capacity is not as readily available, the volatility of fuel
prices increases even with relatively minor disruption events.
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In estimating their capacity, it is possible that some airlines failed to see that the increase
in leisure travel was accompanied by an increase in the elasticity of demand - these
travelers are more sensitive to price and income fluctuations. Airlines facing this sharply
reduced demand and increased fuel prices respond with cutbacks in prices, fleet
reductions, and aircraft order cancellations. In 2001, the airlines ended up parking a
significant percentage of the global fleet mainly older and less efficient aircraft faced
with a weak secondary aircraft market. With orders from the previous boom now
arriving, airlines face a dilemma on whether they should start parking even younger
aircraft and some have instead opted for mothballing the newly delivered aircraft instead
in the hope of preserving their resale value when the market warms up again.
Aircraft manufacturers, faced with the wave of order cancellations, responded in a typical
supply chain bullwhip effect reaction. Boeing opted for drastically reducing production
capacity through painful layoffs and closure of manufacturing facilities in the pursuit of
continuity in short-term financial performance while Airbus simply slowed capacity
expansion given that their backlog was significantly more extensive. Boeing's seeming
overreaction could makes the transition to the next boom period harder and create the
potential for a future expansion that may be faster than warranted in order to reduce an
accumulating backlog.
Further cyclicality inducing effects
The additional parameters that induce cyclical behavior as illustrated in this subsection,
can be summarized into the following:
* External events especially if they coincide with economic downturns can deepen
the cycle.
* Airframe manufacturers can be prone to react in a bullwhip fashion as the
establishment of production facilities, employee training, and introduction of new
aircraft types entail long-term investments.
* Airlines can also order in a bullwhip fashion as they may order more aircraft than
they need even assuming their forecasts being correct. In an attempt to preempt
competition, they order more than warranted during good times and when
backlogs are long in a form of order gaming.
* Timing of deliveries may be out of sync with real demand in capacity and instead
coincide with downturns thus fueling price wars to fill this excess capacity.
* Capital markets, to the extent that they influence the decision making of publicly
traded companies, may force some managers to react with a short-term strategy
dismissing the long-term implications of their actions. Loan provisions are also a
direct way in which financial institutions can impact capacity.
Outlook
The development of the CA EoE in the future can take different twists. The growth rates
projected for the sector depend on the one hand on external factors:
* Economic growth and income distribution in the dominant domestic markets in
North America and Europe but also in the potentially vast markets of fast growing
Asian economies.
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* The increase in unit costs stemming from regulations that intend to internalize the
costs of greenhouse gas emissions and their impact on global climate change.
* The potentially devastating effects of escalation in Middle East conflicts or the
appearance of pandemics.
* The effects of disruptive technologies that change customer segments and
operating parameters drastically.
Whether these potentially destabilizing effects will be amplified due to the internal
dynamics of the industry or if the sector will learn from the history of cycles and dampen
their effects remains to be seen.
On the technology side, airlines seem to have reversed from technology lead adopters to a
semi-technophobic outlook. They seem content with the current level of technology and
are very reluctant to embrace technological innovation that changes the dominant aircraft
design. Instead, they push for further process or cost-cutting incremental innovations to
the current design which are unlikely to be able to continue in the face of hard technical
limits. Given these tendencies, the emergence of a breakthrough that that would create a
technology-induced spike in new aircraft orders similar to the one faced in the transition
from turboprop to jet is rather unlikely in the twenty year horizon of this dissertation.
In the next section we summarize and codify the causes we identified above and form our
working hypothesis as to which are primary causes. This in turn allows us to draft
potential strategies for managing them.
7.2 Codifying the specific cyclicality causes for Commercial
Aviation
Using the causal relationships indications from the previous section, the generic causes of
cyclicality identified in Chapter 6, and the conclusions of the system dynamics
researchers presented in Section 8.3.8 we generated the following list of working
hypotheses as to the causes of cyclical behavior in CA EoE.
1. There is endogenous cyclicality in the current EoE architecture which can be
triggered by and reinforce the impact of external events.
2. The following aspects of the CA EoE are shown to be exhibit cyclical behavior:
2.1. The average profitability of the airline industry and their supply chain (aircraft
manufacturers and suppliers). Other constituents of the EoE may see cyclical
fluctuations but their margins are higher and their profitability remains positive
throughout the cycle.
2.1.1. The cycle in airline profitability is caused by capacity that cannot
be adjusted rapidly enough to the changing demand environment.
2.2. The aircraft orders are highly correlated to airline profitability. The factors that
influence the ordering cycle are:
2.2.1. Multiple decision-makers:
2.2.1.1. Large number of competitive and start-up airlines
that compete for market share.
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2.2.1.2. Leasing firms that project capacity based on orders
from their clients.
2.2.1.3. Capacity retention of unprofitable airlines because
of barriers to exit due to bankruptcy protections
2.2.2. Long manufacturing lead times and large backlogs.
2.2.3. Irrational exuberance of investors and airline decision-makers.
2.2.3.1. Start-ups and cash-strapped legacy airlines defer
profitability expectations.
2.2.3.2. In good times most decisions yield good returns
reinforcing confidence.
2.2.3.3. Short-term management perspective. Short-term
gains are rewarded while long-term losses are not
sufficiently penalized.
2.2.4. Order gaming by airlines simply to stay abreast of competition
enabled by:
2.2.4.1. Cost of aircraft options and cancellations below real
value ((Butler and Keller 1999) (Ch. 17)).
2.2.4.2. These low costs are provided by manufacturers
eager to be competitive in their own industries as aircraft
production is a volume game due to the great economies of
scale, scope, and network afforded to an early winner.
2.2.5. Expectations that as demand increases the passengers attracted
maintain their demand elasticity behavior while in fact they exhibit
more elastic behavior.
2.3. Employment levels in the industries involved.
2.4. Aircraft manufacturing capacity:
2.4.1. Manufacturers go into a hire/fire cycle that is increasing the costs
of the cycle to them as they are regressing in their learning curve
(forgetting).
3. Events that can trigger, moderate, or exacerbate the cycle:
3.1. External demand fluctuations based on global/regional economy and global
events (terrorism, pandemics)
3.2. External input factors like fuel prices, and costs of commodity raw materials (e.g.
aluminum, copper, titanium, carbon fiber)
3.3. Regulatory changes
3.3.1. Regulatory technology forcing (noise and emissions regulations)
3.3.2. Competitive environment (regulations on consolidation, anti-trust,
and operations e.g. Open Skies)
3.3.3. Carbon caps or taxes
3.4. Technology changes and product obsolescence (e.g. transition to jet)
Expanding on the previous hypotheses we observe the following:
* There is a cycle induced by macroeconomic factors (and/or external events like
wars and pandemics) that can drastically change (i) the baseline demand by
shifting the demand curve and (ii) the elasticity of demand for air travel. At an
economic downturn passengers (and to lesser extend firms) are still willing to
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travel if the price is right (demand is elastic downwards) while at an upturn even
high prices may not deter demand (demand is inelastic upwards).
* Like any market that tends to clear, airlines respond to those changes by changing
their prices. Because their supply is inelastic in the short-term due to capacity
commitments revenue management systems allow them to change the fares in
order to maximize load factors since the marginal cost of serving an economy-
class passenger is close to zero.8 2
* Revenue management systems may create an illusion for airlines that are bent on
meeting their load factor targets but at the expense of profitability with break-
even load factors in cases becoming greater than 1. If wrong metrics are applied,
full planes may provide a justification for further expansion of capacity forming a
vicious circle of reduced profitability.
* The lead time between order and delivery of new planes may also amplify the
cycle if the airlines do not anticipate the market growth and the actions of the
other airlines on global scale correctly or otherwise discount the supply chain.
* Anticipating market growth is a hard task because of the uncertainty in the factors
affecting demand and production costs (fuel) that establish the break-even point.
Strategic behavior exacerbates this uncertainty because competing carriers may
wish to secure the capacity in the face of competition. The fact that aircraft
production capacity is limited creates the pressure to order capacity for the sake of
having a position in the waitlist.
* While the capital cost of the aircraft is a known parameter for the airlines after
signing the contract for purchase or lease, the airframe manufacturers need to
clear their market as well. This means that they may charge different prices based
on the demand for their products as the cycle evolves. While it can be proven that
a collusive price-setting outcome is a Nash equilibrium for duopoly suppliers,
there are strong incentives to underbid the competition and prevent that outcome:
o Economies of scale and learning effects favor large production runs.
Aircraft are very capital intensive upfront with very strong economies of
scale (large production runs spread the upfront cost to a larger number of
products) and a strong learning effect.8 3
o Legacy and vendor lock-in effects. A fleet composed by uniform or
single-sourced aircraft is cheaper to operate and maintain (primarily due to
crew and mechanics training and common parts inventory). So the
incumbent supplier of a carrier has an advantage over a potential entrant.
o Bandwagon effect. If an aircraft type that, on paper, offers significant
competitive advantages to the operator over the competition is announced
it still needs to demonstrate its merits. The more airline customers it
attracts the more likely their competitors would be to make firm orders for
it. The reason for this is that aircraft production capacity is difficult to
scale according to demand and therefore airframe manufacturers prefer to
keep a backlog of aircraft in their pipelines which in turn it means that
airlines that order late will have to wait a substantial time that may reach
82 This is disputable if the costs of the reservation system, flight service, etc are accounted for.
83 See Section 4.3.2 for a discussion of the cost structure of airframe manufacturers.
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up to six years or more until they finally receive their orders. This effect is
worsened by the customization required by many airline buyers that would
make a change in ownership a more expensive proposition due to
modifications compared to a standardized aircraft.
o Production scaling. The difficulty to scale production capacity can create
underpricing in the reverse way; aircraft product lines that are faced with
scarce demand either because of failing in their initial attraction (e.g. the
B747 in their initial years as discussed in the vignette in Section 4.2.3) or
because of weak market may still need to remain operating and thus
aircraft may need to be sold at discounts or even produced without a firm
buyer (white tails). This may happen because of company strategy or
government policy (intent to retain tacit knowledge, intent to reach further
down in the learning curve that offers cost advantages, or simply inelastic
labor laws).
o When a product is a virtual monopoly (like the Boeing 747 before the
A380) then pricing allows for more leeway as long as it does not entice a
competitor to enter.
To summarize the effects discussed in the two previous sections, we use the procyclical
factors as identified in Section 6.4 and define how they are applicable to the CA EoE
setting in Table 7-1, which the majority of them is shown to be present.
Table 7-1 Procyclical factors and their presence in the CA EoE
Trigaers
Macroeconomic cycle and Final Demand.
Airlines face a shifting demand and elasticity of demand curve that may change in parallel with the economy
or due to external events (wars and pandemics).
Input variability.
The major procyclical input for airlines, given their energy intensity, would be the cost of fuel but exchange
rates volatility can also affect international operations.
For airframe manufactures the prices of raw material like aluminum, titanium and composites are volatile but
their influence would be much less than the order volatility that they face.
Psychological Factors
Bounded rationality.
Supply chain discounting.
Investment exuberance and strategic optimism.
All CA EoE constituent enterprises are to an extent subject to these
Industry Structure
Imperfect financing and capital market volatility.
It was already mentioned that airlines face uncertain and procyclical financing.
Investment irreversibility and intertemporal substitution.
For airlines, jetliners are expensive capital assets and the decision to purchase one has risks involved and a
mid-term commitment to the asset.Airlines have various means of maintaining capacity without purchases of
new aircraft: postpone the retirement date of their older aircraft, leasing, order deferment and cancellation.
For airframe manufacturers the full development of a new aircraft family is certainly an irreversible
investment decision that at times came close to threatening the survival of the firm.
I
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-Table 7-1 Contiued
Underutilized capacity and labor 'hoarding'.
Both of these can be found in airline operations and aircraft manufacturing.
Airline crews and airframe designers and assembly workers are highly specialized with years of training.
Firing and hiring cycles exist as a way of adjusting capacity (with a delay) but different firms follow divergent
strategies on this area.
Inventories.
Inventory risk is not a primary characteristic of the CA EoE. Airline products (i.e. seats) are by definition
perishable while their means of production (i.e. aircraft) are capital intensive durables. Airframe
manufacturing is based on build-to-order rather than build-to-stock (with the exception of Airbus for a short
period of its early history).
Long lead times.
LCA delivery lead times can range from one year to eight years making them rather long and close to the
period of the cycle itself. As a result the effects of psychological factors can be exacerbated.
Technological change.
Low barriers to entry, high barriers to exit. Airline operations have relatively low barriers to entry after
deregulation (with secondary aircraft markets and leasing reducing ownership risks) but barriers to exit with
Chapter 11 protections and subsidies for flag carriers are still extant.
Supply chain characteristics
Lack of transparency of downstream demand.
Final customer demand is relatively transparent on the aggregate. Incentives for taking it into account are
not lined up properly for airframe manufacturers and leasing firms.
Order batching. Order gaming due to constrained supply. Price fluctuations (promotions, bulk discounts)
All three are present in aircraft ordering and deliveries. Manufacturers offer additional discounts for large
orders and the long lead times create an incentive for phantom ordering especially given that the penalties
for cancellations are not priced correctly.
Strong seasonality. Network effects
Both effects are present in airline industry.
For the airframe manufacturers, seasonality is absent but there are significant vendor lock-in effects.
7.3 Definitions: Strategic Alternatives, Symbiosis, Stakeholders,
Goals, and Implementability
In the previous sections we discussed how cyclicality factors are present in the CA EoE
and set the stage for identifying corresponding solutions. Transitioning to this, we need to
define the terms that we use to characterize these solutions.
On Strategy and Symbiosis
Strategy is the choice of means to achieve an objective. Grant (2005) (pg. 22) defines the
goal of strategy in a firm as "to ensure [the firm's] survival and prosperity." He
differentiates between corporate strategy, i.e. deciding on the scope of the firm and the
industries in which to compete, and business strategy, i.e. the ways the firm competes in
a particular industry through business units. Business strategies are competitive strategies
and are usually envisioned as zero sum games but corporate strategies may take a larger
longer term view. Corporate and business strategies as such are overarching directions
and plans for the future of enterprises that - ideally - have been derived by analyzing the
internal competencies of the enterprise as they relate to its external environment.
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Corporate and business strategies require by definition a central authority to be conceived
and implemented. As we saw in Ch. 5, for an EoE such authority is not defined. Instead,
there is rather disparate leadership over the different constituent enterprises that pursue
their respective value functions. As a result, a single overarching plan that would qualify
as strategy on the EoE level is hard to envision. For complex sociotechnical systems, the
terms strategic alternative and bundle of strategic alternatives proposed by Dodder et al.
(2006) can be used as substitutes for strategy when multiple stakeholders are involved. A
strategic alternative in that case is an action taken by one or more stakeholders with the
objective of affecting system-wide change. Even when implementable, a single strategic
alternative is seldom effective in and of itself. It is more common to require a number of
strategic alternatives (called bundles) that interact synergistically with one another to
achieve the desired objectives of the EoE system.
In order to be implementable, strategic alternatives in the EoE-level should align with the
acting constituents internal strategies. In order to meet EoE-level objectives, we propose
that symbiotic business and corporate strategies can exist. Deriving from the Greek words
"syn" (together) + "bios" (life) it originally meant communal life and is used in biological
systems to describe organisms that live codependently. 84
In an enterprise ecosystem, firms compete for limited resources and for limited markets;
therefore the dominant business strategies are expected to be competitive. Yet, there are
several actions (strategic alternatives) that achieve outcomes and create value further than
the narrow short-term self interest of the actor would dictate. These symbiotic strategic
alternatives may not always be economically optimal in the short-term, as the actors do
not necessarily receive the full rent of their actions, but are usually Pareto efficient.
Therefore, the characterization of a strategic alternative as symbiotic is outcome-
dependent for that particular system.
More formally, we define symbiotic strategic alternative implemented by an actor in an
enterprise ecosystem as an action that improves total system performance by
(a) increasing the probability of survival for a majority of the EoE constituents; and
(b) without significantly compromising the long-term value delivered to any single
constituent.
The definition of system performance may not be straightforward and may exist in the
eye of the beholder. We suggest quantitative formulations of performance and formal
definitions of symbiotic strategies specific to the CA EoE context in Chapter 10 based on
Section 7.4 and the stakeholder analysis presented in Chapter 5.
84 When it refers to two organisms it can take different flavors: mutualism, in which both parties benefit,
commensalism, when one party benefits while the other is not harmed, and parasitism, when one party is
negatively impacted and the other gains. In an ecosystem where cohabitation rather than dependency
defines symbiosis, there is also amensalism when one party is unaffected but the other is harmed,
neutralism, when both parties are unaffected and competition when both parties are harmed. [Source:
Wikipedia entry referencing the Penguin Reference Dictionary of Biology 11 th Edition - 2004].
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Symbiotic strategic alternative can be further classified into:
Competitive
These are actions aiming to gain competitive advantage over an existing or potential
competitor. Their symbiotic effect is based on leveraging evolutionary adaptation and in
the extreme it can take the form of creative destruction processes as described by
Schumpeter and the technology S-curves of (Christensen 1997). After the implementation
of the strategy which introduces efficiencies to one of the competitors, the rest are
required to adopt the efficient innovation, adapt to a new niche, or expire. Examples:
* introduction and spread of efficient production processes (e.g. lean
manufacturing, supply chain management),
* or products (e.g. digital vs. analog media).
Cooperative,
Coordinated actions taken by a group of constituents that provide a competitive
advantage to the members of the specific group. It is a behavior that is potentially
collusive but manages or avoids potential market failures like the tragedy of the
commons, natural monopolies etc. Examples:
* alliances,
* mergers,
* vertical integration,
* cartels etc.
Pareto efficient (non-zero sum games)
Actions that improves parameters of the system e.g. market size, performance, etc.
without disenfranchising any stakeholder. Examples:
* creating a new market niche,
* infrastructure improvements
Top-down
Actions initiated by stakeholders with an interest in total system performance like
government regulators or financial institutions. Examples:
* deregulation,
* subsidies for network coverage,
* targeted control of complete portfolio value chains by universal owners (see
Chapter 5), etc.
Implementability is just as important a consideration as theoretical effectiveness when
comparing strategies. Strategic alternatives that are competitive or top down are more
straightforward to implement. As long as corporate strategic goals of a constituent
enterprise and the proposed symbiotic strategic alternative align, then the leadership of
that enterprise would be more easily be persuaded in implementing it than a strategic
alternative that might seem to compromise short term performance or accommodate
competitors. In the latter case, convincing demonstrations of the long-term advantage and
pilot test projects combined with strong leadership skills would be necessary.
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Having thus defined the necessary terms, we proceed in describing the range of strategic
alternatives and bundles that would be applicable in an effort to reduce the extent of the
cyclical behavior in the CA EoE and hence, the costs associated to it.
7.4 Br(e)aking the Cycle: Symbiotic Strategies as Potential
Remedies for Cyclicality
7.4.1 Existing research
Several researchers, based on their understanding of the causes of the CA EoE
cyclicality, made recommendations on ways to reduce the effects of the cycle in the CA
EoE.
Neidl (1999) asserts that the airline industry will remain cyclical. He believes that as the
structure of the industry changes, the causes of recession and therefore the necessary
remedies change. In Niedl's view the cyclical downturn in 1980s triggered by the
economic recession found the airlines threatened after deregulation: high levels of debt,
strong and contrarian labor unions, and competition from start-ups. The stronger players
added too much capacity subsequently. The milder but longer recession in the 1990s
found the industry with overcapacity. He argues that managerial experience along with
strong balance sheets, and greater fleet flexibility prepare the airlines better to weather the
cycle. Capacity expansion is less aggressive and costs are better controlled. The
flexibility trend could potentially continue towards "asset-less" or "virtual airlines" with
outsourcing of non-core functions and greater percentage of leased aircraft.
Gallagher (1999) discusses the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on aviation. The
generous infusion of capital through foreign direct investment to the rising markets
allowed Asian airlines to overextend and then equally fast to collapse as jittery investors
withdrew whatever funds they could and demand for air travel weakened as well. While
he does not offer a specific solution, he clearly points to transparency as means of
rationalizing capital market decisions.
The system dynamicists that studied commercial aviation, as presented in Section 8.3.8,
reached similar conclusions as to the causes of the boom/bust cycle and the proposed
ways to moderate it. They were essentially in agreement that the combination of delivery
lags, over-estimation of market size due to large number of market entrants and financial
support for these choices, and forecasting errors contributes to the cycle. This conclusion
is in accordance with the views of Niedl and Galagher cited previously and with the
supply chain literature of the bullwhip effect and the observations of cycles in severely
simpler systems like the beer game.
While there is general consensus about the causes of the cycle, there is no clear ranking
that shows which of the causes are dominant and which secondary. What combinations of
alleviating propositions are effective for countering the cycle industry-wide and what
efforts would be simply undermined as another cyclical dynamic becomes dominant? Is
the space of available strategic alternatives systematically covered? Are there synergies
among strategic alternatives and stakeholders that justify symbiotic collaborative
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strategies towards long term performance? What level of risk do the different
stakeholders carry and how does this affect their positions under different scenarios?
How is this level of risk affected by symbiosis? Is risk shared equally and if not what
kind of compensatory exchange would make sense? These are some of the questions that
we will focus on in the rest of the dissertation in devising workable strategic alternatives
for moderating the CA EoE boom bust cycle. We will then test them using a system
dynamics model developed for this purpose and discuss their implementation potential.
7.4.2 Complexity and synergies of available strategic alternatives
Based on the indications from the discussion above, the desired strategic alternatives
could focus on:
* Reduce the delays in the system. Aircraft delivery lead times depend on
production times and backlog accumulation
* Rationalize capacity ordering
* Add flexible capacity
* Improve forecasting
Of course there is a possibility that external influences may even out and in that case the
CA EoE would not need to be restructured to avoid deep cyclical recessions but that is an
unlikely proposition.
In either case, for achieving the above effects there are numerous avenues to explore. For
example, a more rational aircraft ordering pattern can be a result of any of the following
three strategic alternatives:
* Consolidation in the airline industry
* Transformation of airlines to pure operators - asset-less entities that depend on
leasing firms for their capacity. Implicitly this action consolidates the decision-
makers for aircraft ordering to fewer players (the leasing firms) that can better
control risk.
* Establish strong market signals from the manufacturers to guide the market
towards more optimal buying behaviors.
The first strategic alternative can be a natural outcome in a commoditizing industry but
for the highly regulated airline environment, it would require the approval of government
stakeholders as it may violate anti-trust regulations and, for international markets,
intergovernmental agreements. Consolidated enterprises can start facing internal
challenges stemming from the inability to integrate different cultures, fleets, and
executive personalities (common features of airline mergers as described by (Petzinger
1995) ) and even when successful they may end up being complacent in a comfortable
oligopoly and allow unit cost inflation.
The second strategic alternative in the list would require a coordinated transition that
would provide real competitive advantage to the firms implementing it vs. those that do
not. In order to occur successfully, airlines would need to trust the upstream echelons of
the value chain to supply them with the right amount of aircraft capacity at the right time
and at the right price. The risk of owning the aircraft will be held by different entities
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(either manufacturers or lessors) that could presumably pool it more efficiently but would
not ask exorbitant premiums for doing so.
Similarly, for the third strategic alternative to be viable, a single manufacturer would
need to see some guarantee for taking such action that could be costly in market share
and potentially reduce the hard to gain learning economies.
The discussion above illustrates that the design and implementation of strategic
alternatives in the CA EoE is complex on both the institutional and operational fronts. In
the last part of this chapter we chart a set of the plausible strategic alternatives segmented
by stakeholder. These will be used to construct the bundles of strategic alternatives that
are tested in Chapter 10.
7.4.3 Exploring the range of strategic alternatives
7.4.3.1 Airlines
We start by summarizing the strategic alternatives that airlines can take to ensure their
future growth and in response to competitive pressures as discussed in Chapter 3. Airlines
can change their competitive position primarily by affecting their pricing,
network/frequencies, and capacity. This involves the whole planning continuum from
operating to network to fleet decisions to alliances.
The specific areas where strategic action can be taken are:
* Pricing
* Operating Cost
* Network
* Fleet
* Organizational structure
* Alliances
* Mergers and acquisitions
* Marketing
* Distribution systems
Obviously, these actions have to be consistent with the business models of the airlines
involved. Some airlines will be more successful in implementing one business model
over another simply because of the capacity of their management and the effectiveness of
their overall strategies. In practice any changes to be successful need to be oriented
towards a specific objective. Airlines cannot haphazardly implement one strategic action
in one area and a contradictory one in another.
To further develop the available strategic alternatives for the airline players we will
separate them into market, capacity, and cost management categories.
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Market management
Once the decision to enter a specific O-D market with a given frequency is made, the
primary market management strategy is pricing. Pricing can range within a spectrum
from demand-based on one extreme which disregards costs and only considers market
share as driver for pricing schemes and cost-based on the other extreme which anchors
price to a predefined profit margin. Pricing strategies are usually hybrids and are also
highly dependent on the capacity and frequency strategies.
Demand-based pricing focuses on fully utilizing the offered capacity and can lead to
price wars between airlines at industry downturns. Cash-strapped airlines have the
incentive to use their full active capacity and reduce prices to gain cash and the yield
management systems can facilitate this choice. Cost-based pricing offers an advantage to
low-cost carriers for expanding their market shares.
Other market management strategies include entering new geographic markets,
offering new products, and entering an alliance or merging with competitors.
Capacity management
Capacity can be adjusted by strategies that affect:
* Aircraft orders on the longer term,
* Aircraft retirements,
* Secondary market acquisitions or sales,
* Leasing,
* Mothballing/parking, and
* Level aircraft of utilization (this is dependent on fleet scheduling as it is a
function of the hours per day an aircraft flies and its average speed).
Available capacity impacts service levels by changing the frequency and load factors
offered by an airline. Assuming rational yield management practices, capacity is very
closely correlated to market share.
In the peak of the cycle, available spare capacity is usually scarce and order backlogs
make delivery lead times reach beyond five years. If orders have not been placed in time,
losing market share is a possible outcome.
Strategic decisions involve the rates of orders (e.g. procyclical vs. countercyclical or
steady ordering), the rates of retirements (e.g. age to sell aircraft), the available flexibility
in capacity (percent of short-term leases, reductions in utilization, and mothballing,
second-hand market involvement).
Cost management
Strategic alternatives in this category impact the cost structure of the airlines and can be
very diverse. In devising cost management strategies we separate costs into fixed and
variable. Airlines that can reduce the ratio of fixed to variable costs have the flexibility to
adjust their capacity without considering significant sunk costs. For example, short-term
leasing and fly-by-the-hour agreements make the capital investment into aircraft a
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variable rather than a fixed cost and reduce the incentive to utilize "underutilized" capital.
The same is true for employee compensation when based on profit-sharing agreements,
outsourcing airport services like baggage handling, or promoting sales over the internet
as opposed to dedicated sales personnel. In changing variable costs, the decisions may
range from using more fuel efficient aircraft, to reducing and homogenizing in-flight
services.
Table 7-2 summarizes the strategic alternatives available to airlines.
Table 7-2 Possible Strategic Alternatives for Airlines
Extensive use of leasing / Reduction of fixed costs Competitive advantage through Competitive
fractional ownership? allows greater flexibility in differentiation of aircraft is reduced
capacity utilization if not lost entirely.
Capacity time arbitrage (buy Evens out the aircraft order Competitive
low, sell high). Airlines with swings and allows for exit of
healthier balance-sheets can aircraft from unprofitable
take advantage of markets by maintaining
downcycles to obtain cheap secondary market prices.
capacity (and have the option
to sell it or utilize it in the
upcycle).
Moderated capacity ordering Constrains capacity and The practicing airline may be short Cooperative
offsets the effect of supply on capacity during a market
chain discounting upswing.
Retirement patterns for Old amortized aircraft can Requires the maintenance of older Competitive
capacity management be retired or parked without inefficient aircraft in the fleet
penalty of ownership costs.
Less aggressive revenue Pricing seats considering It could mean market share loss if Competitive I
management that marginal costs are not the airline implementing it has Cooperative
zero can ease price wars. higher unit costs or competitor
airlines do not follow
Consolidation through -Consolidating capacity will If unregulated, monopolistic Cooperative
alliances or mergers increase market power and inefficiencies may arise.
reduce excessive capacity.
-Profit-based rather than
market-share based
planning
Improved forecasting
Increasing the flexibility of Reduces the pressure of Requires industry consolidation (if
capacity utilization (by- filling up airliners for during lead by airlines). It is a fairly
product of consolidation) demand recession. inefficient utilization of aircraft
resources.
Mono sourcing vs. dual- Strong relationship with Potential loss of bargaining power
sourcing for aircraft aircraft manufacturer and
potential to strengthen final
demand information
transparency
Profit-sharing programs and Transforming some mid- Premium paid for the added
outsourcing of non-core term fixed costs to variable flexibility
services costs
* Advantages and disadvantages refer to the actor and the effect on stabilization.
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7.4.3.2 Airframe Manufacturers
Similarly, airframe manufacturers have control over their (i) market access based on the
product families they introduce, (ii) capacity production rates and by implication the
manufacturing facilities and labor necessary to achieve those rates, and (iii) the ability to
manage their demand based on pricing, delivery lead times, and relative operating costs.
We saw in Ch. 4, that for aircraft manufacturers the ability to spread the very big initial
R&D investment over large production runs allows them to have better margins per
aircraft sold but this is separate from the ability to substantially reduce actual production
costs.
Based on this, we can categorize the strategic alternatives available to airframe
manufacturers into the following:
* Production capacity policies (including production rate adjustments)
* Production cost policies (primarily lean production although costs are also
impacted by production rate changes)
* Aircraft pricing and promotion policies
* Aircraft characteristics adjustments (including aircraft performance, commonality,
and standardization)
* Business model transformation:
o Focusing on service provision
o Pursuing vertical integration or alliances
Specific strategic alternatives with a brief view of the pros and cons that expand on these
categories are shown in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3 Possible Strategic Alternatives for Aircraft Manufacturers
Pro-cyclical pricing (pricing Maintain steadier order Excess orders during downturns to Competitive
floating on demand) backlog during downturns. take advantage of the cycle.
Competitive.
Stable pricing. Strong signaling prevents In theory competitor can undercut Cooperative I
airframe price wars. slightly to increase market share Competitive
Avoids speculative ordering. but aircraft attributes sway
decisions.
Value-based pricing of aircraft Makes the cost of risk- Payment if buyer is in danger of Competitive
options sharing explicit in the bankruptcy may be unforthcoming.
Order cancellation penalties. manufacturer/airline Requires collaborative agreements
relationship. and transparency to avoid capacity
Airlines "own" their inflation that precipitates a
decisions. downturn for airlines.
Family option delays
specification of size later in
time.
Long-term contracts. Spreading capacity more Increase chances of cancellations.
evenly over time.
Prioritize supply by auctioning "Market" value placed to If one competitor does not Competitive
delivery dates. delivery can be established. implement then the other may lose
orders.
Increases cost of aircraft.
Facilitate quick post-
manufacture customization.
Transformation from aircraft
manufacturer to service
provider:
Fly-by-the-hour aircraft
services.
Establish closer ties with key
customers.
Extensive, risk-sharing supply
chain partnership
Order vetting. Refuse
unrealistic orders.
Introduce paradigm shifting
technologies in sync with the
reinvestment cycle.
Constrain production rate
fluctuations.
Allow backlogs to build before
production rate change is
required.
Reduce capacity delivery lead
times (just-in-time (JIT)
delivery)
Reduce production and
development costs by
operations and lean
improvement.
Strategic aircraft introduction
timing. Introduce paradigm
shifting aircraft before airlines
express interest but timed
with the expected
reinvestment peak.
E.g. low-cost, lower-speed,
high-efficiency aircraft (the
Prius of the skies)
markets.
Enables fly-by-hour
services.
Increases resale value of
aircraft.
Reduction of fixed costs to
airlines.
Gain customer loyalty and
influence over them.
Avoids a shift in the
reinvestment cycle which
makes current fleets
obsolete.
Stabilizes total capacity
inflow rate to the system if
adhered to by both
manufacturers.
Reduces the costs related to
production rate fluctuations
(hire/fire cycle, reverse
learning curve progress,
loss of trust for
supplier/employee relations)
Tighter deliveries usually
reduce the bullwhip effect as
capacity enters the market
more or less on demand.
Better profit margins.
Lower cost of aircraft.
Creates an answer and a
market for the need to
adjust to a carbon limited
world.
Gaining market share.
potentially reduces demand for
new builds.
Requires contract provisions to
ensure minimum utilization.
Competitor gain in market
opportunities.
Reduces the potential revenues
from increasing a disruptive
technology early.
Competitor may act first.
Competitors can capture greater
market share in the upcycle or gain
economic advantage in the
downcycle.
Potentially postpones the learning
curve benefits for new aircraft
families.
Has not been achieved before for
similarly large complex artifacts.
May exacerbate overcapacity by
making aircraft cheaper to own.
Risky proposition due to R&D
costs.
* Advantages and disadvantages refer to the actor and the effect on stabilization.
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Competitive I
Cooperative
Cooperative
Cooperative
Cooperative
Competitive
Competitive
Competitive
Competitive
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7.4.3.3 Leasing Firms
The leasing firms already partially perform some of the strategic alternatives proposed for
manufacturers (i.e. offering flexible capacity) but at a limited basis as the usual lease
terms extend about half the average period of a cycle. The current relationship between
the manufacturers and leasing firms is considered symbiotic (Galagher 1999) but that
may change if airframe manufacturers decide to take a more active role as lessors/ service
providers. As we saw in Ch. 3, leasing firms have gained market share after the 1990s
and their size became significant in the overall market for aircraft capacity after the latest
trough. As a result, their reactions and potential effect on stabilizing the next down cycle
is speculative. For this reason, we test the relevant strategies in Chapter 10 and discuss
how they would be performed if either a manufacturer or a leasing firm took the lead in
implementing them.
7.4.3.4 Capital Markets
As we saw in Chapter 5, the capital markets as a constituent of the CA EoE are quite
fragmented. While their power is concentrating in larger agglomerations like pension
funds and hedge funds, the incentives to their managers are skewed towards short-term
return sometimes perversely so (e.g. pension funds should be expected to have a long-
term stable return). For these reasons, the only potential of the capital markets playing an
active role is by becoming universal owners in a specific value chain with large
percentages of shares outstanding in their portfolio from these firms. That position could
theoretically give them a position to benefit from EoE-wide returns that could allow for
underperformance or losses in a specific echelon of the chain if that would optimize the
whole chain performance. While the possibility of such entities developing is real, their
appearance is not imminent. We will however consider these stakeholders' value
functions as representative of the capital markets in Chapter 10.
7.4.3.5 Government
Finally, governments as constituents play very important roles in the CA EoE. They can
regulate their domestic markets and collaborate in regulating the international markets.
As governments have direct or indirect vested interests in their national (and flag) carriers
and their domestic aircraft manufacturers, they have a competitive international outlook.
At the same time, low cost, extensive network access, and reliable air transportation
service to their citizens and businesses is vital to their economic development prospects
and their political prospects. The political inertia along with the large scale impacts create
often conflicting dynamics that make radical change on the government level a difficult
proposition to implement.
Table 7-4 summarizes the leverage areas available to governments for potentially
affecting the cyclical structure of the CA EoE.
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Table 7-4 Potential Strategic Alternatives for Government Policy
Strategy Advantages* Isfovantages Type
Incentive-based subsidies Subsidies can be useful for If excessive, firms at competitive Cooperative
retaining capacity during disadvantage will continue to
extreme events if operate furthering the capacity
accompanied by crises.
performance-based
incentives.
Antitrust regulation Reducing the number of Loss of consumer surplus Competitive
reconsideration players can allow for more
rational decision making
Full deregulation Reducing barriers to exit Exacerbation of cyclical behavior Competitive
thus allowing more adaptive by increasing the number of
capacity entrants.
Capacity is retained in the system
through second hand markets
counter to expectations
Re-regulation Returning to government Loss of consumer surplus.
sanctioned monopolies
would reduce competitive
pressures and innovation.
Service levels would
probably increase.
Matching demand increases Avoids one cause of the
with airport and ATC capacity network-related delays
faced by airlines and
reduces flight risks. Effect
on cyclicality is uncertain
Reducing perceived volatility Increasing but stabilizing the Increases cost of air travel across
of fuel prices through carbon price of fuel volatility would the board.
caps and taxes force the airlines to account
for a given level of costs and
adjust accordingly. Reduces
uncertainty
Macroeconomic stability Renders most other Still in the realm of economic
strategic alternatives wishful thinking
obsolete
7.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented our basic hypotheses for the causes of the cycle in the form
of a narrative which we then distilled into a list that summarized them explicitly. Our
hypotheses about the cycle are slightly richer than those described by Stopford in the
quote at the beginning of the chapter, but they boil down to the same approximately
categories:
* Macroeconomic cycle (plus other exogenous shocks)
* Competitive behavior or airlines and aircraft manufacturers, and
* Capacity management
These hypotheses provided the backbone concepts on which a system dynamics model of
the CA EoE was built in order to measure their relative importance as discussed in
Chapters 9 and 10.
203
Subsequent to these hypotheses with regard to the cycle, we developed strategic
alternatives aimed at addressing those causal connections shaped on the potential action
space of each constituent enterprise in the CA EoE. A second, and more important,
function of the system dynamics model was to test their relative effectiveness. As the
strategic alternatives discussed here may have synergies if implemented as bundles - in
parallel or sequentially - and improve on their individual performance, we also
considered bundles of strategic alternatives when testing them quantitatively.
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Chapter 8 Models of the enterprise of enterprises: quantitative
and qualitative tools for understanding and architecting large
collaborative systems
"All models are wrong, some are useful"
(Box 1979)
"All models are wrong, that is why they are useful"
(Hines 2005)
"[We need to develop] mathematics which is suitable to social systems, which the sort of
18th-century mathematics that we use is not."
(Boulding 1991)
"My confident prediction (made without a computer) is that progress in computer
hardware will produce a much greater improvement in weather prediction than in the
prediction of economic fluctuations."
(Simon 1982) (pg. 105)
In Chapter 5 we consolidated our knowledge of the commercial aviation system using the
EoE framework in order to identify the salient characteristics of this system, the value
functions of its constituent enterprises, and the leverage points they have in affecting the
system. In Chapters 2-4 we saw that the CA EoE exhibits a strongly cyclical behavior
which is enabled and amplified by the specific dynamics and interactions of the industry.
Even after simplifying and standardizing, the different types, number, time-dependence,
and dynamism of these interactions make it difficult to predict the patterns of behavior
that would emerge when this system becomes exposed to novel (as opposed to historic)
actions and inputs. For this reason, we needed to develop a model of the system on which
to test our hypotheses.
While models for "technical/mechanical" systems (see Chapter 5) have been well
established and proven, the techniques for developing models for enterprises with
acceptable predictive power are more limited and still nascent. In this chapter, Section 8.2
reviews the available methodologies and characteristic applications after a brief
introduction to models and their desirable characteristics in Section 8.1. Section 8.3
discusses the models and applications relevant to commercial aviation that have already
been developed in the literature and sketches what additional characteristics would be
required for our purposes.
8.1 Models as executable representations and characteristics of a
good model
Any attempt to intentionally transform a complex system, on which direct
experimentation is prohibitive or impossible, requires some sort of model that provides
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the change agent with means to represent the system at its current state and a projection
of future states with and without the intervention. Implicit in this use of the word model
is that models are executable. That is the model accepts certain inputs and provides
results based on them that are used to evaluate a policy.
By far the most common models that adhere to this definition are "mental models"; the
understanding of how a given system works based on human experience or as (Senge
1994) (pg. 6) defines as "internal pictures of the world". For more complex systems the
average mind's carrying capacity cannot retain the number of interacting parts in a
phenomenon that is known as "bounded rationality" ( (Simon 1982), (Sterman 2000), pg
26). The number of variables and time iterations a human mind can compute consistently
ranges from three to eight ((Geus 1988), (Lyons, Adjali et al. 2003)). Therefore the use
of "cognitive artifacts" (Clemens 2004) supplement mind's cognitive capacity. The most
widely used cognitive artifacts are representational models like text, descriptive speech,
diagrams, graphs and images. These artifacts require a mental model in order to be used -
executed -and hence their output is subjective. On the other hand, there are functional
models based on algorithms and equations like mathematical models and simulations that
that can be executed and provide consistent outputs for a given set of inputs independent
of the user. The interpretation of results from these models can still be subjective when
filtered through the mental models of the model users.
Clemens (2004) provides a useful visualization of models and their desirable
characteristics in Table 8-1.
All models as they are constructed need to somehow establish that they fit the purpose for
which they were generated. For most formal models this process has three phases (Law
and Kelton 2000) (pp 264-267):
* Validation: determining whether the model is an accurate representation of the
system for the specific goals of the study.
* Verification: assuring that the model's actual implementation is error-free (this
can be trivial for some mathematical models but it certainly is non-trivial for
complex simulations).
* Accreditation: gaining buy-in (credibility) from the ultimate users of the model's
output.
Forrester (1961) (pg. 122) and Sterman (2004) (pg. 890)85 caution that validation and
verification do not mean that the model is objectively true. At best they mean that the
model fits the purpose for which it was built and can gain buy-in from the users but at
worse "claims that models are 'valid' [I are usually part of a rhetorical strategy the
modeler[s] us[e] to legitimate [their] analysis, get their policies adopted, or gain other
advantage." As a result, system dynamics practitioners do not consider validation as a
step function that moves between two states, valid and invalid, but rather as an iterative
process that slowly builds confidence in the model.
85 The same point on validation is made by Forrester (1961) p.. 122.
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Table 8-1 Desirable characteristics of a model (Source: Clemens (2004) modified)
•L. C..A ...
At I I
* Salient (1): Represent things most relevant to the task at hand.
* Accurate (2): Avoid errors and biases.
* Complete yet Parsimonious (2): As simple as possible, but no simpler.
* Perceptible (4): The high level view should be clear.
* Predictive (8): Provide insight about future behavior of the system.
* Falsifiable (9): Experimentation should allow confirmation (or disconfirmation) of the
model's accuracy and predictive power.
* Emotive and inspiring (7): Models are not value neutral and so ideally they should
convey that information. Model users are inspired and assured by design elegance.
Memorable (5): The basic ideas should be conveyed easily and be accessible for future
reference.
* Flexible (3,9): The ability to be developed iteratively is necessary as the user's
knowledge expands.
* Consistent (3): When multiple models are developed, they should be consistent in
context and output.
* Productive (10): Help the user define goals and the actions necessary to reach them.
* Useful (1-10): The most complete and accurate model is not necessarily the most useful
as that depends on the task and the resources required to generate the necessary level
of fidelity.
In the final analysis, all models are wrong as the well known quote in the beginning states
but the reason some are useful is precisely because they are wrong; they take a complex
situation and simplify for our understanding. The art of model making is in striking the
correct balance between the assumptions and the level of abstraction that reduces the
resources needed to build the model while still achieving the purpose of its use. In the
next section we review different modeling methods that have been used to model
complex systems with technical and social components akin to an enterprise of
enterprises.
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8.2 Models for Enterprises
Enterprises are a quintessential example of a system that cannot be experimented with
(aside from "natural experiments") or scaled due to the emergent properties they exhibit.
Understanding the behavior of enterprises structured of enterprises and how they operate
in their environment has been done using methodologies that fall under the following
categories:
Enterprise level:
* Qualitative empirical narratives: using interviews and insider access, researchers
probe the agents in the enterprise to learn about their decision-making processes
and how the different pieces of the organization interact. Although in business
management literature this type of work can be found as simply a narrative, it is
usually accompanied by a theoretical framework.
* Theoretical frameworks: The theoretical frameworks generalize how the firm
operates. Strategic frameworks, for example Porter's five forces (Porter 1985) aim
to identify how firms compete in their environment. Other frameworks like
Christensen's innovator's dilemma (Christensen 1997) or Utterback's dynamics
of innovation (Utterback 1994) provide a broader view of the way an industry
evolves over time. Other theories of the firm use different organizational views
and psychology to describe why decision-makers faced with uncertainty and
incomplete information do not conform to the assumption of rational decision-
making with complete information. Firms in theory have the resources to make
rational decisions under uncertainty and incomplete information by using decision
analysis tools and having as an objective not optimizing but rather satisficing their
value functions. Simon (Simon 1991) cautions not to reify the organization but
rather consider that it is constituted of human beings that make decisions (and
learn) based on heuristics.
* Architecture representations: These models use standardized representation tools
for describing an enterprise. Fox and Gruninger (1998) review computational
enterprise architecture models. The DoDAF architecture framework is one of the
most comprehensive tools currently in use but it still lacks both in completeness
and methodology (Bartolomei 2007). Research at MIT is conducted to develop
more complete representations like the Enterprise Structure Matrix (ESM)
(Bartolomei 2007) and the enterprise views framework (ongoing research by D.
Nightingale, D. Rhodes and C. Glazner).
* Game-theoretic and economic models (industrial organization): Industrial
organization evaluates the strategic choices of enterprises based on game theory
and using economic assumptions (rational decision-making, perfect information
etc.) Econometric models can also be used to facilitate historic analysis and future
projections. Demand models can be used to analyze consumer choices (Ben-
Akiva and Lerman 1985). Real options methods can also be used to evaluate the
outcomes of enterprise strategies (McConnell 2007).
209
Simulation models: The most common simulation models for enterprises are
developed on the operations side and involve microsimulations that use discrete
event modeling to represent manufacturing and assembly procedures. On the
whole enterprise level, applications are scarcer and this is the area where the "new
type of mathematics" referred to by Boulding in one of the opening quotes of this
chapter is more relevant. Arguably this new mathematic language can simply be
the fusion of differential equations and a symbolic/diagrammatic language of
stocks, flows and causal loops that is known as system dynamics. The most
common simulation models of entire enterprises have been based on the branch of
system dynamics known as industrial dynamics ( (Forrester 1961), (Lyneis 1980),
(Sterman 2000) ). Ilgen and Hulin (2000) note that computational modeling has
moved a long way to be accepted as a "third scientific research discipline."
System dynamics models are continuous in time and aggregate. With increasing
computational resources, agent-based models have started to tackle these
problems seeking to simulate enterprises, presumably more realistically, at a
microscopic, i.e. as collection of agents that respond and interact with each other
(Lomi and Larsen 2001).
Besides enterprise-level models, far more prevalent are models of specific functions of
the enterprise which have been developed primarily under the field of Operations
Research. Such sub-enterprise models and decision-making tools include:
* Organization theory
* Mathematical optimization models (e.g. linear programming)
* Simulation models (e.g. discrete event simulation of production processes)
Models for Enterprise of Enterprises
The appropriateness of the model depends on the goal of the research. If that goal
requires EoE level interactions then an EoE level model would be desirable. No single
model could be complete in providing this understanding but rather a hierarchy of models
developed in an iterative fashion based on whether the modeler's needs were met.
A logical sequence would start from developing qualitative understanding through
primary research using interviews with representatives from key constituent enterprises.
If the industries are well researched already then secondary research in the literature
could provide the basis for building the researcher's mental models of the system's basic
behavior. Mapping this knowledge of the system on the EoE framework can generate a
rudimentary architecture that includes all the important constituents and the ways they
interact. Mental models assisted by the architectural representations should allow the
modeler to generate hypothesis about the causes of the undesirable behaviors that
triggered the study in the first place and the types of strategic alternatives that would be
appropriate to fix them.
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1. Define EoE Study Objectives:
Describe the desired future state of the EoE
2. Qualitatively Describe the EoE:
Identify:
* Primary constituent enterprises,
Interests and objectives of constituents (value functions),
* Interfaces between constituents
3.1. Define the Plausible Futures: 3.2. Define the Solution Space:
Create scenarios that represent Identify strategic alternatives towards
plausible outcomes the desired EoE state
4. Model the EoE:
Identify appropriate modeling method(s)
* Quantify the value functions of constituent enterprises,
* Quantify and model the interfaces between constituents,
Calibrate, validate and verify the resulting model
5. Experiment Using the EoE Model:
* Quantify strategic alternatives,
Design experiments that cover interactions between strategic alternatives,
* Run experiments across scenarios
* Compare and identify the promising strategic alternatives
Figure 8-1 EoE Modeling Framework
An EoE, unlike a corporation, is by definition non-hierarchical and the control structure
necessary to implement any strategy that involves multiple stakeholders may not be there.
Even if the strategies involve only a single constituent enterprise, its actions would have
repercussions across the system by triggering responses from the other constituents. The
modeler needs to identify the winners and losers under each strategic alternative. For
understanding the kind of responses to be expected and for devising the appropriate
6. Consider implementability of strategic alternatives:
* Design implementation strategy based on institutional/regulatory aspects of the EoE
* Game theory and compensation schemes for non-Pareto optimal strategic alternatives
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implementation strategies, a quantitative assessment of the stakes involved and how
individual constituents would be impacted along with their responses would be sought.
The quantification and dynamic responses of the EoE system can be modeled by using
mathematical formulas to approximate the value functions of each constituent enterprise
and their response spectra. Such a model could theoretically be analytical and solved at
key time points but in most cases would require a dynamic simulation environment to be
modeled effectively. In any case, a game theoretic framework that defines the responses
of one constituent against the actions of the others would need to be explicitly or
implicitly incorporated either for informing the simulation or for weeding out the
simulation runs that generate "infeasible" outcomes. Lyons, Adjali et al. (2003) showcase
how the supplementation of ABM by game theory could work.
Figure 8-1 shows graphically one approach for modeling EoEs based on the above
discussion. This dissertation was structured based on this framework.
A natural area for the development of enterprise of enterprises models is supply chain
integration. We reviewed a large part of this literature in Chapter 6 in conjunction with
the efforts to mitigate the bullwhip effect. Beamon (1998) also provides a wide overview
of the modeling approaches used in supply chain integration.
On the economic literature front, Pyka and Fagiolo (2005) concur and note the following
developments in economic thought towards increasingly more complex structures:
* Moving from atomistic competition to monopolistic and oligopolistic competition
(Scherer and Ross 1990).
* Recognizing the impact of innovation in generating positive feedback effects and
increasing returns to scale (Romer 1990).
* Introduction of micro-founded macroeconomic models as representations of
"dynamic decentralized economies" composed of agents that make autonomous
decisions. In order to solve these formulations analytically, strong assumptions
(e.g. interactions among agents are either non-existent or complete - all agents
with all agents, rationality, no information asymmetry) (Sargent 1987).
* Anderson, Arrow et al. (1988) view of the economy as a complex adaptive system
which could borrow from the study of physics tools for complex system
understanding. They broke economic phenomena and the relevant tools into:
"Cycles" as represented by dynamic behavior of non-linear deterministic systems,
"Webs": large numbers of agents that interact with the environment and evolve,
and "Patterns": theories based on homeostasis in non-homogeneous systems that
maintain and expand differences between agents.
* Evidence from cognitive psychology and experimental economics that the
common economic assumptions are not actually observed in practice (Kagel and
Roth 1995).
* Need of heterogeneous agents that interact with a network of other agents and
learn based on experience is key to accurate representations of economic systems.
(Kirman 1997)
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Radjicki (2004) argues that system dynamics combined with recent institutional
economics is better suited than (neo)classical economics for modeling socioeconomic
systems that are characterized by non-linear, dynamic, feedback and bounded rationality
which is not amenable to modeling with simple linear economic models based on rational
expectations. Whether he is right, is not proven yet although the economic literature cited
previously points to that direction. In any case, both approaches use different means but
work towards the same goals of understanding complex socioeconomic systems.
Labor in the "Real World" Vs. Labor in the Model
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Figure 8-2 Divergent behavior of structurally identical models due to non-linear dynamics (Source:
Radzicki (2004))
As far as their ability to forecast future behavior, Forrester (1961), Lyneis (1980),
Radzicki (2004) and others caution that system dynamics models even with their superior
handling of complexity can only be calibrated to be used as predictors for the very short
term. Long term future cannot be accurately forecasted even with very precise models.
Taking an insight by Forrester, he demonstrates this by comparing two runs of a single
model - one representing the "real world" and the other the perfectly specified model.
Although structurally the "real world" and the model are precisely the same, even a small
variation in the seed of input variables in the model generate diverging albeit comparable
behavior as shown in Fig. 8-2
The complexity of an EoE level system makes it a daunting challenge for modeling. The
right balance in aggregation (macroscopic view) and independent agency of the
constituents needs to be reached so that adequate modeling resources exist but the results
are both credible and useful.
In the next section we review the types of models that have been built around commercial
aviation interests as well as some characteristic examples from other industries. In
discussing their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses we gradually develop what the
86 Although this phenomenon may resemble the "butterfly effect" in chaos theory (sensitivity to initial
conditions), it differs from it in the sense that the generated behavior (characteristic attractor) is stable (i.e.
these models do not diverge into radically different ways but they rather present the similar overall
behavior (same variance, amplitude of oscillation and period) but with a phase shift).
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desirable characteristics of a model of the CA EoE should be and how these
characteristics could be adapted for use in CA EoE-level modeling. Thus by showing the
weaknesses of existing models when used on the CA EoE level we define the desirable
characteristics for the model that aimed to develop and which are summarized in Section
8.4.
8.3 Model Applications for Enterprises with Emphasis on
Commercial Aviation
Qualitative empirical representations of aspects of the CA EoE formed the backbone of
our understanding of this system and were used extensively in writing the background
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation. In this section we will focus selectively on
representative formal models that either relate to aspects of the CA EoE or illuminate
different modeling methodologies for enterprises.
8.3.1 System Dynamics in Enterprises: Non-aviation industry examples
One of the more prevalent quantitative modeling methodologies for enterprise
applications has been systems dynamics. With a long history that includes Forrester's
(Forrester 1961) seminal Industrial Dynamics, the number of applications is large. Three
recent applications are presented here that showcase the versatility of the methodology:
* Weil and Utterback (2005) present a basic theory of the dynamics of innovation
using a system dynamics model. The firm entry and exit, experimentation with
new technologies, and technology diffusion from early adopters to saturation,
among others are represented.
* Tang (2006) uses a system dynamics model of a corporation (ADI) as a surrogate
model to test decisions for firm value maximization.
* Finally, Dikos (2004) used a system dynamics model of the tanker shipping
market in combination with econometric models to study optimal shipping
investment decisions.
8.3.2 ABM and Game theory application for Telecommunications
Lyons et al. (2000) used an interactive business game with human subjects as participants
to identify potential strategic outcomes for telecoms. They suggest that the human agents
be substituted for by software agents that could "play" a much larger set of possible
configurations of strategies (the human game had only limited time to explore the number
of possible permutations) at the cost of richness in the strategies themselves. They
propose that the agents use evolutionary as opposed to 'classical' game theory in which
agents attempt to maximize their objective function with perfect information. A schema
of evolutionary game theory allows for mistakes and adaptation.
In their model, Lyons et al. used four agents that represented a market leader, a market
follower, a potential entrant and a regulator. Each had specified strategic alternatives
which could be chosen based on their "knowledge" of their environment, previous
outcomes, and their objectives. This ABM model exhibited a cyclical behavior if the
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memory of the agents was restricted but reached equilibrium if their memory was
extended.
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Figure 8-3 Cyclical and stable equilibrium behavior for an agent-based industry model with four
agents (Source: Lyons et al. 2000)
8.3.3 ABM and Enterprise Architecture
Lin et al. (1999) developed a formal architecture notation with the intention to be
transferable into an agent-based model. The primary components in their architecture
were:
* Business units: participant in an enterprise or at industry level an organization.
* Relation interaction: interactions across business units
* Physical facilities
* Processes: every enterprise activity
* Input/output as results of processes
* Information flows
* Decision/strategy
* Knowledge sources: the agents from which information emanates
* Performance measures
They then developed classes of agent types (e.g. inventory management agent, production
planning agent, manufacturing agent etc.) which they combined to represent parallel
supply chains and investigate different supply chain strategies like make-to-stock (aka
push) and make-to-order (aka pull). They found that in the modeled chain, combination
strategies of make-to-order policies for downstream echelons and make-to-stock or
assembly-to-order strategies for upstream suppliers were the most effective. In a similar
vein, Fox and Gruninger (1998) discuss a standardized representation of the enterprise -
an enterprise ontology.
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Pyka (2003) observes that ABM provide insight into evolutionary processes where the
structure of the system can change qualitatively rather than only quantitatively
(Tesfatsion 2001) and can be used as laboratories to test institutional arrangements.
According to Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) agents should exhibit:
* Autonomy: each agent operates without direct control from other agents,
* Social ability, agents interact either competitively or cooperatively
* Reactivity: agents perceive and respond to their environment
* Proactivity: agents forecast expected future and take appropriate actions to
achieve their goals.
* Adaptivity: Pyka (2003) adds to the list by observing that in order to achieve
more realistic behavior and avoid biasing the results of the simulation by the set
of rules that are chosen, rules should themselves be evolving ("endogenously
changing objects").
Building on the idea of enterprises as agents sharing specific rules, Swaminathan et al.
(1998) proposed an agent-based modeling framework as a way to standardize and
facilitate supply chain modeling. They constructed a "library" of supply chain modules
that could be customized to fit the requirements of specific applications.
Another line of research, reviewed extensively by Chang and Harrington (2005), is
interested in modeling enterprises as being constituted by agents rather than being agents.
8.3.4 Hybrid Agent-Based System Dynamic Models
System dynamics and agent-based modeling can in fact be complementary. Schieritz and
Grobler (2002) were among the first to discuss the merits of combining SD with ABM in
modeling supply chains. While Rahmandad and Sterman (2006) have shown that both
approaches can be used successfully in describing diffusion dynamics but that the SD
approach is more parsimonious and less exacting on computational power. Yet, a
combination of the two approaches to reinforce their relative strengths and avoid some
weaknesses remains a promising area of research
8.3.5 SD and ABM models for the Air Traffic Control System (ATC)
The air traffic control system is critical for airline operations but, as we discussed in
Chapter 5, we considered it only as a potential limitation to capacity expansion. The ATC
system is complex enough to be considered an enterprise of enterprises by itself albeit
less complex than the CA EoE. Its primary constituents include the traveling public,
airlines, FAA, FAA employees, the governments and their budgeting and cooperation,
etc.
We discuss the ATC system not only because it is part of the CA EoE but also to
compare the relative merits of system dynamics and agent-based modeling (ABM).
Galvin (2004) studied the ATC system and its potential for future expansion under the
different strategic alternatives like the adoption of free-flight GPS -based systems faced
by FAA using system dynamics as the methodology of choice. Niedringhaus (2004) on
the other hand used ABM to investigate the evolution of the airline industry and the US
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National Airspace System (NAS) for he same purposes (i.e. to evaluate the
responsiveness and capacity expansion options of the ATC).
Galvin's model used aggregate flights and assumptions on how they would perform
under different ATC schemes and focused rather on the revenue and manpower evolution
that FAA would face as the schemes were implemented.
The Niedringhaus model created instead a very elaborate representation of the actual
flights and origin-destination matrix for a preselected set of airports. Airlines that
operated the aircraft in the Niedringhaus model would take competitive actions like fare
raises, aircraft buying etc. The airline agents would in addition exhibit "personality" traits
in terms of their individual strategic preferences for market-share and on-time
performance which along with profits would create their objective function.
While the detail of the ABM model could seem pretty microscopic, this had a negative
effect on the realism of the scenarios actually run. These range from two airport, four
aircraft monopoly vs. duopoly scenarios to airports in the eastern U.S. and 1700 aircraft
flying for a single day.
Even if the ABM model is not completed, the comparison of the two models implies a
preoccupation with detail for ABM models out of which a bigger picture, it is hoped it,
will emerge. System dynamicists instead draw on a larger picture canvas focusing on the
more salient relationships and allowing only little role for agency in the model.
8.3.6 Econometric Models for Airlines: Game theory and Demand Modeling
in Airline network choice and Merger Outcomes
Competition in a hub-dominated environment has been analyzed by Hansen (1990) as an
n-player non-cooperative game with profit maximization as the objective function and
adjustment of frequency as the sole available strategy.
Adler in a series of papers (Adler and Berechman (2001), Adler and Smilowitz (2005))
improved this model to include aircraft size and network type in the formulation. They
used a combination of demand modeling (discrete choice models for passenger choice),
logit models (for establishing market share), linear programming, and game theory to
study optimal and expected behavior of airlines in developing their network. Optimal
hub-spoke network design was studied in Adler and Berechman (2001), and Adler
(2003). Airline decision variables were hub-choice, service frequency, aircraft size, and
fare but the model complexity prevented the analysis of a large number of competitors.
Adler and Smilowitz (2005) studied the effect of mergers on network choice in
international markets.
Alderighi et al. (2002) did not take the hub system as a given but instead considered three
strategic alternatives for airlines: point-to-point, hub-spoke, and multi-hub. They use a
combination of econometrics and game theory, similar to the methodology used by Adler,
to study a simpler market where consumer and airlines try to maximize their
corresponding welfare. They find that a stable equilibrium for large size markets is an
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asymmetric configuration where one competitor provides point-to-point service and the
other uses a hub-spoke network which they consider a representative of the current
competitive environment with legacy and low-cost carriers coexisting.
Armantier (2000) used game theory for a duopoly competition in a single hub and found
that complete cost information exchanges are beneficial to the airlines without impacting
consumer surplus. Like in the previous studies mentioned, some quite restrictive
assumptions were used including no fixed costs, no network effects, no potential entrants
which do not allow for full generalization of the results.
Bilotkach (2005) investigate the effects of consolidation through alliance on interline
passenger fares based on whether they are granted antitrust immunity (i.e. the ability to
coordinate fares - see also Chapter 3) or not. His model includes 4 airlines and therefore
has the ability to investigate a competition between two alliances (two and two) and finds
that alliances with antitrust immunity allows for fare decrease in spoke-hub-spoke traffic.
Bhadra (2005) used an econometric model to study the post-9/11 commercial aviation
environment in the US and observed a strong change in the network structure from hub-
spoke to point-to-point.
8.3.7 Game theory and Econometrics in the Competitive environment of
Industries with focus on Airframe Manufacturers
Moving on to the competition between airframe manufacturers, a series of models were
developed to address aspects of this system.
With regard to aircraft type choice, Bhadra (2003) represented the airlines' aircraft type
choice decision process based on route characteristics using an econometrics model.
Krugman (1987) describes the competition between Boeing and Airbus using a matrix
where the two Nash equilibria (both companies build a Super Jumbo or none builds one -
see Figure 8-3) are inefficient solutions. As a result both players need to emphasize their
commitment in building such an aircraft thus trying to make the opponent not to take up
the task.
Airbus recognized the monopoly of 747 yet industry feasibility studies indicated that the
market could not profitably sustain two super jumbo jets. When Airbus announced its
intent to build a plane larger than the 747, Boeing responded with an announcement of an
even bigger plane yet the specter of internal cannibalization, that is the reduction of sales
of the B747 because of the introduction of a newer and larger aircraft by Boeing, did not
make the threat credible - thus Esty and Ghemanwat (2002) use this as a showcase of a
strategic but failed preemption.
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Figure 8-4 A game theoretic view of the B-AB competition for an LCA in the 500+ seat category
(Note: Outcome values are illustrative, based on Krugman (1987))
Benkard (2004) created an empirical econometric model of aircraft pricing using data
from the Lockheed Tristar (see also Chapter 4). He observed that due to the prominent
learning curves and very high barriers to entry, aircraft prices can be well below static
marginal costs during the initial production phases as manufacturers try to penetrate the
market. He used a labor based cost function based on experience accumulation. On
modeling the demand side, he chose to represent aircraft purchases as rentals rather than
a static discrete choice. This approach was followed in SD models (see below and
Chapter 9) and can be justified by the very active used aircraft market.87
Benkard's model for aircraft choice is multinomial logit based on characteristics like
number of seats, engines, range etc. It is based on Ericson and Pakes (1995) dynamic
models of imperfect (oligopolist) competition that allows for heterogeneity across the
competing firms due to entry, exit, and differences in investments. These models are
computationally intensive to solve and constrained as to their assumptions and are usually
approached with Monte-Carlo simulations. Using this technique, Weintraub et al. (2005)
found that as industries increase in size the consolidation or fragmentation of the market
depends on the increases of the returns to investment.
In trying to validate his model, Benkard was only able to do qualitative comparisons due
to the lack of available historical data on aircraft costs. The model he used allowed for
three industry structures: single-product firms, multi-product social planner, multi-
product monopolist. The social planner structure resembles a cooperative multi-objective
optimizing enterprise of enterprises which in Benkard's experiments provides the highest
total surplus with the single-product firms being a close second. Based on these
observations, he recommends that aircraft industry policy should focus on ensuring that
the manufacturers maintain high enough current output per product rather than
production efficiencies.8  A completely competitive situation results in excess production,
87 He observed that 10-20% of the aircraft fleet is traded every year with more than 60% of aircraft older
than 10 years had more than one operator. Changes occur even seasonally on a global scale.
88 In an earlier investigation, Benkard (2000) used the Locheed Tristar data to establish the dynamics of
learning and forgetting in manufacturing and found that in contrast to traditional learning curve theory,
reductions in output actually push-up the marginal costs of production. To avoid this "depreciation of
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multiple products and diminished learning effects while a completely monopolist one
transfers much of the surplus to the manufacturers. Benkard also explores an alternative
policy to the "government-sanctioned monopoly" where firms are punished if they exceed
a certain percentage of market share which actually is found to have a negative effect on
consumer surplus.
Neven and Seabright (1995) reached a similar conclusion as they also found that a
monopolized industry due to the learning-curve effects may produce more total societal
surplus than a duopolistic one based on their multi-stage game theory application on the
aviation industry. They used a multi-stage game with three players representing Boeing,
Airbus and McDonnell Douglas that was intended to inform government industrial
policy. They find that in their model, competition and consumer surplus was not
enhanced with the entrance of Airbus as it commensurately reduced MDD's incentive to
compete. As a result they estimated that Airbus had a negative impact on total world
welfare but a positive one for European welfare. They posit that government-supported
entrance forces competitors to adjust in a way that they would not otherwise and they
provide as an example the update of the 737 in the face of the A320 entrance - they
speculate that Boeing might have opted for a completely new design if left unchallenged.
Neven and Seabright summarize aircraft development into six generic stages of two
market segments: narrow body and wide body aircraft. Trying to identify optimal
development strategies, they solve the problem backwards by considering entry and exit
decisions for each stage. In order for the system formulation to be tractable, they assume
that manufacturers make a fixed choice on production capacity when they make the
choice to produce an aircraft or not which remains for the 25 years of the production
duration. They also assume that aircraft pricing is not variable in order to gain market
share in the initial introduction or over time in any form of price discrimination or
defense industry spill-overs. They do not consider the possibility that competition force
process or technology innovation. Finally, they consider that the capability to overcome
the barriers to entry for each segment as given - a generous assumption as there are
economies of scope across segment and network effects on the side of the operators.
Given these limitations, their findings and methodology are still valuable but indicate a
need for more realistic dynamic modeling. System dynamics offers a way to do so in
aggregate terms as shown in the next section.
In a later study, Irwin and Pavcnik (2004) used econometrics and demand modeling to
calculate the impact of reduction in subsidies after the 1992 trade agreement and of the
effect that the entry of the A380 would have in the widebody aircraft market. They found
that prices of aircraft did increase coinciding with the withdrawal of subsidies and that
the A380 would reduce the market share of the B747 by 15% but have greater impact on
Airbus's own widebody sales89 .
experience" he recommended retention of labor even if temporary underutilized as knowledge
hemorrhaging and retraining are the probable causes of forgetting. See also Section 4.3.2.
89 Their expectations on the latter matter have been shown inaccurate. The A380 pretty much eliminated the
market for the older B747 and if it were not for the significant A380 production delays, there was no
indication that any new orders for the 747 would have been placed.
220
8.3.8 System Dynamics in the Airline Industry and Airframe Manufacturing
System dynamics has a long history of applications in corporate and policy planning.
Expectedly, the are a number of applications related to commercial aviation. In this
section we will review the most important of them along with representative examples of
SD applications in other industries.
Liehr et al. (2001)
Liehr et al. (2001) used a system dynamics model with the explicit purpose of analyzing
cycle-generating structures in the airline industry and identifying corresponding "cycle-
management" strategic alternatives. Sponsored by Lufthansa, their effort was focused on
what a single airline company should do to outperform the industry based on an
understanding and forecast of cycles.
The basic model used is shown in Figure 8-5 and
with two delays - a structure prone to oscillations.
consists of a negative feedback loop
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Figure 8-5 Abstract micro-structure of the airline market that can generate business cycles (Source:
Liehr et al. (2001))
Based on this basic structure, they developed a model with three modules: the airline and
aircraft industries combined, a microstructure of Lufthansa, and a competition module
that allocates demand to Lufthansa and the rest of the industry. They intentionally chose a
'parsimonious' model structure to "prime policymakers for debate" rather than a more
complex and accurate model that would have limited buy-in as it would be treated as a
black box by management.
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Using their model, they found that counter to prevailing managerial opinion, a large part
of the cycle is due to endogenous dynamics as opposed to external events. In this,
aviation is similar to other cyclical industries like paper, real estate, commodities and
shipbuilding. Based on their findings, they recommended:
* Creation of an organizationally independent business unit to manage capacity as a
prerequisite in any meaningful cycle management strategy.
* Strengthening of alliances as key in introducing wider capacity controls in the
industry. Network planning in the alliance and equalization across regions would
also add stability. Fleet flexibility based on leasing and retirement policies is
another way of managing capacity.
o The retirement policy would require a larger percentage (10-15%) of older
aircraft with low fixed costs to be retained in the fleet to allow easier
capacity management when needed and reduce the pressure on utilization.
o For this strategy to work, countercyclical ordering with higher than
desired orders during downcycles and less than desired orders during
upcycle would be needed. For the leasing strategy to be effective, requires
a similar ability from the part of leasing firms to even-out their orders over
time.
Lyneis (1999 and 2000)
A second example of application of SD in commercial aviation comes from Lyneis
(1999, and 2000). He advocates the use of SD models to support business strategy not
only as tool of great explanatory power as used by Liehr et al and described earlier by
Morecroft (1985) but also as an accurate forecasting tool. The reasons for this is that
forecasting in decision-making is inevitable and SD models can be better than most in
providing not only a numerical result but also an understanding of the dynamics to the
management and a platform to test strategies in a wide variety of scenarios.
In the consultancy role Lyneis (1999) aims to use SD models to:
* Provide effective understanding of the client's problem
* Educate the client for the dynamics of the system by active participation in the
creation of smaller "insight" models to avoid the "black box syndrome"
* Reaching out to others in the company not directly involved with the modeling
* Institute a learning and planning culture that can use the model over the long-term
He uses an example from the commercial aircraft industry to illustrate this with the client
being a large commercial jet aircraft manufacturer and the problem faced by the client is
the highly cyclical behavior of aircraft orders. The questions asked by the client were:
Is the current state (1987-1991) another peak?
* Is adding capacity necessary?
* When should we introduce a next generation aircraft?
* What is the effect on orders generated by:
o European market liberalization,
o growth in freight,
o future oil prices and economic condition?
* What causes cycles and to what extent are they due to external environment?
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Lyneis's basic model, as shown in Figure 8-6, features the same negative feedback loop
as Liehr et al.
Figure 8-6 Basic dynamics in the commercial aircraft industry (Source: Lyneis 2000)
Although intuitively useful, this model could not answer the specific questions posed by
the client and therefore additional detail was added in a structure shown in Figure 8-7 by
disaggregating demand by domestic and international, by region, and by adding modules
for leasing firms and manufacturers.
Using the more detailed model, Lyneis (2000) observed that the reasons for cycles
revolve around the inability of the individual airlines to perceive and act on the
information of the industry as a whole.
More specifically he attributes the cycles to the following:
* The significant delays in the major negative feedback loop amplify the variation
in economic conditions by preventing airlines in total to account for the aircraft
that are in backlog.
* This error is compounded by
o the use of extrapolation forecasting by airlines
o competition for market share in the upcycle create a situation where the
total expected market share by the airlines exceeds significantly the actual
market.
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* Secondary aircraft markets amplify the cycles by allowing capacity to stay in the
system when the new aircraft are delivered.
* Financial dynamics amplify the cycles by instigating investment in upcycle and
discouraging it during a downcycle.
*
TOWej
toberKM rIr
Figure 8-7 Additional detail for the SD commercial aircraft model (Source: Lyneis 2000)
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While Lyneis does specify recommendations based on the above observations (his aim is
to show the possibility and advantages of using SD models as forecasting tools), he
briefly mentions their recommendation to an aircraft part supplier not to cut their
production as much as they used to during the downcycle as they were provided with a
more detailed and accurate mid-range forecast.
Skinner et al. (1998)
Skinner et al. (Butler 1999 Chapter 3, pg. 27) present a third research project that used
SD to model the dynamics of the airline industry cycle with the objective of showing that
management of the cycle is possible. They postulate that an airline that can somehow
manage the cycle will have a better price-to-earnings ratio by increasing investor
confidence. As more carriers adapted their strategies the whole industry could change
limiting the losses during the downcycle.
The expert consensus at the time (a period of sustained profitability for most airlines in
the US) was that industry changed towards a better managed model in two ways:
* Management focus shifted from market share oriented to long term profitability
with a consequent restraint in capacity, and
* External capacity constraints due to longer backlogs and regulatory mandated
retirement of older, non-compliant aircraft.
In addition, they reference 9o two aspects of the industry that may smooth future cycles:
* Long term contracts with aircraft deliveries spread over time
* Reductions on lead times by the manufacturers
While they concede that changes have been made and restraint was arguably evidenced,
they argue that these changes may make the industry less reactive to short-term profits
and other fluctuations but it has not changed the fundamental way the industry operates:
i.e. with high fixed costs, barriers to exit, and long lead times all lead to cyclical industry
performance.
Using this model and different scenarios of demand growth, they correctly anticipated the
existence of a downcycle in the following years given the high number of orders in the
period 1995-1998. They focus on devising "cycle management strategies" for a single
firm through cycle anticipation, corresponding growth and competitive behavior, and
adding flexibility in areas like aircraft mix, options ordering, and labor. Among the
strategic alternatives they propose are:
* Wet leases
* Fleet age stratification
* Fractional ownership
* Profit-sharing programs
* Code-sharing and alliances to coordinate changes in capacity
They only test fleet management strategic alternatives using their model: retirement
adjuster (steady order influx, capacity is adjusted by retirements), order adjuster (steady
90 Boeing's 1998 Market Outlook.
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retirements, capacity is adjusted by orders), dual adjuster (capacity is adjusted by both the
orders and the retirements). Their effectiveness follows the order of presentation and
suggests that the dual adjuster leads to overreaction and that stable ordering with good
fleet stratification is the more efficient strategy.
Weil (1996)
The fourth SD application (first chronologically) on the airline industry is given in Weil
(1996) and its basic structure is shown in Figure 8-8 which is based on a general model of
market commoditization. The basic feedback loops are similar to those in the Liehr et al.
and Lyneis models.
Figure 8-8 Commoditization model of the airline industry (Source: Weil 1996)
Weil concurs that the boom-bust cycles in the commercial aircraft industry are driven by
the structure of the industry rather than external factors. With this model Weil aimed to
respond to the following questions:
* What factors caused the peak of aircraft orders in 1988-1990 and the resulting
excess capacity?
* Why did airline profits collapse?
* What was the role of market liberalization in this?
* Is the damage permanent, to what extent, and what are the mid-term recovery
prospects?
Based on the generic industry model, Weil attributed the excess capacity to the following
set of causes:
226
* Over-estimation of demand growth
* Amplification of planning and forecast errors
* Large and increasing number of players
* Lack of adequate financial constrains
* Market liberalization
The above causes do not act independently but in concery. Firstly, as the market matures,
the price elasticity of the market increases as it expands and attracts more price-sensitive
consumers. As the number of airlines increase - an aftereffect of deregulation - the
potential for making errors are increased. This phenomenon extends to the leasing firms
that also exhibit aggressive market share targets. Another aspect of new entrants is their
relative reduced sensitivity to losses as these are 'expected' until they are established thus
resulting in the projected demand overshoot. The combined effect of the excess orders
from new entrants and legacy carriers is delayed because of the amplified delays in
aircraft delivery. In 'rational' markets these problems would generate an aversion in
investment to new entrants but this can be delayed or entirely absent when financial
markets are in search for investment opportunities. This along with subsidization can
delay exit of firms and the "normal industrial ecology" of consolidation and shake-out
becomes less effective and creates an asymmetry of capacity creation versus destruction.
As a result of the above observations, Weil rightly predicted that the cycles "will grow
increasingly severe and irregular" as commoditization spreads to other regional markets
and that the long-term in the airline margins will be declining.
8.4 Choosing a methodology: combining strengths
8.4.1 Enterprise Modeling Alternative Comparisons
Having reviewed application of enterprise models in this and previous chapters, we
summarize in this section their primary strengths and weaknesses.
Qualitative Empirical Narratives
Strengths:
Easy to understand, detailed, can be an interesting read.
Weaknesses:
No pattern necessarily emerges from the narration.
Difficult to support normative predictions from past behavior.
Causality is not rigorously demonstrated.
While the human mind comprehends the details of each narrative moment, piecing them together is
not easy especially when delays and complex causal loops exist; usually the narrators identify what
they consider primary interaction.
Uses:
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Theoretical Frameworks
Strengths:
Provides a structured way of perceiving commonalities across systems with seemingly disparate
characteristics.
Weaknesses:
In pursuit of generality, it may end being simplistic.
Needs more complex models to validate hypothesis.
Uses:
-> Identifying patterns.
-> Constructing easier to internalize yet useful mental models.
Econometric Models
- Excellent as input feed for specific non-critical functions of more complex models.
Game theory
Strengths:
Strategic tool. Simple to understand in its basic format.
Weaknesses:
Outcome valuation is arbitrary. Model structure is fairly abstract "simplifying away" potentially
important parameters (e.g. the customers).
Uses:
-> Decision-making tool when outcomes are evaluated and backed-up by other models.
System Dynamics Modeling
Strengths:
Explanatory power. Reflects to and refines mental models. Can be used both qualitatively (causal
loop diagrams) and quantitatively. Inputs can simulate different scenarios. Emergence exists by
shifting dominance across causal loops.
Weaknesses:
Rigidity of structure. Any room for system change or emergent needs to be hardwired in advance.
Views system in aggregate so the impacts of individual behavior cannot be outlined easily.
Uses:
- Overview of complete enterprises or enterprise of enterprises.
-- familiarizing non-experts with the system,
-> extracting input data,
-- identifying plausible hypotheses for cause and effect relationships, and
- identifying major stakeholders I possible scenarios for modeling.
Strengths:
Rigorous methodology.
Relatively quick to implement when the data are collected.
Data rich.
Weaknesses:
Needs significant amount of data for estimation and validation.
Little explanatory value.
Prone to bias intentional or unintentional.
Uses:
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Agent-based Modeling
The qualitative/empirical narratives method is very valuable in the initial
understanding of the system and for collecting nuanced information out of disparate data
sources. Having the information in this format, though, does not help in evaluating
specific normative hypothesis regarding the system. In the best case, a mental model is
built in the minds of the readers/analysts using this method but, if the model entails more
than two or three causal/feedback loops, any attempts to follow it for more than one or
two time steps would probably tax the reasoning capabilities of an average person.
Theoretical frameworks are based on simpler notions or comparisons that intend to
identify common pattern rooted in the heart of different systems. Unlike the narratives,
they offer an organizational lens to the researcher who then needs to perform the
additional effort of finding whether the framework is actually conforming to the real
system. In our case, Piepenbrock (2005) (see also Chapter 5) created an attractive
framework that offers valuable insights which additional quantitative models can
implement in quantitative fashion.
Statistical parametric (econometric) models are not ideal for our purpose because of
their limited explanatory power. Lyneis (1999) compared the ability of econometric
models to forecast the cyclicality in demand for aircraft to an SD model. He tested the
most promising econometric model91 across several proposed using retrodiction 92 with
the same inputs for the two methods and demonstrated how the ability to forecast breaks
down after a few cycles even for the best fit regression model as compared to the SD
model.
On the other hand, regressions are useful for modeling parts of the system which are not
of direct interest to the researcher or otherwise would entail too much additional
complexity in the modeling effort. Several researchers followed a hybrid use of statistical
models and SD like Liehr et al. (2000) and Dikos (2004). Another example of synergy
can be Bhadra's work discussed previously; his equations may be used in a more
complex model to derive whether a wide-body or narrow body better fits a certain O-D
91 Incidentally this model uses the GDP lagged 2 years and the change in fuel price as explanatory
variables.
92 Retrodiction is a modeling technique that uses a model to forecast past performance using limited
historical data.
Strengths:
Bottom-up creation of structure. Flexibility in allowing emergence. Individual agent behavior can be
monitored and how it impacts the system. Ability to run in non-continuous timeframe. Intuitive
appeal since socio-technical systems are influenced by discrete decisions (which SD aggregates in
a continuum).
Weaknesses:
Explanatory power not as strong as SD as it relies in emergent behavior based on agent schemata.
Uses:
-- Need to verify hypotheses on agent behavior. Of interest when individual behavior may affect
the system in emergent fashion.
Age t-based 
Modeling
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pair's characteristics. On the other hand, if the same result can be obtained by an
algorithmic process (i.e. by examining the relative costs/seat mile, expected load factors,
and type of destination airport) at low computational cost then this should be preferred
and the results cross-checked for validity to the parametric equations.
In effect the question of methodology for quantitatively modeling the commercial
aviation industry retaining explanatory power boils down to the two remaining
methodologies: SD and ABM. As we saw in Section 8.3.8, at least five research projects
adopted SD as the method of choice to study the cycle dynamics in commercial aviation.
This stated goal and the methodology used imply an unspoken assumption: the individual
agents participating in the system (airlines in the case of Liehr et al. and aircraft
manufacturers in the case of Lyneis) do not greatly influence the total system's behavior.
If this assumption does not hold then system dynamics, with its aggregate system view
may fail to recognize the importance of the change in behavior of an individual
stakeholder or class of stakeholders. Supporting this notion, Lean Enterprise thinking
submits that the environment can be changed by the actions of individual firms (Womack
and Jones 1996).
8.4.2 Matching Project and Method
Before we proceed to argue the case for our purposes, it would be useful to review the
characteristics of the SD and ABM modeling methodologies side by side in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Side-by-Side Comparison of system dynamics and agent-based modeling (Source: Scholl
(2001) modified)
Main Building Causal loops Agent entities
block
Unit of Analysis System structure Rules of agent behavior
Level of Aggregate system Individual agent behavior
Modeling behavior
System Pre-determined Evolvable
Structure
Time Handling Continuous Continuous or discrete
The main drawback that Schieritz and Grobler (1999) identify with SD when used to
model supply chains is the rigidity of the structure that requires the hardwiring of every
possible interaction. This becomes quite an undertaking if the number of possible
partners goes above 2 or 3 for each stage of the chain. As a result, they propose use of
ABM, where the agents' decision-making process ("schemata") is modeled to the
classical SD archetype. This way the agents are allowed to switch back and forth between
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suppliers based on their relative attractiveness; as the simulation progresses, a form of
stable extended-enterprise emerges depending on the simulation parameters.
The issue of choice between two or more suppliers is very important in our case where
the aircraft manufacturers offer similar, almost commoditized product lines and, as we
have seen in Section 2 and will discuss in more detail later, decisions are affected by
parameters that vary from spur-of-moment CEO decisions to heavy political influencing.
Another consideration from our perspective is not only how the system as a whole
performs but also how the individual stakeholders can affect it.
For example, airlines tend to have different characteristics with a more prominent one
being the division between low-cost carriers (LCC) and legacy carriers. While LCCs tend
to own a very homogeneous fleet, legacy carriers are operating many types of equipment.
The fleet choice then becomes an individual problem that is hard to represent in
aggregate with fidelity. Moreover, as Piepenbrock argues, the manufacturers have
different organizational structures and modes of behavior which are again hard to
replicate on an aggregate basis. Knowing whether the behavior of a few customers
(airlines) or suppliers (manufacturers) can influence the system (e.g. dampen the
cyclicality in the industry) is one of our stated objectives. For this reason we believe that
some combination of agent-based methodology with system dynamics decision making is
the more appropriate tool for our purposes.
From the system dynamics models presented in Section 9.3.8, it becomes apparent that
airlines although differentiated do not have an adequate market power to affect the
system. General transition trends e.g. increasing market shares of LCCs can be modeled
successfully in aggregate. Airframe manufacturers, on the other hand, are concentrated
and their decisions (agency) can significantly impact the system. This leads us towards a
structure where the airline industry is represented in aggregate while the manufacturing
part of the value chain is disaggregated into individual agents.
This does not mean that the other methodologies are less useful. On the contrary, as
explained above and outlined in Table 8-3, they can be used for their respective strengths
supporting, at different points, the model development.
To summarize, we expect that an ABM / SD hybrid model will provide the more useful
insights when viewing the commercial aviation industry from an enterprise perspective.
Eventually the model should help us in understanding:
i. the nature of the boom/bust cycle in the industry
ii. the impact of differentiated individual behavior of different agents both from the
airline and the manufacturer side
iii. the long term system evolution under different scenarios (although not intended for
predictive use)
231
Table 8-3 Different system modeling methods and ways to use them during development
-C4
4 - Project Use
Narrative- / Forming model structure.
based Forming agent rules.
Framework- -1 Testing hypotheses generated by the Piepenbrock
based framework.
Econometrics zI Using as inputs for certain functions (e.g. pricing
estimates)
Game Theory 1 '/ Forming agent schemata.
System 1 I Hybridize!
Dynamics Create dynamics structures
Agent-based I] Use agents to differentiate in the behavior of
primary actors.
Primary system modeling methodology.
8.5 Chapter 8 Summary
Chapter 8 provided a review of the available modeling methodologies that could be
utilized in developing appropriate and useful models in the context of Enterprise of
Enterprises. From a theoretical review of the ideal properties of an EoE-focused model,
we transitioned into reviewing specific examples of enterprise-related models but
centered our attention on the models that had been developed for the commercial aviation
enterprises.
In reviewing models for EoE, we found that there is no one single best modeling
approach for the objectives of an EoE. Instead, a combined approach that draws from
qualitative and quantitative research methods is advised. On the quantitative modeling
side, system dynamics had several advantages but for our purposes, a model that
combines agency attributes, that is it differentiates between the strategic choices of the
two manufacturers would be desirable. In the following chapter we outline the structure
of the proposed model that fits this description and discuss the validation and verification
process used to support it.
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Chapter 9 System Dynamics Model of the CA EoE
In Chapter 8, we saw that a number of researchers used system dynamics as the modeling
methodology of choice for several enterprise-level and industry-wide applications. For
commercial aviation specifically, a series of models using approximately similar
structures were developed to study aspects of this industry.
In this chapter, we describe the basic structure and development process of the model we
used for our investigation. Section 9.1 presents the basic model structure tying it back to
our modeling objectives and Section 9.2 describes the verification and calibration
procedure. The complete model is provided in html and executable formats at
http://lean.mit.edu/ in the Publications section.
9.1 CA EoE Model Presentation
9.1.1 Modeling objectives
As mentioned in Chapter 8, Forrester and Sterman underline the necessity of building a
model around certain goals and judging it by how effectively these goals are met.
Heeding their advice, this section presents the goals of the modeling effort in terms of the
questions that we seek to answer. In order to identify the desirable characteristics of our
model and the minimum necessary level of fidelity we will work backward from the
primary objective to secondary requirements.
Referring back to the three questions introduced in Chapter 1, our objective was to
answer the following:
Q1.How is cyclicality manifested in commercial aviation? What are the impacts from
cyclicality in commercial aviation?
Q2.What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the cyclical behavior in
commercial aviation?
Q3.What are implementable strategic alternatives for dampening that cyclicality and
what are their benefits?
Q1 introduces the need for comparative measures in order to assess the relative benefits
of strategic alternatives with regard to the effect of cycles to the various constituents of
the CA EoE.
In order to develop acceptable performance measures for the CA EoE constituents we use
the formulation first presented in Section 5.3 (see Table 5-3) and transcribe it
quantitatively as shown in Table 9-1.
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Table 9-1 CA EoE Constituent Value Functions
Value function
max ZQI,
min D, tF, (l + rp)',
t i
min ,Vt
ZQf
r =0P
max (FtDit - Ci ,tQ E  (1+ r)t'
CarVF = min(std(EVA))
min(t, EVA < 0)
maxf (P - CPj,)QP, -(1+ r )'
Mfg =,
min(std(QP,,))
Carriers
Airframe
Manuf.
Government
Capital
Markets
and
> qp,,Vdomestic j
Symbols
t: unit of time
i: carrier
j: airframe manufacturer
r: discount rate
Qi: Available Seat Kilometers (ASK)
Di: Realized demand in Revenue
Passenger Kilometer (RPK)
Fi: Yield (Revenue / RPK)
Ci: Unit cost (Expenses/ASK)
including cost of capital
Pi: Manufacturer revenue per aircraft
QPj: Aircraft delivered
CPj: Production costs per aircraft
including cost of capital
max (FDi -C,Q,) (1 + rm) + (Pj, - CPj,)QjP, (l+ rm)'t
CapVF = or
max ((FiD
, - C,Q,)+ (Pj - CPj)QPj i ,Vt
The value function formulations in Table 9-1, reflect the following intuitions:
* Passengers and shippers desire for the lowest fare prices but also higher levels of
service. We use load factors as a proxy for service for reasons explained in Ch. 2.
* Carriers are interested in the highest profitability levels possible but also in a
reduction in the volatility of returns and the time they are unprofitable. These
desires also cover the expectations of their employees with the assumptions stated
in Ch. 5 that the employees benefit from working in a stable and profitable
industry.
* Airframe manufacturers are also interested in the long-term profitability and their
employees in the reduction of the volatility of production rates.
PVFPassengers
> qt, V domestic
GovVF =
QP i
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* Capital markets (as a whole or assuming universal ownership) would be
interested in higher total return from the CA EoE in its entirety or in a more short
term perspective, to maximize return at any given time.
* Finally, governments would share the incentives of capital markets but also see
their domestic industries meet some output targets. Employment targets are
implicitly accounted for, as production and employment levels are closely
correlated in both the airline and the aircraft manufacturing industry
It should be noted that the value functions for the constituents and stakeholders are
independent of the modeling methodology chosen. They are given as an optimization
objective functions but they
In order to adequately respond to Q2, the several causal mechanisms we identified in Ch.
7 will need to be present in the simulation model that we develop. Having these
mechanisms in place means that the strategic alternatives designed to address them can
be tested against each other and for potential synergies.
Additionally, based on the generic characteristics of a good model listed in Section 8.1,
we would expect that our model is predictive and allows the spectrum of strategic
alternatives that will be considered to span from continuation of the status-quo to
alternatives that directly change the structure and hierarchy of the fundamental
relationships in the system. Furthermore the model should be complete and perceptible,
as the final recommendations would be intended for use by decision-makers in the private
and governmental constituent enterprises. Therefore, it is important to use intuitive causal
relationships that would be communicated with ease and understood by managers and
executives to assist their acceptance.
In short, the desired model should
(i) exhibit cyclical behavior,
(ii) adequately simulates the most important potential causal mechanisms that we
have identified in Chapter 7
(iii) allows for extensive experimentation with strategic alternatives that can
structurally change the system, and
(iv) \uses intuitive relationships and has explanatory power to facilitate
communication with the end users.
Having these mechanisms in place can help us identify quantitatively what the apparent
primary causes of the cycle are by deconstructing the relative contribution of each cause.
Further the model should identify promising strategies, and facilitate the communication
of results to decision-makers.
In theory an econometric model might be able to provide similar quality of information
assuming that the tight correlations, time-lags, and of the explanatory variables can be
sorted out successfully. However, an econometric model relies on observed data from the
existing environment and assumes that the prevailing relationships of the explanatory
variables persist into the future. It does not account for changing fundamental structures
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and does not exhibit the causal mechanisms of the behavior it depicts. As a result it fails
to meet characteristics (iii) and (iv) described above.
System dynamics instead provides a platform for analyzing the relative impact of causal
relationships with the additional benefits of (i) allowing the testing of structurally
different scenarios compared to the existing observations and (ii) providing a more
intuitive causal relationship in the form of causal loop diagrams that can be used for
communicating the fundamental model assumptions and gain stakeholder buy-in when
required (see also Mostashari 2005).
9.1.2 System Dynamics CA EoE Model
In order to meet the requirements for completeness and parsimony, we had to strike a
balance between what aspects of the EoE would be included in the model and how
accurately they were represented. In this section, we present the model boundaries and
general structure in Subsection 9.1.2.1 and the rest of the subsections are present specific
key subclasses of the model.
9.1.2.1 General Model Structure
Following the structure used by Weil (1996) and Lyneis (2000), our SD model, on a
general level, depicts the structure of the CA value chain with the core model constituted
by three basic classes:
* Demand generation
* Airline competitive environment
* Airframe supply competitive environment
In addition to this basic structure that functions endogenously for the most part,
exogenous influences like fuel prices, economic growth rates that are correlated to
demand growth rates, and government regulations are modeled. In the model we use real
prices instead of nominal ones so that no adjustments for inflations should be necessary
as the model is executed over a period of decades. In the rest of this section, we will
review specific parts of the model.
Figure 9-1, graphically presents the model boundaries using the representation of the CA
EoE from Ch. 5, while Figure 9-2 shows the model structure, and Figure 9-3 the primary
causal loops in a diagram using SD notation.
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In the subsections that follow, we present in greater detail each class, the interface
variables and exogenous parameters, and the basic dynamics present.
I I
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Figure 9-3 High-level causal loop diagram showing the major interactions of the CA EoE SD Model
9.1.2.2 Travel Demand Class
In the model, demand for air travel is considered to be global passenger demand. Air
travel via commercial airlines uses the following general types of aircraft: widebody
LCA, narrowbody LCA, and regional jets with approximately 100 seats or less. As we
saw in Chapters 3 and 4, the norm is that widebody aircraft are used for long-range O-D
markets and mid-range popular routes, narrowbodies for mid-range thin markets and
short-range dense ones, and regional jets for short-range thin feeder routes. This
distinction is in practice muddled with the development of long-range narrowbodies and
high capacity RJs. As a result, we chose to distinguish between narrowbody / RJ demand
and demand serviced primarily by widebody aircraft.
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Demand is expressed in revenue passenger kilometer (RPK). Demand is dependent on
GDP growth rate, average fare price in $/RPK93, and service quality which is in turn
dependent on aircraft load factors and average delays. The consideration of price
elasticity permits different types of responses to price changes to be modeled, a feature
that allows us to emulate differences in the mix of passenger types given that business
travelers are known on average to be more price-inelastic compared to leisure travelers
(Ch. 2). Finally, demand is affected by external factors; conditions that reduce demand in
ways not captured in their full effect by strictly economic factors like terrorist attacks,
armed conflicts, or pandemics.
Of course, airlines do provide freight services using the cargo space of their aircraft.
Freight revenues (along with other ancillary revenues described in Ch. 3) are part of total
airline revenues.
The parameters that influence demand are shown in Fig. 9-4 using SD notation for
labeling the interactions. For example, as discussed above, demand levels are negatively
impacted by an increase in fare price or service quality and this is what the negative sign
indicates next to the arrow. In these level diagrams we do not show the broader feedback
loops that actually define model behavior but only the direct lower level causal
relationships. In other words, the level of demand itself affects the level of fare price and
the load factors and the delays encountered but we will discuss these higher order
interactions as we progressively build the complete model.
Load Factars
ays
taite
xtemal Factors
Figure 9-4 Structure of Demand Class
93 For calibration, we used the total airline revenues divided by the total passenger miles to generate the
fare price in $/RPK. This means that we consider that passengers pay higher ticket prices that include
freight and other ancillary revenues. By doing so, we avoid constructing an additional demand function for
freight which in practice is tightly correlated to passenger demand while maintaining the correct level of
total airline revenues. This design decision was justified because (i) passenger aircraft capacity and freight
aircraft capacity for passenger airlines are directly correlated, (ii) the demand for freight services and the
relevant revenues are a comparatively small portion of the total airline revenues (15%<), (iii) our objective
was to correctly model the airline business cycle and the effect of a separate freight demand would be the
same as that of a combined passenger/freight demand function so in the interest of parsimony we did not
disaggregate it (also followed by Weil(1996) and Liehr(2002)). For other purposes, such disaggregation
does not require substantial modifications.
I
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Service quality
GDP growth rate
Price Elasticity
External factors
Demand
Uimensioniess
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
RPK
fare price as charged by the airline class
Hign ioaa factors imply low service quality ana vice
versa (TF**)
Rate of economic growth (TF**)
Change of rate of demand growth based on the fare
price change rate. (Range -0.4 to -1)
Changes in demand for air travel not captured by
economic activity (e.g. wars, pandemics, terrorism,
etc) (TF**)
The current level of demand for air travel
X
X
X
E
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
** TF: Table Function. For details see App. I.
The key demand equation is further analyzed in Table 9-3.
Table 9-3 Demand Growth Rate Equation Analyzed
(intercept + Captures non modeled changes like population
growth.
GDPgrowth_rate * GDP_elasticity + Captures the effect of economic activity.
GDP_elasticity is a variable that moderates the impact
of negative GDP growth rates because we observed
historically that recessions have relatively less impact
to demand growth rate compared to periods of
economic growth
fare_price_change * price_elasticity ( f(time Captures the effect of altering the price of airline
and passenger mix) ) * tickets. Instead of using the absolute value of the fare,
we use the relative change and a value of elasticity
appropriate for the mix of passengers that may change
over time
serviceefcton_demand (f (loadfactor + fleet The effect that the level of service have on demand.
age) )* Level of service is dependent on load factors,
congestion, and average fleet age
external efct ondemand (f(time)) External effects
9.1.2.3 Airline Industry class
The airline industry is modeled in aggregate terms. The reason for this design decision is
that on a global scale the airline industry is highly fragmented numbering approximately
50 significant airlines and many more smaller ones. As a result, the effect of their
individual actions with regard to the global scale of the industry cycle is relatively small
and response functions can be devised to successfully represent their aggregate impact as
demonstrated by Weil (1996), Lyneis (2000, and Liehr (2002) (see Ch. 8). The key to
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modeling the industry as a whole is the ability to present the prevalent type of
competitive behavior which is in turn is also dependent on the level of consolidation.
Mirroring the functions in the real world, the airline industry in our model performs the
following functions:
* Forecasts future demand,
* Orders aircraft to meet desired capacity
* Manages the utilization and retirements of existing capacity based on demand
* Sets and adjusts fare prices
We discuss each function below.
Demand Forecast Module
Demand forecast is done by extrapolation of the trend in past years. The forecast horizon
is variable and equals to the average delivery time of new aircraft on the premise that this
is the time that needs to be forecasted. This premise is parallel to the actual practice in
which airlines are considered to normally have a two to three year long-term planning
horizon.
The number of historic years used to calculate the trend and the moving average
smoothing factor are also variable. The choice of their value represents long vs. short
institutional memory with longer histories and higher smoothing factors characterizing a
more consolidated industry while the opposite better represents a fragmented industry
with a number of new entrants. The input and output variables for the demand forecast
module with their corresponding equations are given in Table 9-4.
Table 9-4 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of Demand Forecast Module of
the Airline (lnem
Demand
Forecast horizon
Extrapolation
History
Target load factor
Output Variables
Projected Demand
Desired Capacity
RPK
Years
Years
Dimensionless
RPK
ASK
The current level of demand for air travel
Current delivery lead time for aircraft.
Historic demand used as data to extrapolate
demand growth trend. (Range: 1-6)
Desired level of load factor. Depends on the
competitive environment and operational
advances like yield management and electronic
distribution that allow increased load factors. (TF)
Forecast of the demand expected for the end of
the forecast horizon
= Projected Demand / Target load factor
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous, TF: Table Funtion
E
E
X
X
E
E
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Capacity Ordering Module
Aircraft capacity is modeled in available seat-kilometers. New capacity is ordered based
on forecasted demand adjusted by the desired load factor and from which the levels of
existing capacity, planned retirements, and only a portion of the existing backlog are
subtracted. The fact that the backlog is not subtracted represents the phenomenon of
supply chain discounting referred to in Chapters 6 and 7. Lower levels of discounting
may be used as a sign of industry consolidation but the current industry behavior is
modeled quite well if supply chain discounting is 100%.
This desired additional capacity is adjusted by the relative profitability of the industry
where profitable periods trigger relative overinvestment and unprofitable ones
underinvestment [profit efct_on_orders].
Orders are then allocated to the two manufacturers based on the relative profitability that
their aircraft achieve, which in turn depends on manufacturer relative pricing, fuel
consumption and non-fuel operating costs. Another criterion for allocating capacity is the
relative difference in the lead times between manufacturers. Finally, the existence of
inertia in ordering due to the operational efficiency advantage that an incumbent
manufacturer has (see discussion on the vendor lock-in effect Ch. 4) can skew this
allocation in favor of the dominant manufacturer and are represented by a network-effect
adjustment variable. The input and output variables for the capacity ordering module with
their corresponding equations are given in Table 9-5.
Capacity Management Module
Once aircraft capacity is received by the airline industry it ages but remains active until it
is retired. This means that the secondary market for aircraft is not modeled as those
aircraft that are sold by some airlines are retained and used by others until they are retired
or sold to be converted to dedicated freighters (a class of aircraft that is outside our
model's boundary). This choice is supported by Strandenes' (2002) characterization of
the second hand market in shipping as secondary with no significant impact on
transportation supply.
The decision to retire aircraft is based on the retirement age variable that starts with an
initial value of 25 years (average aircraft life expectancy) and adapts based on
profitability [profit_efct_on_retirements]. Similar to the policy described by Skinner et al.
(1998) the retirement age adjusts upwards during profitable times and downwards during
downcycles where capacity is typically shed. Retirement age can also be forced
exogenously in order to simulate government regulation that forces older aircraft that do
not meet the current standards on noise or emissions to retire. This effect is not drastic
because: (i) regulations are introduced progressively and account for the social costs of
replacing relatively new non-compliant aircraft, (ii) manufacturers and airlines try to
anticipate the regulations by offering aircraft that meet them before they are actually
enacted, and (iii) non-compliant aircraft are resold to regions that have not adopted the
new standards.
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Table 9-5 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of Ordering Module of the Airline
Current Active
Capacity
Order Backlog
Supply chain
visibility
Order smooth
Capacity
Retirement rate
Profit efct on orders
Service efct on
orders
Cancellation ratio
Relative profit efct
Relative lead time
efct.
Vendor lock-in efct
Output Variables
Order rate
Order rate to Mf X
Order rate to Mf Y
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
module
ASK
ASK
Dimensionless
Years
ASK/year
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
ASK/year
ASK/year
ASK/year
Level of existing current capacity at average
utilization
Level of capacity that is in backlog or in production
by the manufacturers
Percentage of the backlog "perceived" by the
industry. (Range: 0%-100%)
Aggressiveness in the order placement. They can
be spread over more periods as means to reduce
the risk of forecasting error. (Range 1-4)
Current rate at which the capacity is being retired
Models "irrational exuberance" by increasing
levels of orders in profitable periods and reducing
them in unprofitable ones. (TF)
When service levels deteriorate increases the
pressure to order aircraft even if unprofitable. (TF)
Order rates are allowed to be negative to
represent cancellations as permitted by the
cancellation ratio. (0%-50%)
Relative advantage of aircraft from the competing
manufacturer in terms of ownership costs, fuel
efficiency, and operating costs. (TF)
Relative advantage of aircraft from the competing
manufacturer in terms of delivery lead time. (TF)
Relative advantage of aircraft from the competing
manufacturer in terms of legacy operational
efficiency (can also reflect commonality). (TF)
= (DesiredCapacity -
CurrentCapacity -
OrderBacklog * SCvisibility) / OrderSmooth -
CapacityRetirementRate
= OrderRate * Rel.Profit.Efct *
Rel.LeadTime.Efct *
Vendor.Lock-in.Efct *
ProfitEfctOnOrders(X) *
ServiceEfctOnOrders
(OrderRate - OrderRateMfX) *
ProfitEfctOnOrders(Y) *
ServiceEfctOnOrders
E
E
X
X
E
E
E
X
E
E
E
E
E
E
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Capacity is measured in available seat-kilometers which depends on aircraft utilization(hours flown) along with the number of aircraft. This implies that there is limited
flexibility to increase or decrease available capacity at any given time simply by
increasing or decreasing the hours of aircraft usage before actually having to retire it.
Using this parameter addresses the distinction between operating and active capacity as
discussed in Ch. 4 and allows us to reconcile, for calibration purposes, the capacity data
as reported by the airlines that include only flights actually flown and not those that
would be possible for a given fleet size. As aircraft are expensive assets, airlines try to
utilize them to their maximum potential and as a result the range of utilization flexibility
is rather small in practice.
Total operational capacity can be constrained by the capacity of the infrastructure, if such
an influence is desired, by modeling the effect that such a constraint has on service. The
input and output variables for the capacity management module with their corresponding
equations are given in Table 9-6.
Table 9-6 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of the Capacity Management
Capacity
Operational
Capacity
Adjustment
Normal retirement
age
Profit efct on
retirements
Output Variables
Operational
capacity
Capacity
Retirement rate
Dimensionless
Years
Years
ASK/year
ASK/year
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
utilization
Flexibility to increase or decrease active capacity
depending on competitive conditions and extent of
flexible leases. (TF)
Average aircraft lifecycle in airline operations. It
can be lowered to simulate regulatory
interventions. (Range 20-30)
Aircraft are retained longer during profitable
periods and retired earlier during unprofitable
ones. (TF)
= CurrentCapacity *
OperationalCapacityAdjustment
= CurrentCapacity /
(NormalRetirementAge * ProfitEfctOnRetirements)
Finance Module: Costs
The costs incurred by airlines are divided into:
* Capital costs (aircraft ownership/leasing costs)
* Operating Costs
o Fuel costs
o Non-fuel operating costs (includes all other costs e.g., crew,
administrative, airport fees etc)
X
X
X
E
E
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This allocation partially matches the ones used in the industry (Ch. 3) as it separates
capital ownership costs and fuel costs (of direct interest to our purposes) and lumps
together other expenses like crew costs, administrative, maintenance etc. The reasoning
for this is that changes and innovations on other operating costs may give a temporary
competitive advantage to a given airline but they are quickly adopted industry-wide. In
fact, as we shall see when mapping conceptual strategic alternatives to the model (Ch. 11)
we investigate the effect of flexibility in crew compensation - what is known as profit-
sharing programs - by adjusting a percentage of the operating costs.
Fuel costs and other operating costs are given in $/RPK and are defined exogenously
using a historic price database and prices based on scenarios for the future years. Prices
for fuel use the actual fluctuations in real jet fuel prices. Operating costs monitor the
process advances of LCCs that allow for significantly reduced cost of operations per seat
mile when adjusted for distance.
Table 9-7 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of the Cost Module of the Airline
Cost
Capacity
depreciation
Fleet fuel efficiency
Operating cost
Ownership
Expenses
Fuel Expenses
Operating
Expenses
Total Expenses
Unit Costs
Dimensionless
$/ASK
$/RPK
$RPK
$
$
$
$IRPK
annual lease. It is based on the "aircraft price" at
which it is sold by manufacturers and depreciates
as capacity ages
The reduction in the "rent" cost of capacity of an
aircraft as it ages. Set at 12% per year of age from
original price.
Specific fuel consumption per ASK at the time of
aircraft sale. Specified by manufacturers. (TF)
Cost of operations. Depends on the ability of
airlines to improve their operating efficiency. (TF)
= AircraftOwnershipCost * CurrentActiveCapacity
= FleetFuelEfficiency *
CurrentOperationalCapacity
= Operating Costs * CurrentDemand
= OwnershipExpenses +
FuelExpenses +
OperatingExpenses
= TotalExpenses / Demand
X
X
E
E
E
EE
E* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
Capacity costs are endogenously generated based on the prices charged by the
manufacturers allocated over the lifetime of the aircraft (in effect a rental charge). The
total expenses are calculated by multiplying this charge with the total active capacity. In
order to simulate the added flexibility of leasing, we use a ratio of capacity that is paid
per RPK (actual demand) to represent the economics of a leased fleet. The input and
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output variables for the capacity cost module with their corresponding equations are
given in Table 9-7.
Finance Module: Revenues, Airline competition and Fare Price Setting
The airline industry's revenues are calculated similarly to costs: i.e. by multiplying the
total demand by the current fare price. The estimation of the current fare price is the
critical aspect here as it is an endogenous process influenced by a number of parameters
and instrumental for the representation of the competitive status of the airline industry.
It starts with a fairly basic cost plus model in which the per passenger mile costs
calculated previously are adjusted by the profitability expectations [target_profitability],
the load factor expectations [loading_efct_on_price] and the reality of current profit
margins [profit efct_on_price].
The target profitability is defined exogenously to represent the different stages in the
competitive situation in the industry. As we discussed in Ch. 3, a large number of new
entrants tend to compress profit margins with the expectations of increasing their market
share and future profitability while a more consolidated industry has the ability to reach
for higher profit margins.
The model allows for two ways of adjusting target profitability: either by exogenously
defining the level of competition as represented by the [target-profitability] variable using
a table function or by internally adjusting the level of competition based on the relative
profitability of the airline industry. In this case, competitor entrance increases the level of
competitive behavior simulated by a stock [effective_competitors] while their exit
decreases it. The value of [effective_competitors] is then translated to
[target_profitability] using a table function. The endogenous market dynamics are also
shown graphically in Fig. 9-5.
Table 9-8 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of the Revenue and Competition
I I.-A ^.--.A.- I I•-Ir il I
Price
Profit Effect on
Price
Target Profitability
Output Variables
Fare Price
Revenues
Profits
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
$ / RPK
$
$
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
Effect that profitability has on fare price (TF)
Desired level of profitability. Depends on
competitive status of the airline industry.
= [UnitCosts / (1 +TargetProfitability) ] *
LoadingEfctOnPrice *
ProfitEfctOnPrice
Demand * FarePrice
Revenues - Expenses
X
X or E
E
E
E
-- --
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The target load factor is also defined and it allows for operational improvements made
through the extensive use of yield management practices and optimization algorithms and
of a competitive environment that suppresses prices with the widespread entry of low-
cost carriers that can push their load factors upwards (see Ch. 3). When the target load
factor is not met, the price will tend to increase and correct this imbalance and vice versa.
This tendency needs to be balanced in order to prevent the airline industry module from
falling into protracted loss inducing periods. Profitability effect on price plays that
balancing role by pushing the price upwards when the industry is unprofitable. The input
and output variables for the revenue and competition module with their corresponding
equations are given in Table 9-8.
Airline
Profitability
Market satur
Airline
Revenues
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Airline Target
Profitability
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Airline
Fares
/4I
Figure 9-5: Airline entry and exit dependent on profitability
9.1.3 Airframe Manufacturers Class
As noted previously, airframe manufacturers are modeled as a duopoly with
manufacturers competing using different strategies. Domination of the market by one
manufacturer can be modeled but the emergence of a third player can only be modeled
exogenously by reallocating the revenues and costs of the equivalent market share from
the two modeled manufacturers.
Each manufacturer:
* Plans for and allocates production capacity based on demand to the production
lines of each market segment (narrowbody and widebody)
* Produces and delivers the ordered aircraft
* Sets the price at which the aircraft are sold and their technical characteristics (fuel
consumption)
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Production Module
Production capacity adjusts to the demand fluctuations but in a delayed fashion and come
at a cost that simulates the inertia of the supply chain and the investment or additional
employee compensation 94 required to ramp productions rates up or down respectively.
Constant production rates allow for reduction in base unit costs do simulate the learning
curve. When production rates have to increase drastically to catch up with demand,
expenses include employee hiring and training, building of new facilities, and
coordination of suppliers which cumulatively increase production unit costs (as discussed
in Ch. 4). Similarly, when capacity is drastically reduced, there are costs involved that
resemble "forgetting"; production unit costs are pushed upwards due to the fire cycle
from the need to provide severance packages to the loss experience.
Table 9-9 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of the Production Module of the
Airfrnam Mannferiturr VCl.fi
uraer rate OT MI- I Autyear I ne level OT oroers receivec Dy a manuTaciurer
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
Production itself requires a given minimum time once the order is received. When orders
are received at higher rates than the production then an order backlog accumulates.
Production rates are adjusted in order to maintain that order backlog at the desired level.
94 From overtime and hiring.
Target Backlog Years Years of backlog targeted by a manufacturer X
Production Smooth Dimensionless Aggressiveness in the change of production. X
Production adjustments can be spread over more
periods as means to reduce the risk of forecasting
error. (Range 1-6)
Base Unit Cost $/ASK Base costs of aircraft production. Increasing due X
to complexity and technology. (TF)
Lean Efforts Dimensionless Number of lean efforts attempted X
Cost of Production Dimensionless Rewards steady production rates but penalizes X
Adjustments ...... drastic increases and reductions. (TF)
Output Variables
Order Backlog ASK = OrderRate - ProductionRate E
Desired Production ASK/year = OrderBacklog / TargetBacklog E
Rate
LeanAdjustment Dimensionless = LeanEffortSuccess -
LeanEffortForgetting
Production Rate ASK / year = ProductionRate + E(DesiredProductionRate - ProductionRate) I
ProductionSmooth
Production Unit $ / ASK = BaseUnitCost * E
Cost CostOfProductionAdjustment (
ProductionRateChange /
ProfuctionRate) *
LeanAdjustment
I
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Another way available to manufacturers to reduce their production unit costs is lean
manufacturing (see Ch. 4). There are three aspects of lean manufacturing that are
available as options:
* Reduced production lead times (production time needed from the start of an
aircraft construction to its delivery)
* Reduced production rate change costs (ability to switch production lines easily
and adjust capacity based on demand)
* Reduced base unit production costs. The latter are balanced by the level of lean
initiatives as shown in Table 9-9 and Figure 9-6. The feedback of increasing
complacency when profitability targets are met can be adjusted.
Figure 9-6 Lean Initiatives for the Airframe Manufacturers Production Module
While lean manufacturing had been proven successful when applied to mass production -
applying it to the specialized production of LCA requires strong leadership to guide
through a period of adaptation and experimentation. State-of-the-art lean manufacturing
involves just-in-time (JIT) pull production with substantially lower unit costs compared
to traditional mass production. While applying it to aircraft manufacturing is a huge
challenge, we considered it as an option for production management. It depends on the
level of commitment for applying it and directly impacts production unit costs. The input
and output variables for the production module with their corresponding equations are
given in Table 9-9.
Finance Module
Similar to airlines, manufacturers base their prices on a cost plus model which is in turn
modulated by several factors. The base costs are defined exogenously to reflect the
increase in R&D and manufacturing costs due to the increasing complexity and advanced
material technology is required to achieve the performance of modern LCA. This base
cost curve is considered common for both manufacturers. Using this and a level of target
profitability the "list price" is calculated. The list price is then discounted to the "real
price" in order to meet market share and/or production targets that are defined by the
competitive strategy of each manufacturer. Revenues are then calculated based on the
capacity delivered in real prices.
The real costs of production depend upon the rate of production rate adjustments (that are
intended to include the learning/forgetting dynamic of the hiring/firing cycle), made as
well as can be exogenously defined to simulate differences that like large scale technical
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missteps if necessary (e.g., the recent Airbus A380 wiring problems that ballooned the
R&D budget by an additional estimated $2B).
Table 9-10 Input and Output Variables and Exogenous Parameters of the Finance Module of the
Airfrnmp Mannfnetuhlrr (Clsrn
Costs
Base unit costs
Target Market
Share
Market Share
Market share Effect
on Price
Target Backlog
Demand Effect On
Price
Profitability Effect
on Price
Target Profitability
Output Variables
Price
Revenues
Expenses
Profits
$/ASK
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Years
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
Dimensionless
$/ASK
$
$
$
* E: Endogenous, X: eXogenous
production rate changes and the learning effect.
Base costs of aircraft production. Define the "list"
price. Increasing due to complexity and
technology. (TF)
Desired share of annual airline aircraft orders.
= OrderRateMfX / OrderRateMfY
Level of price discount based on the difference
between current order market share and target
market share. If market share is low, then prices
are lowered and vice versa. (TF)
Years of backlog targeted by a manufacturer
Level of price discount based on the difference
between current production rates and backlog. If
backlog is depleting fast, then prices are raised
and vice versa. (TF)
The effect that profitability exerts on price levels.
Low profitability tends to increase the real price
but the effect is relatively weak given that
manufacturers can rely on subsidies and other
business unit diversification (defense) for support.
(TF).
Desired level of profitability for manufacturers. Set
at 10%.
= [BaseUnitCost / (1 + TargetProfitability) ] *
DemandEfctOnPrice *
MarketShareEfctOnPrice
=ProductionRate * Price
= ProductionRate * ProductionUnitCosts
Revenues -Expenses
The competitive strategies for the manufacturers are focused on producing the right
product, at the right price, at the right time. As we saw in Ch. 4, an aircraft from one
manufacturer can be more competitive than the equivalent offering of the other based on:
(i) list and discounted price tag,
(ii) performance,
(iii) lifecycle operating costs,
(iv) availability, or
(v) politics.
X
X
E
X
X
X
X
E
E
E
E
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In the way that we executed this model we assumed that only prices (i) differ on average
between rival fleets. It is possible to execute strategies where the difference is
performance, which was tried by McConnell (2007) using a very similar model. Prices
(and profitability) are impacted by production rates and lean efforts. The specific
strategic alternatives that we considered in our experiments are discussed in Section 10.4.
The input and output variables for the production module with their corresponding
equations are given in Table 9-10.
9.2 Calibration Verification and Validation in the Literature and
application in CA EoE Model
9.2.1 Calibration Verification Validation of System Dynamic Models
(Literature Review)
As we saw in Section 8.1, Law and Kelton identified three steps in completing a model:
validation, verification and accreditation, and we noted that the SD view of these phases
is that it is not a two state process (Sterman 2004): that is, a model does not become valid
from invalid but it is rather an iterative process that increases the confidence in the
validity of the model.
Having said that, there are two schools of thought with regard to SD modeling:
* Classical (Educational): this approach favors purposefully simple and intuitive
model structures that can create fairly complex outcomes. Accreditation (that is
buy-in from the users) is an educational process of the user in the behavior of the
simple structures and their ability to convey fundamental aspects of the problem
despite imperfect tracking of the key parameters. The outcome of the model
although not accurate, is robust enough to be used for policy making purposes
(Radzicki (2004), Graham (1980)). The parameter estimation in this approach is
made outside the model - established entirely empirically. These models are quite
robust to parameter fluctuation and therefore exact estimation is not necessary.
* Statistical (Forecasting): By contrast, practitioners of this approach strive to
generate very detailed and complex models in order to achieve both more accurate
forecasting value and buy-in by correctly tracking key parameters of the system.
This approach was partly propelled as a response to criticism of major SD models
like the World Dynamics model (Forrester 1971) (e.g., Nordhaus (1973) ) and
involved statistical and econometric tools for parameter estimation and validation.
Peterson (1980) (p. 226) discusses statistical tools for calculating parameter
values and specifically the FIMLOF (full information maximum likelihood via
optimal filtering) method.
Hand calibration is a middle road between the two schools that combines some of their
strengths and can be used when data are hard to obtain. Lyneis and Pugh (1996) (pl-2)
(referenced by Radzicki (2004)) rebut criticisms of hand calibration by conducting an
experiment to compare the relative effectiveness of the two methods. With regards to
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ease of replication and rigorousness, they found that "[h]and calibration works, and is
less of an art and more replicable than might be expected. Moreover, it produces results
which are as close to the true values as automated calibration, and typically are close
enough to make no significant difference to the outcome of policy interventions."
As discussed in the next section, in our model we used a combination of the above
approaches by using econometrics where applicable along with hand calibration of
variables based on intuition of the basic system behavior. For our purposes the
attractiveness of hand calibration for some variables was motivated by the difficulty in
obtaining historic values.
Sterman (2004, pp. 859-861 and remaining chapter) summarizes a large number of
assessment tests for SD models proposed from various sources and expands on their use.
In the next section we apply the tests that are pertinent to our modeling needs to support
the model validation process.
9.2.2 CA EoE Model Verification
As we saw in Section 8.1, verification is an iterative process. The first part of verification
was constructing the model based on the mental model of how the various enterprises as
model subsystems interact that was facilitated by the EoE framework. A part of the
model (the airline and demand modules) employed structures utilized by previous
researchers (Weil (1996) and Lyneis (2000)) which gives added weight to the conceptual
acceptance of the structures used.
Boundary adequacy and structure assessment are test areas proposed by Sterman (2004)
that are pertinent to verification. These were addressed in the discussion of Section 9.1.2
using boundary tables.
As part of the development process, the model was run multiple times in different
computers and using different integration methods and time steps without significant
changes in outputs but some integration methods failed to execute due to incompatibility
with some of the functions used. The current choice of integration methods and time-step
was made for computational speed.
Finally, the equations used were checked for dimensional consistency and each
subsystem was checked for performing according to expectations.
9.2.3 CA EoE Model parameter calibration
The second step of the modeling process was the definition of values for the numerous
parameters of the model as it was being built. This was approached sequentially:
* establishing correlation,
* defining a basic reasonable value, and
* adjusting it to match the selected key parameters with the historical data used for
calibration.
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When dealing with entire subsystems (modules) and in an effort to match the historical
data we used the following procedure:
* Initial estimation of parameters of the module,
* Separating the module and feeding historical data,
* Calibrating to historic data
* Reconnecting the module to the complete model
The key parameters used for calibration were:95
* Airline total demand, operating capacity, and load factors
* Airline revenues, costs, and profit margins
* Airline orders and manufacturer backlog (aircraft delivery lead times are captured
with backlog)
Due to the strong feedback loops involved, this was an iterative process. It consisted of
isolating components and establishing that they perform as expected independently using
the relevant historic data as inputs and then reconnecting all the modules to verify that the
rest of the model performed as expected.
The values of all the parameters are given in the electronic attachment of the model
(available in html and executable format at http://lean.mit.edu/ in the Publications
section) but in this section we will present an example of how the calibration process
proceeded, discuss the values of key parameters, and present the graphics used for the
final verification. In the example all variable calibration methods are discussed from
econometric, to data fit, to intuitive estimation and existing literature.
Initialization
We calibrated the model using 1984 as the starting year. By 1984 the following structural
aspects of the industry were in the process of being established:
* airline deregulation in the US market was well under way,
* LCCs were introduced and growing (Southwest, People Express etc)
* Yield management systems started to grow
* Airbus had carved a niche for itself in widebody aircraft and was about to
introduce its narrowbody family.
In these ways, the structure of the industry approximated the current environment and for
this reason mid-eighties is a good starting point for the system dynamic model as it gives
ample historical data for further calibration and does not have to account for big
differences in industry structure.
Example of the Calibration Process: calibrating the demand subsystem class
From the discussion in Ch. 2 we have seen that we expect demand for air travel to depend
on:
* economic output,
* population growth,
95 Load factors, airline profit margins, and manufacturer backlog are second order effects
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* fare price
* external events, and
* service quality
And this is the structure we used as discussed in Section 10.1.2.1 with the exception of
population growth which we captured by using a constant in the growth rate equation.
Box 9-1 Testing demand and its input factors with regression
Simple model of demand:
Dr = bl * GDPr + b2 * YIE + b3 * Wd + a
Dr: Demand annual growth rate
GDPr: GDP annual growth rate
YIE: Average airline yield in $/RPK
Wd: Dummy indicating external effects on aviation (1 for the years 1973 (Yom-kippur war and terrorist
attacks involving aircraft, 1988 (Lockerbie largest terrorist attack involving aircraft), 1990-1 (First Gulf war),
2001-2 (9/11 terrorist attacks, War in Afghanistan) )
The results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using data spanning 1971-2004 are shown
below:
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 2.33648 3.387256 0.689786 0.495631
GDPr* 2.212452 0.524759 4.216126 0.00021
YIE -29.6423 24.13605 -1.22814 0.228945
Wd -1.2232 1.493174 -0.8192 0.419135
Adjusted R2 : 0.53
Only the GDP effect is shown to be statistically significant (at the 5% level) but the yield and the external
effect factors have the right signs while the intercept is positive indicating a constant increasing trend. The
predicted with the above equation vs. actual demand growth rates are plotted below.
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Testing for economic output and fare price and leaving the population growth to be
considered in the intercept, we run a simple OLS to verify this model, the results of
which are shown in Box 9-1. These results are indicative that the factors we identified are
correct. We did not test for the effect of service levels as their effect would only be seen
I
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in spillover demand of which we do not have direct aggregate data. Nevertheless we
would still like to have that feedback mechanism influencing the demand because first it
is intuitive and second potentially useful when it comes to extreme levels of congestion
which are not experienced by the historic system.
Having tested the relevance of the factors we considered with regard to estimating the
demand growth, we test and see what values would resemble the historic data as output.
To do this, we use, when available, historical data as inputs and calibrate the value of the
parameters in the function at hand.
To make this process clearer, we return to our example. The equation of the demand
growth rate variable is structured as shown in Table 9-3.
In this function the variables that are endogenous and generated in other parts of the
model are fare_price_change and load_factors. These we can substitute with historical
values and subsequently adjust the other variables so as to match the known historical
demand as an output.
In order to initialize the unknown parameters we use best guess estimations from
available data:
* For example as starting point value for the intercept we used 0.023 based on the
coefficient from the regression in Box 9-1.
* For the price elasticity values we use estimates in the literature that were
presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2-7) based on two meta-studies that compiled
price elasticity estimations for air travel. We choose a number close to the average
between business and leisure passengers for the elasticity of international and
short-haul travel which gives us -0.45 for widebody and -0.9 for narrowbody.
* For the external efct_on_demand we construct a table that attempts to capture
events that would not be adequately captured in the economic metric (see Fig. 9-6
and also Box 9-1). Notice that the effects span two years and precede the event
because a smoothing function is applied to avoid the appearance of jugged lines in
the output diagrams which is cosmetic rather than functional as the model is
robust to abrupt trend changes.
* Finally, the service_efct_on_demand is a variable that associates the potential
negative effect that increased load factors and overly aging fleets with their
associated negative safety implications have on demand. This factor can also
capture the effect that external constraints on capacity (i.e. infrastructure) would
have as they would force the use of higher load factors given that additional
flights could not be added in a congested system despite the desire to do so. This
is constructed based on the intuition that people find the inconvenience of
congested aircraft, delays, and overbooking as deterrent to travel and choose
either to not travel for long-range flights or chose an alternative mode for shorter
range ones. Based on this the concave shape of the variable, shown in Fig. 9-7,
makes intuitive sense as the level of discomfort increases disproportionately to the
load factor (i.e. a passenger in a 55% loaded plane would find little if any
difference to a 65% one but the difference would become significant for an 80%
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loaded one. In constructing this shape, we also took into account the fact that it is
an average value which implies that the number of 95% load factor flights is
much higher in a system with average load factors of 80% as opposed to one with
65%).96
Figure 9-7 Values for the external-efct_on_demand variable in the demand modules
the average fleet age is 10 years
Using these values as initial estimates and historical data as inputs, we performed
multiple runs micro-adjusting them to achieve a close match between historical and
modeled output.
This process was repeated for the other modules and several more times after connecting
them together to adjust the endogenous dynamics and the differences that the slight
changes in the values created. The resulting graphs were compared to historical data
among other calibration techniques as discussed in the next section.
96 These values were initialized based on Weil (1996) model and later slightly adjusted to reflect
differences between widebody and narrow body trip types.
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9.2.4 Validation of the CA EoE Model
Having discussed verification and calibration, this sector presents the validation
procedures for the CA EoE model. Below are some assessment tests/questions suggested
by Sterman (2004) (pg. 852) that have not been discussed previously and are relatively
straight forward:
* Structure assessment
o Does the model adhere to physical laws? the model contains no stocks
like aircraft ordered or the aircraft production backlog that are allowed to
have negative value. Similarly, load factors are not allowed to exceed
100%.
* Parameter assessment -
o Are there "fudge" factors? The model does not have any parameters with
no real world counterpart. There are cases where that relationship may not
be straightforward like functions where the exact values are unknown
(e.g. the load factor - service quality relationship in Fig. 9-8b) or the
value of parameters that exist but represent non-measurable quantities
(e.g. target profitability for airlines and airframe manufacturers). But in
these cases there is a relationship represented which if not taken into
account would be implicitly disregarded.
o Are the parameters consistent with the knowledge of the system? The
calibration process described in Section 10.2.3 explored this by isolating
each model subsystem.
* Extreme conditions and sensitivity
o Does the model respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies,
shocks and parameters? A large number of experiments were conducted
using a varying number of sometimes extreme policies. The areas were
the model is robust to these events and where it is not are addressed in
Chapter 10.
* Behavior reproduction
o Does the model reproduce the behavior of interest in the system?
Endogenously?
o Does the model generate the problems that motivated the study?
o Does it match the frequency and phase of variables match historic data?
These questions need a more extensive treatment and are answered in the
following Sub-section 10.2.4.1.
9.2.4.1 Behavior reproduction tests
This is a series of statistical and observation tests in which the parameters used for
calibration as presented in the beginning of Section 10.2.3 are presented against the
model results. In order to test how well the model is able to reproduce future events, we
use a test run that was constructed utilizing historical data until 1995 and all the variables
that explicitly use historical data to be calibrated were "forecasted" for the period 1995-
2005.
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Operating capacity, demand, and Load Factors
Using data from the global airline industry collected by the Airline Transport Association
ATA as historical basis, we constructed the demand and capacity time series and
compared with the corresponding model outputs as shown in Figure 9-9.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-9 Calibrated demand and total capacity (in RPM and ASM) model data compared to the
historical values for global airlines (Source for historical data: ATA 2006)
A second order effect that describes the relationship between capacity and demand are
load factors which are tracked in Figure 9-10.
..i . i i M o d e l d i i i i i ........ i................Av. Loadfactor
Model data
Historical values
1985 1990 1995Ii1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-10 Historical and model data comparison: Load Factors
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Airline Revenues Costs and Profit Margins
Costs and revenues are another important
and are shown in Figures 9-11 and 9-12.
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Figure 9-11 Historical and model data comparison: Airline costs (Source for historical data: ATA
2006)
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Figure 9-12 Historical and model data comparison: Airline revenues (Source for historical data:
ATA 2006)
The second order effect that compares how the relationship between the two economic
measures is the profit margin shown in Fig. 9-13.
........  ..
I I • I
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Figure 9-13 Airline Profit Margins of the Calibrated Model vs. Historical data (Source for historical
data: ATA 2006)
Airframe Manufacturers Orders and Backlogs
On the boundary between airframe manufacturers and airlines are the orders of aircraft
and the amount of backlog orders that the manufacturers carry which reflect their
production rates.
As we discussed in Chapter 4, there are considerable differences between the two
manufacturers in the real world that include different production policies (including
backlog), production costs, implementation of lean manufacturing, pricing policies and
different points in market penetration (Airbus was still an incumbent in 1984 just
introducing the A320 narrowbody product line). Not only these differences exist, but
their implications were also identified as potentially important for the cyclicality in the
CA EoE as discussed in Chapter 7 (e.g., a production policy that favors longer backlogs
may exacerbate the 'supply chain discounting' effect).
For these reasons we simulated the two manufacturers in order to capture these
differences. The orders for Manufacturer A (MF.A) representing Boeing (combined
Boeing and MDD for the 1984-1997 pre-merger period) are captured in Fig. 9-14 while
the orders for Manufacturer B (MF.B) representing Airbus are shown in Fig. 9-15. While
the orders track the historical record, there are differences that can be attributed to the
following two reasons:
* As discussed in Section 9.1.3, our simplifying assumption was that manufacturers
competed only on price while their product lines were technically similar,
* As discussed in Box 4-3, aircraft ordering can be highly politicized - especially in
the international front - and as a result these effects cannot be captured.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-14 MF.A airline capacity orders (in ASM) for the calibrated model and historical data
(Source for historical data: Boeing orderbook and author's calculation)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-15 MF.B airline capacity orders (in ASM) for the calibrated model and historical data
(Source for historical data: Airbus orderbook and author's calculation)
262
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-16 Historical and model data comparison: Airframe Manufacturers Deliveries (Source for
historical data: Boeing and Airbus websites and author's calculations)
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Figure 9-17 Historical and model data comparison: Airframe Manufacturers Backlog (Source for
historical data: Boeing and Airbus websites and author's calculations)
Finally, Figures 9-16 and 9-17 show the comparisons of model data with historical
delivery rates for the manufacturers individually and aggregate and total aircraft order
backlogs. Order backlogs are second order effects and still match quite well with the data.
i
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For the delivery rates, while the Airbus data series matches the model quite well, between
the two manufacturers, for Boeing, the higher level of orders that it receives in the model
in years 1986-1991 (as shown in Figure 9-14) result in the higher level of deliveries in the
period 1989-1994 (delayed by the manufacturing lead time).
From a visual inspection of the figures displayed in this section, one can see that the
model tracks the real world data reasonably well. In order to test this relationship
statistically, we perform the following tests.
Statistical Testing
Statistical tests conducted support that the model results are not statistically significantly
different compared to the real world data as summarized in Table 9-11.
,apuaclly (/[ runfloI
op. ASM)
Demand (in trillion
RPM)
Load factors
Airline costs in ($B)
Airline revenues
Airline profit margins
Aircraft orders (in
trillion ASM)
Aircraft backlog (in
trillion ASM)
2.03
1.39
0.68
101
103
0.026
0.21
0.61
2.03
1.39
0.68
98.9
101.1
0.027
0.19
0.63
0.077
0.061
0.02
5
5.2
0.018
0.067
0.164
0.981
0.975
0.430
0.959
0.949
0.663
0.628
0.636
0.001
0.004
0.019
0.172
0.152
0.003
0.081
0.019
0.153
0.007
0.002
0.246
0.185
0.000
0.095
0.111
0.845
0.989
0.979
0.582
0.663
0.997
0.824
0.871
0.986
0.976
0.718
0.730
0.735
0.916
0.531
0.771
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
The t-test statistical
are statistically not
cannot be rejected.
test in Table 9-11, starts with the hypothesis that the model results
significantly different than the data distribution which in all cases
We notice that the errors are increased compared to second order
variables (like profit margins and backlogs) which is to be expected.
We also notice from the fact that the Uc Theil statistic is greater than Um and Us that
there is a phase shift between the model results and the historical data but does not give
information as to the relative magnitude. By inspection, this phase shift is less than one
year which is a small time frame for the time-scales that we are considering. On the same
topic, Sterman (2 0 0 4 )(pp. 877) notes that the system type we are considering -- a
combination of supply chains and commodity markets - "selectively amplify certain
frequencies in the random shocks that constantly perturb them. Since no model can
capture all the random variations in the environment, model dynamics can diverge from
the data even if the model is perfectly specified." (emphasis in the original).
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9.2.4.2 Ex-post forecasting
As a final part of the calibration procedure we tested the model as forecasting tool using
data until 1995 for the calibration of its external variable inputs (external effects on
demand, fuel prices, GDP growth rates) and extrapolated "reasonable forecasts" of these
assuming that were unaware of their real values.
Figure 9-18 Ex-post forecast for capacity and demand with calibration data "known" until 1995.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 9-19 Ex-post forecast for airline profit margins with calibration data "known" until 1995.
The model proved quite robust under that test missing of course the level of demand drop
caused by the combination of economic slowdown, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and their
aftermath but overall tracking close to our expectations as shown in Fig. 9-16. More
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importantly, the model captured an endogenous cycle in profitability showing a
significant dip in airline profit margins as shown in Figure 9-17.
9.3 Chapter 9 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the basic structure of the system dynamics CA EoE model
that we built to perform quantitative experimentation on the CA EoE. We also described
the calibration, verification, and validation processes that were employed to ensure that
the model is a useful simulation of reality for our purposes and shown that the logical
structure as well as the outputs compared to historical data match well by visual
inspection and statistical comparisons.
In Chapter 10 we use this model to compare and contrast the specific effects of the set of
strategic alternatives that we identified in Chapter 7 with regards to their relative
effectiveness in dampening the CA EoE cyclicality and providing benefits to the
stakeholders involved.
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Chapter 10 Scenarios and strategies for the CA EoE: Design
and Execution of Experiments
In Chapter 9, we described how we structured, calibrated, and validated a system
dynamics model of the CA EoE. This chapter is using the model to evaluate different
strategic alternatives with regard to their effectiveness in dampening the cyclicality
evidenced in the CA EoE. The approach that we take in analyzing the CA EoE is
summarized for clarity in Figure 10 1.
Word I
Exogenous Factors:
*Economy (GDP)
-Oil (Fuel prices)
-Shocks
*Price elasticity of demand
A
Scenario Strategic
Elements Alternatives
Value
Functions
Figure 10-1 Levels of Analysis for Experimentation using the SD Model of the CA EoE
From a high level perspective, there are four levels of analysis in our approach as shown
in Fig. 10-1:
* World level: it is exogenous to actions taken by the constituents. It provides the
elements of the different scenarios.
* EoE level: actions taken by EoE constituents are considered endogenous to this
level but are exogenously defined for the SD model. E.g., the decisions and
lobbying needed to convince the government constituents to allow higher levels
of consolidation in the industry are exogenous to the SD model but they are
considered as a strategic alternative that has a direct impact on the EoE and this
impact can be evaluated by using the SD model.
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* SD model level: the model level can compute the results from different
combinations of scenarios (World level inputs) and strategic alternatives (EoE
level inputs).
* Evaluation level: The outputs from the model are then evaluated based on a
(subjective) representation of the value functions of the CA EoE constituent
(shown in Table 9-1). Those strategies that that are symbiotic (or come close to
being) are selected and they are considered with regard to their implementability.
The identification of strategies can be iterative.
The rest of the chapter is devoted to discussing how this analysis was conducted in detail
and presenting its results. Specifically, we look into the possible futures of the CA EoE
system using ideas from scenario planning in Section 10.1, defining the external factor
parameters for the next 20 years for each scenario. In Section 10.2, we distinguish
between the exogenous and endogenous causes of cyclicality and provide a quantitative
assessment of their relative influence. Section 10.3 tests the strategies that we identified
in order to reduce the cyclicality in the CA EoE. The experiments are run on the system
dynamics model presented in Chapter 9 for all three scenarios and each strategy is tested
individually to allow comparisons for relative effectiveness. Section 10.4, explores
combination and possible synergies among strategic alternatives and how they influence
and are influenced by the competitive dynamics of the aircraft manufacturing industry.
10.1 A Qualitative Glimpse of the Future: Generic and CA EoE
Specific Scenarios
In order to make useful recommendations it is necessary to extend the model into future
forecasts. To do this, we use scenario planning to generate three possible world states that
could plausibly emerge in the next 20 years based on scenarios generated for generic
purposes and scenarios and forecasts that are specific to the CA EoE.
10.1.1 Generic Background Scenarios
In evaluating the outcomes for given strategies we need to somehow specify the future in
which they unfold. Scenario planning, as pioneered by Shell and others in the 1970s
(Schwartz 1991), provides a tool for 'imagining' different possible futures in a structured
fashion.
Our scenarios aim to create believable settings for the conditions faced in the future by
the commercial aviation EoE rather than foreseeing all possible variations including
extreme ones. Therefore we will vary the basic "environmental" parameters of the model
(demand growth rates along with GDP growth rates, demand elasticity, fuel prices,
potential infrastructure limitations, technology inputs and their variance) to generate the
basic scenarios.
Scenario 1 (Sl): Global Village
This scenario is generally following the trends we have witnessed until now without
drastic changes. The background is a globalized interconnected economy. Developing
giants like China and India steadily increase their economic output per capita while world
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population keeps increasing but at a declining rate, with most of the increases occurring
in the developing world. Moderate to high economic growth tightens the global ties and
makes travel for both pleasure and business a desired activity. Both regional and
international travel is highly prized. Airport infrastructure is built on an as needed basis
but with some delays involved given the negative externalities created in the areas
surrounding busy airports and the resulting opposition. Some regional travel is substituted
by 2015 and onwards by the creation of high speed rail networks in the US and China and
expansion of the existing ones in the EU and Japan.
Large environmental catastrophes and widespread diseases are avoided through
coordinated planning and any armed conflicts that arise are confined to regional levels.
Global warming is kept under control by using a mix of alternative energy and technical
fixes, with SO02 sprayed artificially as an "atmospheric sunscreen" being one of them
(reference). As a result, the demand for fossil fuels lessens but not by much thus making
the peak in "peak oil" a fairly protracted plateau with occasional high variability in fuel
prices but generally stable levels. While variation in the level of economic output is still
present, large crises in the form of the 1930s Great Depression are averted.
Scenario 2 (S2): Islands of Sufficiency
After significant turmoil in the first half of 2010s, the populations in North America,
Europe and Asia took an inward turn towards self sufficiency. Economic booms (and
crises) became a thing of the past, as sustainable growth levels hovered close to 1% for
the developed world and did not exceed 5% for the developing world. As a result of this
introverted focus, technologies of the "small is beautiful" kind such as micro
manufacturing (reference) gained ground and proved sufficient in providing for most of
the moderated material needs of societies. Artificial reality environments based on
information technology served the need for interaction across cultures and oceans far
better than expensive and security obstacle-riddled air travel.
As a result the demand for long range wide body aircraft diminishes significantly and it is
primarily the dedicated business travelers who make up the lists for smaller but long
range jets similar to the Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) based on the 737 platform and its
rivals. As a result of a significant reduction in the demand pressure, fuel prices plateau
and expansion of airport capacity ceases.
Scenario 3 (S3): Growth and Overshoot
Global economic output starts increasing at a slightly accelerating pace. Climate change
remains off the political agenda and as a result fuel prices are subject to significant
fluctuations. Their average levels are controlled by the infusion of new oil discoveries
and coal to oil conversion processes. The positive economic outlook fuels demand for air
travel and the infrastructure capacity needed is struggling to catch up due to the delays
involved in supplying it.
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After several years of apparent prosperity, the fundamental economic instability of big
trade imbalances, and asset price bubbles is compounded by extreme weather events and
consequent large losses of agricultural production. Inflation in the prices of primary
goods like food and clothing becomes very high and only the most affluent can afford to
travel. Furthermore, severe measures to quickly curb these problems follow the political
turmoil that in some nations is little less than a revolution.
10.1.2 CA EoE Scenarios Relative to Generic Scenario Planning
There is a vast number of scenarios generated for use under different contexts. In order
to provide some sense of how the scenarios that we propose match with larger scope
scenario exercises we reference two such works. The first is the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC 2001), a seminal study on the potential global impacts of
climate change and the other was from scenario planning master Shell (2002).
IPCC used seven scenarios that broadly fell in four quadrants. Scenario family Al was
based on increasing economic and population growth rates and increasingly connected
economies that lead to cultural and political convergence. In A2 the world fragments and
regional development becomes competitive and slower. B1 retains the global
convergence aspect of Al but emphasizes cooperation to reduce environmental and
societal problems. Finally, B2 aims for similar objectives but the means of doing so are
based on self-sufficiency. Compared to the IPCC scenarios presented here, the three
scenarios that we are using for testing our strategic alternatives (S1, S2, S3) can be
relatively placed to conform to IPCC's scenario matrix as shown in Table 10.1 and
Figure 10-1.
A2
The A2 soryine and scenro fami describes
a very heterogneous wodd. The underlying
theme Is self-lance and peservda-n of lood
identities. Fertility patterns across regions
converge very slowly, which results in
continuously increasing populaton. Economc
development Is pimarily regionally oriented
and per capita economic growth and
technological change more fragmenled and
slower than oth storylkea
As opposed to IPCC's multiple scenarios, Shell's practice is to create only two
characteristic scenarios. For their 2002 exercise these were named Business Class and
Prism respectively. These are interesting as they project the volatility of both regional
growth rates and fuel prices. Although notably, the oil price projections are significantly
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lower than actually materialized the long term volatility projections resemble those of S2
for the Prism Shell scenario and S1 for the Business Class Shell scenario.
More
Economic
More
Global "
More
Regional
A2
B2
S2
More
Environmental
Figure 10-2 IPCC Scenarios and the Relative Placement of S1, S2, S3
e 10-3 Shell Scenario Parameter Projections
The scenarios we presented in the two previous sections referred to the external
environment of the commercial aviation industry. Of course the industry itself will react
to these changes dynamically along with endogenous evolution. Therefore it is useful to
S3
Al
S1
B1
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consider the potential range of these changes and we start doing so by reviewing the
literature on future scenarios for airlines and trends in aircraft manufacturing.
10.1.3 Commercial Aviation Specific Scenario Planning
Taneja (2002) describes some "radical" scenarios in Chapter 6 of his book Airline
Survival Kit (pg. 175 on). In terms of aircraft, he posits that the clever combination of
existing types of aircraft can enable additional markets by by-passing busy international
hubs. He considers the possibility of successful ascendance of fractional ownership and
air taxi business jets to provide a significant fraction of business travel with the
advantages of ubiquitous access and convenient boarding. At the low end of the market,
leisure travel can be captured by low cost carriers both for national and international
trips. These two events can put legacy airlines in a difficult positition thus driving the
least efficient of them out of business unless subsidies or adaptation takes place.
He also envisions the potential effect of community-sponsored airlines, effectively local
governments subsidizing airline service to their communities although that may be harder
for poorer areas which would be presumable the ones underserved. As part of the
changing business environment, he also suggests the possibility of using airport staff for
most airline needs. This approach could even be extended to aircraft and crews, making
airlines core competence that of business aggregators and network designers (similar to
Nike in the athletic apparel market) as opposed to owners of the production capital.
Table 10-2 Four Aviation Scenarios for 2010 (Source Taneja (2004))
Triumph of the new wave: The new paradigm airlines, or low cost carries (LCCs), have all but dominated the
legacy carriers in the vast majority of markets. The remaining legacy carriers successfully differentiated by
adopting certain characteristics of the LCC business models or by focusing on segments like business
travel. The demise of several legacy carriers shrunk the existing hub-spoke networks leaving several
smaller communities with the need to subsidize their connections to the network. LCCs in different regions
found their counterparts as reliable partners in providing expanded network service. Taneja notes that the
shake-out could be even fiercer in the case of an exogenous precipitous drop in demand (e.g. pandemic or
widespread terrorism).
Survival of the late adopters: In this scenario, Taneja envisions an era of global airline giants. Either through
consolidation or attrition, the number of remaining major carriers globally is reduced to three in N.America,
four in Europe, six in Asia Pacific, and one in Middle East. The rest of the surviving carriers have been
delegated to regional/feeder status with strong alliances with the major players with a number of them
surviving as niche providers on the high and low end of the markets. The primary drivers in this scenario are
the inability of most legacy carriers to reach the consistently improving performance of LCCs and a less
restrictive regulatory climate both on international ownership and industry consolidation limitations.
The connectivity paradigm - From surfing to flying: The market leaders that emerge in such a scenario are
Electronic Travel System companies. Travel aggregators that consolidated most of the market power
relegate airlines to simply a seat supplier which do not even schedule their own flights. The databases and
information processing power residing with ETS's makes them far more efficient in assigning optimal travel
itineraries.
Emerging Markets - the New Frontier The growth in travel demand by emerging economies like China,
India, Brazil and Indonesia, relocates the focus of the industry to these countries. Led by "enlightened"
regulatory policies from their governments the entrepreneurial spirit of these countries allows the lower
income populations to use travel services tailored to their needs.
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The same author, in his book Simpli-flying, published two years later (Taneja 2004, pg.
161), provides four more structured scenarios for the year 2010 as summarized in Table
10-2.
A more formalized scenario planning approach to the aviation industry was implemented
by Farr and his team (Farr et al. 2005). They created a software tool that allows
practitioners to set their scenario expectations for where the industry is heading and it
then generates forecasts on specific parameters based on those predictions. The list of
parameters that they are considering aligns with the ones that we are using.
Finally, another set of scenarios that are specifically related to the CA EoE were
presented by Jarry (2003). He identified two scenarios: one of isolation and regional
rather than global travel which is similar to our "islands of sufficiency" scenario and a
second scenario named "the little planet" which is more optimistic and similar to our
"global village" scenario. As for the aircraft evolution, he does not see any dramatic
changes in the form of propulsion, speed, and capacity of the aircraft in the next one
hundred years. Although, these types of predictions have frequently been erroneous
failing to foresee scientific breakthroughs and the pace of innovation, they should be
sufficient for our outlook for a mere 20 years - after all the A380s and Boeing 787s built
today will almost certainly be in use in that timeframe.
The manufacturers themselves have been forecasting future demand pretty consistently
for the same period of time (see Boeing 2006 Outlook and Airbus Global Market
Forecast 2006) although they do differ on how this demand will be divided between
different types of aircraft primarily in the widebody category.
10.1.4 Translation of Scenarios to Model Parameters: extending the current
state
Table 10-3 summarizes the effects on the external factors of the above scenarios.
Table 10-3: Overview of Scenarios Primary Variables
Scenario GDP Demand Elasticity Fuel Infrastr.
Growth Variance Narrowb. Wideb. Business Leisure Goods Growth Variance
S1. Global M L L L M Some
VillageM L L delay
S2. Islands of L L Ample
Sufficiency * L
S3. Growth L• n
and H L and L and M H Delay
Overshoot H
These scenarios are translated into corresponding parameter inputs for our CA EoE SD
model as shown in Table 10-4.
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Fable 10-4 Exogenous 
scenario parameters
Sl: red line, S2: Jreen line dotted 
with circles, S3: blue line dotted with 
triangles
Having presented the potential futures that we will use in running the model, we now
proceed in conducting some sensitivity analysis with regard to the relative effects of
exogenous factors in Section 10.2 and of different strategic alternatives in Section 10.3.
10.2 Relative Importance of Exogenous and Endogenous Factors
as Mechanisms for Cyclicality
In Chapter 7 we identified certain mechanisms as possible causes of cyclical behavior in
economic and supply chain systems. In this section, we review those mechanisms testing
their relative effect by using the CA EoE model. We start by comparing the relative
impact on cyclicality of the external factors in 10.2.1 and proceed in investigating
endogenous mechanisms in Section 10.2.2 and on. For this section, comparisons are
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made with the baseline of the calibrated model for the S1 scenario unless otherwise
specified.
We describe each mechanism providing a background, the reasoning for how it would
work, and their actual simulated impact. At this stage we only consider mechanisms that
can be construed as strategic alternatives with regard to a single objective: reducing
variability in the airline industry sector. In Section 10.3, the value functions of different
stakeholders as presented Table 9-1 will be discussed extensively.
10.2.1 External Factors
In the CA EoE system there are several external factors based on regional differences,
competing modes, and regulations but in the model these have been abstracted to
* global economic growth,
* disruptive events with disproportional effect on air travel compared to their
economic impact, and
* fuel prices
While there is a correlation between fuel prices and economic growth, these are used in
different areas of the model. While economic growth rate is influencing the demand for
air travel, fuel prices only go into the calculation of the expenses of the airlines. Another
potential caveat is the ability of airlines to hedge fuel prices through future contracts 97 but
that is currently diminishing.
In order to see the effect of each, we run the model using scenario Sl and isolating each
external factor. Figures 10-4 and 10-5 show the differences in the oscillatory behavior for
airline profit levels and aircraft order rates respectively.
Figure 10-4: Comparison of Normalized Airline Profit Levels when all external factors are active
(Sl) and when only one is active for each run
97 As we saw in Ch. 3, there is no futures market for avgas but rather the markets for crude and heating oil
that are highly correlated to the price of av gas and therefore are used for hedging.
Airline Profit Leels (Normalized 1 In 1984)
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Figure 10-5 Comparison of Normalized Airline Profit Levels when all external factors are active (Sl)
and when only one is active for each run
Figure 10-6 Comparison of Detrended Airline Profit Levels when all external factors are active (S1)
and when only one is active for each run
Inspection of Figures 10-4, 10-5, 10-6 and Table 10-5 which shows the coefficient of
variation 98 for each case indicates that for airline profitability the external factors that
influence its tendency to oscillate are in order:
1. Fuel price volatility,
2. GDP growth rate variations and
3. External factors.
98 Coefficient of variation is a dimensionless measure of volatility and is calculated by dividing the standard
deviation of a population over its mean:
CV =-It
Order Leels (Nonralized 1 in 1984)
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This means that profitability in the short term is much more dependent on the
unpredictable fuel changes than that of demand (GDP and external factors both influence
demand directly). The opposite is true for aircraft orders which are more influenced by
changes in demand rather than the short term cost changes of the fuel input.
Table 10-5 Coefficient of Variation List for External Factor Experiments
S1 (all exogenous factors active) 1.10 0.86
Fuel (fuel active) 0.88 0.53
GDP (GDP active) 0.74 0.71
Ext (external factors active) 0.67 0.58
These results indicate that the exogenous factors are not critical in generating cyclical
behavior in the system. These results show that even in the improbable case that
exogenous factors stabilized, the internal dynamics of the CA EoE can force it into
cyclical behavior even with small exogenous perturbations. The mechanisms that
contribute to this endogenous behavior are discussed in Section 10.3.7.
Even the most optimistic strategist does not expect that the structured randomness of
economic and fuel cycles factors will actually disappear. As a result, we look into the
endogenous parameters of the CA EoE to investigate areas where flexibility or resilience
to the unavoidable destabilizing effect of external factors can be found.
10.2.2 Effects of Competitive Environment in the Airline Industry
In Ch. 3 we saw that deregulation opened the door to industry restructuring with waves of
new entrants and bankruptcies of some legacy carriers. Competition bred different
business models and pushed fares and unit costs downwards but in most cases it implied
reduced profit margins. This effect of the competitive environment is correlated to
industry concentration although as we saw in Ch. 2, each O-D pair is a market in itself
which in general is only imperfectly contestable.
Waves of new entrants can be attracted by high profit margins during an upcycle, and are
enabled by availability of capital from willing investors, and affordable and available
equipment either from the secondary market or from operating leases. A common
characteristic of new entrants besides high leverage is the willingness to defer
profitability for several years until sufficient levels of market share, name recognition, or
consumer loyalty is reached.
This effect of industry concentration on profitability can be captured in the model by two
equally effective ways: (i) exogenously defined target profitability levels and (ii)
endogenous dynamic of market entry and exit (see Ch. 9). This subsection investigates
the effect that these endogenous industry fluctuations have on the observed oscillatory
behavior with two experiments (shown in Table 10-6).
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The differences are captured in Figures 10-7 and 10-8 by comparing a flat target
profitability curve that corresponds (on this aspect only) to a more concentrated industry
with the calibrated target profitability curve that simulates two waves of new entrants and
hence two periods of reduced target profitability. In order to make the comparison more
clear we removed the influence of all external factors in these experiments.
Table 10-6 Experiments related to the effect of competitive environ
10.2.2.A Continuously concentrated industry and no external 0.56 0.53
factors
10.2.2.B Industry with interspersed waves of entry and
consolidation (calibrated endogenous) and no 0.64 0.53
external factors
A.rtine Prolit Levels(Nonelized I In 1984)
Figure 10-7 Normalized Airline profits Comparison
Order Levels (Normalized I In 1984)
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The effect of new entrants in fueling a profit cycle is pronounced whereas the effect on
order levels is much less so since we assumed that for these experiments industry
consolidation will only affect profit seeking and not the order process. These results are
robust even when we make industry concentration endogenous.
For completeness, it is also important to note the effect of the aircraft manufacturers'
competitive behavior in the above, which is demonstrated in Section 10.4.
From the above we can also see that the cycle in orders is influenced more heavily by the
forecasting process and variations in demand that are generated by the exogenous factors
rather than the cycle in airline profitability. This result indicates that it is possible to
retain a competitive yet less oscillatory market.
10.3 Countercyclical Strategic Alternatives
In the previous section we demonstrated that (i) exogenous factors trigger cyclical
behavior in the CA EoE but with varying relative significance and that (ii) the CA EoE
has endogenous dynamics that create cyclical behavior even when exogenous factors are
stabilized. We demonstrated (ii) by comparing between a continuous consolidated
environment (akin to the regulated period in airline history) vs. an open competitive
environment with entrants and exits (but with higher barriers to exit). Even with stable
exogenous factors the later environment was shown to generate business cycles.
Given that the variability in the exogenous factors is by definition not controllable, we
focus our attention on strategic alternatives that are aimed to counteract the cyclicality in
areas endogenous to the CA EoE. Based on the strategic alternatives that were developed
qualitatively in Chapter 7 we investigate the following areas:
Levels of flexibility in airline operations:
o Fixed vs. variable costs
* Fixed to Variable Costs: Profit Sharing and Outsourcing (Section
10.3.2). Investigates the transfer of fixed operating costs to
variable via profit-sharing agreements and service outsourcing as a
way to defer costs in a downcycle.
* Leasing Variation: Ownership fixed costs to flexible costs (Section
10.3.1.1). Investigates the effect of more flexible ownership costs
offered by leasing.
o Aircraft fleet management
* Flexibility in Aircraft Fleet Utilization (Section 10.3.1).
Investigates how different aircraft utilization strategies affect
cyclicality.
* Aircraft retirement patterns: Retirement Adjuster (Section
10.3.3.1). Investigates how a change in the aircraft retirement
patterns affects the CA EoE.
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* Aircraft ordering patterns
* Supply chain visibility (Section 10.3.3.4). Investigates
reductions in 'supply chain discounting'.
* Demand Forecasting (Section 10.3.3.2). Investigates
changes in forecasting: how smoother forecasts affect the
cycle.
* Adjusting the Effect of Profitability on Order Patterns
(Section 10.3.3.3). Presents the effects of moderating
ordering 'exuberance' in profitable for airlines periods.
* Changes in the airline competitive environment
o Competitive environment and yield management (Section 10.3.4.1).
Illustrates how industry consolidation and consequent increase in fare
prices affect cyclicality.
o Effect of Airline Entry and Exit (Section 10.3.4.2). Studies the effect of
changing barriers to entry and exit on pricing and how this impacts the
cyclicality in CA EoE.
* The competitive environment of aircraft manufacturers:
o Effects of Aircraft pricing (Section 10.3.5.1). Investigates the effect of
coordinated (i.e. assuming manufacturer cooperation) changes in aircraft
pricing.
o Production rate adjustments (Section 10.3.5.2). Investigates the effect of
coordinated (i.e. assuming manufacturer cooperation) changes in aircraft
production rates.
o Competitive strategies of aircraft manufacturers (Section 10.4). Removes
the coordination constraint and investigates how the competition between
manufacturers impacts the CA EoE.
10.3.1 Flexibility in Aircraft Fleet Utilization
Demand for air travel can be heavily seasonal and is also subject to external events9
While yield management is intended to even out some of these demand variations (see
Ch. 3), there still are times where demand is not matched with supply and therefore
supply needs to be readjusted. This is especially the case when there is overcapacity in
the market in which case the available responses for any airline are four: (i) reduce active
capacity by retirement of aircraft (secondary market sales may correct an imbalance if
other regional markets experience undercapacity but in general retain the capacity in the
market), (ii) reallocate the current active capacity to non-impacted routes (if there are
available markets), (iii) reduce operational capacity (use the existing active capacity at
lower utilization levels), and (iv) do nothing and simply compete aggressively on pricing.
Airlines do a combination of the above to obtain an outcome as close to their strategic
objectives as possible. Airlines that have the option to reallocate capacity or have low
enough operating costs to operate profitably with lower utilization rates have an obvious
advantage over airlines that have to reduce active capacity by cutting down on frequency
99 See Chapter 2.
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or even mothballing aircraft for periods of time as in this case they continue to incur the
aircraft capital costs and at least part of the fixed operating expenses like base crew
salaries and gate leases.
Assuming that reallocation is not possible (choice ii), then retirement (choice i) is an
option if there are aircraft in the right age bracket. Reduction of operational capacity by
reducing the utilization of active capacity (choice iii) is a viable option limited by the
requirements of network coverage (a carrier cannot stay in a market with frequencies that
are too low) and the fact that aircraft are expensive assets whose underutilization reflects
on the balance sheet. Moreover, in a downcycle, prices of aircraft in secondary markets
are also significantly reduced'" thus making any thoughts of selling less palatable and a
choice of the last resort. The same perspective is true for the majority of the leased
aircraft, for which the leasing terms are long enough as not to be useful in times of
significantly reduced demand1U 1
On an industry-wide basis, the more operational capacity is maintained on the market, all
else being equal, the less profitable average operations are. Therefore, the first strategy
for addressing this dynamic is to consider the effect that greater flexibility for
establishing operational capacity based on observed demand. In practical terms, the
policies that would allow this strategic alternative (i.e. increased fleet management
flexibility) include:
* Operating leases (wet or dry) for individual carriers,
* Buy-back agreements from the manufacturers (aircraft put options),
* Active time arbitrage for aircraft (buy low in downcycle with the expectation to
sell high during an upcycle),
* Greater industry consolidation in a manner that creates a competitive environment
that is not dictating maximum fleet utilization.
Experimental Results
We conduct a set of experiments comparing the baseline (moderate flexibility) for each
scenario that we identified with two experimental runs. Specifically the representative
alternatives are:
* Little flexibility (airlines are highly competitive in their market share and have
only a 10% leeway to park/underutilize their available equipment)
* Moderate flexibility (the baseline situation where on average airlines have a 20%
leeway in fluctuating their capacity. 102 with some like American Airlines having
up to 40% seasonal swings and Southwest having less than 5% seasonal swings).
* High flexibility (In this option, the flexibility accorded to airlines is up to 40% on
an industry-wide basis).
'00 See Ch. 4.
101 See Udvar-Hazy's opinion as CEO of ILFC, a large leasing firm, in Section 3.4.9.2.
102 These estimates of fleet management flexibility are based on the range of seasonal flexibility that is
observed in airlines currently. For example American Airlines has a seasonal fluctuation in its capacity of
about 40% while Southwest a more modest 5%.
282
Table 10-7 Flexibility in Aircraft Management
SScenario S S2 $3
periment eine Less Flex More Flex Baseline ss ex More Flex Baseline Less ex More Flex
NPV *10000 73.87 184. 79.29 53.57 140. 59.97 22.05 131
0 -26.1% 84.4 0.0% -32.4% 77.3 0.0 -63.2% 120.0
Coef. Var. 136 1.91 0. 1.04 1.85 0.7 18.76 7.93 3.0
000% 40.2% a30.6 t 0.0% 7 8.9% -27.3/ 0.0% -57.8% -8370
Median . Utiliation 738% 81.4% 61 72.8% 80.7% 57. 72.6% 80.1% 
63.0
NPV S 10000 93.77 123.4 66.70 62.29 86.o 117.07 114.79 137.
0.0 -62% 23.5 0. 29.0 0.0 -1.97 17.4/
Coef. Var. (Profit) 1.47 1.42 1 1.02 1.27 0. 2.1 2.48 1.8
otal orders r 10000 90.51 121.89 52.18 46.46 64.61 97.71 99.47 109.
000 -9.5% 21.97 0.00 -11.0% 23.87 0.0% 1.8% 11.87
Coef. Var. ordrers 083 0.90 0.7 0.43 0.59 0. 1.26 1.34i 1.1
00% 8.5% -5.4 0.0% 36.6% -12.6 0.0 6.5% -12.4
AveraS e Fare 10000 96.88 102.9 92.83 91.63 95. 101.20 100.97 103.43
00%t 3.0% 3.87 0.0% -3.1% 4.97/ 0.0%b 2.9%/ 2.97
verLF 67 73 69. 68.5% 72.7 67.3% 64.6% 70.5%
0.0 5. -1.7% 4.3 0.0% -3.9% 4.8
Note on significance: Given the uncertainties involved in model building, changes of less than 3% are not
considered significant differences. In the first place our model fidelity in some variables diverges from the
real-world values by 5%. For this reason, and in order to maintain a healthy margin against a false positive
we consider changes between 3% and 15% as indicative, while 15% or above are considered strong.
Interpretation and Discussion
For S1 a reduction in flexibility has a negative effect on airline NPV (-26.1%), the
reductions in the other two scenarios are more pronounced especially for S3, which sees a
reduction of 32%. The same holds true for manufacturers (6% reduction of profitability in
Si). Conversely, increasing flexibility provides a strong boost in the returns for the two
types of enterprise constituents. The improvement is more pronounced, ranging from
84.4% for the airline NPV in S1 to 120% in S3. This boost occurs because fleet flexibility
allows the airlines not to compete based on available capacity (i.e. park aircraft more
easily) and also as a result of this, allows airlines to order with less risk. This happens
even as the idle capacity is continued to be paid for by the airlines. The effect on
cyclicality are consistent with the above; for S1, the airline profitability cyclicality is
increased by 40% when less flexibility is allowed and decreased by 30% for more
flexibility.
We also note that the greatest benefits for airlines accrue under the more volatile Scenario
3 where the reduction in volatility of airline profitability and total order rates is the most
pronounced.
In other words, it benefits the CA EoE with an improvement between 20% to 50% in the
net present value of airline profitability and up to 30% of improvement in the airframe
manufacturers profitability to have an operational capacity limiting scheme, i.e. to be able
to reduce available operational capacity while still competing as aggressively as before in
the other dimensions using the remaining capacity. Such a reduction though becomes a
coordination and policing problem, going back to the prisoner's dilemma / variation of
tragedy of the commons discussed in Ch. 5.
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10.3.1.1 Leasing Variation: Ownership fixed costs to Variable Costs
Capacity flexibility in the previous set of experiments was achieved with the airlines
bearing the costs of the underutilized aircraft under the baseline leasing structure (starting
from less than 5% of the fleet and reaching up to 30% of it). In this experiment, we
wanted to explore what happens if the number of leased aircraft which transfers an
amount of the risk to the leasing firms varies. We used the following alternatives:
* Less leasing: Leased aircraft limited to 15% of the fleet.'0 3
* Moderate leasing (baseline): leased aircraft reach 35% of the fleet.
* More leasing: leased aircraft exceed 50% of the fleet
Experimental Results
The results from these experiments are shown in Table 10-8.
Table 10-8 Ownership Fixed to Variable Costs
SScenario I l S_2 83
Less
t Baseline Less Leasi More Leasi Baseline Leas More Leasi Baseline Less eas More Leasi
NPV 100. 100.24 101.7 7929 79.73 79. 59.97 59.10 62.8
0.00 0.2% . 0.0% -1 4. %
Coef.Var. 1.3 1.35 1. 1.04 1.03 1. 18.76 22.02 12.55
0.0% -0.8% -1. 0.0/ -1.0% 0.2 0.0% 17.4% -33.1
73.6% 72.8%ilization 72% 73.0 72.6% 72.6% 72.6
NPV 100.00 101.28 107. 66.70 65.47 69. 117.07 117.50 119.61
0.0% 1.0% 7.0 0.0% -1.8% 3.7 0.0 0.4%
Coef.Var. Proflt) 1.47 1.38 1. 1.02 1.10 0. 2.15 2.14 2.0
Total orders 100.00 97.81 106. 52.18 51.19 53. 97.71 97.97 96.2
0.0 -2.2% 6.0 0.0 -19 2.3 0.0 0.3 -1.5
Coef.. ordrers 0.8 0.86 0. 0.43 0.44 0. 1.26 1.25 1.2
0.0% 3.8% -3.4 0.0% 2.4% -1.4 0.0% -0.8% -3.5
Ave FarefI 100.0 101.27 96. 92.83 93.99 89. 101.20 10291 96
Median Fare 100. 101.60 93.61 89.55 90.74 85. 101.47 105.61 93.5
0 0.02 -0. 0.00 0.01 -0. 0.00 0.04 -0.0
Aver F 69.5% 698-Q 69.7% 69.7% 69. 67.3% 67.1% 67.8
0.0% -0.2% 0.4 0.0% 0.0% 0.1 0.0% -0 0.7
The effect of leasing as a way of transitioning ownership costs from fixed to variable for
the industry as whole is shown to be very limited (less than 1% while our margin of
significance is 3%) on the airline side on total profitability and its volatility. Where it
plays a minor role is in increasing the effect of price differentials in aircraft when
volatility is high, but this effect is hardly noticeable.
Interpretation and Discussion
As a result of the above experiments we can deduce that leasing is effective in the grand
scheme of reducing the airline profitability cycle only if it is combined with greater
flexibility in fleet utilization and not in and of itself. The reduction in aircraft ownership
costs it can provide during a downcycle is not sufficient and in practice countered by the
greater overall cost of lease financing, since as it has to include the profitability of the
lessor.
103 These are estimates intended for a sensitivity testing. They cover the existing situation -30% of LCA are
under some form of lease as well as the upside (50%) and the low end (15%) possibilities.
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10.3.2 Fixed to Variable Costs: Profit Sharing and Outsourcing
A common complaint of airlines in dire straits revolves around their fixed operating costs
from crew salaries and also airport operations. Crews need to be retained for the next
upswing in demand as their training and experience is expensive to duplicate. While
average crew real salaries have not increased faster than inflation (see Ch.3), legacy
airlines have to resort to bankruptcy protection in order to force further concessions from
their employees.
One way to potentially address this issue is to apply flexible industry-wide profit sharing
agreements and to outsource non-core operators. By implementing them, airlines will
have the flexibility to manage their operating costs during downturns but also the
obligation to better compensate their employees when their profitability targets are
exceeded and pay a premium to the airport-service firms for the flexibility to cancel their
contracts.
We investigate the effect of these alternatives with the following experiments:
* 15% cost deferment: Operating costs can be reduced up to 15% and the premium
for services is up to 5%.'04
* 25% cost deferment: Operating costs can be reduced up to 15% and the premium
for services is up to 8% of regular operating costs.
Experimental Results
The results from these experiments are shown in Table 10-9.
Table 10-9 Comarative Results for the Cost Deferment / Profit Sharin Strateic Alternative
Scenaro S 2 S3
15% Cost 25% Cost 15%Cost 25%Cost 15% Cost 25%Cos
n Baseline deferment determent Baseline deferment deferment Baseline deferment deferment
NPV 100.00 112.33 115.1, 79.29 86.17 87. 59.97 68.39 71.8
0.0 12.3% 15.1 0.0% 8.7% 10.2' 0.0 14.0% 19.
Coef.Var. 1.3 1.23 1.1 1.04 0.96 0. 18.6 11.45 10.1
0.0 -9.7% -13.4 0.0% -7.8% 4 39 -4.
Median .lizaion1 73.8% 75.1% 78.5 72.8% 74.1% 737/ 72.6% 76.6
NPV 100.00 121.62 129.4 66.70 81.52 87. 117.07 136.94 143.7
0.0% 20.2% 29.5 0.0% 22.2 31.8 0.0% 17.0% 22.8
Coef.Var. (Profit)1.47 1.42 1. 1.02 1.00 1. 2.15 2.12 1.98
Total orders 100.00 108.84 112.31 52.18 54.77 57 97.71 98.83 100.7
0.0% 8.8% 12.3 0.0/ 5.0% 9.8 0.0% 1.1% 3.
Coef. Var. ordrers 0.83 0.81 0. 0.43 0.38 0.3 1.2 1.22 1.1
0.0%/0 -2.5%1 -4.00 % 0.0 -10.9% -13.6 0.0% -3.7% -6.6
-- -4 -- 1 - --
Average Fare (1 100.00 95.94 93.4 92.83 88.95 86. 101.20 96.80 94.1
Median Fare 100.00 94.65 91. 89.55 85.35 81. 101.47 62 92.3
0.0% -5.3% -8.4 0.0% -4.7% -8.5 0 -5.8% -8.9
e LF 69.5% 70.3% 70.4 69.7% 70.1% 70.1 67.3% 682 68.5
10.0% .1% 1.3 0.0% 0.6  0.6 0.0% 1. 1
104 These estimates are hypothetical and represent savings from both outsourcing of non-core services
and/or profit sharing that amount to about 5% of total operating costs.
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Figure 10-9 Comparative Airline NPV Diagram for the Cost Deferment/ Profit Sharing Strategic
Alternative (Scenario Sl)
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Figure 10-10 Comparative Total Orders Diagram for the Cost Deferment/ Profit Sharing Strategic
Alternative (Scenario S1)
Interpretation and Discussion
In theory, this strategic alternative should facilitate stability in the airline profitability
cycles, and the model experiments shown in Table 10-9 and Figure 10-9. Cost deferments
increase airline profitability from 15% (Si 25% deferment) to almost 20% (S3 25%
deferment) and provide a reduction in cyclicality as well. Peaks and troughs are shaved
moderating the ordering behavior. More importantly, as costs "seem" to be reduced in the
troughs, this allows the downward push of prices to continue and increase overall
demand. The primary beneficiary of this are the airline customers that perceive
significantly reduced average fares (up to 8% for S1) and subsequently respond by
increasing the demand.
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This in turn supports the demand for more aircraft capacity (see Fig. 10-10 also) with
total orders increased from up to 12% but with only small reductions in the order
variation. Interestingly, manufacturers gain from the surge in orders which increases their
NPV return by up to 32% (S2 25% deferment).
In the upcycle, the reduced profitability (in Fig. 10-9 for 2012 the profit is reduced by
about 30%) would also induce slightly less competitor entrance.
As our experiments have pushed the level of costs that can be reduced to a relative
extreme (15% and 25% of operating expenses excluding fuel and maintenance), it is to be
expected that in practice any effect would be smaller. More importantly, implementation
would require strong discipline from the management and employee side to provide
increases when called for and accept the benefit reduction from the labor side. If either of
these fails then the effectiveness of the strategy is jeopardized as shown to be the case
historically (Petzinger). Schemes that have better chances of success may include stock
options rather than profit sharing (e.g. Southwest). Another disadvantage of this strategy
is that it requires industry-wide implementation to have the effect showed above - a far
from easy proposition, but on the other hand, it can be implemented by individual airlines
(it does not require cooperation) and to an extent it does, as the spread of outsourcing of
non-core airport services shows.
10.3.3 Changing Fleet Management Practices as Strategic Alternatives to
Counter Cyclicality
In the previous experiments, the order functions of the airline industry were only
indirectly influenced by the strategic alternatives that were examined. This set of
experiments is investigating the impact of direct changes in fleet management. We start
by applying the retirement adjuster strategy proposed by Skinner et al. (1999)(see Ch. 9).
10.3.3.1 Aircraft retirement patterns: Retirement Adjuster
The retirement adjuster strategy is based on a fairly simple concept: retire older aircraft
when profitability is low and retain them longer when profits are strong which by
implication means that available capacity is limited and retaining capacity eases the
strain.
Our baseline model is structured so that airlines do follow this strategy (see Ch. 9). In this
section we investigate its relative effectiveness. The three samples of this strategic
alternative are:
* Baseline: for negative profitability the normal retirement rate can be increased up
to double the normal and decreased down to 90% of the normal for positive
profitability.
* Stronger retirement adjuster: for negative profitability the normal retirement rate
can be increased up to triple the normal and decreased down to 70% of the normal
for positive profitability. The 'normal' retirement age of the aircraft is also
increased by 2 years to 27 years.
287
Weaker retirement adjuster: for negative profitability the normal retirement rate
can be increased up to 20% above the normal and decreased down to 95% of the
normal for positive profitability. The 'normal' retirement age of the aircraft is also
reduced by 2 years to 23 years.
Experimental Results
The results from this set of experiments are shown in Table 10-10.
Table 10-10 Comparative Results for the Retirement Adjuster Strategy
Scenario S1 S2 53
Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker Stronger Weaker
Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement
Interpretation and Discussion
The overall effect of strengthening or weakening the baseline retirement adjuster strategy
is minor and below our threshold of significance except for weakening the retirement
adjuster effect which has a 5% negative impact on airline profitability in the more volatile
Scenario 3. Similarly, although a stronger retirement adjuster strategy does seem to
positively influence the profitability of airlines (up to 2% increase in Si), it has no
measurable impact on the cycle and the same is true for the weaker adjuster strategy.
Part of the benefits from the strategy are offset by the poorer fleet-wide fuel efficiency
and greater maintenance costs that this strategy requires as a complication of the retention
of an older fleet. It should also be noted that in a very volatile environment like the one
simulated by Scenario S3 the value of this strategy is slightly greater as it prevents larger
losses.
This is not to say that our findings directly contradict the findings of Skinner et al (1999)
and the similar recommendations of Liehr et al. (2002). It may well be true that an
individual airline could benefit from having a reserve fleet of older aircraft used in less
dense routes for which the ownership costs are minimal as at this age the aircraft would
be amortized (although that is not true for their maintenance and operating costs,
primarily fuel consumption). We just find that as an industry-wide strategy, its influence
on the cycle is comparatively less pronounced. Finally, there are two downsides in
relying on an industry-wide retirement adjuster strategy that are not captured by the
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model: (i) the potential for increasing the industry's emissions due to the retention of
older aircraft and (ii) the fact that capacity is sticky and the tendency by competing
airlines to be reluctant to withdraw capacity unilaterally even if it is cheaper to do so.
10.3.3.2 Demand Forecasting
Another way to affect capacity is to change the order patterns of airlines. We saw that
airlines, like most enterprises, extrapolate from the present to define and project their
future needs. In aggregate, their projections are based on a relatively short past period
which we adjust in order to examine the effects that this would have on the overall
industry performance using the following experiments:
* Baseline: 3 years historic demand used to smooth the projections
* Smoother forecast: 6 years history used to smooth projections
* Less smooth forecast: 1.5 year of historic demand used to smooth projections
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-11 and presented
graphically in Figures 10-11 and 10-12.
Table 10-11 Comparative Results for Forecasting Adjustment Strategy
Scenario S1 S2 S3
Longer Shortter Longer Shortter Longer Shortter
History History (less History History (less History History (less(smoother smooth (smoother smooth (smoother smooth
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Figure 10-11 Comparative Airline NPV Diagram for the Forecast Adjustment Strategic Alternative
(Scenario S1)
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Figure 10-12 Comparative Total Orders Diagram for the Forecast Adjustment Strategic Alternative
(Scenario S1)
Interpretation and Discussion
A look at the results would indicate that the long history adjustment of the forecast
improves the profitability for both the airlines (up to 17% for S1 and S2 and 34% for S3)
and the manufacturers (up to 14% NPV improvement for S3) while not dramatically
increasing the prices for passengers (less than 1% increase in average fare). The
manufacturers receive a more stable order pattern (see Fig. 10-12) and that is the key
explanation for their profitability as cumulatively they receive fewer orders. All this
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comes at the cost of slightly increased cyclical behavior for the airline profitability both
at the bottom and the peak of the cycle which is indicative of a lag in the desired level of
capacity and the capacity actually ordered (expected as the forecast trend becomes less
sensitive to short-term variation). Interestingly in the volatile scenario (S3) both of the
alternatives do better than the baseline in dampening the cycle although only the
smoother forecasts does improve overall profitability.
The picture is reversed when the short-term history forecast is used: cyclicality in the
airline profitability is slightly reduced from the base case but this means that the cost of
acquiring the aircraft is increased due to the increased variation in orders and, more
importantly, the capacity that is available at any given time is increased by following the
often spurious short-term small upward moves.
Overall, lengthening the historic forecast period smooths order patterns and increases
overall profitability primarily by restricting supply of aircraft in upturns but with the
disadvantage of persistence in ordering in the downtrends. As a result, the smoother order
pattern in one echelon of the CA EoE value chain (manufacturers) does little, in this case,
to resolve cyclicality for the airline industry, although the end outcome is significantly
positive. That is, there are strategic alternatives that although they increase cyclicality in
the long run, they provide benefits to the bottom line for the CA EoE constituents
10.3.3.3 Adjusting the Effect of Profitability on Order Patterns
Similar in concept to adjusting the forecast history for smoothing the aircraft order
pattern, we consider the effect that profitability exerts on aircraft orders. The effect of
profitability simulates the disproportionate increase of orders during profitable periods
and their reduction during unprofitable ones. As discussed in Ch. 3, the increase in orders
during the upcycle can be attributed to the availability of capital, exuberant expectations
of demand growth and market share capture by any given airlines, and the increased
number of entrants during these periods - entrants that need aircraft to operate.
To explore what the impact is of changes in this aspect of the ordering behavior of
airlines we conducted the following experiments:
* Baseline: In low profitability times, the calculated (forecasted) amount of orders
is reduced by up to 20% and inflated up to 20% when profitability targets are met
or exceeded.
* Unreactive to profit: In low profitability times, the calculated amount of orders is
reduced up to only 5% and inflated up to 5% when profitability targets are met or
exceeded.
* Reactive to profit -moderated: In low profitability, the calculated amount of
orders is reduced by up to 40% and inflated up to 5% when profitability targets
are met or exceeded.
* Reactive to profit: In low profitability, the calculated amount of orders is reduced
by up to 70% and inflated up to 40% when profitability targets are met or
exceeded.
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Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-12 and presented
graphically in Figures 10-13 and 10-14.
Table 10-12 Comparative Results for Profitability Effect on Order
scnai IS1 S2 83
Unreactive to Reaclve to Reactiveto Unreactive to Reactive to Reactive to Unreace t I Reactve to Reactive oS Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit ProfitBsD Or rdBaseine Or Baseline
100.00 58.43 151.37 152. 79.29 38.63 119.00 119. 50.97 6.27 102.95 113.64
0.0% -41.6% 51.4 52.4 0.0%1 51.3% 50.1% 50.1 0.0% -69.5% 71.7% 89.
COe. Var. 1.36 2.59 1.19 1.21 1.04 3.53 0.70 0.7 18.76 -5.01 12
0.0% 90.6% -12. -10. 0.0% 240.1% -32.6% -32.5 0.0% -126.-64
Median . us lo 73.6% 70.3%1 83.41 8.0 72.8%1 70.1%1 66.6% 69.2% 72.6*M 609.6% 64 2
100.00 112.96 97.67 04. 66.7 72.34 53.70 52 117.07 12B.19 129.21 1144NPV 
n -21
N~,0.0% 13.0% -3.3% -5.4% 0.0% .6.% -19.5% -21. 0.0% =9 104% *
Var. 1. 1. 1.51 1. 1 . 2. 14 2.
otalder100.00 10779 90.34 90.55. 97.71 1 1119. 
781
0.0% 7.6% -9.7% --9.3% 0.0% 5.7% -16.6% -17.8% 0.0% 9.7% 22.6% 10COo. Var. 05 0. 0. 1 1 1
0.0% 6.7% 14.1% 5. 0.0% 15.5% 12.3% 7. 0.0% 04 33.0% 23.4
4AveraosFae 100.00 100.61 99.631 9.4 92.63 90.11 91.52 914 101.20 101.93 102. 101.1
1Fr00.00 100.65 90.30 . 9.2 87.2 87.4 101.47 103.51 105.96 102
0.0% 0.7% -0.7% -1. 0% -. -2.6% -. 4 0.0% 2.0% 44% 0.
LF I 69.5% 68.0% 71.9% 72.1 69.7% 71.7% 71. 67.3% 654 70.0% 70.8
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Figure 10-13 Comparative Airline NPV Diagram for the Profit Effect Adjustment Strategic
Alternative (Scenario S1)
Interpretation and Discussion
Observation of the results show that as a general rule, disregarding the profitability
indications'05 leads to deteriorated performance. Profitability drops significantly (50%
for S1 and S2 and almost 90% for the more volatile S3) when airlines rely solely on
forecasts for their ordering. In other words, following the market signals rather than the
forecasts, in the competitive CA EoE, is a more rewarding way of operating. This is a
105 Profitability is a reliable signal for over- or undercapacity in competitive markets by model design and
following basic economic tenets.
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'surprising' outcome in some ways as in theory decoupling ordering from the effects of
'exuberance' would be expected to moderate the cycle which is shown not to be the case.
The strategy of being moderately reactive performs better than the other two alternatives
in all of the scenarios, as it allows for a less varying order stream for manufacturers. In
this case, the strength of the strategy stems from a not-excessive limitation of orders
during the downcycle which pushes profitability enough in the upcycle to retain order
levels equal to the baseline.
From the implementation perspective, the industry appears to use the signal from
changing profitability sensibly although reducing the "exuberance" side of the ordering
cycle is shown to be beneficial for both the airline and the manufacturer industries with
limited negative impact on the customers.
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Figure 10-14 Comparative Aircraft Orders Diagram for the Forecast Adjustment Strategic
Alternative (Scenario S1)
10.3.3.4 Supply Chain Visibility
The third strategic alternative related to ordering patterns investigates the effect of taking
into account the backlog in aircraft orders and reducing the 'supply chain discounting'
effect noted in Ch. 6 and 7 generally and implemented in the SD CA EoE as described in
Ch.9. The SD literature discussed in Chapter 8 also demonstrated the importance of
backlog visibility in supply chains. Even an idealized supply chain made of individuals is
prone to disregarding the backlog orders as was repeatedly shown by the 'beer game'
demonstrations (see Sterman 1989 and Ch. 6).
In the much more complex airline industry, competitive behavior that leads to market
overestimation (exuberance), order gaming (phantom orders), and the desire to remain
competitive have the effect of a cumulative industry behavior to heavily discount the
aircraft in order backlog when placing their current orders. The 'supply chain visibility'
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strategic alternative balances this trend by taking into account a percentage of the actual
current backlog of airframe manufacturers when ordering new aircraft.
To investigate the importance of this effect we run the following experiments:
* Baseline: (0% supply chain visibility which is equivalent to 100% supply chain
discounting)
* 50% visibility of the supply chain
* 75% visibility of the supply chain
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-13 and presented
graphically in Figures 10-15 and 10-16.
Table 10-13 Comparative Results for the Supply Chain Visibility Strategic Alternative
Scenario S1 S2 S3
50% SC 75% SC 50% SC 75% SC 50% SC 75% SC
ent Baseline Visib Visiblity Baseline i V i Baseline V i i
NPV 10000 238.53 314.3 79.29 176.65 236. 59.97 206.70 273.4
0.0% 138.5% 214. 0.0 122.8% 198.9 0.0% 244.6% 355.9
Coef. Var. 136 1.11 0. 1.04 0.73 0. 18.76 1.22 0.88
00 -18.3% -27.1 0.0 -30.1 -39.5 0.0% -93.5% -95.3
ization 99.4% 100 72.8 99.4% 100.0 72.6% 97.8% 99.8
NPV 10000 63.29 54. 66.70 39.64 36. 117.07 70.93 63.4
0% -36.7% -45.6 0.0 -40.6% 45 0.0% -39.4% -45.8
Coef. Var. (Profit)1.4 2.08 2.41 1.02 2.25 2. 2.15 3.75 2.97
Total orders * 100.00 67.75 62.71 52.18 32.86 31.51 97.71 59.16 48.58
0. -32.2% -37.3 0.0 -37.0% -39.6 0.0% -39 -50.3/
Co. Var. ordrers 0.83 1.03 1.0 0.43 0.73 0. 1.26 1.38 1.2
0.0% 24.5% 28.4 0.0 69.7% 10.0% -0.2%
Averae Fare ( 100.00 97.69 98. 92.83 90.27 90.7 101.20 98.41 98.41
Median Fare I100.00 97.13 9. 89.55 86.89 88. 101.47 99.24 98.6
0.0% -2.9% -3.4 0.0 -3.0% -1.7 0.0% -22 -2.8
Aver LF 69.5% 75.8% 78.9 69.7 74.8% 77. 67.3% 75.6% 78.3
0.0 9.0% 135 0.0 7.3% 11.5 0.0% 12.3% 16.4,/
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Figure 10-15 Comparative Airline NPV Diagram for the Supply Chain Visibility Strategic
Alternative (Scenario S1)
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Figure 10-16 Comparative Total Orders Diagram for the Supply Chain Visibility Strategic
Alternative (Scenario S1)
Interpretation and discussion
The effect that supply chain visibility has is indeed quite dramatic as the NPV of airline
profitability in effect doubles (140% change for 50% SC visibility in S1 and up to 240%
change in S2). The impact is higher the more volatile the environment is, as indicated by
a comparison between S3 and S2. This does come at a price for the manufacturers for
which the total order rates and profitability plummet while the variability of orders is
increased significantly (CV increases by 25% for S1 50% visibility and 70% for S2 for
the same strategic alternative). While passengers face higher load factors (thus lower
service levels and as a result, need lower prices to be induced to travel) the total levels of
both demand and the average and median fare remains close to the baseline.
This seemingly very effective strategy is a traditional remedy for the bullwhip effect in
the supply chain management literature (see Chapters 6 and 7). We find that it does not
work exactly as expected for the whole value chain as some of the "excess" capacity that
is ordered acts as a buffer for the errors in forecasting. The removal of that buffer makes
ordering more erratic (increasing order CV by up to 90% for the S2 75% visibility) and
hurts the profitability of manufacturers who because of their competitive situation have to
carry this additional cost. Yet, the potential for implementation is quite low in a
fragmented industry environment. It would require a consolidation of the ordering
process and a compensation scheme for manufacturers who would otherwise have the
incentive to continue supplying larger volume of aircraft to any party interested in buying
them as their volatility of orders is in fact increased.
10.3.4 Changes in the Airline Competitive Environment
We have seen in Chapter 7 that an increase in the number of new entrants induced by
lower barriers to entry and the difficulty to shed capacity due to barriers to exit can lead
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to overcapacity and consequent severe price competition. Anti-trust regulations can
prevent industry consolidation and as a result the decision to merge or not resides with
the airlines but the ability to do so involves both government and capital market
stakeholders (financing).
In this section we focus on the pricing effects of consolidation as the effects on order
rates and fleet management were discussed previously.
10.3.4.1 Competitive Environment and Yield Management
This set of experiments looks at how different competitive environments influence the
CA EoE by employing variable yield management. As we discussed in Ch. 3, using yield
management, airlines adjust their prices so as to achieve the desired load factors. In a
competitive environment, airlines are willing to lower their prices much more than if they
operate as a monopoly (which is true even for contestable markets). To see how this
influences cyclicality we conduct the following experiments
* Baseline: The desired fare level (calculated by a cost plus target profit model) can
be increased or decreased by up to 20% to adjust to the external demand.
* More competitive: The desired fare level can be increased only up to 8% and
reduced by 45%.
* More consolidated: The desired fare level can be increased up to 35% and
reducedby 10%.
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-14.
Table 10-14 Comparative Summary Results for the Effect of Competitive Environment and
Consolidation in Pricing
cenariao S1 S2 S3
I HLA-e LnA- hA LA- LA-e L mUA
Interpretation and Discussion
It is not surprising to note that the consolidated industry has lower load factors but
significantly higher NPV for airlines (more than doubled at 144% for S1 and S2 and
274% for S3). The coefficient of variation in their profitability is also reduced (by almost
50% from 1.30 to 0.7 for S 1) but that is not translated in a reduction for the variation in
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total orders (slight increase from 0.83 to 0.86 for Si). Even so, airframe manufacturers
increase their revenues as well (by 7% for Si), because the higher profitability increases
the number of total orders.
It should be noted though that this strategic alternative does not include changes in the
ordering patterns which would most probably be a direct consequence of consolidation in
the industry (but not necessarily so in the case of simple pricing collusion). It is expected
that a consolidated airline industry would manage their fleet with less variation (but this
would not be the case with a colluding industry). Even in this case, the airframe
manufacturers may not benefit much as they would face customers with stronger
purchasing power.
Overall, pricing power in a consolidated industry is quite a strong mechanism for
reducing variability but returning to the regulated environment that would allow such
behavior is not a feasible standalone political option. The argument for greater
consolidation needs to be tied to increases in service levels. From the model results this is
shown to be a plausible claim as the increase in the fare price to the end consumer (fare
increases by up to 7% for S3) is balanced by an increase in service levels (load factors as
our proxy for them are reduced by little less than 4% across the board). More
importantly, the inverse - i.e. more competition - provides some benefit in price
reductions compared to the baseline (between 3 and 7%) but it also amplifies cyclicality
in profitability substantially (tripling the C.V from 1.36 to 4.16 in Sl). Yet interestingly,
this profitability do not translate into additional order swings.
10.3.4.2 Effect of Firm Entry and Exit on Pricing
One effect of changing the barriers to entry and exit is to adjust ordering practices, the
magnitude of which as we saw in Section 10.4.3 can be quite substantial. In this section
we isolate the effect of entry and exit to pricing; a large number of new entrants lowers
the profitability expectations in the whole industry (therefore the base pricing) as they
attempt to establish. The reverse is true for a consolidated industry. We investigate this
effect of entry and exit with the following experiments:
* Higher entry rates and lower exit rates: More competitive environment by
doubling the baseline entry rates and halving the exit rates.
* Lower entry rates and higher exit rates: Less competitive environment by halving
the baseline entry rates and doubling the exit rates.
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-15.
Interpretation and Discussion
As in the previous section, the results coincide with the expectations of economic theory:
i.e. consolidation allows prices to rise and stabilizes the output of the industry and the
welfare of the final consumer is degraded. What is interesting in this set of results is that
the relative impact of changing entry and exit rates from the consequent pricing changes
is small but not insignificant (7% benefit to airline profitability and a 10% reduction in
CV for S1 that can be up to 24% airline profitability increase and 60% reduction in CV
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for the more volatile S3 scenario). These effects do not come at the expense of the
consumer as there is no significant change in the median fare.
Table 10-15 Comparative Summary Results for the Effect of Adjusting Barriers to Entry and Exit on
Fare Pricing
ScenarSo S S2 S3
Lower Entry Higher Entry Lower Entry Higher Entry Lower Entry Higher Entry
Higher Exit Lower Exit Higher Exit Lower Exit Higher Exit Lower Exit
rmex t Baseline Rates Rates Baseline Rates Rates Baseline Rates Rates
PV 100.00 113.30 95.5 81.50 89.99 77.1 62.01 76.95 55.91
0.0% 7.2% -9.6 0.0% 10.4% 5 24.1%
Coef. Var. 1.31 1.1 1.31 1.00 0.92 1. 17.21 37.2
0.0% -10. 0.0 0.0/ -8.2% 4.10/ -59. 116.20/
Median 7C . Utilization 7 .74.1 2.6 72.7% 73.0% 73.173.0
NPV* 100.00 102.24 105. 68.74 67.82 67 1 121 125.8
0.0% 22% 5.50/ 0.0% -1.3% -1.1- 0.0% -3.5% -0.40/
Coef.Var. (Proft) 1.50 1.42 1. 1.00 1.01 0. 1.77 1.92 1.7
Total orders 100.00 99.92 100. 52.96 51.22 51. 99.79 98.7,0.0% -0.6% 0.50/ 0.% -3.3% -3.00/ 0.0% -1.6% -1.01
Co . Var. rdrers 0.86 0.88 .8 0.42 0.4 5 0. 1.24 1.23 1.2
0.0 2.5% 1.4 0.0% 6.9/ 8.50/ -0.6
Averae Fare ( 100.00 100.31 99.8 92.85 93.06 92. 101.20 101.56 101.0
Median Fare 100.00 99.97 100.0 88.92 89.10 88.7 101.40 102.06 101.21
0.0 0.1% 0.2 0.0% 02% -0 0.0% 0.6% -0.2
Aver LF 69.5% 69.6% 69.8% 69.7% 69.8 67.3% 67.3% 67.3%
0.0% 0.0% 0.1 0.0/ 0.0% 0.0 0.0 % 0.0
10.3.5 Aircraft Manufacturer-specific strategic alternatives
As noted in the previous set of experiments, the aircraft capacity aspect of the CA EoE is
a most critical one. Therefore, the action of aircraft manufacturers, as influenced by their
competitive environment, are expected to influence the whole CA EoE. In the set of
experiments presented in this section, we investigate the effect of pricing policies and
manufacturer competition along with the effect of production rates and planning.
10.3.5.1 Airframe Manufacturers: Effects of Aircraft Pricing
Aircraft pricing (which included additional incentives for an aircraft like financing,
buyback agreements and performance guarantees) is a key component of aircraft
manufacturing competition. Testing its influence on the cycles of the CA EoE we run
experiments in which the price of aircraft was altered based on current demand. For this
exercise we forced the two manufacturers to follow the same pricing policy (a constraint
that will be relaxed when discussing the airframe manufacturers' strategies in Section
10.4).
These experiments test the relative impact of discounting from list price for aircraft. In
Ch. 4, Figure 4-9, we saw that these discounts can be as much as 50% for mass orders
although price increases are not as substantial, assuming that the average selling price is
80% of the list price would allow for increases to reach the actual list prices when aircraft
supply is tight.
The experiments that were conducted to explore the relative impact over this range of
discounts are the following:
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* Baseline pricing: Adjusted upwards or downwards by up to 20% in an effort to
manage demand towards the current production rate.
* Manufacturer collusion: Pricing is adjusted only 10% downwards and up to 40%
upwards. Manufacturers do not compete on gaining market share either.
* Manufacturer signal pricing: Strong swings of pricing both ways: 50%
downwards and 40% upwards.
* Manufacturer intense competition: Pricing downward adjustment of up to 50%
discounts from the desired (list price) when demand is low. Aggressive
discounting for capturing market share was also included in this run.
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Table 10-16 and Figure 10-
18.
Table 10-16 Comparative Summary Results for the Aircraft Pricing Strategic Alternatives
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Figure 10-17 Comparative Diagram of Airline NPV for Aircraft Pricing
106 As discussed in Ch. 9, if demand for aircraft persists, the production rates are raised but this comes at a
cost and is a delayed response.
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Interpretation and Discussion
The dramatic changes in aircraft pricing based on supply/demand equilibration that are
showcased by the three stylized experiments appear to have little effect on the airline
competitive behavior (airlines see a reduction of slightly more than 17% in signal
manufacturer competition for S1 and up to 24% for S2). Cutthroat pricing expectedly
results in significant losses for the manufacturers (ranging from -60% for S 1 to -130% for
S2) and would have repercussions in aircraft R&D that are not modeled here.
The signal pricing, on the other hand, in which price swings to extreme in both directions
improves the manufacturers' profitability substantially (30-40% across scenarios)
Ordering and owning more expensive aircraft during an upcycle does not seem to induce
substantially less orders anymore that lower prices in the downcycle induce more orders.
These results are based on the indirect effect of changing the ownership costs of aircraft
which are transferred to consumers despite the competitiveness of the airline industry.
Also, the psychological inducement of a steep aircraft discount which is known to play a
role in aircraft buying is not modeled here; this may increase the actual impact of these
strategies on a case by case basis. Overall, swings in aircraft pricing provide little benefit
to the airline industry and in fact intense competition with the consequent reduction in
ownership costs are simply passed on to consumers.
10.3.5.2 Airframe Manufacturers: Production Rate Adjustments
Besides pricing, production scheduling is another lever available to airframe
manufacturers with a potential of significant impact on the CA EoE. Production rate
changes simply respond differently to the changes in aircraft demand and only impact it
by second order effects (e.g., without supply chain visibility, a decrease in production
rate responsiveness increases 'invisible' backlogs and as a consequence the swings in
demand will be exacerbated). Given the history of previous experiments we expect that
the leverage of this alternative would be significant and the results indeed do not
disappoint.
We conduct experiments in which both manufacturers follow the same strategies that are
categorized into slower production rate adjustments and faster production rate
adjustments. The following stylized experiments were conducted:
* Slow production rate change: MF.A is mimicking MF.B in their production rate
and backlog choices. The change of production rates is slowed to one third of the
rate of change in baseline for MF.B and the backlog increased to from two to six
years.
* Slow production rate change and 25% SC visibility: We explore the synergies
provided by a slower production rate and a more informed ordering strategy that
is no misled by the large backlog accumulation.
* Fixed production scheduling: Production adjustment are entirely decoupled from
orders and pegged to long-term air transport demand trends.
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* Quick production rate change: MF.B adopts the manufacturing practices of MF.A
with faster production rate changes and shorter backlogs. The change of
production rates is increased to double the rate of change in baseline.
* Just-in-time (JIT) delivery: both manufacturers transition to very fast production
rate changes and backlogs of around a year or less. Linear production scheduling:
Production rate changes are disabled entirely and replaced by a fixed production
schedule that is using a linear regression of the projected demand growth rates for
the entire simulated period. In order to make this option feasible is to utilize lean
manufacturing methods that reduce the costs of production rate changes.
* Just-in-time (JIT) delivery and 25% SC visibility: This experiment retains the
manufacturing process of the previous one but it also investigates the potential
synergy offered by a reduction in the supply chain discounting by 25%.
Experimental Results
The results from the relative experiments are summarized in Tables 10-17 and 10-18 and
Figure 10-19.
Table 10-17: Comparative Summary Results for Aircraft Production Rate Adjustment Strategic
Alternatives (Slower or decou led production)
se1 S2 S s
Both slow Both slow Both slow
prod rate prod rate prod rate
Both slow change + Both slow change + Both slow change +
prod. rate 5%SC Fixed prod. rate 25%SC Fixed prod. rate 25%SC Fixed
ment Baseline change vilbity Production Baseline change visiity Production I Baseline ch v Production
NPV 100.00 121.28 210.85 213.1 79.29 78.53 143.28 85. 59.97 93.8 1 200.96 76.
.0% 21.3%1 110.9% 113.1 0.0% -0% 80.7 82 0.0% 56.5%1 2351% 27.
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- - - -7---% - - -1.
NPV20% for S .For the less volatile S2 scenario, the manufacturers still see benefits from the 128.0. 7st3.ra7tegy (46% increase in profitability) but the airlines' profitability is not affected1.4% 17.6% 9This
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Interpretation and Discussion
As anticipated, this strategic alternative shows significant potential for affecting the CA
EoE. Simply slowing down the production rate changes to one third of the baseline,
increases manufacturers' welfare by 74% for SI while increasing airline profitability by
20% for S 1. For the less volatile S2 scenario, the manufacturers still see benefits from the
strategy (46% increase in profitability) but the airlines' profitability is not affected. This
strategy also exhibits synergies with the SC visibility strategic alternative; airline
profitability jumps by 110% for SI and even more for S3 which is more volatile. Not
only that, but in both cases the median fare sees small decreases that can be attributed to
the efficiency gains in production by the manufacturers. Overall, these two strategies
show indications of a symbiotic win-win-win combination assuming that the they are
implementable which will be discussed later in this section.
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Table 10-18 Comparative Summary Results for Aircraft Production Rate Adjustment Strategic
Alternatives (Quicker or JIT aircraft delivery)
Scei$l 1___ SI___________ 2 S____ 3 ___
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Figure 10-18 Comparative Diagram of Airline NPV for Production Rate Adjustments
A fixed production schedule adopted by both manufacturers provides a marginal
improvement in airline profitability over the Slow + SC visibility strategic alternative
raising airline profitability by 113% for S1 (3% more) but the manufacturers see their
profitability skyrocket by 171% as all production rate changes fall within the range of
sustaining the learning curve effect. Interestingly but not unexpectedly, with an entirely
rigid aircraft delivery date that is not reactive to changes in demand, in the low volatility
scenario (S2), the linear production rate strategy is in fact increasing the volatility of the
performance of the airlines as it adapts slower than forecasting. Besides this, the
downsides to this alternative include an increase in the cost of travel for the consumer (up
to 2% for the S2 case) but, importantly, a substantial increase in the average load factors
and equipment utilization which imply a deterioration of service levels.
On the other hand, the JIT delivery set of experiments, and to a lesser extent the faster
production rate changes alone, does show a net positive impact to airlines for the more
volatile scenarios (S 1 and S3) but at a significant cost for the manufacturers that have to
adjust their production rates almost instantly even when lean production is in place.
-S1 Airline Proit NPV Baseline
--4-- S1 M Slowpod rate charge
----- 1 M Fast prod rate charge
- - S1 M Uneer Prodxtion SchecUing
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10.3.6 Strategic Alternative Review and Comparative Discussion
Using the results above, we can specify the strategic alternatives that would be expected
to have the better performance in moderating the CA EoE oscillatory behavior based on
the relative impact of the mechanisms that were investigated. Table 10-19 summarizes
the results from the key experiments conducted in this section while Figure 10-19 shows
the strategic alternatives that are within the 'symbiotic quadrant' for airlines and
manufacturers.
Exogenous factors do provide a continuous noise input that changes the equilibrium of
the system and their absence would go a long way towards stabilizing the system. In
practice though, this is not a workable proposition and it is the system itself that amplifies
these input variations and propagates the cycle by almost doubling the volatility. (Section
10.2.1)
Focusing on the things that the CA EoE constituents have control over, we found that the
competitive environment does affect amplitude of the cycles and, in absence of external
factor noise, the changes in the competitive environment do create cyclical behavior
affected by the waves of entry and consolidation but with lesser amplification. This
means that it is possible to retain the benefits of competitive behavior without the level of
cyclical variation currently observed. Our working hypothesis, that control over
cyclicality would have positive impacts on the CA EoE constituent enterprises is also
shown to be correct as all the alternatives that improve the value for "universal owners"
reduce cyclicality as perceived by the constituent enterprises and shown by reductions in
the coefficient of variations in profitability and order patterns. The only seeming
exception (MF fixed production rate) increases cyclicality for airlines but it practically
eliminates it for manufacturers (total decoupling of production from orders).
Transforming some of the short-term fixed costs for airlines to variable through profit
sharing in its current form has a small but significant positive effect in moderating the
cycle but it does increase profitability for the airline industry (at the expense of
employees mostly).
Affecting the supply of capacity instead can have dramatic impact in the reduction of the
cycle. Increasing the flexibility of capacity or moderating the order rates so that they take
into account the backlog of the entire industry go a tremendous way towards reducing
cyclicality.
Intervention by manufacturers alone, on the other hand, in the form of managing their
backlogs and production rates more efficiently (lean production) can moderately help
compared to the existing situation (especially since the conventional approach to orders is
that due to airline related delays, any deliveries in less than a year's time are bound to be
underutilized. Deterioration of service and backlog explosion though amplifies the cycles
to the extreme. Similarly, pricing discipline by the manufacturers and strong signaling
has little noticeable effects.
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Figure 10-19 Relative Plot of Strategic Alternatives Performance for Airlines and Manufacturers
based on S1 (shaded 'symbiotic' quadrant)
From the experiments in this section we can draw the following general conclusions:
* Control of capacity is key in controlling the performance of the CA EoE
* Reductions in volatility in the CA EoE are positively related to improved
performance (with the exception of when airline performance is decoupled from
ordering as in the MF fixed production experiments)
* After airline industry consolidation/collusion, the more powerful strategic
alternative is decoupling aircraft production from ordering (i.e., adoption by
MF.A of the MF.B production strategy of higher backlogs and slower production
rate changes)
* Implementation of a JIT delivery strategy has comparatively less impact than the
previous strategic alternative and its success relies on the technological ability to
adjust production rates. It has the advantage that it does not require any
cooperation/collusion between constituents vertically or laterally.
In the next two subsections we will review and explain these findings in terms of their
dynamic behavior in Section 10.3.7 and in terms of their theoretic implications in Section
10.3.8.
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Table 10-19 Color-coded Comparative Review of Effects of Strategic Alternatives Averaged Over
Scenarios Ranked by Universal Owner Returns
75% SC visibility
More consolidated airlines
MF fixed prod. Rate
Slow prod rate change + 25%SC visibility
50% SC visibility
MF Collusion
More flexibility
Slow prod rate change
Reactive to profit ordering
Mod reactive to profit ordering
MF JIT+ lean + 25% SC visibility
25% cost deferrment
Mf signal pricing: sensitive
Longer history (smoother forecast)
MF JIT+ lean
15% cost deferrment
Lower entry higher exit
MF Quick prod. Rate
Baseline with active firm entry and exit
More leasing
Higher entry lower exit
Stronger retirement adjuster
Less leasing
Shorter history (less smooth forecast)
Weaker retirement adjuster
Less flexibility
Unreactive to profit ordering
More competitive
MF intense competition: high comp
iGreen: indicative positive impact Tor me constituent enterprise
Orange indicative negative impact for the constituent enterprise
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•
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10.3.7 The Endogenous CA EoE cyclicality amplification mechanisms
Figure 10-20 Endogenous Amplification mechanisms for the CA EoE (Relevant Sections 10.3.7.1 and
10.3.7.2)
From the cyclicality inducing mechanisms in the CA EoE described in Ch. 7, we showed
that some are more prominent than others.
We summarize each mechanism and our findings in the subsections below and with the
help of Figure 10-20.
10.3.7.1 Mechanism 1: Low Barriers to Entry, High Barriers to Exit
Indicated with the green bold arrows in Fig. 10-20, this amplification mechanism is based
on the delay of entry: an unanticipated increase in travel demand for which capacity is
not adequate, improves the profitability of existing carriers which in turn attracts new
entrants. The new entrants intensify competition to gain market share and drop the
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"targetprofitability" for the industry which in turn suppresses airline fares and
profitability. If exit is slower than entrance, then this slump in profitability can be
protracted even if it does not coincide with a demand trough.
As described in Section 10.3.4.2, we found that changing the rates of entry and exit has
relatively less impact to the industry compared to changing the intensity of competition.
In this case, as Section 10.3.4.1 discussed, the deeper the competition (i.e. price war) the
more intense the cycle becomes (volatility in the system is increased by 25% when tickets
can be discounted up to 45% of the normal profit price as opposed to 20% of the
baseline).
The latter refers particularly to the 'intensity' of the [Load_Factors] - [AirlineFares]
link that represents the yield management system. When fare prices are more sensitive to
load factors amplifies the effect of the mechanism discussed in the next section.
10.3.7.2 Mechanism 2: Aircraft Order Delivery Lead Time Effect
This is the classic bullwhip mechanism. In Fig. 10-20 is shown in bold orange arrows.
An unanticipated increase in demand boosts the forecast for future demand which in is in
turn translated in aircraft orders. A side mechanisms that amplifies these orders is the
investment exuberance which fuels the increase in the orders based on an increase in
profitability ([Airline_profitability] - [Desired_capacity] shown in brown arrows).
Depending on the manufacturers production capacities and policies, the orders can take
anywhere from two to six years to materialize as capacity. In the meantime, capacity is
lacking, load factors remain high, and so is profitability which continues to press the
order rates upwards.
Once these cumulative orders start to materialize, load factors are suddenly lowered and
profitability along with them. Orders suffer disproportionately, thus preparing the ground
for the next iteration of this mechanism.
In section 10.3.3.2, we saw that 'smoothing' the historic data points used for ordering,
improves profitability but, also, slightly increases cyclicality. This happens because the
overall inertia of the system is increased that way and the effects of additional profits
when the airline orders are slow to respond to an upward demand trend actually
exacerbate the mechanism described here.
The "moderately reactive to profit ordering" strategic alternative discussed in Section
10.3.3.3 was more effective, and more consistent, in increasing returns for airlines and
reducing cyclicality. It exploits the ([Airline_profitability] - [Desiredcapacity] link by
making airlines to order less aircraft in downturns but also capping the exuberance in
upturns. As discussed in Section 10.3.3, this mechanism is effective but only on an
industry wide basis as it would penalize any single airline that would try to follow it.
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A balancing link to this mechanism is the one shown as the dotted thin orange arrow link:
[Order_Backlog] - [Desired_Capacity]. It provides the ability to countervail the
accumulation of orders by reducing the 'supply chain discounting' effect. As discussed in
Section 10.3.3.4, increasing supply chain visibility to 75% suppressed the cyclicality of
the airline profitability but with slightly degrading effect for the manufacturers both in
increased volatility of orders and also in reduced volume of orders (and hence revenue).
Aside from this, implementation of this strategy requires consolidation of the fleet
management function; a role to be taken either by the manufacturers or by leasing firms.
An additional effect that increases the impact of this mechanism is the lengthening of the
planning horizon as manufacturer backlogs increase (shown with the red bold arrows in
Fig. 10-20). Of course, the reverse effect is observed when faster delivery times are
implemented (see JIT in Section 10.3.5.2). As such, JIT delivery is an interesting
alternative assuming that the technical problems of a JIT assembly for an airframe can be
overcome.
10.3.7.3 Mechanism 3: Competitive Manufacturing and Aircraft Price Decoupling
from Production Costs
The third main mechanism that creates an internal cycle amplification dynamic is shown
in Figure 10-21 marked by the bold green arrows. It is based on the decoupling of short-
term manufacturer profitability and real aircraft prices.
In this case, an increase in travel demand which we saw eventually results in an increase
in orders causes the manufacturers to ramp-up production. If the increase in orders is
small, then production costs are decreased based on the learning effect and in fact prices
can be lowered even further, thus stimulating further demand. If the increase in orders is
high enough and the manufacturer's response strategy is to maintain a low order backlog,
then unit production costs increase. Yet, this is not an increase that is 'felt' by the airlines
that would in turn respond by lowering their new orders. Given the competitive dynamics
shown in 'red' arrows in Figure 10-21, the manufacturer will not raise prices. This is
especially the case if the two manufacturers follow different production strategies; if one
manufacturer continues to ascend the learning curve as it avoids costly production
volatility while the other caters to customer demand faster, then the prices of aircraft
remain low despite the increase in production costs in the more responsive manufacturer.
The implications of this endogenous amplification mechanism are further explored in
Section 10.4.
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Figure 10-21 Endogenous CA EoE Amplification Mechanism (Relevant Section 10.3.7.3)
10.3.8 Symbiotic Strategies from the Systems Perspective of the CA EoE
Going back to the indications in Ch. 5, the strategic alternatives available for the
constituents of an EoE can be broadly categorized into strategic alternatives that 'couple'
or 'decouple' (thinking of this as a range of possibilities with shades of gray rather than
black and wide) a given constituent enterprise with the ones directly related to them.
While changing the state of coupling between two directly related constituents affects
their interaction, it also has side effects that can ripple across the EoE.
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In this section, we review some of the key strategic alternatives discussed above from the
perspective of EoE and summarize their characteristics of:
* Authority delegation to another enterprise (usually to risk and resource poolers),
and
* Level of coupling between enterprises
and how this affected the manifestations of cyclicality in the CA EoE.
10.3.8.1 Changing the competitive airline environment (collusion)
A consolidation of the airline industry (or widespread price collusion) can be represented
as an increase in the direct coupling between airlines as shown in Fig. 10-22.
Figure 10-22 EoE View: Increasing effective mass of airlines by coupling through consolidation or
collusion 107
The coupling between airlines and their demand is reduced as the monopoly pricing
power of airlines is increased. Thinking in mechanical terms, this implies an increase in
the effective mass of airlines relative to the mass of the oscillating bodies representing
demand, as shown in Figure 10-22.
10.3.8.2 Fleet Management
The advent of leasing firms allowed for a decoupling of asset ownership and operation.
As such it removed a controlled relationship that was traditionally held within the
enterprise (airlines as owners/operators) to a relationship with a newly formed enterprise
entity (leasing firms and the firms associated with their asset management) that depends
on a relationship with differing degrees of coupling; this relationship can have shades
from tightly coupled (own leases) to entirely decoupled (wet leases). By moving an
internally controlled function to an external enterprise, we expect that some of the
cyclicality faced by the airline will be transmitted to the leasing firms and partly dissipate
because of their ability to hedge on a larger scale. The mechanical analogy that clarifies
this idea is shown in Figure 10-23.
107 A refresher note on the EoE view figures notation from Ch. 5: Capital first letter and oval represents
enterprises. Double line one dotted the other continuous indicate control from an enterprise. Lower case
first letter and small circle denote capacity or function. Small oval represents pooled capacity or function.
Spring indicates interface/coupler.
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Figure 10-23 EoE View: Internally controlled ownership function over aircraft capacity
transforming into an interface coupler between enterprises (Leasing Firm and airlines)
Based on the experiments in 10.3.1, increasing the flexibility in fleet management for
airlines the profitability for the airlines is increased even when they bear the full
ownership costs.
Before deregulation, the significant profit margins allowed the internally controlled
capacity to be underutilized without penalty. With deregulation (and yield management
systems), internally controlled capacity was increasingly pushed to the limit of utilization
even when it created cumulative losses in the industry. The appearance of leasing firms
as independent enterprises that could pool the risk of aircraft ownership across many
airlines allowed for the decoupling between aircraft owners and operators with benefits
accruing to both.
The stability provided by this decoupling depends upon the following caveats:
(i) demand faced by the client airlines of lessors be uncorrelated, and
(ii) ordering of capacity by leasing firms to be based on aggregated demand
forecasts and to be the majority (ideally the only) source of orders
(iii) the length of the contract between operators and owners to be substantially
less than the period of oscillation.
Alas, none of the three is fully applicable:
* As we saw in Ch. 2, the demand faced by airlines even across continents is
correlated given the tight interconnections of a globalized economy and while
such division may be used for seasonal variations, macroeconomic business cycle
variations usually cascade globally to some extent.
* As we saw, in Ch. 3, leasing firms base their orders to a very large extent on the
orders they receive from airlines. To make the overcapacity problem worse, when
leasing firms order speculatively, their orders are in addition to the orders already
placed by airlines on their own.
* The majority of operating leases have durations of 3-5 years which is very close
to the period of the business cycle (5-7 years) and therefore allows little recourse
for airlines to break these contracts and therefore airlines are effectively owners of
the aircraft assets for the duration of the cycle.
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In addition to the above, the appearance of leasing firms further reduced the barriers to
entry in the airline industry thus increasing the number of effective competitors and the
effects of exuberance in ordering.
Sidenote for the retirement adjuster strategy (from Section 10.3.1.1)
The retirement adjuster strategy does not delegate control of a function to another entity
that can pool risk and resources. On the other hand, it does allow for a partial decoupling
of capacity and operations within the airline as it makes the cost of retirement at any of
the remaining older aircraft at any given time practically zero. In any case the benefits
from such a strategy are measurable but small.
10.3.8.3 Fixed to Variable Operating Costs
This strategy has strong similarities from the EoE perspective to the leasing strategy as it
involves the delegation of control to a coupling interface with other constituents but with
the difference for the CA EoE system that it does not involve aircraft capacity. The
similarities are underscored by the mechanical representation of Figure 10-24.
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Figure 10-24 EoE View: Internally controlled service function transforming into an interface coupler
between enterprises (Airport services). Similarly the unions 'relax' their control of the crews to allow
for the profit-sharing agreement (the labor union enterprise is delegating control to crews and thus is
now loosely coupled to the Airlines).
From the experiments in Section 10.3.2, we found that such relaxation has a measurable
effect but is not as significant as changes of capacity.
10.3.8.4 Airframe manufacturers: Dual effective strategy?
As we saw from the experiments and discussion in the previous sections, capacity is key
for controlling the cycles in the CA EoE. Yet the promising strategic alternatives that
involve control of volatility can take two distinct paths. One strategy that was shown to
work was the traditional lead time reduction recipe for controlling the bullwhip effect
(see Table 10-19 and related discussion): if aircraft can be delivered with little lead time
and backlogs are not allowed to build up, then the ineffective and delayed corrections of
supply is reduced and significant cyclicality-inducing strain is taken off the CA EoE
value chain.
These two different strategies are presented in diagram form in Figures 10-25 and 10-26.
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Figure 10-25 EoE View: Tightly coupling production rate at the manufacturers to airline capacity
while retaining the control structure of airlines over capacity. (the SM-CH.2 or JIT strategy from
Ch. 5)
Figure 10-26, EoE View: Decoupling capacity from the control of airlines and tightly coupling (or
controlling) production rate at the manufacturers to airline capacity. (the SM-CH.3 or decoupler
strategy from Ch. 5)
Both of these strategic alternatives were shown to have significant merits in Section
10.3.5.2; in fact they were the most dramatic among the considered strategic alternatives.
Their implementation and how to resolve strategic differences between the competing
manufacturing enterprises present additional challenges and require further
experimentation and the use of a game theoretic context. Furthermore, there is the
potential to generate synergies between strategic alternatives. The experiments related to
these aspects are described in detail in the next section.
10.4 Competitive Behavior of Manufacturers: Bundles of Strategic
Alternatives and their Impact on CA EoE
In the previous section we explored the 'design and policy space' of the CA EoE by
conducting experimental runs by implementing only a single strategic alternative with
varying intensity of implementation. This helped us demonstrate that, barring airline
collusion or consolidation and the pricing power available to airlines this way, the
primary system leverage lies with various strategic alternatives to control capacity
availability.
Some, like JIT production, do not require any degree of behavior that might be
considered anticompetitive, although they may require strengthening of the extended
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enterprise ties in the production supply chain. Others, like supply chain visibility, may
result from consolidation or they may also result from an extension of the extended
enterprise of the airframe manufacturers to include airlines - a variant of the vertical
integration that existed early on in the history of air travel with the United/Boeing
conglomerate, in the 1930s.
Each strategy though may be complemented by additional actions intended to exploit
synergies between strategies and complement their effectiveness. On the other hand, the
strategic alternatives that involved airframe manufacturers that were presented in the
previous section assumed coordinated behavior. As this is far from given in the
manufacturing competitive duopoly and could lead to anti-trust action in both the US and
the EU, the dynamics of their competitive actions need to be explored further. In order to
address these issues, we conducted a set of experiments summarized in the design of
experiments Table 10-20.
Table 10-20 Desi of eriments for Airframe Manufacturers Cometitive Behavior
Sj Aternatives A B A W. B Mt.A Mf.A MI.B W.A Mt.B f.A J f.S A 11.B
JIT delivery " "
Slowproduction rate change. • ,
Quick production rate change
Fixed production schedule
Leanmanufacturing .
Adaptive production (costs)
Vertical integration (50%) * _ * ' * _
Aggressive Competition
Exp8 1 Ex 1 Expl0 1 ..xp)11 12 13 14 Exp 15
Stmitegic Alternatives idf.A f. B Mf.A 1H.B If.A Id. B f. A A Mf. 1f.A J.B B A MW.B
JrT delivery
Slow production rate change
Quick production rate change
Fixed production schedule
Lean manufacturing
Adaptive production (costs)
Vertical integration (15%)
Aggressive Competition
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Table 10-21 Experimental Results for Scenario S1
NPV Normalized 100.00 100.25 103.00 102.62 100.64 100.57 100.13 101.84 101.20 112.43 155.93 100.74 111.14 99.91 120.45 117.68
Coef. Var. 1.34 1.63 1.60 1.63 1.68 1.66 1.72 1.51 1.64 1.43 1.19 1.38 1.31 1.38 1.37 1.42
Medan C. Utilization 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.83 0.94 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.77
NPV (Normalized 100.00 85.34 112.89 11343 85.39 83.53 86.32 28.69 106.99 66.85 76.37 121.34 80.52 99.67 169.96 173.53
Coef. Var. (Profit 1.47 2.11 1.10 1.10 1.92 1.98 1.84 48.64 1.21 2.60 1.25 0.87 .40 0.79 0.71
Total orders Normaliz 100.00 99.21 102.40 102.45 99.60 99.66 103.11 102.85 100.99 97.35 65.00 99.42 85.78 98.96 129.83 133.03
Co. Var. ordrers 0.82 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.86 0.93 0.97 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.81
NPV Normalized 82.62 64.91 109.51 122.39 69.17 64.09 78.24 1.50 109.03 40.11 121 74. 87 1 181.41
Coef. Var. Profit 1.47 2.11 1.10 1.10 1.92 1.98 1 1.21 2.60 1.25 0.87 121 1.40 0.79 0.71
Total orders Normaliz 155.81 152.54 158.11 160.08 155.71 155.25 169.49 153.24 159.5714524 87.15 151.06 120.03 152.99 179.15 191.02
Co. Var. ordrers 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.96 1.01 0.88 1.01 1.09 0.80 0.86 0.80 0.89 0.75 0.75
NPV (Normalized) 100.00 90.95 96.66 84.75 86.77 88.45 79.40 50.90 86.36 81.97 78.92 10027 72.5 95.02 155.84 135.51
f. Var. (Profit 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.83 0.84 0.89 1.01 0.88 0.82 0.98 0.81 129 0.78 0.95 0.87
Total orders (Normalized 100.00 10124 103.83 102.00 99.06 99.69 94.27 109.85 98.76 103.79 79.13 103.25 99.40 100.16 152.96 149.28
Co. Var. ordrers 0.83 1.01 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.03 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.86 0.92 0.92
Aver e Fare Normalized) 100.00 99.84 99.88 99.99 99.79 99.80 99.99 98.80 96.94 100.26 98.55 100.17 100.40 97.36
Median Fare (Normalized) 100.00 97.46 97.63 97.82 97.31 97.37 97.60 96.12 97.78 96.12 94.00100.51 97.36 100.29 99.56 94.45
Aver e LF 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.71
Orange significant negative impact Ifor the constIILILUent enterpriseI11
Orange significant negative impact for the constituent enterprise
Baseline
With the experiments in this section we tried to account for competitive behavior
between manufacturers. The baseline which we compared against had the following
characteristics:
Manufacturer A (modeled after Boeing)
Mf. A is dominant in both the narrow and wide body markets at the beginning of the
simulation, year 1984. Mf. A adapts its production rate faster than Mf.B retaining a
target backlog of -3 years. Mf.A has the advantage of the vendor lock-in effect but a
disadvantage in average production costs that it attempts to counter with lean production
initiatives.
Manufacturer B (modeled after Airbus)
Mf. B is following a different philosophy in production. By not adjusting their production
rates immediately, their backlog is allowed to build up to an average of -6years. This
inertia to production rate change makes Mf. B less prone to costs from adapting to the
i~ac~ IExal I IEmS I leza5 IExpe I IExda IExoO IEw~lOlEml~lEmlP IExD13 IEm14 IEwD15 I
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cycle. It may mean that they lose part of the orders from customers that have to wait
longer but only a 15% order spill is allowed (possibly more than what has been
historically observed).
Summary of experiments
Exp.1: Manufacturer A (MF.A) speeds up production to achieve JIT delivery.
No benefit in airline profitability, increases in volatility and deterioration for the
manufacturers indicate that this is a weak move.
Exp.2: MF.A speeds up production (JIT delivery) and hones the skills for lean
manufacturing reducing production costs.
It improves Mf.A's position (+32%) and slightly improves airlines' position (+3%)
although Mf.B is at a small disadvantage (-3.3%).
Exp. 3: MF.A speeds up production (JIT delivery) and hones the skills for lean
manufacturing reducing production costs AND manages to reduce the costs of
production changes. MF.B continues to change production rates at a slower rate but also
utilizes lean production.
MF.A is better able to use this type of change to its advantage but a price war between
manufacturers and the inability of MF.B to match the level of lean that MF.A has creates
a losing proposition.
Exp. 4: MF. A attempts vertical integration while using JIT.
Vertical integration implies the ability to implement the supply chain visibility strategic
alternative (discussed in Section 10.3.3.4) to only the subset of airlines that are clients of
a single manufacturer (MF.A in this case). Both manufacturers are negatively impacted
but airlines and customers see no significant difference.
Exp. 5: MF. B attempts vertical integration.
Both manufacturers are disadvantaged while airlines see little benefit. The fact that MF.A
is operating in JIT mode does not offer the opportunity for improvement through supply
chain visibility compared to when the delivery lead times were longer.
Exp. 6: MF.B attempts vertical integration augmented by lean manufacturing
As in Exp.5, both manufacturers lose.
Exp. 7: Both manufacturers attempt vertical integration combined with lean mfg. and
they both compete aggressively
Airlines are practically unaffected (+1.8%) but both manufacturers are negatively
impacted (-98% for MF.A and -48% for MF.B).
Exp. 8: Same as Exp. 7 with the difference of normal competitive behavior on behalf of
the manufacturers, less supply chain visibility (15% down from 50%) and the ability to
implement lean manufacturing augmented.
Airlines are practically unaffected but MF.A registers gains (+32%) while MF.B is
negatively impacted.
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Exp. 9: While MF.B stabilizes production to fixed scheduling, MF.A pursues a JIT
strategy.
The airlines benefit from such commitment but both manufacturers lose although MF.A
is at greater disadvantage (-51%).
Exp. 10. Both manufacturers pursue JIT deliveries and master lean mfg.
This is a winning proposition for the airlines but both manufacturers are disadvantaged.
Exp. 11: Manufacturer production rates follow the baseline but they both pursue lean
with MF.A still better adapted to do so.
Mf. B appears to be unaffected from this move while Mf. A sees the bulk of the gains
(+47%) and the airlines are also unaffected.
Exp. 12: MF.B increases production rate changes to match that of Mf.A while Mf. A
implements lean manufacturing.
The airlines gain from the reduction in lead times but both manufacturers lose compared
to the baseline.
Exp. 13: MF.B combines vertical integration and lean manufacturing (Variant of Exp.6).
Mf. A gains at the expense of Mf. B while airlines are only marginally benefited. Single
manufacturer implementation of supply chain visibility penalizes the manufacturer that
initiates it.
Exp. 14: MF.A and MF.B follow slow to adapt production.
This experiment simply replicates the run of Section 10.3.5.2 that showcases the effect of
stabilized production rates for both manufacturers. All constituent enterprises benefit
from such a choice while the final customers, passengers and shippers, are only slightly
(below our significance threshold) disadvantaged.
Exp. 15: MF.A and MF.B follow slow to adapt production enhanced by lean
manufacturing and supply chain visibility.
This experiment enhances the slow to adapt production by combining lean manufacturing
and a level of supply chain visibility with it. Only Manufacturer A sees extra benefits
with this arrangement as it can quickly diminish the original cost advantage of MF.B and
take better advantage of their higher lock-in effects. The other stakeholders also benefit
but to a lesser extend compared to Exp. 14.
In order to more effectively compare these alternatives with a larger number of bundled
alternatives that allow different combinations we run optimization experiments. The
optimization algorithm followed a taboo search approach and aimed to maximize the
combined profitability of airlines and airframe manufacturers. The results from one such
experiment that involved a set of 200 model replications is shown in Figure 10-27. While
the experiments did not include the fixed production option, when compared to them, the
fixed production alternative is shown to be a non-dominated strategic alternative.
317
8.
g=
ii
I=IloS
=
=
a 0.00 00o 1.00 1.o0 200 U20 3.00 3o 4,00
Airline normalized profit (S1 Baseline = 1.00)
Figure 10-27 Optimization experiment results (200 model replications)
Interpretation and Discussion of Experiments
One implication that comes out of these experiments is that the production strategy
followed by Mf. B that involves slow production rate adjustments confers a competitive
advantage. As a result, it would be against the interest of Mf.B to change their strategy.
A second implication is that there are no significant benefits if a single manufacturer
could move to a JIT delivery production system (assuming that such a move would be
technically feasible) but airlines would see benefits if both manufacturers did that. Not
only that, but there are no apparent additional synergistic benefits if the two
manufacturers pursue drastically different strategies (i.e. one with JIT delivery from a
backlog of 3 years and the other continuing a long lead-time delivery strategy).
A third implication (from Exp. 6,7 and 8) is that when manufacturers pursue a vertical
integration strategy with some of their airline clients, the airline industry benefits only if
a no manufacturer follows JIT delivery. In either case, the manufacturers that initiates it
would require some form of revenue redistribution in order not to be penalized.
By testing the two different strategies followed by the manufacturers, we wanted to
investigate the potential for synergistic value chain behavior. That is, whether the two
manufacturers faithfully pursued different strategies would create more value for the
chain than if they followed identical strategies.
Manufacturer B follows a strategy that can be characterized as long-term mistrust to the
market signals. They loath to adjust capacity fast enough so as to respond to the signals
from their customers and instead focus on the long-term coordination with their own
suppliers and employees. While Ren et al. (2006) imply that the customers have an
information advantage for their markets, given the need to forecast and adjust to
competitor behavior, their long-term expectations may be far from system optimal. In this
case, it is shown that a more efficient outcome is generated by practically ignoring the
airline signals and rather building on the long-term demand trend. This outcome is also
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reinforced by the ability of the airlines to use the competitiveness between the
manufacturers to their advantage thus rendering any long-term punishment of airlines for
breaching their contract ineffective.
The success of this strategy for Mf. B, is dependent on the ability of Mf. A to deliver
their aircraft in JIT-fashion at low productions costs. Given the difficulty of such an
achievement, the ability of Mf.B to retain the advantage has higher probability of success
even with non-trust based customer relationships.
Aircraft manufacturers face a prisoner's dilemma kind of problem in their decision to
adjust capacities independent of orders to optimize for long-term performance. That is
they have an incentive for adjusting production rates fast enough so that they can cater to
airline demand and avoid losing orders due to delays. On the other hand, they would both
be better off if they adjusted production rates slowly. Unfortunately, if both did follow
the same slow adjustment strategy it may induce the entrance of a third LCA competitor
- an unlikely for the immediate future but possible long-term effect. The key to compete
effectively even with large backlogs may lie with the uncertainty of orders in the backlog;
as airlines place phantom orders, these may be exchanged or auctioned if and when they
are cancelled. This is a strategy that Airbus seems to follow, i.e., delivery times of
significantly less than the backlog would allow are offered to buyers with the expectation
that some of the original firm orders will be actually freed up by cancellations from the
clients that actually placed them.
While it is true that neither of the two manufacturers will face bankruptcy in the near
future as they are supported by large consortiums with multiple interests and of course
governments have a vested interest in their operation, it is highly unlikely that their
management would be willing to go to such a step as they are measured and judged by
short-term economic performance.
Airlines on their side face prisoner dilemma choices on a smaller scale and tend to
overorder as a result of that but they are too disaggregated for any change to be
meaningful. The potential of alliances to turn into mega-carriers may be paradigm
changing but their ability to navigate anti-trust regulations is still unclear. Even if mega-
carriers are established, it is not unreasonable to expect the same competitive conditions
to exist between mega-carriers (i.e. a push towards overordering to preempt the
competition).
Several isolated measures taken by the manufacturers (like shorter lead times, and strong
pricing incentives) could have potential in reducing the amplitude of the cycle but not
sufficiently so.
The potential for a manufacturer to enter into a unisourcing service provision agreement
with one or more alliances/mega-carriers is shown to have negative implications for the
manufacturer if it provides increased supply chain transparency. If a manufacturer does
this without support from a leasing firm they would be entering the leasing business and
be viewed as competitors in that business. In such an agreement, the equipment provider
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will have the responsibility to support their partners/clients in their needs on a long-term
basis. While this is an effective strategy for reducing cyclicality in the airline industry
and increasing airline's returns in all of these cases the acting manufacturer face losses in
profitability.
Overall, the best symbiotic strategy that can be initiated by the manufacturers is slowing
down their production adjustment rates as repeated in Exp14. This strategy can be
managed effectively by allowing the manufacturers to base their quoted delivery schedule
on the (high) probabilities of cancellation in a given airline. This strategy may start to
become more difficult as airlines start to stabilize because of the limitations on
production capacity and therefore stop cancelling their orders. At this point (perhaps a
decade or more in the future) pricing of the delivery slots through auctioning and
increasing the penalties for cancellations may work. This is the point at which the
vulnerability from a third entrant in the LCA market is also the greatest. As our model
does not include this event our ability to design strategies for this eventuality is limited
but it can be implemented in future model expansions. The benefits of this strategic
alternative are quite high and even bundles of strategic alternatives cannot easily
outperform it.
10.5 Chapter 10 Summary
In Chapter 10, we used the system dynamics model of the CA EoE developed in Chapter
9 to experiment with and compare the set of strategic alternatives aimed at reducing
cyclicality and increasing the welfare of the CA EoE constituents as measured by their
proxy value functions (see Table 9-1). The basis for these alternatives was first presented
in Chapter 7 but they were quantified in order to be testable in this chapter (Sections 10.3
and 10.4).
We identified three primary mechanisms by which the structure of the CA EoE sustains
and amplifies the exogenous cyclicality-inducing factors. Aside from consolidating the
airline industry and giving monopoly pricing power to the remaining airlines, capacity
management appeared to be the best family of strategic alternatives.
Available aircraft capacity is controlled not only by airlines but also by the actions of
airframe manufacturers and leasing firms. The consolidated airframe manufacturing and
leasing industries were identified as prime candidates for affecting change in the CA EoE
since Ch. 5, and in this case we showed that their coordinated action can indeed create
substantial benefits across the CA EoE and dampen the prevalent cyclical variation. From
the two main strategic alternative options available, JIT delivery of aircraft and its
antecedent long-term fixed schedule (or slowly changing) production rate, the first faces
significant technical challenges in maintaining the manufacturers' returns and even then
it is still inferior compared to the second alternative which may face surmountable
institutional challenges to its implementation.
Given the different philosophies in manufacturing presented by Boeing and Airbus faster
vs. slower production rate adaptation, we hoped to find them complementing each other.
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The experimental results showed that the coexistence of the two strategies will only
benefit the airline industry if it is combined with some form of vertical integration that
reduces the supply chain discounting effect. If this is the case though, the manufacturer
who actually implements such a system will be disadvantaged. These complications can
be avoided if both manufacturers adopt a slower production rate adjustment which can be
a win-win for the airlines and the manufacturers and does not require any collusive action
from either side.
In the following, and final, chapter we will review our findings in the broader context of
the thesis, summarize our work and identify avenues for future research.
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Chapter 11 Conclusions, Contributions, Future Work
In this concluding chapter, we will present our findings concisely and tie them back to
our research questions and hypotheses. We will also summarize the contributions that this
work makes and identify areas where targeted additional work on modeling could further
illuminate our understanding of enterprise of enterprises in general and refine our
recommendations for the commercial aviation enterprise of enterprises (CA EoE) in
particular.
Our research was motivated by the negative repercussions stemming from the volatile
boom-bust cycle of the airline industry. Historically, the increase in volatility of airline
profitability became significant in the post-deregulation period (after 1978 for the US
with the rest of the world following gradually). While increased competition and a
commoditizing product made air travel available and affordable to a larger segment of the
world population, the accompanying increased volatility of returns, amplified in a
bullwhip fashion in the value chain of the EoE (see Figure 1-2 for a view of the CA EoE)
value chain and Figure 1-3 for a visualization of the volatility), caused increased friction
with employees and an unstable environment for the complex and expensive task of
aircraft development and production.
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Figure 11-1 A View of the Commercial Aviation Enterprise of Enterprises (from Ch. 5)
When looked from a systems perspective, the fundamental input to the system - demand
for air travel - seems remarkably stable with negative growth rates occurring only in two
years out of a sixty year history. Yet aircraft manufacturers are recipients of large order
variations from the airlines in classic bullwhip effect fashion. From the same vantage
I 1 I -~ IIlit
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point, the commercial aviation system is not a classic supply chain bullwhip-forming
environment. Some of its key characteristics are:
* The market for air travel is discrete, broken into O-D pairs. Contestability
assertions aside, airlines, in practice, price with higher than competitive rates
unless actually challenged on the specific route they serve, even when there are a
number of competitors in the region.
* Two fundamentally different network systems are employed successfully: hub-
and-spoke and point-to-point, each with each own set of advantages and
disadvantages.
* The growth rate of demand for air travel is strongly correlated to the economic
growth rate. Historical demand growth rates have decelerated but remained
positive with only two exceptions (1991 with a recession and a war coinciding
and 2001 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
* There are few, if any, product inventories involved in the sense that an aircraft
seat-mile is a perishable good. Labor and capital are the areas that oscillate with
periods of over- and under- investment.
* Airline costs are highly dependent on energy costs, labor costs, and capital
ownership costs. Yet some airlines follow business strategies that allow them to
manage these better than others (some low costs carriers or LCCs have managed
cyclicality better than most legacy carriers).
* The three major market segments, business travelers, leisure travelers, and freight
shippers, exhibit substantially different elasticities of demand and level of service
expectations. The characteristics of its segment are not static but evolve over time.
* The value chain echelons are characterized by different types of markets:
o Airlines compete in markets that range from monopolies to almost perfect
competition.
o Infrastructure providers (airports and air traffic control systems) are
regulated oligopolies in varying degrees.
o Aircraft (and engine) manufacturers are competitive oligopolies.
o Aircraft manufacturers for LCA currently consist of a duopoly. Despite
this the two enterprises, Boeing and Airbus, exhibit different strategic
outlooks with Airbus, a more recent entrant, being more integrated with its
extended enterprise and Boeing being less so.
* Aircraft are increasingly expensive to develop but their production is still subject
to strong learning economies, airline lock-in effects, and economies of scale.
This summary reinforces the notion that the commercial aviation sector is a complex
system. Not only that, but that there is no single authority, in the current institutional
situation, to enforce coordinated behavior.
These observations raised the following question:
How prone is the commercial aviation value chain to the cycles
(endogenous factors) and how important are the factors outside its influence
(exogenous factors)?
The natural, and more important, corollary to this question is:
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Are there ways to retain the benefits of competition while reducing the
resulting inefficiencies and social costs related to volatility in commercial
aviation and can they be implemented by the enterprise constituents of the
sector?
Which, based on the relatively centralized hour-glass like view of the CA EoE with the
narrow point residing with the aircraft manufacturers (see Figure 1-1), leads to the final
question:
Could the structure of the commercial aviation value chain and the
characteristics of its enterprises be leveraged to affect non-zero sum
positive change in the absence of centralized authority?
Answering these questions was the motivating force behind the research journey that is
summarized in this chapter. In Section 11.1 we review our methodology and research
structure. Section 11.2 summarizes the answers and conclusions that we reached based on
our research and outlines our specific contributions. Finally, Section 11.3 discusses the
areas in which promising future research can be conducted to further the answers to our
research questions.
11.1 Research Structure and Methodology
In order to answer the research questions outlined previously, we needed to understand
the nature and interactions of a system comprised of multiple enterprises with diverse
interests, objectives and business strategies facing uncertainty in their decisions.
Extending the system of systems (SoS) research, we considered all of commercial
aviation as an enterprise: a purposeful undertaking that provides air transport services and
is composed by a number of constituent enterprises. This enterprise of enterprises (EoE),
formalizing the definition of the term first used by Nightingale (2004), has constituents
that are managerially and operationally independent yet they all exist in part to provide
this greater societal function (its Keynesian "social purpose"). Their relationships
(interfaces), or levels of coupling, are not ones of authority but of codependence.
This lack of a directing authority turns the problem of coordination towards a specific
goal, in our case the reduction of observed volatility and the accompanying improved
efficiency into an almost impossible task reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons or an
expansive prisoner's dilemma game found in economics literature.
Yet, parsing the commercial aviation (CA) EoE into its constituent enterprises and
abstracting their 'local' value functions and the interfaces that connect these enterprises
helped in identifying the key leverage points and in structuring a model to simulate the
behavior of the CA EoE. This provided a platform to quantitatively evaluate the
performance of different strategic alternatives.
Based on the prerequisites for operationalizing this approach, our research methodology
was structured so as to cover the following salient areas:
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* Develop a fundamental understanding of the industry-specific characteristics of
the CA EoE and specify how costly cyclicality is manifested in the different
constituent enterprises (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).
* Internalize, adapt and extend the SoS concepts to address the particular features
and needs of EoE analysis. Outline the application of the EoE conceptual
framework in commercial aviation (Chapter 5).
* Review the literature on the characteristics and causes of business cycles and of
the bullwhip effect in supply chains - phenomena closely related to the CA EoE
cycle (Chapter 6). Using lessons from the literature, develop a narrative and
working hypotheses on the mechanisms of the CA EoE cycle and corresponding
strategic alternatives to reduce this cyclicality (Chapter 7).
* Define the desirable characteristics of an EoE model and scan the available
modeling methodologies that are appropriate for enterprise modeling and the
specific CA application (Chapter 8).
* Build and validate a simulation model of the CA EoE (Chapter 9) and use it to test
different strategic alternatives and identify the ones that are more promising for
implementation (Chapter 10).
To provide a more specific summary of the dissertation, the chapters' content is
summarized below in greater detail.
In Chapters 2-4 we described the three primary echelons in the CA EoE value chain
respectively: in Chapter 2 the drivers of demand for air travel, in Chapter 3 the diverse
world of airlines and aircraft leasing firms, and in Chapter 4 the duopoly of two prime
manufacturers - Boeing and Airbus - and how the industry and market for LCA
transformed to its current stage. In each chapter the relevant features and accompanying
costs of cyclicality were demonstrated.
Socio-
Technical
'P (systemic)
U5 Technical/
Mechanical
Unitary Pluralist
Authority
Figure 11-2 Classification of Systems (based on Jackson and Keys (1984) from Ch. 5)
In Chapter 5, we introduced the enterprise of enterprises framework as a useful way to
characterize and analyze the interlinked commercial aviation industries and institutions.
EoE was inspired by the system-of-systems (SoS) concept which was largely applied on
technical/pluralist systems while EoE targets socio-technical/pluralist ones systems
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(using the classification in Figure 11-2). The constituent enterprises in an EoE have
operational and managerial independence, like an SoS, but the relationships are richer
than an interface standard which has been the SoS researchers leverage point of choice
for system change. Using the EoE framework and based on our understanding of the
constituent enterprises and stakeholders in the system we identified potential points of
leverage for affecting change in this system while accounting for the individual
stakeholder value functions and area of influence.
Chapter 6 reviewed the literature on different manifestations of cyclical behavior,
particularly in economics and supply chains. As a conclusion of this investigation, based
on a narrative of mechanisms that can induce or influence cyclical behavior in the CA
EoE, we drew a list of possible causes for the business cycle as exhibited in the CA EoE
and the corresponding suggested countercyclical strategic alternatives in Chapter 7.
These potential strategic alternatives were vetted for effectiveness and implementability
using the EoE structure, but actual quantitative testing of the most promising alternatives
was necessary as a means of establishing their usefulness. The complexity and large scale
of the system at hand forced the consideration of simulation modeling as tool for
quantitatively testing and comparing our hypotheses. In Chapter 8 we reviewed the
literature on modeling for enterprises of similar scale. The rich literature that used system
dynamics as the methodology of choice to address similar problems for the airline
industry was a strong indication that it was well adapted for our purposes as long as it
could be extended to model differences in strategic choices between manufacturers (agent
behavior).
Chapter 9 presents the details of the SD model as developed for the CA EoE based on a
pre-existing model by Weil (1996). We discuss the calibration, validation and verification
procedures in order to demonstrate that the model has adequate level of detail and can be
useful for our purposes.
In Chapter 10 we start by developing the background for extending the simulation into
the future by presenting three possible scenarios that exhibit different degrees of volatility
and underlying demand growth rates. Each strategic alternative is tested individually for
relative effectiveness and a connection between the strategic alternative and its theoretic
impact is made using causal loop and EoE diagrams. Finally, combinations of strategic
alternatives that are geared towards demonstrating the existence of potential synergies
between alternatives and accounting for different competitive strategies are presented.
11.2 Conclusions
We present our conclusions from the research described above by respond to the initial
research questions as formulated in Chapter 1.
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11.2.1 How is cyclicality manifested in commercial aviation? What are the
impacts from cyclicality in commercial aviation?
Year-to-year changes in the demand for air travel are highly correlated to economic
conditions, regional and global, and travel-suppressing incidents like terrorist activity,
active wars or the fear of pandemics. Yet these fluctuations are surprisingly small and the
average trends of growth for the industry have been remarkably stable for decades (ref.
Ch2).
Cycles with much greater variance are exhibited by the average profitability of airlines.
American and international airlines exhibit comparable degree of variance which means
that on average they experience cycles of similar intensity (Ch. 3).
Aircraft orders are highly correlated to the profitability fluctuations and exhibit even
higher levels of variance than airline profitability changes (Ch. 4).
Faced with order variability of such magnitude, aircraft manufacturers, in a manner
reminiscent of supply chain bullwhip fluctuation, respond by adjusting their production
capacities. These adjustments usually are followed by significant hire and fire cycles (Ch.
4).
We showed that the cycles in the CA EoE are manifested primarily in:
* Airline profitability indicators
* Aircraft orders and deliveries
* Employment levels of airlines
* Employment levels of manufacturers
The impacts of the cyclicality in the above indicators on the different stakeholder groups
and constituent enterprises in the CA EoE are numerous.
We identified a set of key stakeholders in the form of constituent enterprises and end
users. Among the different types of stakeholders, some fare better than others in the cycle
while individual enterprises are better suited to respond to the cycles compared to the
average performance of their respective industries.
Passengers and shippers
The end users, i.e. passengers and shippers, increased their welfare substantially by the
deregulation of the airline industry. At least a portion of this gain in welfare came as a
result of direct or indirect subsidies to legacy carriers. For the most part though, the
competitive environment fostered the adoption of the hub-and-spoke network by virtually
all legacy carriers that allowed previously unheard of frequency levels and lowered unit
costs. The competitive environment also allowed the emergence of low cost carriers and
persistent declining trends in unit costs (CASM). These gains came at a cost; levels of
service, reliability, and predictability of the fare prices deteriorated (fare variance
increased) but are currently improving as the competitive environment seems to revert to
equilibrium.
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Airlines
We saw that the profitability of airlines is the prime cyclical indicator of the CA EoE.
While an aggregate measure, most airlines in the industry face a synchronized cyclical
trend although some airlines are better in managing to stay profitable even at the bottom
of the cycle. For airline employees these cycles mean unanticipated income losses or
unemployment and uncertainty for their future. In economic terms, the utilization of
airline resources is inefficient (See Ch. 2).
While substantial, these costs would be manageable if the cycles did not propagate
upstream in a bullwhip fashion as cyclical profitability is a lagging indicator for
investment decisions.
Aircraft manufacturing supply chain
The inability of airlines to maintain consistent profitability for the majority of the airlines
reinforces the cycle of intense overinvestment that is followed by a long period of
underinvestment. As a result of this variation in orders, aircraft manufacturers and their
suppliers systematically misestimate the amount of investment they should undertake.
This leads to increased costs of inventory and "forgetting" and increased risks of
investment in production capacity and aircraft (See Ch. 4). As orders fluctuate,
manufacturers adjusting the production capacity to meet demand face heavy costs, both
when they have to increase or decrease their production rates due to the capital and
skilled labor intensive nature of their operations.
Capital Markets
The succession of profitable and unprofitable years strains the liquidity of airline carriers
and manufacturers and increases the risks for investors. Perversely, the increased returns
in the boom years and the high level of variance in returns may be desirable
characteristics for fund managers that prefer short- over long-term return (see Ch. 5) even
if they imply abysmal performance during the downcycle (small investors facing sever
losses notwithstanding).
Other stakeholders
Airports have consistently generated better returns than airlines presumably due to their
monopoly status. The few exceptions include airports that clamored for hub status
without adequate local demand and excessive reliance on a single airline (see Ch. 5).
Aircraft leasing firms have also been consistently profitable. Their history as dominant
aircraft owners is short and therefore the impact that a long downcycle would have on
their returns has not been observed.
The D. Gross hypothesis: cycle benefits vs. costs
Gross (2007) argued that from a social welfare perspective, cyclical industries that leave
a commercial infrastructure residue after the high growth period (bubble) halts have in
fact a net positive effect on social welfare as the services that can provide allows for
innovative entrepreneurial uses. This could be plausible for commercial aviation as the
massive investment in aircraft and the competitive behavior of airlines showed the way
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towards innovations to reduce unit costs and spurred booming industries from mass
tourism to availability of relatively cheap air freight.
On the other hand, the resources needed for the manufacturing supply chain of
commercial aircraft are not allocated efficiently over time and society bears a significant
cost from the losses during downcycles that range from airline subsidies, to employee
pension funds bail out and the hire/fire cycle in the industries involved.
More broadly, the approaching limit of resources (fuel and raw materials) faced by
society in the not so distant future makes the expectation that the expansion of
commercial aviation can continue unimpeded quite optimistic. In a cyclical environment,
the ability to prepare for the coming crisis is severely limited with potentially
catastrophic consequences.
To summarize, some of the direct impacts of cyclicality are the following:
* For owners and investors in the commercial aviation enterprises there are costs
associated to uncertainty in the return of investment from the commercial aviation
industries. Increased risk without commensurate increases in the economic
returns.
* Inefficient allocation of capacity and productivity over the cycle. This is found in
both the airframe manufacturing and the airline industry. In both instances as
capacity lags behind demand and then races ahead the primary source of
counterbalancing force in order reach equilibrium is employment levels.
* These cycles have impacts on the final service quality as experienced by
passengers and freight shippers. There are fare price fluctuations along with
variations in frequency and reliability that create a business environment that
offers unreliable level of service.
* On the production side, frequent hire/fire cycles create labor management
tensions and are costly both for the industries in the form of productivity losses
and for the employees who have to bear unemployment externalities. Specifically
for airframe manufacturers, that are characterized by strong learning economies,
production rate volatility prevents full exploitation of the learning curve.
* In order to account and balance societal externalities, government assistance in
various forms is used. These costs can be significant; for example the cost of the
Air Transportation Stabilization Act to stabilize the US commercial aviation
industry post-9/11llwas estimated to be $20B and an additional $3.75B was
requested for targeted employee retraining and transitory health coverage.
An important characteristic of the manifestations and impacts of cyclicality in the CA
EoE is that they are correlated and reinforcing. As indicated above, the tendency of
airlines and airframe manufacturers to fluctuate their capacity using employment creates
lower productivity and additional costs. Interestingly, when these externality costs are
addressed through government assistance and are directed to the enterprises rather than
the employees, it has the perverse effect of retaining capacity in the system exacerbating
overcapacity problems and deepening the impacts of the cycle to the other indicators.
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In the last bullet for impacts, we referred to the Air Transportation Stabilization Act.
While this type of assistance is far from unique and can be found in different settings, it
can be argued that it was addressing a unique problem generated by an extreme event (the
9/11 terrorist attacks). As we explore in next question, the visible problems of the airline
industry were preexisting conditions.
Figure 11-3 A sample of endogenous dynamics of the CA EoE (from Chapter 10)
11.2.2 What are the salient causal mechanisms that induce the cyclical
behavior in commercial aviation?
Using sensitivity analysis and comparing the relative impact of external factors (GDP
growth rate, fuel price volatility, and shocks) we found that the current structure of the
CA EoE is prone to endogenously generated cycles. Even in the absence of external
volatility, the CA EoE system will oscillate depending on the entry and exit dynamics for
airlines. As for the relative impact of external factors, we found that they are ranked as
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follows: fuel, GDP, shocks. Therefore, the justification of external shocks as special
reasons for providing government assistance to the various enterprises does not seem to
be supported.
The dynamic relationships that can cause the type of cyclical behavior referred to in Q. 1
are numerous and reinforcing, as we discussed in detail in Ch. 7 and as shown in Figure
11-3.
The following is a summary list of the causal relationships that were identified:
- Macroeconomic induced volatility (wars and pandemics included) affect (i) the
baseline demand by shifting the demand curve and (ii) the elasticity of demand
for air travel.
- To clear the market, airlines change their prices. Because their supply is inelastic
in the short-term due to capacity commitments, revenue management systems
allow them to change the fares in order to maximize load factors since the
marginal cost of serving an economy-class passenger is believed close to zero. In
competitive markets, these adjustments may lead to price wars.
- Revenue management systems may create an illusion for airlines that are bent on
meeting their load factor targets but at the expense of profitability with break-
even load factors in cases becoming greater than 1. Having full planes provides a
justification for further expansion of capacity forming a vicious circle of reduced
profitability.
- Retaining capacity in an unprofitable market and needs for liquidity can intensify
price wars into a death spiral.
- The lead time between order and delivery of new planes amplifies the cycle if the
airlines do not anticipate the market growth and the actions of the other airlines on
global scale correctly (i.e. in the presence of strong supply chain discounting).
This is the case when a large number of discrete decision makers are involved.
New entrants with financial backing that expect to defer profitability in the pursuit
of market share also contribute to exaggerated ordering.
- Anticipating market growth is a hard task because of the uncertainty in the factors
affecting demand and production costs (fuel) that establish the break-even point.
Strategic behavior exacerbates this uncertainty because competing carriers may
wish to secure the capacity in the face of competition. The fact that aircraft
production capacity is limited creates the pressure to order capacity for the sake of
having a position in the waitlist in a form of game ordering.
- Aircraft manufactures have their own competitive pressures and because of:
o Economies of scale and learning effects favor large production runs.
o Legacy and lock-in effects.
o Bandwagon effect.
o Production scaling.
have the incentive to undercut their competitors and also offer undervalued
aircraft options, delivery deferment, and cancellations.
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11.2.3 What are implementable strategic alternatives for dampening that
cyclicality and what are their benefits?
We first look at the strategic alternatives available from a theoretical perspective and then
we discuss the experimental findings.
EoE Architecting and Cyclicality
From an architecture or systems theory point view, we found that the strategic
alternatives that we generated to address cyclicality in the CA EoE could be categorized
under three archetypes of strategies for reducing cyclicality in EoEs:
1. Delegation of control of functions or capacities to a 'pooler' enterprise that exerts
greater and cumulative control over these functions of individual enterprises and
therefore reduces redundancies and increases efficiencies (e.g. outsourcing of
non-core function, aircraft leasing).
2. Tighter coupling of signal to response without any delegation of control exhibited
as greater responsiveness or flexibility (e.g. pull production with just-in-time
deliveries of aircraft).
3. Decoupling of signal to response through coordinated action in key echelons (e.g.
fixed or slow to adjust production schedules based on long-term demand trends).
Effectiveness and Implementability of Strategic Alternatives
In the specific context of the CA EoE we found that control of capacity was the key
leverage point in controlling cyclicality.
For example, we found that if the owners of aircraft did not 'insist' in retaining the bulk
of the fleet in operation during recessions the airlines collectively would gain up to 50%
of their profitability even if they would still carry the full cost of ownership. The
implementation of such a scheme fails for the same reason as the prisoner's dilemma
game; in an uncoordinated, non-collusive environment with multiple competitors the
Nash equilibrium is one where all competitors use all their available resources as their
short-term incentives do not reward voluntary withdrawal.
The retirement adjuster strategy, as proposed by Skinner et al., attempts to address this by
reducing the perceived cost of a withdrawal by maintaining a slightly older fleet on
average in which the fully amortized aircraft would make the choice of retirement easier.
Yet, we find that collectively the benefit from such a strategy is small and partially
outweighed by the increased operating and maintenance costs.
Flexible leasing agreements that have durations of about a year or less and so are
significantly less than the average period of the cycle (-8 years) as opposed to the current
norm of 3 to 5 years, may be another promising way to allow for such reductions as long
as the aircraft owners be it leasing firms or manufacturers can be compensated for the
additional risk they are carrying.
The above were assuming that the current order and production patterns are maintained.
It is exactly in this order/production pattern though were the key to controlling capacity
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lies. As demonstrated by Sterman (1989) and others, the backlog in a given supply chain
is heavily discounted by those making the ordering decision for a variety of reasons (like
multiplicity of decision makers, order gaming, and 'irrational exuberance'). As delivery
lead times become longer, so do the potential for forecasting errors and the effect of
'supply chain discounting' increase along with order volatility (bullwhip effect).
Airline industry consolidation or a vertical integration scheme between airline alliances
and manufacturers that would reduce the supply chain discounting by 50% could double
the airline industry's profitability but it would also reduce the volume of orders received
by manufacturers and increase the volatility of those orders as there would be less slack
in the system to meet unanticipated increases in demand.
A strategic alternative followed by manufacturers that involves pull-production with JIT
deliveries could increase the return to airlines by 15% by having lead-times of less than
one year without any changes in order patterns. Yet, the technical implementation of such
a scheme could be infeasible for products like aircraft. Not only that, but the risks
involved in not having substantial backlog would necessitate the ability to easily switch
between production lines - a task that is again hard for these type of products. Is it
impossible? The answer to this resides in the future.
Finally, the opposite of this strategy shows even greater potential. Given the complexities
involved in aircraft production, rapid changing in production rates carries significant
costs for the producer and for the labor force employed by them (aircraft production
traditionally is labor and not capital constrained). As a result, a production strategy that
involves steady growth pegged on long-term trends rather than actual orders would
effectively decouple production from orders at the risk of order spill-over and of market
share losses that threaten a loss of the edge in customer lock-in. Conversely, if the long-
term production plan is overoptimistic, it may have the opposite effect of flooding the
market with cheap aircraft and further reducing airline profitability.
We found that a coordinated move towards long-term production planning is positive for
both the manufacturers that gain from production efficiencies (400%) and the airlines that
benefit from a limited influx of new aircraft (gains of about 100%) while passengers are
not heavily impacted (<5% average fare increase). As one of the manufacturers (Airbus)
already follows a variant of this strategy (carrying much higher backlogs compared to
Boeing - see Figure 4-23) compliance of the other would not be problematic. The
problems stem from the strategic threat of potential entry by a third manufacturer.
Finally, we did not find any synergistic effect between two different manufacturer
strategies: one following a JIT strategy and the other a fixed production schedule one.
Depending on the ability to implement lean manufacturing cost effectively, the JIT
manufacturer gains or loses moderately but at the expense of the slower production
manufacturer.
We identified a set of strategic alternatives for the different constituents of the CA EoE
(Ch. 7) and codified them so that they can be modeled by the system dynamics model we
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developed for this purpose (Ch. 9). We summarize this codification below indicating in
parenthesis the stakeholders directly involved:
* Reducing airline fixed costs:
- Profit sharing agreements and outsourcing of non-core functions
(Airlines/Unions)
- Fleet flexibility (Airlines/Leasing firms/Manufacturers)
- Leasing ratio (Airlines/Leasing firms)
* Controlling airline capacity:
- Profit effect on orders (Airlines/Capital markets/Leasing firms)
- Smoothing order patterns- long-term trend forecasts (Airlines/Leasing
firms)
- Collaborative order patterns (Airlines/Manufacturers and/or Leasing
firms)
* Vertical integration / supply chain visibility
- Delivery patterns:
* Production time (Manufacturers)
* Target production backlog (Manufacturers)
* Production rate flexibility (Manufacturers)
- Capacity pricing (Manufacturers)
* Effects of learning/forgetting dynamic and lean manufacturing on
production costs
* Market share targets and aggresiveness
* Controlling airline pricing:
- Industry consolidation (Airlines/Capital markets/Governments)
Using the SD model developed, we identified that the dynamic with the greatest leverage
over the airline profitability cycle is the apparent lack of transparency in the ordering
process. Competitive pressures for gaming the system and the large number of decision-
makers make orders that exceed optimal levels for stable profitability sometimes by far.
We demonstrated experimentally that reducing the lead times of delivery, improving
forecasting by smoothing it over longer periods to better capture the trend, greater
number of cancellations, or even allowing for greater pricing power of the airlines all
have substantially lower impact on modulating the profitability cycle than simply
ordering with full accounting of the aircraft in backlog. If this function is carried out by
airlines though, the outcome for aircraft manufacturers is not Pareto-efficient as their
profitability is reduced and the actual volatility of orders is increased. Instead we found
that the most promising symbiotic alternative lies with the adoption of slow production
rate adjustments by both manufacturers as shown in Figure 11-4. The strategic
alternatives indicated in the symbiotic quadrant show that the aircraft production rate
adjustments are key in improving returns (and cyclicality) in the system. It should be
noted that passengers do not face deterioration of costs in this case as it is the increased
production efficiency that contributes to the increased value rather than increases in fare
prices.
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Figure 11-4 Relative performance (NPV of profitability) of bundles of strategic alternatives for
Airlines and Aircraft Manufacturers
Based on the experimental quantitative results outlined above and the qualitative insights
of the EoE analysis (Ch. 5), we identified the airframe manufacturers as the most
promising link in the value chain for embarking on cycle modulating initiatives because
they have both the consolidation level (duopoly), the incentives (large costs due to
production rate fluctuations and increasing risk-sharing of the asset carrying cost with
airlines) and the key leverage of controlling production capacity with perfect visibility of
backlogs vis-a-vis realistic demand forecasts. Despite this alignment, the specific
characteristic of the competitive dynamics in their industry described in the previous
question also provide strong disincentives from modulating the cycle and incentives to
fuel. As a result, there is a risk that the first mover in the airframe manufacturing industry
to attempt to moderate the cycle may lose market share and fall into a death spiral or
respond correctively to this losses and overcompensate.
The Womack and Jones hypothesis
Womack and Jones (1996)(see Ch. 6) postulated that as lean thinking is established in a
critical mass majority of stakeholders in an industry, then business cycles would be
eliminated or at least significantly reduced.
In the CA EoE value chain this hypothesis is only partially confirmed if we simply
consider lean manufacturing principles. Even if both manufacturers (and their suppliers)
create a responsive supply chain with minimal lead times between order placement and
delivery and the ability to fluctuate production rates accordingly at low cost, the cyclical
behavior is still very much present. Demand management techniques are necessary
(possibly in the form of the virtual vertical integration described above) to really even out
the cycles.
The Piepenbrock hypothesis
Piepenbrock (2005) suggested that integral firms can dominate in mature technologies
and commoditizing markets while modular firms are better adapted to nurturing
disruptive innovations in differentiated product markets.
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Our model was not designed to investigate this hypothesis, but by showing the advantage
of adoption of the slow production rate change as symbiotic strategy reinforces the first
half of the hypothesis.
Will the cycle persist under diferent future scenarios with the current industry structure?
If no action is taken, the industry can be faced with its largest crisis if external factors
turn sour. These possibilities were investigated using scenario analysis. Even with the
increasing fuel efficiency of the fleet of new aircraft there is a very large number and
increasing number of long-range wide-body aircraft in backlog (>550 787s, >200 A380s,
>100 777s 2007 data) in addition to a large order backlog for narrow body aircraft like
the 737NG and the A320 family. These orders, faithful to the historical pattern, come at a
peak of airline profitability but may enter service in a period with very high fuel costs and
depressed demand that has the potential of sending the industry into a large recession.
As the cycles are largely endogenously caused, changes in external factors, even if they
stabilize, are not enough to restabilize the industry. This needs to happen through
innovative rearchitecting and the bundles of strategic alternatives we propose (see
previous question) can initiate such transformation.
11.3 Contributions
As a way of summarizing, we suggest that the contributions of this research are as
described below:
In this research we contributed to the study of complex systems and business strategy.
We did so by:
(i) integrating disparate literature strands:
a. Comprehensive coverage of the literature on commercial aviation that
spans air travel demand generation (Ch. 2), airlines and aircraft leasing
firms (Ch. 3), and aircraft manufacturers (Ch. 4) along with regulatory and
business strategy aspects of these industries.
b. Synthesis of the literature on business cycles as found in economics and
supply chain (Ch. 6)
c. Providing an overview and comparison of strengths and weaknesses of the
modeling approaches for enterprises (Ch. 8)
(ii) introducing the Enterprise of Enterprises framework as appropriate for
studying systems of interacting industries with multiple constituents that
exhibit managerial and operational independence and relevant derivative
'architecting heuristics' (Ch. 5)
(iii) identifying and categorizing the costs (and benefits) of business cycles in the
CA EoE by stakeholder. Identifying and ranking by dominance the causes of
the cyclicality in the CA EoE.
(iv) creating a comprehensive, public-domain model of the CA EoE using system
dynamics enriched by agent behavior for the airframe manufacturer class that
expands previous models (Ch. 9)
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(v) developing symbiotic bundles of strategic alternatives aimed to moderate the
cyclical behavior of the CA EoE and demonstrating their effectiveness and
implementability across a series of future scenarios (Ch. 10).
11.4 Promising Areas of Future Work
Like most ongoing research endeavor on complex systems, this work is not definitive. It
could benefit from improvements, additional testing, and expansions of the approach
taken. In this section we outline some of the possible enhancements of this line of
research.
Modeling improvements
As with any model, the balance between model fidelity and performance is not perfect.
Our modeling approach could potentially benefit (or show that no additional
improvement is made) by:
* Expanding the use of agents to include airlines
* Introducing seasonality and regional demand differences to enhance fidelity
* Using endogenous schemata for the decision of introducing new aircraft
* Modeling the possibility of new entrants in LCA manufacturing
* Calibrating the manufacturing processes with more accurate, proprietary, data (as
opposed to using only data available in the public domain)
* Discretize aircraft to allow for a more intuitive representation of aircraft lifecycle
* Introduce freight markets in the model
In addition, the CA EoE system given the relatively small number of agents involved
could be a proving ground for the nascent but promising field of agent-based models.
Future research can investigate whether an agent-based only model would provide
consistent dynamics with the ones observed in practice and with the system dynamics
model. That would show that ABM can be applied in systems where the number of
agents are low enough that the interactions cannot be fully represented statistically. If
such a modeling approach is successfully validated, it would provide an excellent test-
bed for verifying that alliances of enterprises following the proposed strategic alternatives
would indeed have competitive advantage.
In addition to the above, a deeper exploration of the relative benefits of bundling of
strategic alternatives by identifying those that display the highest level of synergistic
behavior is also part of your intended future research.
Deeper qualitative work
For this research we relied on research conducted by researchers and journalists to
capture and understand the effect of personal dynamics on the history and current
condition of the CA EoE (i.e. the path-dependence of the CA EoE on the leadership and
management choices of specific persons).
As a way to enhance the implementation potential of our proposed strategic alternatives,
future researchers can investigate how they resonate with managers and decision makers
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in the constituent enterprises. Using interviews and questionnaires of industry
professionals would enhance the implementation aspect of the proposals.
Additional Applications
Finally, as we saw in Ch. 6, commercial aviation is not the only cyclical EoE. Therefore,
it would be of great interest to apply the EoE framework and modeling methodology that
we used to other cyclical industries like telecomm and shipping and investigate whether
the lessons learned from this work can be generalized or whether the special
characteristics of the other industries make for unique appropriate strategic alternatives.
Closing Words
Having reached the end of this research journey, we would like to thank the readers that
were interested in our work. Our hope is that this contribution offers a small but solid
addition to the understanding of complex socio-technical systems in general and of the
highly competitive world of commercial aviation in particular.
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